


Journal of **the European Association for Chinese Studies**

| CENSORSHIP



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FOREWORD

The Dodgy Realm of Conventionality - On the Occasion of the Founding of the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies*

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Written on the occasion of the launching of the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies*, this article develops from the fundamental difference the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (ca.480-ca.540) made between the world of perception and the world of language, and the ramifications this philosophical distinction has for how concepts as 'China' and 'journal' are understood. Further referring to Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 6th or 7th century), a hierarchical structure is suggested within the domain of academic publications and the position of the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* within this hierarchy is reflected upon. The latter is discussed through the angle of Zhu Xi (1130-1200) *daoxue* thinking, as well as from the perspective of the contemporary state of the field of academic publishing.

本文撰寫於「歐洲漢學學會雜誌」建刊之際，試從印度佛教哲學家陳那 Dignāga (約 480 - 約 540) 關於感知世界和語言世界之間根本差異以及這種哲學上的差別對於「中國」和「雜誌」等概念的影響出發，運用法稱 Dharmakīrti (約六、七世紀) 在所有概念領域內提出的一種層次結構，來考量「歐洲漢學學會雜誌」作為學術出版物的角色，並結合朱熹(1130-1200) 道學思想的角度以及學術出版領域的現狀進行探討。

Keywords: Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Zhu Xi, classical liberal economic theory, neoliberalism

關鍵詞：陳那、法稱、朱熹、古典自由經濟理論、新自由主義

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According to the Indian Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (ca. 480–ca. 540), the world of perception is fundamentally different from the world of language. For Dignāga, at the moment of primary perception of an object, no mental defilement has yet occurred. It is the essence of perception that it is devoid of any mental creation (*kalpanā*). This explains why it is in the moment of primary perception that the possibility lies of seeing things as they really are (*yathābhūtan*), i.e., free of any subject/object dichotomy. Immediately following the moment of primary perception, however, a perceived object is mirrored on the surface of the perceiver's consciousness. As a result, the initial perception is transformed according to this consciousness that is, itself, shaped through previous experiences. Also, language is a product of mental activity. Language is also a transformation, created by the subjective mind. Language is therefore not able to make statements about an object as it was primarily perceived. That is to say, because language does not refer to that to which it claims to refer, the world of perception is fundamentally different from the world of language.

Dignāga conceptualised the relation between words and objects by what he termed '*apoha*' (lit. 'exclusion'). Let me explain with an example, whereby I shift my attention from Dignāga's India to China. When a speaker or a writer uses the word 'China', this word – in itself already transformed by the mirror of the speaker's or writer's consciousness – not only evokes 'China' in the way this speaker's or writer's consciousness imagines 'China' to be, but it also evokes all hypothetical interpretations of 'China' that an audience or a reader may, with their own consciousnesses that are shaped by their own previous experiences, possibly create. Although it is very unlikely that two interlocutors or a writer and a reader conventionally portray 'China' in exactly the same way, the conventional level – the dodgy realm of conventionality – is the only realm in which human communication, including scholarly writing, about 'China' is possible.

Regardless of how defective the word 'China' is on the conventional level, it pretends to refer to and apparently also produces a 'universal' notion. For Dignāga, this productive aspect is the positive aspect of '*apoha*'. From a conventional perspective, every positive aspect is unavoidably connected to a negative counterpart. When we use the

same word ‘China’, we, in a negative way, separate all possible conventional interpretations of ‘China’ from what does not correspond to the supposedly ‘universal’ notion ‘China’. Put simply: using the word ‘China’ implies that the object that is referred to is not something that is not-China. Or, to give another example, the word ‘journal’ simply means that the object that is referred to is not a non-journal. Dignāga himself stated that “A word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects. For example, the word ‘cow’ simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (*vyakti*), a universal (*jāti*), or any other thing. The apprehension of an object by means of the exclusion of other objects is nothing but an inference” (Hattori 1968, 12-13, also see Hayes 1988, 26).

Dignāga, and after him Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 6th or 7th century), went further. When the positive aspect of ‘*apoha*’ evokes all hypothetical conventional interpretations of a word or concept that an audience or a reader may possibly create in their minds, this also implies that everything that does not correspond to this word or concept is left unaffected, i.e., it remains in the realm of primary perception, and is not brought to the dodgy realm of conventionality to which language belongs. Through this function, ‘*apoha*’ is able to structure reality hierarchically. I again explain with an example: the combination of the words ‘journal’ and ‘European Association for Chinese Studies’ to form the concept *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* specifies a particular specimen within the multitude of non-academic and academic journals – with which a three-level hierarchical structure is created: (((‘European Association for Chinese Studies’) academic) journal). Because the concept *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* refers to only one specific journal, all ‘other’ journals, academic or other, are left unaffected, i.e., they remain in the realm of primary perception. To use Buddhist terminology again: one particular journal – the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* – is brought from the level of the absolute to the dodgy realm of conventionality, i.e., the realm in which we, academics, are also functioning.

Sinologists and China specialists may, as conventional beings, be able to function only in the conventional realm, but the Neo-Confucian (or what the mirror of Chinese perception refers to as *daoxuejia* 道學家) Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) stated the following:

“In the universe, there has never been *qi* without principle, nor principle without *qi* [...] As soon as there is principle, there is *qi*, but the principle is fundamental. [...] In fact, one cannot state that the one is prior and the other is later. However, when one absolutely wants to return to the origin, then one is obliged to see the principle as prior. This does not mean that the principle is a separate entity. On the contrary, it is inherent in *qi*. When this *qi* is absent, the principle would not have anything to hold on to [...] How does one know whether the principle is prior and is followed by *qi*, or the other way round? This cannot be verified. On a conceptual level, however, I presume that *qi* operates in function of the principle. As soon as this *qi* combines [in the form of *yin* and *yang*], there is principle. Whereas *qi* has the capacity to create and realise things, principle neither has the intention nor the plan nor the capacity to create things”

(天下未有無理之氣，亦未有無氣之理。[...] 有是理便有是氣，但理是本，[...] 此本無先後之可言。然必欲推其所從來，則須說先有是理。然理又非別為一物，即存乎是氣之中；無是氣，則是理亦無掛搭處。[...] 而今知得他合下是先有理，後有氣邪；後有理，先有氣邪？皆不可得而推究。然以意度之，則疑此氣是依傍這理行。及此氣之聚，則理亦在焉。蓋氣則能凝結造作，理卻無情意，無計度，無造作。) (*Zhuzi yulei*, 1: 2-3)

It is herein that lies the possibility for self-cultivation, i.e., the possibility to bring the conventional level (what is within forms 形而下) as close as possible to the archetypical level of the ‘principle’ (形而上). As Zhu Xi observed: When something is made “there has to be a well-defined prior principle. (畢竟是先有此理)” (*Zhuzi yulei*, 1: 2-3)

Also when making a journal, there is a well-defined prior principle involved, and the contributors to a journal have to try to attain to the level of the ‘principle’ - or to the level of the absolute (*paramārtha*, *tathatā*), as the Buddhists would have it. An academic journal should aim at making statements about the researched objects that are as little as possible distorted through the conventionality of the observing mind. That is to say, the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* should aim at coming as close as possible to the absolute, archetypical, level of primary perception,

and through this academic endeavour try to distinguish itself from the dodgy conventionality of ‘other’ journals. To the extent that the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* is successful in this mission, it will also add to the renown of the European Association for Chinese Studies.

I return to Dignāga. At the moment an academic transmits to words his/her findings on his/her object of research, this can only be a mental creation (*kalpanā*). The way findings are put into words, the format that is chosen to express these findings in (monograph, edited volume, paper journal, online journal – all of these choices in themselves being ways to structure conventional reality hierarchically), and even the framework in which this research and the transmitting of these findings to words occur, can belong only to the dodgy realm of conventionality. The 21st century that is now at the beginning of its third decade has its peculiar conventional characteristics. This also applies to academia. Different from classical liberal economic theory that measures value in objective terms of the cost of resources and labour, neoliberal capitalism uses a subjective theory of value. Value is conceived of as conferred by the subjective preferences of agents. For academia, it is important to add that whereas classical liberalism saw the individual as characterised by having an autonomous human nature and being able to practise (in) freedom, in neoliberalism, the state “seeks to create an individual that is an enterprising and competitive entrepreneur” (Olssen and Peters 2005, 315). In neoliberalism, further, the market has become a useful technology for use by the state, a “mechanism for the institutional regulation of public sector organizational contexts, [...] a technique of government’s ‘positive’ power, acting deliberately through the vehicle of the state to engineer the conditions for efficient economic production” (Olssen and Peters 2005, 317–318). That is to say that what David Reisman called the ‘productive state’ (that simultaneously is active as participant in and as controller of the economic process), as opposed to the ‘protective state’ (that limits its ‘interference’ to the protection of citizens within a constitutional and legal framework) increasingly determines economic and academic life (Reisman 1990, 81). In the 21st-century global neoliberal world order, the ‘productive state’ extracts compliance from individuals in order to engineer a market order.¹ In this sense, the ‘productive state’ threatens to

¹ For the distinction between ‘protective’ state and ‘productive’ state as the difference between law and politics: see Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 69.

restrict the rights of privacy and personal freedom, as well as of professional autonomy. And, indeed, ‘entrepreneurship’ and ‘the market’ have encroached on the academic ‘profession’ as well. Also, academic teaching and research are increasingly coping with the logic of ‘the market’, with the introduction of concepts such as demand and supply, relevance to labour market conditions and prospects, targets and objectives, contract-based employment, and results orientation, all to the detriment of values such as ‘professional autonomy’ for the individual academic, and such as the ‘common good’ and ‘public interest’ for the society for whose edification (apart from the value of ‘knowledge for the sake of knowledge’ itself) the academic is supposed to work (Olssen and Peters 2005, 324–326).²

It is within this context and against the background that commercial academic publishers also have to navigate within the neoliberal framework, that the European Association for Chinese Studies has – after a discussion that took many years – decided to start its own online journal, in an attempt to keep aloof from commercial neoliberal patterns. This approach should also liberate the content of the journal and give space to hotspot discussions, allow a refocusing on all too long forgotten studies, bring non-mainstream topics into the limelight, and cast light on the varied field of Chinese studies in Europe (including studies that are not published in the global academic language that is English). It goes without saying that the editorial committee of the *Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies* leaves the first and the final word to its contributors.

