Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Screening without China: Transregional Cinematic Smuggling between Cold War Taiwan and Colonial Hong Kong

Kenny K. K. Ng
Hong Kong Baptist University, China
kennykkng@hkbu.edu.hk

How can research into film policy inform us about the nature of power and cultural politics regarding film censorship? How does censorship affect the aesthetics and identity of film-making produced under political and market constraints? Focusing on the geopolitical regions of British Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China, this article delineates the impact of British colonial film censorship and the politics of cinematically representing revolutionary China during the Cold War. It reveals that British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy in the 1970s and 80s from suppressing mainland Chinese films to inhibiting films that might offend China from screening in Hong Kong. The evidence points to a distinctive picture of transregional smuggling and cinematic boundary-crossing, namely, the dangerous trafficking and interception of movie images, ideologies, and propaganda. Film screening of 'China' in Hong Kong and Taiwan was subject to strict official surveillance to quarantine undesirable public visuality and political discourses. The study examines film's ambiguous expressions of China and Chineseness as it constantly negotiated the factors of colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and Cold War transnational politics.

電影政策的研究如何揭示電影審查的權力機制及其文化政治的本質？在政治和市場的約束下，審查制度又如何影響電影製作的美學和自我定位？本文將聚焦英殖民香港、台灣和中國這三個地緣政治區域，探討英國在殖民地實行的電影審查制度的影響，以及冷戰時期電影革命對中國政治的指涉。 1970 至 80 年代期間，英殖香港的電影審查員改變了以往審查策略，從打壓中國大陸的電影變成禁止在香港放映可能會冒犯中國的電影。從這種策略上的改變可以看出跨地域 "走私" 音像影視對意識形態和宣傳領域的獨特影響。在當時的香港和台灣，放映和觀看有關「中國」的電影受到官方的嚴格監控，以杜絕可能惹是生非的公眾現象和政治話語。本文將呈現冷戰時期的港台電影及其在中國和中國性這兩個概念上模棱兩可的表達，研究在這種視覺記錄中，人們面對和處理殖民主義、中國民族主義和冷戰跨國政治等問題的過程。

This article delineates the impact of British colonial film censorship and the politics of representing revolutionary China in cinema during the Cold War in Hong Kong.[1] Adopting an archive-based cultural-historical approach, this study reveals that British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy in the 1970s and 80s from suppressing mainland Chinese films to inhibiting films that might offend China from screening in the colony. In 1974, Hong Kong independent woman film-maker Tang Shu-shuen 唐書璇 made *Zaijian Zhongguo* 再見中國 (*China Behind*), which depicted four Chinese students fleeing into Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution. The film was banned when it met mounting attacks by pro-communist newspapers. In 1981, Taiwan director Bai Jingrui 白景瑞 released *Huangtian houtu* 皇天后土 (*The Coldest Winter in Peking*), a film about the atrocities of the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution. The film was screened for only one day in Hong Kong when it was abruptly withdrawn from public viewing. The Hong Kong government banned the film because it contained "political propaganda", and screening the film would run the risk of "damaging good relations with other territories" ("Film Censorship" 1980–1983). Another Taiwanese production, Wang Tong's 王童 *Jiaru woshi zhende* 假如我是眞的 (*If I Were for Real*), was rejected in the same year. Telling the story of how a young man extorted a fortune by claiming to be a son of a Chinese general, colonial authorities prohibited the film from screening because it was "likely to be used as propaganda" and was "not in the best interests of Hong Kong" ("Film Censorship" 1981–1982).

How can research into film policy inform us about the nature of colonial power regarding film censorship? Focusing on the shifting geopolitical and diplomatic relationships of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Britain and the PRC, I delineate a picture to show how Cold War tactics and colonial censorship affected the production, circulation, reception, and imagination of films in the circuit of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China during the 1970s and 1980s. This study maps out a distinctive picture of transregional smuggling and cinematic underflows, namely, the dangerous trafficking and interception of movie images, ideologies, and propaganda. Cinematic projections of 'China' in

Hong Kong and Taiwan were subject to strict official surveillance to quarantine undesirable visuality and political disputes from the public.

In facing both Chinese national politics and global Cold War stratagems, the Hong Kong government tactfully maintained neutrality between the PRC and the ROC, adjusting its film censorship policy to evolving political circumstances to target communist or anti-communist films at different times. What is really at issue is not only British colonial film policy but also Cold War geopolitics in the Asian front. The changing diplomatic relationships of London and Hong Kong with China and Taiwan are pivotal when it comes to understanding the cultural and political frictions generated from controversial Taiwan-related movies and images. Based on press coverage, historical accounts, and declassified documents, the study reveals a high level of anxiety felt by colonial administrators about the turmoil provoked by the Cultural Revolution in China.

This period witnessed the rise of Hong Kong as a vibrant center of film production and entertainment business particularly for the Southeast Asian regions, yet the impact of the global Cold War on the cinematic economy and expressions in Hong Kong is seriously understudied. Perusing the multi-archival materials and reading them between the lines against the responses of film-makers and the viewing publics, I venture to illuminate the identity politics of the Hong Kong people as it was mediated through the colonial film policy changes. How did censorship affect and interact with the aesthetics and identity of film-making produced under political and market constraints? What did the Cold War geopolitics mean to the citizen audience and how was this manifested? The study examines film's ambiguous expressions of China and Chineseness as it constantly negotiated the factors of colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and Cold War transnational politics. It calls for a dynamic cultural-artistic approach to probe the ambiguous interplay of state ideology, film policy, film form, and audience reception to ponder how filmmakers and audiences could get around the legal apparatus of censorship to engage in the alternative discourses of political freedom and the right to the truth.

Film Censorship and Cold War Hong Kong Geopolitics

Cinema, as a form of compelling storytelling and spectacle, has been historically subject to the manipulation of the state and cultural agents to shape the identity and ideology of a place and its people. Regarding colonial film censorship, British governments directly exercised censorship authority in their colonies in India and Africa (Chowdhry 2000; Vasudev 1978; Burns 2002). In Hong Kong, before the Japanese occupaton of the city in 1941, the authority of censorship was assigned to the police in order to maintain public order and eliminate undersirable representations on screen perceived to be harmful to the native Chinese population (Newman 2013, 167). The draconian measures of cultural control were diametrically different from what Western regimes did in their homelands, as Britain (Trevelyan 1973) and America (Randall 1968; Doherty 1999; Grieveson 2004) had unofficial censoring bodies formed by the industries themselves, but they did not have any legal powers to enforce or regulate.

Since the late 1940s, with the onset of the Cold War, British Hong Kong had been turned into a battleground between the Communists and the Guomindang on political and cultural fronts. The cinema became a vital arena for the combat for hearts and minds. Colonial authorities secretively practised film censorship to contain Chinese nationalist and communist propaganda on screen to avoid political turmoil in Hong Kong. In 1953 the government issued the Film Censorship Regulations after the British suppressed communism in the Federation of Malaya in 1952 — a time that coincided with the end of the Korean War. The 1953 Regulations reserved official power for the government to exercise censorship in secrecy. The colonial administration tightened its grip on film inspection to curb communist propaganda and leftwing film activities as many influential filmmakers fled to Hong Kong from the mainland after the war (Barbieri 1997, 77–78). Yet the regulations, while granting limitless power to official censors, provided only guidelines for the manner of censorship, but not prescriptions of legal rights upon which films should be censored. The colonial film censorship system had been operating without legal authority (Ching 1987). The clandestine censorship reveals the nature of British Hong Kong rule and policy toward

cinema and mass culture, in which colonial officials diplomatically dealt with international politics and big powers through intervening in the distribution and exhibition of film and public visuality at large.

The historical trajectory manifests the shifting stance of British colonial authorities in exercising censorship behind the Hong Kong film scene. It showcases British-style pragmatism in handling the exhibition of mainland films and the representation of China in films in the colony. The film censorship policy has to be contextualised in order to make it meaningful to the cultural Cold War in East Asia.

British global power declined substantially after WWII. Asia, except for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, became peripheral to British foreign policymakers. Britain's early recognition of the PRC in 1950 was only a pragmatic approach to preserving British economic interests in the mainland and Hong Kong. Whereas economic interests dominated Britain's foreign diplomacy in dealing with China and Taiwan, the colonial power had to maintain its special relationship with the U.S., which was pursuing a proactive policy of containment against China. The British were never concerned about the unification or division of China, nor did they intend to produce a two-China situation. The China issue mattered to them only when it had wider implications for regional peace and security (Tsang 2006, 196).

In 1958 Mao Zedong triggered a new Taiwan Straits crisis when the PRC troops shelled the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Britain formed a de facto, albeit temporary, strategic partnership with Taiwan to support the U.S. without promising to provide further military aid to defend Taiwan. Steve Tsang (2006) contends that Britain and the ROC constituted the "Cold War's odd couple". British officials were keen to retain commercial links and an informal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan through Hong Kong, yet British officials believed that Taiwanese sovereignty under the Guomindang regime was shaky. Britain opposed any possibility of a 'Two China' solution. To London, the crucial issue was to prevent the Taiwan question from triggering a war in East Asia, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950. Britain and the ROC had become "unwitting partners" by the late 1950s in pursuit of their respective goals (Tsang 1994, 105–6).

As the geopolitical conflict between the PRC and Taiwan escalated in 1958, Hong Kong censors toughened their policy on PRC films while they showed favouritism toward Taiwan films. Taiwanese documentaries *Jinri baodao – Taiwan* 今日寶島－台灣 (*Today's Taiwan*) and *Ziyou zhenxian zhi sheng* 自由陣線之聲 (*Voice from the Free World*) were passed for screening, but the mainland documentary *Ode to the Motherland* was banned in Hong Kong. The two Taiwanese documentaries should not have been passed because they contained shots of pictures of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist flag, and the slogan "*Fangong dalu*" 反攻大陸 ("Reclaim the Mainland"). The existing Panel's criterion censored from films all shots of Chinese leaders, political rallies, and national flags regardless of their Nationalist or Communist affiliation. It was on the same criterion that the mainland Chinese documentary on the 1957 National Day celebrations in Beijing was banned, for it included shots of the PRC national flag and leaders (Du 2017, 127).

Hong Kong censors' preferential decisions on Taiwan propaganda over the PRC counterpart engendered vehement protests from the local communist press and institutions in August and September 1958. The New China News Agency and Southern Film Corporation (the distributor of PRC films in Hong Kong) condemned the Hong Kong government for clandestinely exercising a "two-Chinas plot" through film censorship. Allowing national icons to be seen on screen could be interpreted as recognising Taiwan's status as an independent nation. Even the leftist movie celebrity Xia Meng 夏夢 had to toe the party line to accuse the Hong Kong government of plotting a "two-Chinas conspiracy" (Lee 2013, 29). Du (2017) relates the Hong Kong authorities' bias toward Taiwanese over PRC films to the Taiwan Straits crisis, when Britain unwittingly forged an informal strategic partnership with the ROC to support the United States (129). The timing of Britain's foreign and diplomatic cultural manoeuver could not be more apposite. Britain sought to maintain a balance of power without committing its military forces to Taiwan's defence. It was therefore expedient for Hong Kong's colonial censors to express diplomatic support for Taiwan on the cultural front. Beside the factor of the immediate geopolitical conflict, indeed, the colonial authorities' harsh measures against mainland propaganda stemmed from their fear of communist influence in Hong Kong in the volatile 1950s.

Nonetheless, British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy of political censorship from the mid-1960s, from prohibiting mainland Chinese films to banning films that might offend China from being screened in Hong Kong. Zardas Lee (2013) suggests that after the mid-1960s, censors tended not to treat the Nationalist government in Taiwan in a positive light as they did with the United States and Chinese governments. And colonial officials resolved to protect the images of America and other friendly countries. "The communists' demand for keeping scenes and commentary that demeaned the United States, Britain and its allies was hardly acceptable to the Hong Kong government" (54). Since the late 1960s, Lee indicates, "Hong Kong had been banning Taiwan films that referred to Chinese communists as "bandits", but allowing Chinese films that demeaned Chiang Kai-shek in the same way. The government protected Chinese films and also China's image" (102–3). The British Hong Kong authorities were evidently distancing themselves from the government of Taiwan and becoming friendlier with that of the PRC.

British Hong Kong's tendency to disfavour Taiwan-related movies had much to do with Britain's diplomatic gesture to develop its "friendly relations" with China in spite of the propagandistic rhetoric of anti-communism and ideology characteristic of the Western bloc. The political goals of improving Sino-British relations and lessening Cold War conflicts in East Asia dictated the political censorship of PRC films in Hong Kong. Different from the American policy of containment and military threat, Britain opted for compromise and the PRC's admission to the United Nations. The British efforts to establish full diplomatic relations with China were, however, complicated by the success of Sino-American rapprochement with Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1971 (Mark 2017, 162).