May this new journal shine through the grey fog of conventionality!

Bart Dessen

President EACS

Sint Amandsberg, 6 January 2020

² Olssen and Peters (2005, 326) state that the rising importance of ‘managed research’ and the pressures to obtain ‘funded research’ increasingly infringe on academic freedom, and that “The extent to which the ideal [...] of the university as an institutionally autonomous and politically insulated realm, where there are traditional commitments to a liberal conception of professional autonomy, in keeping with a public service ethic, has any relevance in a global economic order, is increasingly seen as an irrelevant concern”.

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EDITORIAL

Censorship and Self-censorship in Chinese Contexts

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Editorial on the topic of "Censorship and Self-censorship" and introduction of the journal

介紹歐洲漢學學會期刊及本期專題“審查與自我審查”。

Keywords: Censorship, Self-censorship, Sinology, Chinese Studies, Editorial

關鍵詞： 審查，自我審查，漢學，编者序

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Censorship is a constant and well-established factor in the development of Chinese media and culture (Qiu 2009). The population under Chinese rule have lived with agents of censorship and daily practices of self-censorship in imperial times, under warlords during the Republican era (1912-1949), in the People's Republic, and under KMT rule with martial law in Taiwan (Zhao 1998, Qiu 2009).

The situation in the People's Republic differed from the situation in the former Soviet Union. In much less repressive political conditions inside the People's Republic, nearly twenty years ago, Perry Link (2002) has argued, the "Chinese Communist Party rejected these more mechanical methods in favor of an essentially psychological control system that relies primarily on self-censorship". He illustrates the hidden power of censorship in a fascinating metaphor:

In sum, the Chinese government's censorial authority in recent times has resembled not so much a man-eating tiger or fire-snorting dragon as a giant anaconda coiled in an overhead chandelier. Normally the great snake doesn't move. It doesn't have to. It feels no need to be clear about its prohibitions. Its constant silent message is "You yourself decide," after which, more often than not, everyone in its shadow makes his or her large and small adjustments—all quite "naturally." (Link 2002, see also Hamilton/Ohlberg 2020, ch. 12)

Censorship in this Maoist ideological setting worked because there were internalised perceptions of potential danger and red lines, repeating mechanisms of self-constraint and self-censorship, and discipline through observation and self-observation in the peer groups (Bakken 2006, Svarverud 2010).

Consequently, China state-censorship "is not a cloak-and-dagger business" (Crevel 2017). It has clearly shifted from "classical" totalitarian practices of surveillance, public intimidation, persecution, and brain-washing of dissidents to forms of censorship governance that try to hinder debate on specific issues (Document 9 2013) and that repress manifestations with potential for collective action (King et al. 2013).

Censorship gains power precisely when people respect the red line and do not talk about it. Those who do not want to make the anaconda alert will remain on the rehearsed paths of politically correct perception. Performed self-discipline is

normalised in contemporary Chinese cultural life. This is so true for our colleagues in Chinese academia. During their careers, they have perfected this discipline of anticipation of red lines (Hamrim & Cheek 1986) in an act of self-protection for their “obedient autonomy” (Evasdottir 2004, Cheek 2015).

Overview of this issue: Censorship inside China

This first issue of the JEACS tries to break the silence and speaks about the anaconda in the overhead chandelier. It discusses the institutions and processes of this “normalisation” by censorship in a *longue durée* and how censorship and self-censorship framed perception and subjectification processes in China.

In 2018, we received an overwhelming response of 56 submissions of abstracts and chose eight presenters for a workshop on “Censorship and Self-censorship in Chinese Studies”. The six articles all stem from discussions held from 8 to 10 March 2019 during a workshop in Prague at the Chiang Ching-kuo International Sinological Center of Charles University (CCK-ISC).

This workshop was made possible through the generosity of Prof. Olga Lomová (Charles University) and her team. Therefore we want to use this opportunity to thank all of them and the Chiang Ching-kuo International Sinological Center for providing accomodation and travel costs for most participants.

After long discussions and exchanges, we are glad to publish six research articles addressing various forms of censorship and their implications. The articles, arranged in chronological order, attempt to show different aspects of (self-)censorship manifestations in various media: historical writings, literature, and films. These contributions show that censorship is and was a political and cultural practice in the Sinophone world. They address the political production of censorship as well as the strategies employed by various actors to deal with censorship regimes.

Limin Bai addresses the political and institutional side of what was published and compiled during the Kangxi era. By analysing the emperor’s tactics for creating a sort of “soft power”, Bai illustrates how this shaped the intellectual milieu of the time.

By analysing the compilation of the *Guwen guan zhi*, Jyrki Kallio reveals how the *Guwen guan zhi* promotes unorthodox ideas in a subdued manner. He argues that the editors of *Guwen guan zhi* were not merely following officially established norms of the literary canon sanctioned by the Qing government just in order to produce one more textbook, more handy for students, thus, likely to become more popular than the complex and more demanding text compilations issued by court-officials. Employing content analysis methods, the author draws attention to the compilers' unexpressed bias towards 'cracking wider the inevitable fault-lines in China's state-enforced orthodoxy'.

Martin Blahota discusses how Jue Qing, one of the most accomplished writers in Manchukuo, used Aesopian language to bypass official censorship in his books. This process had two goals: to camouflage praise for resistance against the Japanese coloniser and, at the same time, to draw the reader's attention to it.

Wendy Larson looks into the literary representation of self-censorship in two short stories of Wang Meng, a former Minister of Culture of the People's Republic of China. In *A Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department* and *Long Live Youth*, Wang shows how censorship and self-censorship are part of daily life.

Kenny N.N. Ng investigates film censorship in Cold War Taiwan and colonial Hong Kong. Looking into the shifting practices of censorship in the 1970s and 80s, he examines film's ambiguous expressions of China and Chineseness as it constantly negotiates the factors of colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and Cold War transnational politics.

Xi Tian highlights such strategies for coping with the censorship and publishing environment in her article on a very recent online genre, "boys' love". By analysing how they cope with the uncertainty of what will be censored due to vague definitions, this article shows that the effect of censorship is more than deletion. It creates new visibilities in the public domain, from journalism to literary activities to performing arts (Yang 2015). Censorship does something with culture, it creates new visible cultural responses and artefacts.

These research articles are followed by the Spotlight section. Spotlight targets focal and controversial topics through investigations from well-argued subjective view-points and revisits historical actors of European sinology and their major works.

In relation to the topics addressed in the special issue, this first Spotlight seeks to document and reflect upon recent developments on censorship. David Bandurski illuminates the People's Republic's growing control of the print media. For journalists, the anaconda has already moved from the chandelier just next to their hands on the computer keyboard - functioning self-censorship now becomes a balancing act and permanent threat to one's own (professional) existence. This may be either caused by too much ingratiation, by manipulation or sarcastic overtones or by effusive transpicuous appraisal.

In the second Spotlight piece of our current issue, Nicholas Loubere documents incidents of self-censorship by Western publishers in recent years. He examines these “incidents” and the responses of the publishers upon being discovered—arguing that the convergence of China's increasingly assertive information control regime and the commercial academic publishers' thirst for ever more profits has resulted in a new form of institutionalised commercial censorship outside Chinese frontiers.

The third Spotlight article on Marcel Granet by Rémi Mathieu inaugurates our inquiry into the founding fathers and innovators of modern European Sinology. By looking into their innovative efforts within their situated pasts, this section reflects upon what can be said and analysed in our field. A self-proclaimed sociologist, Marcel Granet successfully challenged the existing boundaries of the institutionalised field of Sinology. Consequently, he opened up new sources for research and introduced new methodological approaches into European Sinology. He made possible the relocation of what is essential to a field such as Sinology.

The Spotlight section is followed by two review sections discussing translations and research monographs. Their common aim is to call attention to books published in languages other than English to increase the visibility of important work based on less frequently quoted European languages.