Even before the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the 1970s, Britain was confident in developing normal diplomatic relations with China despite the Vietnam War and the 1967 riots (Lee 2013, 102–3). In film censorship, Hong Kong officials pragmatically kept on revising their internal censorship regulations to soften their position against PRC films. The 1960s guidelines indicated a more lenient attitude toward political subjects in films with certain constraints. The Film Censorship Board of Review stipulated in "A Statement of the General Principles" (1965) that "no

film should be banned simply because it is political in nature or has propaganda for the sole or main purpose," on condition that "its showing in public to any audience likely to include political opponents would not cause a breach of the peace, would not on its own inspire individuals or small groups to organise seditions or subversive underground bodies in their places of work, schools, etc." Censors were advised to adopt more tolerant directives, stipulating that "films purporting to eulogise life or conditions in other countries or under other regimes should be passed for public showing, provided they do not include offensive attacks on other governments or national leaders or on other people's ways of life, or make derogatory comparisons." Yet, censors were cautioned to "bear in mind particular sensitivities on both sides of the camp to implied recognition of 'Two Chinas'".

The "Annual Report on Film Censorship" (1970) mentioned that nine films from Taiwan (features and shorts) were submitted for censorship for the event of a Taiwan "Mandarin Film Week" held at the City Hall in June. "Four of them were approved, while three were cut and two were banned for excessive military significance." By contrast, eight films from mainland China were submitted for censorship, and all were approved. These mainland films included some documentaries (four about the "9th National Congress" and one on the completion of the "Nanking Bridge" as well as potentially militant films (two about the Sino-Soviet border clash under the general title "New Tsar," and a war drama about guerrilla activities in Japanese occupied territory).

In the years 1965–1974, 34 films (out of 357 banned movies) were excluded on political grounds. These controversial political films came from countries including China, Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Israel, the United States, Canada, Britain, and France. In 1973–1987, 21 films (out of 8,400 films submitted) were banned on political grounds: eight from Taiwan, three each from Hong Kong and Vietnam, two from China, and one each from North Korea, the United States, France, Japan, and Italy (Pomery 1988, 79). The archival evidence shows that the Hong Kong government was alert to films that might offend China or depict China in an unfavourable light. Films depicting the recent political event of the Cultural Revolution and

those produced by Taiwan with anti-communist themes attracted repeated interference from Chinese representatives in Hong Kong.

The shifting criteria of censorship in the 1960s and 70s show us the expedient nature of colonial manipulation of the policy after considering the regional geopolitics and the local Hong Kong situation. By the late 1960s the British share of world commerce was declining. As Malaysia and Singapore were de-colonised and became sovereign and independent states, Hong Kong remained Britain's only military outpost in East Asia. At the same time, the postwar period saw the coming-of-age of the locally born post-war generation who had benefited from the city's rapid economic development and improved living conditions in housing, education, and social welfare. By the 1970s the colony had been turned into a service hub with global links to the U.S., Japan, and Asian countries. The flourishing therein of popular culture based on the Cantonese vernacular reflected a confident sense of local identity as well as the cosmopolitan outlook of the young. The Chinese identity that most Hong Kong people subscribed to was a "complex and convoluted one", as Steve Tsang (2004) notes, for "being Chinese in Hong Kong was primarily an ethnic and cultural affiliation and generally did not mean being a Chinese citizen or national of the PRC" (195). The traumatic disturbance of 1967, as a spillover from the Cultural Revolution that could have posed a serious challenge to the colony's governance and social stability, had proved to be a historical turning point for an emerging Hong Kong identity. Whereas most local young residents were critical of the colonial government in the era that saw the rise of the civil rights movement and decolonisation worldwide, they were equally distancing themselves from the PRC, especially when China was plunging into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

The socio-economic and cultural transformations of Hong Kong would have contributed to a shift in the attitude of colonial officials towards relaxing censorship of PRC films from the mid-1960s as they observed the Hong Kong audience's general antipathy to political films and propaganda. In 1970, the government noticed that communist films had very restricted outlets in Hong Kong and were seldom seen by a wide uncommitted audience (Director of Information Service 1970). This assessment of the unpopularity of PRC productions could have been a reason for officials to ease control

on mainland films. During the Cultural Revolution the Southern Film Corporation was allowed to show some propaganda films in Hong Kong (Xu 2005, 231–35). Not surprisingly, communist movies had already lost their appeal to Hong Kong movie-goers. At the same time, colonial officials did not want to infuriate local leftist radicals by severely limiting their films, especially after the 1967 riots in Hong Kong (Ng 2008, 29).

The government's tendency to approve more PRC films for screening in the colony can be seen in the reports by the Panel of Censors. The Chief Film Censor William Hung (1972) stated that "political films from China Mainland have showed a continued increase" with eleven films submitted for censorship (two Korean War films, four documentaries, three stage operas, one ballet, and one ping-pong-game film), which were all approved for exhibition. The Southern Film Corporation distributed a number of political films—six from North Vietnam and four from North Korea—which were all approved. Four films were submitted from Taiwan by Hong Kong and Kowloon Cinema and Theatrical Entertainment Free General Association. The films had little political interest as they were intended for exhibition in a "Mandarin Film Week" held at Caritas Social Centre on December 9–12. However, the Board still banned two of them.

While the film censors were instructed to filter out mainland pictures glorifying Mao Zedong or displaying communist military might, they were vigilant about excluding Taiwan and English-speaking films with derogatory remarks on mainland China or Chinese leaders. Taiwan films submitted for censorship in 1979 were mostly sword-plays, love stories, and domestic dramas. But one Taiwan film that made reference to a "commune" and "refugees" was cut with consent (Hung 1971). Hung (1970) warned that some U.S. films in the late 1960s had a fashion of "inserting into films some scenes or remarks about Red China, Red Guards, Mao Tse-tung, etc." Although these dialogues or commentaries were meant to be jokes or amusing remarks mostly in jest, the censors should realise the risk of approving such jesting scenes or remarks as they were likely to be misunderstood or become offensive to those lacking a sense of humour.

The control over provocative non-PRC film materials could be seen as a pragmatic strategy adopted by Hong Kong censors to scale down local leftist pressures. The left-wing press in Hong Kong and the Southern Film Corporation had been more vociferous than their Taiwan counterparts in accusing the government of discriminating against PRC films through film censorship. That colonial censors gave PRC films more lenient treatment toward the 1970s manifested the Cold War factor in Sino-British diplomacy, in which Britain continued to develop a 'friendly' relationship with the PRC. Another aspect that needs addressing is the local politics of film censorship. As the panel's reports subtly suggested, under British command Hong Kong officials could maintain a significant degree of agency and autonomy by making expedient directives to force off screen materials that might offend China. Observing that didactic political films had lost the favour of local middle-class movie-goers, moreover, they tended not to impose rigid control on communist films so as to avert imminent political agitation from local left-wingers.