The last section of the JEACS is devoted to dissertation abstracts. It provides information on recently defended PhD theses to inform our scholarly community on new research carried out in Europe by early career scholars.

At the end, we turn to ourselves: Recent developments display a clear intensification and rising presence of censorship activities not only within China (Document 9, 2013) but also visibly in all major kinds of foreign relations or among China's activities abroad. Having left the sinological armchair in our Institutes for a role of exchange with a globalised China, our former positionality as "researchers at a distance" has become more embedded and entangled. On the one hand, China comes to us, with the open or "hidden hand" (Hamilton/Ohlberg 2020) lobbying for its interests (Brady 2017; Hamilton 2018; Izambard 2019; Weber 2020). Confucius Institutes have often become part of the universities with their sometimes contested agendas (Sahlins 2015). On the other hand, we connect with people from China: for colleagues coming from China or married to Chinese partners, China is part of their daily life, from which they cannot distance themselves at all (Kjellgren 2006). With the opening-up of a self-isolated China and its integration into the world, the Chinese regime of "censorship and self-censorship" is no longer observable from a distance. Censorship and self-censorship is already part of our academic life (Carrico 2018; Greitens/Truex 2018). It reshapes social and organisational structures, and forms and hinders academic careers and cooperation opportunities not only there, but also here (Hansen 2006; Klotzbücher 2014). China is not only an object of research, but also an expanding field of political power: we are still used to our comfortable professional role as observers from the distant armchair, even though we are realising that our environment has long since transformed us into a "vulnerable observer" (Behar, 1996; Klotzbücher 2019). Joseph Esherick (2014) has documented in detail the challenge faced when intending to publish for readers in China. Vulnerability became manifest even within our own association, EACS. The printed conference programme of our association became an object of censorship during our biannual conference in Braga in 2014 (Greatrex 2014). Self-censorship, taboos, bans on speech, all create explicit or implicit boundaries and disconnect issues and research communities. A continuous discourse, including rising black zones and red lines in our field of Chinese Studies, will be necessary to identify

threats, concealed conflicts, and even new perspectives naturally arising from a situation we have just begun to realise as a common concern..

This is the reason why the question of self-censorship within Chinese Studies was also part of the call for papers in 2018. What does it say about us and our reflectivity that not one essay was submitted on censorship and self-censorship in *our* field? How can we become more innovative if we are not aware of our position and what is missing or covered up in our academic hierarchies? That is why we are launching the special issue on this topic today: we invite submissions on censorship and self-censorship in our field as an ongoing “special collection” that could grow out of this issue.

EACS has spent years discussing this journal and we are now glad finally to launch the first issue. Thank you to all supporters and contributors on this long road. EACS provided financial support for the funding of translation and the setup of our journal infrastructure. We are looking forward to constructive and fruitful cooperation in the Editorial Board and to the ambitious suggestions of our readers!

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Shaping the World of Scholars: The Soft Power of Emperor Kangxi (1661- 1722)

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Modern scholarship has noted that the Kangxi emperor's patronage of scholars is a form of "soft power" that assisted the Qing ruler during the Kangxi reign to achieve success in conquering the minds and hearts of Han Chinese, especially those eminent scholars who remained loyal to the fallen dynasty. This "soft power" emerged after the Kangxi government had decisively quelled the revolt of the Three Feudatories (*San fan* 三藩) (1673-1681). In 1679 the *boxue hongru* 博學鴻儒 special examination signalled a significant moment in which the Kangxi emperor adopted a more diplomatic and personal approach to scholars under his rule. This paper examines several examples of scholars' presenting (*jin cheng* 進呈) their scholarly works to the emperor/government. By analysing the Kangxi emperor's tactics for fostering this particular scholarly phenomenon, this study reveals the key elements behind his successful use of soft power in shaping the intellectual milieu of the time.

康熙皇帝在平定三藩之亂（1673-1681）有望之時，開博學鴻儒科（1679）以網羅抗清的明末遺儒為清政權服務。此制科之舉標誌著康熙皇帝新文化政策之始，顯示其欲以懷柔與高壓兼施之手段，從學者鴻儒入手而達到其征服漢人民心之目的。如此懷柔政策，套之於今天的術語，即軟實力。本文圍繞康熙朝之初至鼎盛時期學者們向康熙皇帝進呈他們學術著作的現象，探討此種軟實力之實質及功效。通過以仇兆鰲（1638-1717）、萬斯同（1638-1702）和李顥（1627-1705）三個案例為中心的考察，本文展示了康熙懷柔策略的諸方面，揭示其如何收攬漢族名儒學者參與清帝國的諸項社會、文化工程，期望在思想文化這個層面上建立清朝統治的合法性，從而進一步在政治上確認、穩固大清帝國的根基。

Keywords: Kangxi Emperor, jin cheng, Qiu Zhao'ao, Wan Sitong, Li Yong

關鍵詞：進呈, 仇兆鰲, 萬斯同, 李顥

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Existing scholarship on late Ming and early Qing history has noted that the Kangxi emperor's patronage of scholars, in today's vocabulary, is a form of "soft power" that assisted the Qing ruler during the Kangxi reign to achieve success "in reconciling and combining the strengths of both indigenous and alien ruling elites" (Struve 1982, 266).¹ This form of "soft power" emerged after the Kangxi government had decisively quelled the revolt of the Three Feudatories (*San fan* 三藩) (1673–1681), with the help of loyal Chinese generals who defended the Manchu government when it was threatened by anti-Qing forces. Most Han generals and officials chose to collaborate with the Manchus in their confrontation with the Three Feudatories, which contributed significantly to Kangxi's triumph and helped legitimise Manchu rule (Wakeman 1984, 631–665; 1985, 1099, 1123–1124).

However, the legitimacy of Manchu rule could not rely solely on military power. To ensure the continuation of the dynasty, it was necessary for the Kangxi emperor to adopt a soft approach (*huairou* 懷柔) to Chinese scholars. The term *huairou* in modern Chinese means conciliation or mollification, and a policy of *huairou* refers to designated schemes designed to treat others kindly in order to win their minds and hearts.

Etymologically, the word originated from two phrases in *The Doctrine of the Mean*: "the kindly cherishing of the princes of the States" (*huai zhuhou* 懷諸侯) and the "indulgent treatment of men from a distance" (*rou yuanren* 柔遠人). Their intent was to guide the management of the relationships between *tianzi* 天子 (the Son of Heaven) and *zhuhou* 諸侯; and between the Zhou states and the non-Zhou tribes. According to Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127–200), *yuanren* here refers to "the princes of surrounding kingdoms", such as "of the tribes that lay beyond the six *fu* 服², or feudal tenures of

¹ This paper is dedicated to Anthony (Tony) Quinn (1962–2018), Asian Languages Specialist Librarian, University Library, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. The classical Chinese-language materials held by the university library was largely the result of Tony's painstaking efforts over many years. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers of this article and their insightful comments and suggestions were helpful for the revision of this article. Many thanks also to Alison Hardie for her thorough and skillful copy-editing work.

² *Fu* is a general term standing for the lands outside the Zhou royal domain, referring to both *zhuhou* 諸侯 and tribal peoples which, in the Chinese sources, were termed *man yi* or *Man* 蠻, *Yi* 夷, *Rong* 戎, *Di* 狄, and the barbarians or aliens in English. Based on both ethnic distinctions and geographical distances from the central zone of the king, the concepts of the divisions and zones varied. However, according to *Zhou Li* 周禮 (Rites of Zhou) and *Shangshu*, 尚書 there were two major concepts: *jiufu* 九服 and *wufu* 五服. A concept of *jiufu* or *jiu ji* 九畿 refers to "nine zones of submission" that "extended outwards from a tenth division, that is, the central zone of the king" (Loewe &

Zhou rule” (Legge 1861, 273). The aim of *rou yuanren* was to ensure that the princes of barbarian tribes from all quarters deferred to the rule of the empire/kingdom (*sifang gui zhi* 四方歸之); and *huai zhuhou* was to uphold reverence to the ruler throughout the kingdom (*zhuhou wei zhi* 諸侯畏之) (ibid.). The word *zhi* 之 in this context refers to the ruler of the Zhou, which extended its territories by granting authority to members of the royal family and sometimes to adherents they favoured.

The tribes in *sifang* 四方 (four quarters/directions) were considered *man yi* 蠻夷 (often translated into English as the barbarians or alien peoples). It originally referred to non-Zhou peoples, but developed into a term for non-Chinese or non-Han peoples. As James Legge in a note to his translation indicates, the rule of *rou yuanren* evolved as a principle “for the treatment of foreigners by the government of China” (Legge 1861, 273, n.13). The rule of *huai zhuhou*, at the same time, became a fundamental proposition to induce acceptance of the supreme power of the emperor by all local lords/government officials.