Through manipulating the censorship rules, the colonial government hoped to shape Hong Kong's audiences and citizens to be politically apathetic towards Chinese politics and contemporary history. How does censorship affect the aesthetics and identity of local film-making produced under political constraints? How did Cold War cultural politics interfere in the Hong Kong film scene in the transnational exchange with Taiwan and the PRC? I highlight some remarkable local and Taiwan-related film productions in the 1970s and 80s that became controversial censorship cases, and explore how the Cultural Revolution figured as a living event and lived memories on screen.

Politics of Art and Identity: *China Behind*

In 1974, Hong Kong woman producer-director Cecille Tang Shu-shuen made *China Behind*, a.k.a. *Ben* 奔 (*The Dissidents*). Set in 1966 at the advent of the Cultural Revolution, the film tells of the agony of four Guangzhou students who attempt to flee China to Hong Kong. This independent film follows the escapees from China, who struggle to sneak into the colony by land only to find life not as rosy as they expected.

Painting a bleak portrait of Chinese society as it did, the film was equally critical of the materialistic city of colonial Hong Kong.

China Behind was submitted to the Panel of Film Censors in October 1974. Local leftists denounced the film as being "anti-China" and "counter-revolutionary." Their mounting attacks forced Tang to withdraw the film from screening. The film was re-submitted to the censors in December, and was again rejected for public screening. Pierre Lebrun, the Chief Film Censor, explained the ban was imposed because the film "contains certain materials which are believed to be damaging to the good relationship between Hong Kong and another territory" ("Censors Ban Film on China"). Tang's decision to withdraw it was made in view of the "unfavorable reaction from local left-wing groups." Tang expressed an apolitical viewpoint in gesture by emphasising the film as "a work of art", while she did not want to "spark off any sort of political row" (Chu 1974). Behind the scenes, however, the film-maker would have been aware that covert negotiations and collusions were in place between the colonial government and representatives of the PRC in Hong Kong. The Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong invited the director over for a "chat" about *China Behind* after the film had been submitted for censorship. Xinhua was curious to know the source of funding or if it was from the camp of "Soviet Revisionism." The PRC representatives asked Tang for a copy of the film to preview before it could ever make it for public screening (Yau 2015, 166).

The ban on *China Behind* in 1975 continued until 1980, when the political advisor recommended that the Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA) clear the film for private cinema-club showings. Indeed, the local prohibition of *China Behind* throughout the 1970s would have had to do as much with the Cultural Revolution as with the escalating Vietnam War and the impact of Vietnamese refugees escaping to the colony. The film about the mainland dissidents in their exilic journey to Hong Kong could have resonated with a picture of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese boat-people, driven by the fear of the new communist leadership after the war, fleeing to a safer refuge in Hong Kong. Colonial officials had to take the external political situation into consideration when they assessed the possibility of releasing the film for public viewing.

China Behind was permitted for general viewing in 1981. By that time public memories of the Cultural Revolution and refugees had waned in Hong Kong. The film was shown only in a local film society in March as the film's distributor D&B Studio assessed that "the film would have failed commercially" (Stoner 1987). The film's distributor D&B Studio decided to resubmit the film in 1987 to challenge the current film censorship system. It was approved for showing on the commercial cinema circuit in May 1987.

The film's production context of Taiwan infuriated left-wing opponents in Hong Kong, who accused it of being a propagandist film from Taiwan, an "effort of a small Chiang clique to tarnish the achievements of the Cultural Revolution" (Chu 1974). Ironically, Tang's crew did the shooting illegally in Taiwan as they smuggled props like the five-star red flags, Mao statues and Little Red Books (Chairman Mao's Quotations), and revolutionary-era costumes into the land which was still under the reign of the White Terror (Lei 2016; Sa 2012). The film production could not be done in the mainland as the Gang of Four was still in power.

The story starts in the spring of 1966 at the advent of the Cultural Revolution. It opens with scenes of the swimming team-mates in the regular drills at Guangzhou University, with blurred water images and swimmers' bodies to foretell the protagonists' later escape by swimming through dangerous waters to the coast of Hong Kong. The modernistic imagery would be reminiscent of thousands of mainlanders who reportedly fled China during the Cultural Revolution, many of them failing to make their way in the sea with their dead bodies found near the coast.

Shot on a low budget, the film is reminiscent of Italian neo-realism in deploying amateur actors, location shooting, natural light (with more night scenes) and sound, hand-held camera, and voice-over. Sung Chuan, a final year medical school student from a capitalist family, cannot stand his bleak future and decides to leave China. His voice-over at the beginning gives a poignant sense of the human stories of his co-conspirators. With minimal technical support and skills, the film's cinematographer Chang Chao-tang's black-and-white documentary style helps to reveal "a sense of alienation" and "coldness" behind the human dramas (Yau 2004, 74).

The narrative is infused with incisive sympathy with the escapees who are torn between the ideological fervours of the two (communist and capitalist) worlds. The film ends with the protagonists' successful mission to land in Hong Kong, only to find themselves shocked at the city's contradictory pictures of economic inequality. The couple (Han Lun and Sung Lan) reside in a cramped flat on a public housing estate. Han Lun becomes a minor clerk at the stock exchange company. Noises of the stock market in Hong Kong and sounds of horse-racing are juxtaposed with loudspeaker broadcasts of Mao's political slogans in mainland China. Sung Lan is seemingly suffering from a nervous breakdown as seen from her expression of bitter laughter while having her hair done in a barber shop.

China Behind was the first film made by an ethnic Chinese woman film-maker about the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1970s, when the Gang of Four was still in power, the Cultural Revolution was mythicised as a great achievement of the Chinese people. *China Behind* proved to be Tang's most courageous and visionary venture to deliver her critical view of the political tragedy in China. Whereas pro-communist groups cynically smeared the film as a "black movie containing poisonous elements to blemish the image of China", Tang defended her work less as a political indictment than as an existential inquiry about the human condition in extreme living circumstances. Her film "tries to show the frustrations of young people when asked to choose between idealism and reality" (Chu 1974). Tang's broad concern with the human existential condition as seen in the plights of the characters was doomed to misapprehension and politicisation.

What did the geopolitics of the Cold War mean to an engaged film-maker and how was this manifested? Implicit in Tang's depoliticised gesture and her reaction to film censorship is the identity politics of the Hong Kong film-maker mediated through the changes in colonial film policy as the Cold War entered a different stage in the 1970s. Supporting the censorial measures on *China Behind*, the chief censor Lebrun argued that the conservative Hong Kong colonial police and legislature in the 1970s was only a "reflection" of the dominant conservative escapism in society (Yau 2004, 78). The evolution of colonial censorship policies functioned to shape a depoliticised community of ethnic Chinese Hong Kong citizens who kept on distancing themselves from

contemporary Chinese politics. The postwar youths who were nurtured in Western culture and values, however, would have acquired a cultural nostalgia for China. At the same time, they did not identify with the undemocratic political systems in the mainland and Taiwan, as much as they were resistant to British colonial rule and western hegemony in Asian countries in the era of decolonisation, the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement, and the "Defend Diaoyu Islands" movement.

In this sense, *China Behind* was emblematic of the marginalised position of Hong Kong vis-à-vis the British colonial and Chinese communist powers. The film's core narrative of Chinese refugees swimming across the border exemplified the border-crossing experiences of the Hong Kong people, who were mostly migrants from mainland China. Sarcastically, the moral degeneration and spiritual disillusionment of its characters revealed the dehumanising effects felt by people from both sides of the border. The film ventured to lay bare the clash of communist and capitalist ideals in the protagonists, manifesting the clashes of Cold War ideologies as well as foreshadowing Hong Kong people's identity crisis and their wish to escape from the communist authorities and values after the 1997 handover. By emphasising her film's existential concern and moral criticism, Tang defied the sociopolitical context of censorship and the interpretation of her film as political advocacy. Her attempts to explore the essential human condition in the film, and to question how a human being lives and changes in a particular socio-economic environment, constituted an idiosyncratic political vision of a Hong Kong film-maker.

Transnational Censorship: *The Coldest Winter in Peking* and *If I Were for Real*

Having elaborated how an independent film-maker dealt with censorial pressures from left-wing groups and colonial officials to address the issues of identity politics and film aesthetics, this section further explicates how Cold War geopolitics affected the nature of trans-border exchange between Hong Kong cinema and Taiwan films. In its pragmatic diplomacy, Britain maintained a consulate in Taiwan until 1972, following the

establishment of an embassy in Beijing. In Hong Kong, the ROC and PRC both maintained extensive intelligence networks and commercial links with the colony. To avoid political friction on the cultural front, the government continued to grant censors much discretion to police Chinese-language films. The investigative report of Frank Ching (1987) revealed that since 1973, colonial officials had operated illegal rules to block films that depicted China unfavourably, causing public fear of a 'conspiracy' between the Chinese and Hong Kong governments in constraining Taiwan films in the colony.

In the same year, 1987, when *China Behind* was resubmitted to Hong Kong's censorship board, Taiwan's state-owned Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) simultaneously asked for reclassification of two films — *The Coldest Winter in Peking* and *If I Were for Real* — as a test. Different from Hong Kong's independent film *China Behind, If I Were for Real* and *The Coldest Winter in Peking* were Taiwan-based productions that had got on the nerves of Hong Kong film censors when they came out in 1981.

Financed by the state-run CMPC, *The Coldest Winter in Peking* was made at the historical juncture when diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan had just been severed and a wave of patriotism swept the Taiwanese populace (Yau 2015, 180). On its public release in Taiwan on 5 February 1981, the film caused a sensation and became a box-office smash (Liang 2004, 243). This big-budget production that cost about US\$ 2 million recruited Taiwan stars to act, including Qin Xianglin 秦祥林, Hu Huizhong 胡慧中, Lang Xiong 郎雄, Gui Yalei 歸亞蕾, and Ke Junxiong 柯俊雄. Based on the misfortunes of an overseas-trained Chinese scientist, who returns to work in China during the Cultural Revolution, the film centers on his tumultuous experiences of broken families and betrayed love.

The Hong Kong government slapped an immediate ban on the film effective from midnight after only one day's regular showing in town on March 26, 1981. About 17 theatres mostly in the Shaw Brothers network of movie houses throughout Hong Kong were ordered to withdraw the film immediately. It was the first time that the board had

banned a film on seemingly political grounds after initially passing it.[2] Lebrun explained that his earlier decision to pass the film was because he "interpreted it as an entertainment drama based on a series of well-known historical facts". He thought the film was a "Chinese version of *Gone with the Wind*" ("Filmmakers in Taipei Plan Appeal on Ban"), comparable with *Dr. Zhivago* in terms of its epic scope and sentimentalism. But on a second review, Lebrun noticed that "the film has political overtones which are liable to be exploited" (Chugani 1981).

The South China Morning Post ("Officials Brush off Censor Rumpus") revealed an untold story from internal sources. The ban apparently followed representations made by Hong Kong-based mainland Chinese officials to the Political Advisor's Office, which called for a second review of the film. The review came to the conclusion that Lebrun might have misjudged the film as the reviewing officials expressed "an element of surprise that the film was passed for public viewing in the instance". The officials believed that it was true that 90 per cent of the film could be seen as an "entertainment drama based on well-known historical facts"; however, the remaining 10 per cent of the film was "unambiguous propaganda", linking what happened during the Cultural Revolution to the current leadership in China. One official pointed out the symbolic message of "the rising sun of the Nationalist flag", and was quoted commenting on the political overtones as implying: "Look, that's what had happened during the Cultural Revolution, can you trust the present leaders now? Trust the KMT (GMD) instead." These comments allegedly coming from the Political Advisor drove Lebrun to look at the film again, resulting in his reversal of his previous judgment all on his own.

As the news of the ban spread during the evening, crowds of Hong Kong spectators flocked to the theatres to see the 9:30 pm and midnight shows. Many of them were young people who were curious about the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution. Some expressed disappointment at the government's move to ban the film as it should let people decide for themselves whether the film was biased or not. Older members of the audience considered that the ban was brought about because "the Government

---

[2] The case of *The Coldest Winter in Peking* was the first time the Film Censorship Board banned a film for political reasons after first passing it. It was, however, the third time since 1973 that a film had been withdrawn while being screened, but the previous two films' cases were concerned with explicit sex scenes, namely, *Sex on Wheels* and *Erotic Dreams of the Red Chamber*. See Leonard 1981.

wanted to maintain its good relations with China" ("Sensitive Film Grinds to a Sudden Stop"). About 43,000 people reportedly went to see the film's premiere on that day (Leonard 1981). During the showing in the Jade Theatre, it was reported, laughter burst out from some of the film-goers who thought the film was exaggerated in some of the scenes from what they saw in China. But five out of seven people interviewed by a local newspaper thought there was no need for the ban, as the Chinese in Hong Kong should have the right to be informed what was happening in China ("Movie Fans Hit out at Decision").