The original *huairou* concept also spawned the idea of *hua yi zhi bian* 華夷之辨 (the distinction between *hua* (xia 夏) and *yi*, or the Sino-barbarian dichotomy) to differentiate between the Chinese and non-Chinese. According to the *Shangshu* 尚書 (Book of Documents), the monarchs’ strength of character (*de* 德) was vital in order to “exert their spiritual qualities, thereby persuading those who were distant to come into their own fold” (Loewe & Shaughnessy 1999, 994). This on the one hand asserted the superiority of the Chinese culture; on the other, however, Confucius believed that this cultural barrier could be overcome once the so-called barbarians or aliens adopted Chinese values and customs. This concept was depicted by Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824):

When Confucius composed the *Spring and Autumn* [*Annals*], if the leaders of the land adopted alien (*yi* 夷) modes of behavior he treated them as aliens; but

Shaughnessy 1999, 996). A concept of *wufu* or five zones originated in *Yu gong* 禹貢 (The Tribute of Yu) of the *Book of History* (tr. Legge 1879, 75–76) that “spells out the distances of the five, which are named *dianfu* 甸服, *houfu* 侯服, *suifu* 綏服, *yaofu* 要服, and *huangfu* 荒服. The *dianfu* is interpreted as the zone of the Son of Heaven” (Loewe & Shaughnessy, ibid). Another version was *liufu yi fan* 六服一蕃 referring to *dianfu* 甸服, *nianfu* 男服, *cailu* 采服, *weifu* 衛服, *manfu* 蠻服 and *yifu* 夷服. The term *fan* refers to the zones which were further remote and “designated as *zhen* 鎮 (under garrison) and *fan* 蕃, or 藩 (on the edge)” (Loewe & Shaughnessy, ibid).

once they had advanced into the countries of the center (*zhongguo* 中國) he treated them as he did the inhabitants of the center. (Loewe & Shaughnessy 1999, 993).

Han Yu's passage emphasises cultural identities in differentiating *hua* (*xia*) and *yi* and the reversibility of such identities. Nevertheless, according to Mencius, only the Chinese culture (*xia*) could transform the ways of *yi*, and not vice versa (Legge 1893, 2:253-254).

The Manchu rulers were conscious of the distinction between the *hua* (*xia*) and *yi*. While their military successes might have established the Manchus' supremacy in China, but "a legitimate claimant to the Mandate of Heaven" for the non-Han ruler was determined by the extent to which he served the Way (*dao* 道). As John D. Langlois (1980, 359) points out, "Culturalism could be made the servant of imperial legitimacy by a warlord-turned-emperor."³ The Kangxi emperor's new cultural policy aimed to establish an alliance with Chinese scholars in order to legitimise the cultural identity of Manchu rule.

The educational background of the Kangxi emperor laid a solid foundation for this attempt. According to his own account, he began studying Confucian classics when he was only five *sui*; during the course of his study, he pondered over the texts of these classics until he fully understood the essence of their doctrines (垂世立教之精心) (Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 1984, 2.1249). This statement illustrates the personality of Kangxi who enjoyed displaying his erudition to his subjects, including his tutors who, in turn, eagerly extolled him as the patron teacher over the empire as well as the ruler of the Qing (以君道而兼师道). (Wei Yijie 2.45a). The emperor's knowledge of Confucian classics and history and his role as the patron teacher enabled him astutely to court Chinese scholars in order to ensure that Han Chinese supported Qing rule whole-heartedly.

Meanwhile, the military successes surely provided a "secure footing" for the Qing dynasty, which gave the Kangxi emperor the confidence to adopt a more diplomatic and personal approach to scholars under his rule (Struve 1982, 244). The *boxue hongru*

³ According to Langlois (1980, 356, n.2), "Culturalism is often taken as a given with respect to Chinese civilization."

博學鴻儒 (broad learning and outstanding scholarship) special examination in 1679 marked a significant step for this new cultural policy. The purpose of this special examination was to select eminent scholars to work on Ming history, an imperial project which aimed to mitigate scholars' opposition to Manchu rule.⁴

There are many scholarly works on this historical event from social, political and cultural perspectives. This study, however, focuses on the Kangxi emperor's patronage of scholarly activities by discussing the cases of scholars' presenting (*jìn chéng* 進呈) their scholarly works to the emperor.

The Chinese term for the emperor's patronage is *enyu* 恩遇. The word *en* 恩 signifies favour, and *yu* 遇 means to encounter and meet with. By the mid-Kangxi period most Han Chinese scholars, regardless of whether they had already secured a government post or were still struggling to climb the civil service examination ladder, longed for such *enyu* whereby the Kangxi emperor “happened to take note of some special accomplishment” (Struve 1979, 347). At the same time, certain prominent and wealthy Qing officials engaged in “large-scale patronage” by sponsoring scholars “who impressed them in some way” (ibid.). Both forms of *enyu* were operative in Kangxi times. For scholars who were still *buyi* 布衣 (lit. plain-clothed scholars) – not yet having obtained a degree nor been appointed by the government⁵ – their *enyu* would depend on an agent, namely one of those who had already gained the patronage of the emperor and held important government positions. Through such agents these *buyi* or officials in lower ranks could then potentially gain the opportunity to improve their social status with the ultimate goal of obtaining patronage from the emperor. Through this form of “sub-patronage” the Kangxi emperor expanded his influence within the social circle of scholars and formed a scholarly network through which the soft power of the Kangxi emperor permeated and was replicated down the social and scholarly hierarchy.

Lynn Struve, in her study of the “Three Xu” brothers, Xu Qianxue 徐乾學 (1631–1694), Xu Bingyi 徐秉義 (1633–1711), and Xu Yuanwen 徐元文 (1634–1691),

⁴ For a detailed documentation and analysis of this special examination, see Wilhelm 1951, 60–66; for a more recent study see Wang 2016.

⁵ From the Tang dynasty onward, the term has been used to refer to those literati who were not successful in the civil service examinations and consequently did not secure a post in government.

remarks that this form of patronage of scholars was “semiofficial in nature”, “operating through unofficial channels and engaging numerous intellectuals in their private employ.” Most importantly, it was “crucial to the legitim[is]ation of Ch’ing rule during the K’ang-hsi reign” (Struve 1982, 231). Li Guangdi 李光地 (1642–1718), a contemporary of the “Three Xu” brothers, was also a prominent patron of the Kangxi reign and used his position and relationship with the Kangxi emperor to offer his patronage to scholars who participated in the imperial projects which the emperor championed.

Scholars under such semiofficial patronage were often referred to in Chinese as *muyou* 幕友 or *mubin* 幕賓. They lived at a high official’s house as guests and formed his personal entourage (*mufu* 幕府).⁶ Shang Xiaoming (1999) uses the term *youmu* 游幕 to describe the means by which the Qing scholars were employed to participate in scholarly activities. The word *you* 游 stands for travelling, and there were many reasons for them to travel, such as tutoring, attending public lectures/gatherings, or finding a master to guide their studies. For example, Mei Wending 梅文鼎 (1633–1721) travelled to Beijing in 1689. It is believed that the purpose of this trip was to visit Ferdinand Verbiest (Nan Huai ren 南懷仁, 1623–1688). Unfortunately, Verbiest had recently passed away and Li Guangdi sponsored Mei because he had learned of Mei’s expertise in mathematics and astronomy through his younger brother Li Dingzheng 李鼎徵 who, a few years earlier, had published Mei’s work entitled *Fangcheng lun* 方程論 (Simultaneous linear equations), which was written in 1672. Li Guangdi asked Mei Wending to teach him and his sons mathematics. Mei thus became the *muyou* of Li Guangdi who later encouraged Mei to compile and publish *Lixue yiwèn* 曆學疑問 (Inquiry on mathematical astronomy) (c.1701). Li then facilitated the presentation of *Lixue yiwèn* to the Kangxi emperor, who was greatly interested in the work and summoned Mei to an audience in 1705. (Jami 2012, 218–9 & 2013, 19–47; Elman 2009, 41; Li & Guo 1988, 11–42; Bai 1989, 39–47).

⁶ Kenneth E. Folsom (1968) studied the *mufu* under Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901). The study conducted by Jonathan Porter (1972) focuses on the private bureaucracy or *mufu* that Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811–1872) established through his recruitment of talent.

The Kangxi emperor would normally grant an award to the scholars who presented their works to him, showing his appreciation of their scholarship, and most importantly, rewarding their deference to Manchu rule. This article examines the scholars' *jūn cheng* from this perspective, with a focus on Qiu Zhao'ao 仇兆鰲 (also Ch'ou Chao-ao, 1638-1717),⁷ Wan Sitong 萬斯同 (1638-1702), and Li Yong 李顥 (1627-1705). This focus is largely determined by the ways that, as scholars, they represented their time, and by their interactions with scholarly communities.

Both Qiu Zhao'ao and Wan Sitong were disciples of Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 (1610-1695) who, after the failure of the anti-Qing campaigns, returned to his home town in 1661, focusing on scholarship, lecturing, and writing. In 1668 he reopened the academy (Jishan zhengren shuyuan 戢山證人書院) of his teacher, Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578-1645), who in 1645 died of self-imposed starvation because of his grief at the fall of the Ming dynasty.⁸ This academy attracted hundreds of people who came to attend Huang's lectures, some of whom became his disciples. This solidified Huang's reputation as a well-known scholar in the South-East region, paralleling that of Li Yong in the North-West (Jiang 1969, 11a).⁹ As highly eminent scholars of the time, Li Yong and Huang Zongxi both remained loyal to the Ming dynasty by refusing to work for the Qing government. Some disciples of Huang Zongxi, such as Wan Sitong and his brother Wan Sida 萬斯大 (1633-1683), followed their teacher's example and kept their Ming loyalist (*yimin* 遺民)¹⁰ identity; however, others such as Qiu Zhao'ao chose to obtain a government position by climbing the civil service examination ladder.