Apparently, Lebrun's decision was swayed after strong protests from the New China News Agency in Hong Kong. The Chinese representatives were understood to have been angry at "the Taiwan treatment of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four issues" (Chugani 1981). Before issuing the ban, Lebrun had an emergency meeting with Nigel Watt, the Commissioner of TELA. Lebrun added that the film was being used and was likely to be further used by certain sections of the media in Hong Kong and abroad for propaganda purposes. Taiwan's CMPC protested against the film ban and threatened to launch a lawsuit against the Hong Kong government to obtain compensation for the losses incurred by the film's distributors through the fault of the censors (Leonard 1981). "The decision for censoring the film was obviously politically motivated," Ming Chi of CMPC said, "because Hong Kong authorities examined the film at least three times and held numerous discussions before they issued a three-month license on March 12." CMPC insisted that the movie itself was strictly "commercial, artistic and factual" rather than political as reassessed by Hong Kong's film censor ("Film Ban Company Threatens Law Suit"). At the same time, CMPC appealed to the Shaw Brothers Motion Picture Co. to negotiate with the Hong Kong government. Movie mogul Sir Run Run Shaw called on Governor Sir Murray MacLehose to revoke the ban, but without success.

Soon after the Film Censorship Board of Review rejected CMPC's appeal against the prohibition of *The Coldest Winter in Peking* on May 6, the Taiwan film company was considering the production of a video cassette tape of the banned film for Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. But CMPC hoped to release the tape after the movie had been shown in Singapore and Malaysia, in order not to affect the box office takings in the

two countries ("Film Ban Appealed"). To beat the ban in Hong Kong, Taiwan promptly campaigned for tourist and film-going events in Taipei targeting the Hong Kong people and overseas Chinese audiences. The Taipei First Hotel offered free rooms and cinema tickets for Hong Kong tourists to fly to Taipei to see the film. The Hong Kong visitors were all given two-day-one-night complimentary accommodation plus free tickets to watch the show. The Taiwan authorities allegedly sped up issuing visas "tremendously" to help Hong Kong people join the tour ("Firm Takes Film Ban Fight to Appeals Board"). All of the theatre's 1,000 seats were reportedly filled at each showing, and the audience included an average of 400 overseas Chinese and 50 Western visitors a day. CMPC and the Taipei hotel owner claimed that their organised "protest activities" were not publicity gimmicks but were actuated by "a strong sense of patriotism". They were "simply dedicated to the cause of anti-communism—and nothing else" ("Taiwan Tries to Get Ban Lifted").

Significantly, the issues of transnational screening, trans-media politics (film and video), and propaganda campaigns were crucial to the controversy over this Taiwan film about the Cultural Revolution. After Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, the Cultural Revolution officially came to an end. Nonetheless, political tensions persisted between the PRC and the ROC. As Taiwan was under the reign of martial law (1949–1987) with propagandistic promotion of anti-communism in the early 1980s, the transnational Cold War politics still troubled colonial censors and their political advisors in making cultural policy decisions. They consistently ignored the voices of Hong Kong film-makers and audiences and deprived them of their rights to consume Chinese story-telling on screen. The press coverage of the Hong Kong spectators testified to the fact that young citizens were eager to know about the Cultural Revolution and contemporary China, while the general audience did not necessarily take the film as mere propaganda.

Whereas Cold War politics unfolded as the intricate intertwining of proxy cultural wars, espionage, diplomatic manoeuvreing, and media campaigns in the cinematic circuits of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the way in which its local experiences were manifested in everyday life is worth scrutiny. Implicit in this line of questioning is the nature of intercultural exchange in film-making and reception as they are mediated through

the politics of film censorship. *If I Were for Real* was a transcultural production involving a Taiwanese screen adaptation of a Shanghainese play based on a nineteenth-century Russian drama, enhanced in commercial value by Mandopop music and Cantopop film stardom. The film was adapted by director Wang Tong from a 1979 Chinese satirical play in six acts written by Shanghai-based playwright Sha Yexin 沙葉新. The play was inspired by the March 1979 arrest of Zhang Quanlong 張泉龍, a young man who impersonated the son of Li Da 李達, deputy head of the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department. While the Chinese film title was adopted from Teresa Teng's famous Mandopop album, the story was also inspired by Nikolai Gogol's satirical play *The Inspector General* (1836), rewritten by Sha Yexin into a play about a Chinese swindler to expose the corruption of communist officialdom.

At the end of the 1970s, Li Xiaozhang 李小璋 (Alan Tam/Tan Yonglun 譚詠倫), a 26-year-old sent-down youth at a state farm, is frustrated as he cannot obtain a transfer to the city. His pregnant girlfriend Zhou Minghua 周明華 has already returned to the city. Without his securing the transfer, her father will not let them marry. Realising that tickets to a popular play (Nikolai Gogol's *The Government Inspector*, about an impostor) are unavailable to commoners but reserved for cadre members and their families, he poses as the son of a high-level cadre to gain entrance to the play. Soon many cadres and high communist officials all fawn over him in the belief that he will in return use his connections for their selfish gains. Li enjoys a privileged life for some time during his stay in Shanghai, and almost succeeds in receiving his transfer. His impersonation is exposed in the end and he is brought to trial. Admitting his guilt, he poignantly reminds the audience that if he were really this son taking bribes from fawning underlings—"if I were for real"— everything would have been completely legal and accepted. It is the impersonation but not corruption itself that is the crime.

The original Shanghai-based play was produced in August 1979 by the Shanghai People's Art Theatre. The play exposed corruption in the establishment and lampooned the impostor's "victims". After a brief run in a few major cities, the mainland authorities imposed a ban on its public performance. In January 1980 Hu Yaobang gave the order to halt the performance of the play (Fong 1987, 213). In the same month, the

text of the play, which had been issued in China only as a restricted circulation publication, was "smuggled" to Hong Kong and published in *The Seventies* (*Qishi Niandai* 七十年代), a Hong Kong magazine. The screen adaptation in Taiwan turned the satirical comedy into a political drama to condemn Chinese communism. Probably for political reasons, the movie won the Golden Horse Awards in 1981 including Best Feature Film, Best Actor (Alan Tam), and Best Adapted Screenplay (Chang Yunghsiang). It was selected as the Taiwanese entry for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film at the 54th Academy Awards, but it failed in the nomination.