Such different choices regarding their *yimin* identities were decisively reflected in the forms of *jūn cheng*. While Qiu Zhao'ao voluntarily submitted his scholarly works to

⁷ *Qing shi gao* (Draft History of the Qing) does not include any biographical information on Qiu. Hummel (1943-44, 175-176) includes a brief account of Qiu's life based on *Yinxian zhi* 鄞縣志 (1877). For a recent chronological account of Qiu's life, see Zhang 2011, 89-92, 108.

⁸ For a discussion of Huang's status as Liu Zongzhou's successor in Confucian philosophy, see Struve 2013, 306-309.

⁹ According to Quan Zuwang 全祖望 (1705-1755), Li Yong, together with Sun Qifeng 孫奇逢 (1584-1675) and Huang Zongxi, were "the 'three great Confucians' of the time: Li in the west, Sun in the north, and Huang in the south" (Birdwhistell 1996, 21).

¹⁰ The term *yimin* literally means leftover, remnant or surviving subjects. For a discussion and definition of the term, see Yim 2009, 1-3; Struve 1979, 327; Jay 1991, 5-6. For a study of Chinese literati in the Ming-Qing transition period and their views of *yimin*, see Zhao 1999.

the Kangxi emperor in order to win his favour, Li Yong's submission was rather involuntary, resulting from the emperor's demand (*suoyao* 索要). Most importantly, in order to maintain his Ming loyalist stance, he even rejected the opportunity of an audience with the Kangxi emperor in 1703. About two years later, on his fifth Southern Tour (1705), the Kangxi emperor summoned Mei Wending to an audience, which brought the emperor's patronage not only to Mei Wending himself but also to his grandson Mei Juecheng 梅穀成 (1681–1764) (Jami 2012, 251). Mei Wending's meeting with the emperor was an occasion most scholars of the time would regard as the ultimate glory in their lives. Li Yong's unyielding commitment to his integrity, however, stands out against the prevailing ethos of the scholarly world during the reign of Kangxi.

Wan Sitong is well known for his contribution to the compilation of a standard *Ming History*. As mentioned earlier, the *Boxue hongru* special examination was intended for the recruitment of eminent scholars to accomplish this imperial project. Both the literati of the Ming-Qing transition period and the Manchu rulers of the early Qing were keen to compile a history of the Ming. While literati of the time sought a historical perspective on present issues, the Manchu rulers of the early Qing appropriated history as a tool to help “acquire the imprimatur of political legitimacy” (Ng & Wang 2005, 239). The historical works of Huang Zongxi and Wan Sitong were both highly regarded. Huang compiled the *Mingru xue'an* 明儒學案 (Records of Ming scholars), presenting a historical survey of the important schools of Confucianism of the Ming dynasty.¹¹ Wan Sitong authored the *Rulin zongpai* 儒林宗派 (Confucian schools and their branches), a chronological coverage of scholar traditions from the time of Confucius to the Ming dynasty. The Qing government tried to recruit both of them for the Ming History project. Maintaining his non-cooperative stance, Huang Zongxi avoided joining the project but was ordered to submit his collection of materials relating to the *Ming History* project to the Bureau of History. Wan Sitong refused the offer initially but later consented to work on the project as a private scholar. He invested all his knowledge and energy over twenty years of his life in this official project.¹² This paper examines why and how Wan devoted himself to this official project while insisting on

¹¹ For a discussion of Huang's scholarship in history, see Struve 1988a, 479–484.

¹² For an excellent discussion of Wan's life and scholarship, see Struve 1988b, 90–100.

his Ming loyalist identity. Through these case-studies, this article engages in a critical analysis, identifying the key elements behind the success of the Kangxi emperor's soft power in shaping the intellectual milieu of the time.

Qiu Zhao'ao 仇兆鰲 and His *Du Fu's Poetry with Detailed Annotations*

In 1693 Qiu Zhao'ao presented his *Du Fu's Poetry with Detailed Annotations* (*Dushi xiangzhu* 杜詩詳註) to the Kangxi emperor, and this act raises a question regarding his attitude toward the Qing ruler, as he adopted a stance differing from that of his teacher Huang Zongxi and Huang's other disciples such as Wan Sitong who kept their Ming loyalist identity.

After obtaining a *Jinshi* degree in 1685, Qiu secured a position in the Imperial Academy. In 1693 the Kangxi emperor issued an edict emphasising a requirement for literary works to show "consistency between literary representation and behavior in real life" (Hao 2017, 210). The emperor emphasised *lunshi zhiren* 論世知人, or "knowing a person by discussing his time", and asked scholars to submit their own literary works. However, Qiu chose to present his commentary on Du Fu's poetry. In his explanation of his motive for this choice, Qiu focused on *shangyou* 尚友 (literally meaning "regard someone as a friend" and by extension "taking something such as books as friends"), emphasising the idea of "taking morality as one's friend" (*yi de wei you* 以德為友) (Satō 2009, 91–95). Qiu stated that Du Fu's poetry truly demonstrated his love for his country and his loyalty to the ruler throughout his entire life. His poetry also revealed the causes behind the decline of the Kaiyuan 開元 (713–741) and Tianbao 天寶 (742–756) eras and how the emperors in the reigns of the Qianyuan 乾元 (758–760) and Dali 大曆 (766–779) reinstated order after the chaos. Qiu asserted that his interpretation of Du Fu's poetry correlated with the emperor's instruction of "knowing a person by discussing his time" (Qiu 2007, 5: 2352).

The image of Du Fu “as a man with paradigmatic Confucian morality” (Hao 2017, 1) did not arise until the Song when the literati extolled Du Fu “for his ability to convey Confucian moral values and judgment through poetry in addition to producing a faithful account of the historical past” (ibid., 12). This mode of “life reading in the Song served as an important self-shaping strategy for the literati class in the construction of their political and cultural identity under various circumstances” (ibid.). During the Ming-Qing transition period, there were competing interpretations of Du Fu’s poetry, but the Ming loyalists’ use of commentaries on Du Fu’s poetry to “show their political loyalty to the fallen Ming” (ibid., 13) was viewed as a potential political threat to the Qing regime. Under such circumstances Qiu’s comments on Du Fu’s poetry echoed “the interpretative transparency suggested by the Kangxi [sic] in his edict” (ibid., 212), presenting “the intervention of Qing official ideology in the practice of reading Du Fu that aims to disarm potential threats imposed by Ming loyalists’ readings” (ibid., 13).

The rationale for Qiu’s submission of his interpretation of Du Fu’s poetry was that anyone who read Du Fu’s poetry would regard Du Fu as his friend; based on this pretext, Qiu’s presentation of his interpretation to the emperor was motivated by the morality presented in Du Fu’s poetry which, Qiu stated, was deeply rooted in moral principles and demonstrated his moral perfection. Qiu’s rhetoric linked Du Fu’s poems to the official ideology of the Qing government, and “adeptly expressed his loyalty to the Qing” (ibid., 209).

In 1694 Qiu requested leave from his post in the Imperial Academy and returned to his hometown Ningbo in order to devote himself to the practice of internal alchemy (*neidan* 内丹) (Pregadio, 2013, 811). Meanwhile, he continued to work on *Du Fu’s Poetry with Detailed Annotations* and printed a revised version of this work in 1702. In early 1703 during his southern tour the Kangxi emperor arrived in Hangzhou. Qiu Zhao’ao took this opportunity to submit his revised work to the emperor. Pleased with Qiu’s submission, the emperor in return sent Qiu a tablet inscribed *can xia yin nian* 餐霞引年 (lit. practising [Daoist method of breathing] at dawn and prolonging life), referring to Qiu’s practice of internal alchemy to prolong life (Zhang 2011, 91–92). One year later Qiu was again summoned to the capital for various important positions,

including a vice presidency in the Board of Civil Office and the chancellorship of the Imperial Academy (Hummel 1943-44, 176; Zhang 2011, 92).

Qiu's presentation of *Du Fu's Poetry with Detailed Annotations* to the emperor accorded with Kangxi's 1693 edict and this achieved his purpose of winning the emperor's favour. Meanwhile Qiu "tried to situate his commentaries in the interpretative tradition of Du Fu and used its affinity with Qing official ideology and the imperial power of Emperor Kangxi to reinforce the authority of his reading" (Hao 2017, 209). This may be seen as an illustrative example of the emperor's soft approach to the scholarly world of the time, demonstrating how it worked to help him to conquer the hearts and minds of Han Chinese.

In 1711 Qiu retired from office due to illness and returned to his hometown of Ningbo. The Kangxi emperor was concerned about Qiu and summoned Qiu's two sons, asking them to pass on some medicine kept in the imperial stores (*neifu* 內府) to their father. It was reported that the medicine worked magically and Qiu recovered immediately after taking it (Jin 1982, 158). Qiu made further revisions to *Du Fu's Poetry with Detailed Annotations*, and also finished compiling his annotations of *Cantong qi* 參同契 (The Seal of the Unit of the Three), an ancient treatise on Chinese alchemy, explaining the Taoist way of making the golden elixir.¹³ Once again Qiu presented this book to the Kangxi emperor. However, the emperor's gift to Qiu, a golden fan with Kangxi's hand-written inscriptions, had arrived even before his submission reached Beijing. The last two lines of the inscription were quoted from Bai Juyi's 白居易(772-846) poem *Xun Guo daoshi buyu* 尋郭道士不遇 (Seeking the Taoist Guo but failing to find him): "I wish to consult him about the *Cantong qi*; I don't know when I can come again to follow him" (欲問參同契中事, 更期何日得相從) (*Yuding Quan Tangshi*, *juan* 440, 1.11). The poem describes how Bai Juyi went to visit a Taoist Priest with the surname Guo, intending to consult him about the book *Cantong qi*. However, the priest was not in the temple. Disappointed, Bai concluded his poem by asking when

¹³ The treatise, written by Wei Boyang 魏伯陽 in about 142 A.D., was translated into English by Lu-Ch'iang Wu in 1932. Tenney L. Davis provides the Introduction and Notes to the translation. For an introduction to the author of *Cantong qi* and the knowledge of Chinese alchemy, see Wu, Wei and Davis 1932, 210-230. Pregadio (2011) offers a more recent study and translation of the book.

he could come to learn from the priest about the book *Cantong qi*.¹⁴ Jin Zhi 金埴 (1663-1740), a poet and a *buyi* scholar of the Qing, used these two lines to praise a close relationship between the Kangxi emperor and Qiu, as the word *qi* 契 can also be understood as seamless, suggesting a seamless relationship between them – the emperor was missing Qiu, wanting to consult Qiu about scholarly works and to have Qiu’s company again. Jin Zhi proclaimed that the patronage of the Kangxi emperor to Qiu was far greater than that of the emperors Bai Juyi served in the Tang dynasty (Jin 1982, 158).

Bai Juyi was born in a time of great political disorder and lived through the reigns of eight emperors. He became a poet when he was still a child; however, because of the socio-political chaos of the time, there were no happy poems produced during his childhood. In 800 Bai Juyi was successful in the Literary Examination, and commenced his career as a government official. Up until his death in 846 he served seven emperors. His poems not only reflected the times of his life but also voiced his political criticism which often resulted in his being posted away from the court at Chang’an.¹⁵ Jin Zhi’s comparison of the Kangxi emperor and the seven emperors Bai Juyi served therefore contains a compliment to Kangxi, suggesting that none of the emperors Bai Juyi served were as great as the Kangxi emperor and none of these emperors would treat scholar-officials as the Kangxi emperor did. What Jin Zhi expressed here perhaps reflected the sentiment of many of those literati who failed the imperial examinations and were longing for such patronage, which could change their lives.

Li Yong 李顥 (1627–1705) and His Passive Resistance to the Kangxi Emperor’s Patronage

The preceding discussion reveals the allure of the emperor’s patronage to most Han Chinese scholars, and demonstrates Kangxi’s tactics aimed at conquering the mind

¹⁴ A study of Bai Juyi and his interest in Chinese alchemy (Yoke, Chye and Parker 1974, 166) suggests that this *Guo doashi* could be Guo Xuzhou 郭虛舟, one of the Taoist alchemists Bai Juyi encountered.

¹⁵ For an early study of Bai Juyi and his poetry, see Waley 1949; also Chu Binjie 1994.

and heart of Han scholars. However, there were still non-cooperative scholars who strove to maintain their identity as Ming loyalists by refusing to serve the Qing government. Li Yong, a native of Guanzhong, Shaanxi, was one such Ming loyalist.¹⁶ As a private scholar and teacher, Li Yong repeatedly declined to be recommended to the Qing government for a post or to take any of the official examinations, including the *Boxue hongru* examination in 1679. He even turned down the offer of an audience with the Kangxi emperor in 1703, a once in a lifetime opportunity that both Qiu Zhao'ao and Mei Wending embraced. This section focuses on how the Kangxi emperor, while showing his tolerance of Li's passive resistance, astutely demanded Li Yong's works – a tactic that forced Li Yong to comply with the emperor's order of *jin cheng*.

There is no evidence that Li was ever associated with any anti-Qing activities or groups. His loyalty to the Ming may have originated from his loyalty to the Confucian tradition in which filial piety is at the core. Li's father, Li Kecong 李可从 (1599-1642), was killed in fighting with the rebel Li Zicheng 李自成 in 1642. At that time Li Yong was barely 15 years old. His mother, née Peng, despite intolerable hardship, raised him with Confucian values of loyalty, filial piety, chastity and righteousness (Li 2012, 602). Even whilst living in poverty, she refused to remarry or send Li Yong to work in the local yamen. She was determined to remain loyal to both her husband and the Ming since her husband died for the Ming dynasty. This family background and life experience deeply “conditioned and shaped his social relations, intellectual views, and political stance” (Birdwhistell 1996, 20). It is from this perspective that we may see that the dynastic change “affected his relationship to the Confucian tradition, since he could not help but see current events from the perspective of a concern about the past and the future” (ibid., 20-21).

As mentioned earlier, Li Yong was regarded as the last major figure in the Guanxue tradition. His teachings attempted to reconcile the differences between the Cheng-Zhu School and the Wang Yangming branch of Neo-Confucianism. His understanding of

¹⁶ For Li Yong's life, see Hui 2012, 45: 556–594; also Hummel 1943–44, 498–499; Wu Huaqing 1992, *juan* 1–4; Zhao Erxun 1998, *Liezhuan* 列傳 (Arrayed accounts) 267: 3357–3358; Wickes 1967, 498–499. For an introduction to Li Yong's life and scholarship, see Peterson 2016, 495–497. Birdwhistell (1996) presents an intellectual biography of Li Yong.

a genuine Confucianism emphasised practical morality “along with a form of self-cultivation that featured rigorous reflective thought and practice” (ibid.,10). He was famous not only as a great Confucian scholar but also as an exemplar of filial piety.

In late 1703 the Kangxi Emperor carried out his western inspection tour, travelling to the western region including the provinces of Shanxi and Shaanxi. Gioro-Huaxian, the Viceroy of Shaanxi, along with other high officials of the western region, met with the emperor when he arrived at Pingyao, a city of Shanxi province. The emperor asked Huaxian about Li Yong, saying that when his tour reached Shaanxi, he would summon Li Yong. This was like an imperial decree, prompting the Viceroy to send Li Yong an invitation letter, along with a certain amount of gift-money. He asked Li to be at Xi’an in order to prepare for his meeting with the emperor. The Viceroy was aware of Li’s history of passive resistance, so he sent a hand-written letter to Zhang Houfang 張侯芳, the magistrate of the county (*yi* 邑), with a specific instruction that Zhang should go to Li Yong’s house with a generous endowment and cordially invite him to go to Xi’an to wait for the emperor’s summons. Furthermore, the Viceroy considered that Li Yong lived in poverty and would hardly have any money to pay for clothing and travel expenditure, so he particularly instructed Zhang Houfang that the county should take care of these issues and allow family members to accompany Li Yong to Xi’an; all the costs incurred should be reimbursed by the provincial government. (Li 2012, 595-596).

Li Yong’s son, Shenyan 慎言, sent a letter to the Viceroy on behalf of his father, pleading:

My father, now at an age of seventy-seven years old, has been ill since last autumn, and still cannot walk. He is dying and we have already prepared for his death. Magistrate Zhang knows all about this situation (ibid., 596).

言父年已七十有七，自客秋臥病，至今不能動履，一息奄奄，後事已為早備，此張令素所深知目擊者。

Zhang Houfang was sympathetic towards Li Yong’s situation and agreed to go to Xi’an and talk to his superior. However, on the 12th day the governor Jin Fu sent another official to the county before Zhang had reached Xi’an, demanding that Li Yong leave

for Xi'an that night. The reason behind this urgent order was that the emperor would arrive there on the 15th day, so the local officials wanted to make sure that Li Yong would be there on the 13th day. Shenyan had no choice but to leave for Xi'an with the government officials, hoping that he could plead his father's illness to the Viceroy in person. Those officials would not dare let Shenyan go home until the 19th day when the emperor sent an earnest and gentle edict (*wenzhi* 温旨): Li "is old and has been ill, so there is no need to force him to come" (高年有疾，不必相強) (ibid., 597).

Apart from excusing Li Yong from meeting with him, the emperor granted Li Yong a tablet adorned with four Chinese characters in his own calligraphy: *caozhi gaojie* 操志高潔 (unimpeachable integrity)¹⁷ along with a poem by himself. Then the emperor made a request for Li Yong's works (ibid.).