At issue here is the use of the story for different political purposes. In the Shanghai stage version, Li Da takes pity on the impostor and speaks up for him, blaming his actions on the Gang of Four's policy of sending urban youth down to the countryside and on cadres for their toadying behaviour. The Taiwan film adaptation underwent some major dramatic changes to augment its criticism of human nature and the corruption of Chinese society. The film disregarded some of the "inherent ambiguities in the play" to sharpen its condemnation of communism (Fong 1987, 233–53).[3] For instance, the film introduces a licentious and corrupt character Wang Yun, deputy mayor of Shanghai, who keeps an innocent actress as his mistress, thus strengthening the negative impression associated with the ruling elite in mainland China. In the film, Zhou Minghua's pregnancy is revealed much earlier than in the play. As a result, the opportunistic prankster Li Xiaozhang is portrayed, in a positive light, as a hero fighting for the survival of his future family. The play ends with Li Xiaozhang on trial and Zhou Minghua in the hospital. In the film, Zhou Minghua drowns herself (and her unborn baby), while Li Xiaozhang cuts his wrist and inscribes with his blood the words "If I Were for Real" on the cell wall before his death. The main characters do not kill themselves in the end in the original play.

In Hong Kong, TELA issued a ban on the film on August 25, 1981, saying the film "is likely to be used as propaganda and not in the interest of Hong Kong" ("Taiwan Movie Banned"). Lebrun insisted that the ban was an independent decision of the censorship authorities without any intervention from the New China News Agency. "I

---

[3] For an analysis of the play and adaptation, see Barmé 1983, 319–32; for a translation of the play, see Sha, Li, and Yao 1983, 198–250.

don't think Hong Kong can afford to have polemics between groups of different ideologies," Lebrun noted, implying that the decision was made to steer clear of potential conflicts between Taiwan and the PRC ("Film Censorship" 1981–1982).

The Coldest Winter in Peking and *If I Were for Real* were resubmitted to the censor board of Hong Kong in 1987, but the ban on the two films was not lifted until 1989. *The Coldest Winter in Peking* was submitted for censorship on 7 June, 1989, that is the third day after the June Fourth Massacre that marked an end to the 1989 Democracy Movement begun in April 1989; the government censors approved the film, and the film was released again in Hong Kong on 22 June, 1989. *If I Were for Real* also successfully passed the censor board and was released on 4 May, 1989, before June Fourth (Yau 2015, 180–1). Were the resubmissions of these two films based on an opportunistic business motive? The democratic student movement in Beijing in 1989 certainly alarmed Hong Kong citizens about their uncertain future after 1997, which would have fueled public interest in seeing the two films about the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. What was the government's political motive for allowing the two provocative films to be publicly screened?[4] Political speculation has indicated the ongoing Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong, as Britain could gain more bargaining power by stirring up public opinion against communist China (Yau 2015, 181).

The two controversial Taiwan-related film cases attest to the dynamics of transnational Cold War politics, in which the changing political climates and shifting audience receptions were crucially tied up with the historical relationships of colonial Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. In view of the overt political anti-communist messages of the films as understood by colonial censors within a larger geopolitical framing, what is noteworthy is how local audiences could read the manifold meanings of the films as imaginative story-telling. The two films can be read as exposés of political catastrophes and human suffering to denounce the socialist system. Yet they also reach beyond the surface of political accusations. The emotional treatment of tragic romances and

---

[4] The author personally got to view the two films in commercial theatres in the summer of 1989, as he recalls, a few weeks after the Tiananmen tragedy in Beijing. The author has yet to gain permission to access confidential documents to understand how the censors passed the two films, which were previously prohibited, in the changing sociopolitical circumstances in 1989.

thwarted human relationships in the films deliver a new interpretation of the work of "Scar Literature" with profound humanism. At once political and thought-provoking, the two films probe issues of individuality and human freedom when powerless individuals are opposing and protesting against the inhuman political system as a whole.

Reflections

This study draws on primary research from colonial archives and press coverage to unveil the behind-the-scenes history of Hong Kong film censorship. It reveals the practice of colonial censorial constraints on screen exhibition in relation to the trans-border exchange of film productions between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China at the height of Cold War paranoia. It observes a shift in the British censorship in the 1970s and 1980s regarding mainland films and the representation of China in films. Having conducted adequate research on the censorship-related cases and untold stories, the study attempts to contextualise the film censorship policy regarding the geopolitics of the Cold War in Asia, in particular Britain's diplomatic negotiations with China and Taiwan, to understand how the cultural Cold War was played out in East Asia, and particularly the vital role of the Hong Kong film scene.

The study interrogates how the relentlessly changing practices and apparatuses of colonial censorship can illuminate the local politics of Hong Kongese officers in response to the ever-adjusting policies, and ponders the identity politics of the citizen audience in reaction to official censorial measures. The controversial cases have demonstrated the vulnerability of the censorship system to international politics that shaped erratic official decisions in dealing with the changing Cold War situation. British-style pragmatism and managerial expediency were most acutely manifested in how flexibly—and sometimes awkwardly—Hong Kong officials handled thorny issues and social crises arising from the danger of exhibiting controversial films and propagandist newsreels imported from mainland China and Taiwan in this period. I believe that the proclaimed political ethics of "even-handedness", which the colonial authorities invariably used to justify their positions and objectives of playing a fair game between the

PRC and ROC regimes, may be simplistic and crafty excuses for colonial decision-makers.

Arguably, Hong Kong censors could have maintained some degree of cultural autonomy in adjusting censorship policies vis-à-vis both British rule and the propaganda war between the PRC and Taiwan in this period (Du 2017, 117). What is most revealing and fascinating, however, is how local film-makers and audiences countered the censorship policy to negotiate a local identity in everyday life. Tang Shu-shuen's tactic of screening China demonstrates how a creative film-maker moved beyond the ideological divides and deployed cinematic story-telling to articulate a notion of contested Chinese identity that was different from the Cold War rhetoric of anticommunism or Chinese patriotism. This questioning of Chineseness, which cannot simply be reduced to political allegiances, was ambiguously expressed by the Hong Kongese audience in their move against the ban on viewing prohibited films with the tabooed subject of the Cultural Revolution. Such illuminating cases offer us new insights that censorship studies is not so much about prohibiting, silencing, or erasing memories of a populace as about producing and creating new forms of memories of the past and expressions of local identities in flux.

Bibliography

"A Statement of the General Principles as adopted on 20 November 1965 by the Film Censorship Board of Review." 1965. *Hong Kong Public Records Office. Hong Kong Record Series. HKRS* 934-5-34. Government Records Service, Hong Kong.

Bai Jingrui 白景瑞. 1981. *The Coldest Winter in Peking* (*Huangtian houtu* 皇天后土).

Barbieri, Maria. 1997. "*Film Censorship in Hong Kong.*" MPhil thesis. The University of Hong Kong.

Barmé, Geremie. 1983. "A Word for the Impostor: Introducing the Drama of Sha Yexin." *Renditions* 19/20: 319-32.

Burns, James M. 2002. *Flickering Shadows: Cinema and Identity in Colonial Zimba-bwe.* Athens: Ohio University Press.