As discussed in previous sections, most scholars under the Kangxi regime, regardless of whether they had already entered officialdom or were still struggling to climb the social ladder, willingly followed the edict and presented their scholarly works to the Kangxi emperor. In the case of Li Yong, however, the emperor had to ask for it. On the twenty-first day Shenyan, Li Yong's son, was taken to the emperor's temporary palace in Xi'an by the Viceroy. Shenyan expressed his gratitude to the Kangxi emperor on behalf of his father, with Zhang Houfang, the county magistrate, holding Li Yong's *Erqu ji* 二曲集 (Collected works of Erqu) and *Sishu fanshen lu* 四書反身錄 (Record of reflections on the Four Books) on his knee to the left of Shenyan.

Li Yong, unlike Qiu Zhao'ao, did not voluntarily present his works to the emperor. For years Li Yong insisted on his commoner's position, and his passive resistance worked effectively against the official pressure and threats imposed on him and his family. He had nothing to lose since his own life was the only weapon he used in his fight to maintain his Ming-loyalist stance. This was especially evident in 1678 when Li Yong was recommended for the *boxue hongru* special examination. Although Li Yong declined it on the grounds of his poor health, the government officials did not listen and forced the local yamen runners to carry a bed-ridden Yong to Xi'an. Surrounded by the local officials and yamen runners, who all pressed him to stop his resistance,

¹⁷ Hummel provides a more literal translation: "Discipline and Purpose High and Pure" (Hummel 1943-44, 499).

Yong lay in bed and ignored them. Li Yindu 李因篤 (1631-1692), one of the fifty scholars who were admitted to the *boxue hongru*, came to bid farewell to Yong prior to his departure for the special examination. Seeing those who surrounded Yong were cold and intimidating, Li Yindu became concerned that Yong's resistance would bring misfortune to him, so he tried to persuade Yong to give in. Other people, who loved Yong and shared the same concerns about his life and safety, all echoed Li Yindu's advice. However, Yong closed his eyes without responding to any such advice or concerns, and commenced a hunger strike. (Li 2012, 586)

The Viceroy, however, placed more pressure on Yong and even threatened to charge him with resisting the imperial order (*kangzhi* 抗旨). Li Yindu, fearing for Yong's life, cried and begged Yong to be cooperative. Yong replied with a smile:

All human beings are mortal. I am only concerned with whether or not it is a worthy death. It would be the right place if I have to die today (ibid.).

人生終有一死，惟患死不得所耳。今日乃吾死所也。

He then began to make arrangements with his son and disciples for affairs after his death. Upon entrusting his will, he was determined to die and even stopped drinking water. On the fifth day the Viceroy, worrying that Li Yong would die on him, made an appeal to the Court on Yong's behalf whilst sending other officials to Yong's bedside to comfort him. Only under such circumstances did Yong end his hunger strike. In the end Li Yong was able to evade taking the *boxue hongru* examination. For this he gained the reputation of "iron man" (*tiehan* 鐵漢) (ibid.).

Gu Yanwu 顧炎武(1613-1682), one of the most famous Ming loyalists and historians, wrote a poem to express his admiration for his friend. In this poem, Gu eulogised Li Yong by using a historical reference to Li Ye 李業 (style name Juyou 巨游), an official and scholar of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 AD). Li Ye refused to serve Wang Mang 王莽 (r. 9-23 AD), and later Gongsun Shu 公孫述 (d. 36 AD) on account of illness. Shu sent his official, Yin Rong, to coerce Li into submission by giving him two options: either accepting the post or taking poison. Li took the poison. Shu was surprised and ashamed of killing a man with integrity, so he sent his envoy to Li Ye's

funeral and offered a gift of cloth to his son, but his son refused to accept it (Crespigny 2006, 434, 981). Gu praised Li Yong:

He is the scholar who knows where his loyalty belongs (讀書通大義),
His integrity stands above all righteous scholar-officials (立節冠清流).¹⁸

In a letter to his friend Li Zilan 李紫瀾, Gu said that the Viceroy changed his attitude and went on to make a plea on behalf of Li Yong because he was informed of the case of Li Ye and he feared that Li Yong would die on him. With this historical reference, Gu Yanwu regarded Li Yong as a man holding an unyielding commitment to his cause who “would not bend to threats” (*weiwu buneng qu* 威武不能屈): he “was pressured to [serve the government] by higher officials. He was even carried to a place near to Xi’an. Although bed-ridden, he had no choice but to hold a knife and vow to end his own life” (為上官逼迫，昇至進郊，至臥操白刃，誓欲自裁).¹⁹

The word *bipo* 逼迫 vividly describes the great pains that Li Yong and other Ming loyalists, such as Fu Shan 傅山 (1607-1684), Wang Hongzhuan 王宏撰 (1622-1702), and Xu Ye 徐夜 (1611-1683), endured to avoid being recommended (Peterson 1951, 237-238). Like Li Yong, they were all friends of Gu Yanwu (Chen & Zhu 2000, 162-163). Gu himself also held an unyielding attitude and threatened to kill himself in his response to Xiong Cili’s 熊賜履 (1635-1709) attempt to recommend him for the Ming History project (Chen & Zhu, *ibid.*; Peterson 1951, 233-234). He also refused to have his name submitted to the court for the *boxue hongru* examination (Chen & Zhu, *ibid.*; Peterson, *ibid.*, 236). Gu Yanwu, Li Yong and other Ming loyalists all valued their moral integrity (*jie* 節 or *qijie* 氣節) and reputation for virtue above their lives.²⁰

¹⁸ This poem, quoted in Hui Longsi 惠龍嗣 (2012, 586), is collected in Gu 1976, 418.

¹⁹ Gu 1976, 67-68, and Hui Longsi (2012, 586) quoted this letter in his biographical record of Li Yong.

²⁰ For an account of how well-known scholars, including Gu Yanwu and Li Yong, responded to the recommendations, see Peterson 2016, 573-579.

Wan Sitong and the Ming History Project

Compared with Li Yong and Qiu Zhao'ao, Wan Sitong was born into a prestigious family with an ancestral line of eleven generations who had been prominent largely due to their distinguished military service to the Ming dynasty from its founding year through to the career of Wan Bangfu 萬邦孚 (1544 – 1628), Sitong's grandfather. However, Wan Tai 萬泰 (1598-1657), Sitong's father, decided to focus on literature and history instead of pursuing a military career. (Liu 1936, 1b-3a). Like Huang Zongxi, Wan Tai was one of the devoted disciples of Liu Zongzhou, but neither followed the example of their teacher who committed suicide as a means of demonstrating his loyalty to the Ming court. Instead, they joined the anti-Qing force to fight the invasion of the Manchus in Zhejiang province, and both of them offered to work for the temporary Ming government at Shaoxing in 1645 (Liu 1936, 3a; Chen and Fang 1988, 333-34; 1991, 31-36; Hummel 1943-44, 352, 612, 614; Quan 1969, 4a-b).

When the Manchus took over Beijing, Sitong was only seven *sui*. Due to the political turmoil and the change of dynasty, the Wan family were forced into hiding on Yulin 榆林 mountain in Fenghua 奉化. According to Wan Sitong's own recollection (Wan 1936, 1.3a -b), they had to run between rocky mountain valleys during the day and rest at night with the fear of jackals and tigers (晝行巖壑間，夜宿豺虎際). At Yulin they lived in caves for more than three years (穴居逾三年) and were often short of grain. In 1649 the Qing government held a population census, aiming to identify the Ming loyalists and their families. Wan Tai had no choice but to take the family back to the city where they had previously lived, but their old residence had been ruined. As a result, they had to resettle in a village at Xigao 西皋 where they started farming. At that time, Wan Sitong was about 12 *sui*, but he went to work in the field with his brothers, and gradually became "a lad from a farmer's house" (*tianshe'er* 田舍儿) (ibid., 3b; Liu 1936, 3a-b). Under such trying circumstances, Wan Sitong's education, as the youngest son of Wan Tai, was neglected and Wan Tai was concerned about his future. However Wan Sitong devoted himself to the study of Confucian classics and history, surprising his family with the knowledge he had acquired through his self-study

(Liu 1936, 3b). In 1654 Sitong and his brothers, following Wan Tai's instruction, all went to study under Huang Zongxi (Chen and Fang 1988, 336).

Like Li Yong, Sitong never sat for the civil service examinations. Similar to most *buyi* scholars in early Qing, he made a living by tutoring in private houses (*guanke* 館課). In 1675 some of his classmates and friends, including Qiu Zhao'ao and his nephew, Wan Yan 萬言 (1637-1705), succeeded in the civil service examinations, but Sitong was adamant that he would not change his stance as a Ming loyalist. In 1678 he was recommended for the *boxue hongru* special examination, but he turned it down in order to uphold his loyalty to the Ming. By that time Sitong was well known for his scholarship in historiography, and celebrated scholars of the time were all eager to meet him and read his works (Yang 1936, 3b). The Three Xu brothers returned home that year to mourn their mother's death. They invited Sitong to their home at Kunshan, to help in compiling the ancient Chinese rituals of mourning. Sitong accepted the invitation and started working on the project *Duli tongkao* 讀禮通考 (Complete study of mourning rites). In 1679, shortly after he became the house guest of Xu Qianxue at Kunshan, the project of compiling the standard *Ming History* commenced, and Xu Yuanwen, as the head of this government project, invited Sitong and his nephew Wan Yan to go to Beijing with him. (Chen and Fang 1988, 342; Yan 2014, 931). Sitong declined the offer at first but later accepted this invitation with a strict condition that he would not take an official position in the Bureau for compiling the *Ming History*; instead he preferred to work at Xu Yuanwen's residence in Beijing. He also insisted that he would not take any salary from the government nor claim authorship. Under such conditions he participated in the project as a *buyi* scholar, and more importantly, as a Ming loyalist (Chen and Fang 1988, 343; Hummel 1943-44, 613).