"Censors Ban Film on China." 1975. *South China Morning Post*, January 3.

Ching, Frank. 1987. "Hong Kong Plays Political Censor for China." *Asian Wall Street Journal*, March 17.

Chowdhry, Prem. 2000. *Colonial India and the Making of Empire Cinema: Image, Ideology and Identity.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Chu, Kenneth. 1974. "Film Withdrawn after Leftist Row." *South China Morning Post*, October 22.

Chugani, Michael. 1981. "Taiwan Film—Made Banned." *The Sun*, March 27.

Director of Information Service, 1970. Letter to Chairman of Film Censorship Board of Review, October 27. *Hong Kong Public Records Office. HKRS* 1101-2-13.

Doherty, Thomas. 1999. *Pre-Code Hollywood: Sex, Immorality, and Insurrection in American Cinema, 1930-1934.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Du, Ying. 2017. "Censorship, Regulations, and the Cinematic Cold War in Hong Kong (1947-1971)." *China Review* 17, 1 (Feb): 117–51.

"Film Ban Appealed." 1981. *The Star*, April 9.

"Film Ban Company Threatens Law Suit." 1981. *The Sun*, March 28.

"Film Censorship." 1980–1983. *Hong Kong Public Records Office. HKRS* 70-8-1372.

"Film Censorship." 1981–1982. *Hong Kong Public Records Office. HKRS* 70-8-1368.

"Filmmakers in Taipei Plan Appeal on Ban." 1981. *Hong Kong Standard*, March 28.

"Firm Takes Film Ban Fight to Appeals Board." 1981. *South China Morning Post*, April 8.

Fong, Gilbert C.F. 1987. "The Darkened Vision: If I Were For Real and the Movie." In *Drama in the People's Republic of China*, edited by Constantine Tung and Colin Mackerras, 233–53. New York: SUNY Press.

Grieveson, Lee. 2004. *Policing Cinema Movies and Censorship in Early-Twentieth-Century America.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hung, William. 1970. "Annual Report on Film Censorship, January–December 1969." *Hong Kong Public Records Office. HKRS* 1101-2-13.

Hung, William. 1971. "Annual Report on Film Censorship, January–December 1970," *Hong Kong Public Records Office. HKRS* 1101-2-13.

Hung, William. 1972. "Annual Report on Film Censorship, January–December 1971." *Hong Kong Public Records Office. HKRS* 1101-2-13.

Lee, Zardas Shuk-man. 2013. "From Cold War Politics to Moral Regulation: Film Censorship in Colonial Hong Kong." MPhil Dissertation, The University of Hong Kong.

Lei Xinyun 雷昕芸. 2016. "Zaijian Zhongguo daoyan Tang Shuxuan" 《再見中國》導演唐書璇 (China Behind and Its Director Tang Shu-shuen). *Yazhou Zhoukan* 亞洲週刊 (Asia Weekly) 30, no. 42 (Oct). Accessed September 2017. https://www.yzzk.com/cfm/content_archive.cfm?id=1476329236199&docissue=2016-42.

Leonard, Dawn. 1981. "Ban on Taiwan Film Leads to Lawsuit Threat." *South China Morning Post*, March 28.

Liang Liang 梁良. 2004. *Kanbudao de dianying: Bainian jinpian daguan* 看不到的電影一百年禁片大觀) (Forbidden films: An overview of banned films in one hundred years). Taipei: China Times Publishing Co.

Mark, Chi-kwan. 2017. *The Everyday Cold War: Britain and China, 1950–1972.* London: Bloomsbury Academic.

"Movie Fans Hit out at Decision." 1981. *The Star*, March 28.

Newman, David. 2013. "British Colonial Censorship Regimes: Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, and Shanghai International Settlement, 1916–1941." In Silencing Cinema: Film Censorship around the World, edited by Daniël Biltereyst and Roel Vande Winkel, 167–90. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ng, Kenny K.K. 2008. "Inhibition vs. Exhibition: Political Censorship of Chinese and Foreign Cinemas in Postwar Hong Kong." *Journal of Chinese Cinemas* 2 (1): 23–35.

"Officials Brush off Censor Rumpus." 1981. South China Morning Post, March 31.

Pomery, Chris. 1988. "Hong Kong '88: Censorship—Opening Up, Clamping Down." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 7.

Randall, Richard S. 1968. *Censorship of the Movies: The Social and Political Control of a Mass Medium.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Sa Kula 薩庫拉. 2012. "Zaijian Zhongguo yixie beijing ziliao" 《再見中國》一些背景資料 (Some Background Information on China Behind). Accessed September 2017. https://www.douban.com/note/214315260.

"Sensitive Film Grinds to a Sudden Stop." 1981. *Hong Kong Standard*, March 27.

Sha Yexin 沙葉新, Li Shoucheng 李守成, and Yao Mingde 姚明德. (1979) 1983. "Jiaru wo shi zhende" 假如我是真的 (What If I Really Were?). Translated by Edward M. Gunn. In *Stubborn Weeds: Popular and Controversial Chinese Literature after the Cultural Revolution*, edited by Perry Link, 198–250. Minneapolis: Indiana University Press.

Stoner, Ted. 1987. "Truth behind the Film Ban." *TV Times*, May 27 - June 2.

"Taiwan Movie Banned." 1981. *Hong Kong Standard*, August 26.

"Taiwan Tries to Get Ban Lifted." 1981. *Hong Kong Standard*, April 11.

Tang Shu Shuen 唐書璇. 1974. *China Behind* (*Zaijian Zhongguo* 再見中國).

Trevelyan, John. 1973. *What the Censor Saw*. London: Michael Joseph.

Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang. 1994. "Unwitting Partners: Relations between Taiwan and Britain, 1950–1958." *East Asian History* no. 7 (June): 105–20.

Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang. 2004. *A Modern History of Hong Kong*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang. 2006. *The Cold War's Odd Couple: The Uunintended Partnership between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958.* London: I.B. Tauris.

Vasudev, Aruna. 1978. *Liberty and License in the Indian Cinema*. New Dehli: Vikas.

Wang Tong 王童. 1981. *If I Were for Real* (*Jiaru wo shi zhende* 假如我是真的).

Xu Dunle 許敦樂. 2005. *Ken guang tuo ying* 墾光拓影 (Pioneer of lights and shadows). Hong Kong: MCCM Creations.

Yau, Ching. 2004. *Filming Margins: Tang Shu Shuen, a Forgotten Hong Kong Woman Director.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Yau, Herman Lai To. 2015. "The Progression of Political Censorship: Hong Kong Cinema from Colonial Rule to Chinese-style Socialist Hegemony." Phd Dissertation, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.