One might argue that although Wan Sitong insisted on his *buyi* position and *yimin* stance, he was after all under the Xu brothers' patronage which, as mentioned earlier, was semi-official in nature. This may indicate that Wan Sitong softened his attitude toward Qing rule. However, as Quan Zuwang pointed out, Wan Sitong agreed to participate in the project because he decided to "serve his old country by undertaking the compilation of its history"; in so doing he kept his identity as a Ming *yimin* (蓋先生欲以遺民自居, 而即以任故國之史事報故國) (Quan 1977, 28.355). The word *guguo*

故國 here may be translated as “native land”, “old country” or “former dynasty”, but in the context of the compilation of a history of Ming, it surely refers to the Ming dynasty.

Some scholars viewed Wan’s participation in the Ming History project as a compromise made by Huang Zongxi with the Qing government (Wang Lijian 2016, 56).²¹ It is well-known to students of Chinese history that Huang Zongxi fought against the Manchus in the early Qing period. Like Wan Tai, in 1649 Huang was threatened by the Qing government which forced those who had joined anti-Qing forces to give up their resistance, otherwise their family members would be implicated. Huang Zongxi was concerned about the safety of his mother who at the time still lived at their old residence. He had no choice but to leave the resistance force in 1650 under a false name (Huang Houbing 1969, 29a-b; Quan 1969, 4b). After returning home and resuming his scholarly pursuits, Huang Zongxi, like many Ming loyalists of the time, adopted a non-cooperative stance by focusing only on his scholarship, teaching, and organisation of public lectures.²² In 1677 Ye Fang’ai 葉方霽 (1629–1682), chancellor of the Hanlin Academy and vice-president of the Board of Ceremonies of the time, tried to persuade Huang Zongxi to work for the Qing government, but Huang declined. In 1678, Ye recommended Huang Zongxi to the Kangxi emperor for the *boxue hongru* examination, but once again Huang managed to elude it thanks to his disciple Chen Xigu 陈锡嘏 (1634–1687), who appealed to the emperor on behalf of his teacher. In 1679, both Ye Fang’ai and Xu Yuanwen invited Huang Zongxi to take part in the Ming History project, but he once again turned down the offer, with the excuse that he had to look after his aged mother. This time Huang Zongxi was not so successful, as he was forced to make a significant compromise: allowing his son Huang Baijia 黄百家 (1643–1709) and disciples such as Wan Sitong and Wan Yan to work on the Ming History project (Huang Houbing 1969, 37; Huang 1936, 462). Since Huang Zongxi was reluctant to participate in the project in person on the grounds of his age and health condition, in 1680 the Ministry of Personnel ordered the local officials to copy

²¹ For a general account of the doubts about Huang Zongxi’s Ming *yimin* identity, see Liu & Wang 2010, 148–155.

²² For a thorough discussion of *jiang jing hui* 講經會 (Public lectures on Confucian classics) in the early Qing period, see Wang 2015, 78–175.

his collection of books and materials relevant to the Ming History project and submit them to the Bureau (*Da Qing Shengzu Ren [Kangxi] huangdi shilu* 2.1179).²³

Wan Sitong's participation in the Ming History project was encouraged by Huang Zongxi: "The task of identifying the virtuous and the treacherous of the Ming dynasty is now entrusted to a commoner" 一代賢奸托布衣 (Huang 1991, 4:84). However, he advised Wan Sitong not to engage in the project in an official capacity (Huang 1936, 462).

Wan Sitong echoed the view of Huang Zongxi. He was deeply concerned that there had been no books on the 293-year history of the Ming dynasty, and that this hiatus would leave later generations lacking in information related to Ming history (Liu 1936, 4a). Apart from this concern, Wan Sitong also had a strong personal reason: he linked his participation in the project to his ancestors' meritorious services to the Ming dynasty:

In the past, four of my ancestors died for the Ming. I am now compiling a Ming history. Is this not a service to the Ming? My ancestors had no difficulty in sacrificing their lives for the Ming; as a great grandson and great great grandson, how could I not devote myself to collecting historical pieces of the Ming? Otherwise, I would not be able to face my ancestors when I am six feet under. (Liu 1936, 4a)

昔吾先世四代死王事，今此非王事乎？祖不難以身殉，為其曾玄乃不能盡心網羅以備殘略，死尚可以見吾先人地下乎？

Clearly Wan Sitong regarded his engagement in the Ming history project as a service equivalent to his ancestors' sacrifices to the Ming. Inspired by this lofty ideal, Wan Sitong, as a commoner and *yimin*, accepted the challenge of working on the colossal project for over twenty years. He felt helpless over the dynastic change but hoped that he could at least use his knowledge to compile a Ming history so as to comfort his ancestors in heaven (今鼎遷社改無可為力者，惟持此志上告歷祖在天耳) (Liu 1936, 3a). He worked tirelessly on the project until his death, and this inspiration or

²³ For a specific study of Huang's large book collection, see Campbell 2006/2007, 1-24.

will (*zhi* 志) supported him in enduring (*yin ren* 隱忍) the separation from his family for such a long period (Liu 1936, 4a).

Wan Sitong's devotion to the Ming History project was also linked to his historiographical principles. He distrusted the official history project which, in his opinion, could be rushed and handled by many people who might not select materials with careful scrutiny, while neglecting the local contexts of the time when coming to describe a historical event or fact. As a result, such an official history project would only produce a piecemeal history which, Wan was deeply concerned, would fail to provide a clear record of historical periods between peace and disorder, nor identify the virtuous and the treacherous (使一代治亂賢奸之跡暗昧而不明) (Fang 1983, 332). With his determination to avoid such flaws in the Ming History project, he virtually changed the nature of this official project by undertaking the collection and sorting of material, compiling and editing the documents all in his own hand. In his mind, the sacrifice he made was similar to his ancestors' service to the Ming dynasty. From this perspective, we may say that Wan Sitong effectively made a unique *jìn cheng* to his ancestors. Furthermore, he took this project as the duty of a Ming *yimin* for future generations to remember the past rather than as his submission to the Qing government. In this sense his hard work to preserve the history of the Ming dynasty was an act of cultural loyalty rather than political loyalty.²⁴

The Power of the Kangxi Emperor's Soft Approach

For Ming loyalists like Huang Zongxi, Li Yong, and Wan Sitong, who valued their reputation and integrity more than their own lives, it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain their Ming-loyalist identity under the Kangxi emperor's soft power.²⁵ In the case of Li Yong, local officials had tried hard to coerce him to be cooperative with the government but all had failed. The emperor did not want to persecute a true

²⁴ Here I borrow the point made by Peter K. Bol on Yuan Haowen's 元好问 (1190–1257) letter to Yelü Chucai 耶律楚材 (1190–1244). See Bol 1987, 525.

²⁵ For a discussion of the difficulty in upholding the Ming loyalist stance in the Kangxi reign, see Zhao 2010, 28–54.

talent of the time and a great man of integrity, so he arranged for a plaque with his inscription to be placed on the wall of Li's house to symbolise their meeting. The emperor's praise of Li Yong's integrity turned Li's passive resistance into a high moral virtue endorsed by the Qing ruler. The emperor's plaque demonstrated not only his respect for a great scholar and a virtuous man, but also his tolerance of Li Yong's passive-resistance, which formed part of the Kangxi emperor's soft approach to the remaining Ming loyalists.

Before requesting Li Yong's works, the Kangxi emperor had already learned of his scholarship through the recommendations sent to him by local officials. After receiving two of Li Yong's books, he sent them to scholar-officials in his Southern Study (*nán shūfāng* 南書房) for an assessment of their content and value. They subsequently reported to the emperor that Li Yong's scholarship focused on understanding the substance of classical learning (*míngtǐ* 明體) and then applying it to social life and one's moral cultivation (*shìyòng* 適用). They also informed the emperor that Li Yong's *Fanshen lu* was "truly useful to the study of Zhu Xi's commentary on the *Four Books*, and would make a great contribution to the learning of the sages" (真堪羽翼朱註，有功於聖賢之學). His advocacy of *huìguo zìxīn* 悔過自新 - to repent one's fault and make a fresh start - encouraged everyone to put what they learned from the Classics into practice. It was the opinion of these scholar-officials that if everyone followed Li Yong's teaching and practice, then they could each become a gentleman (*jūnzǐ* 君子), and the whole of society would assume a peace and order commensurate with conditions under the rule of Tang Yao and Yu Shun, the legendary sage-kings (Li 2012, 597-598).

This scholarly evaluation of Li Yong's learning effectively aligned it with official ideology which, by promoting the principles of the Cheng-Zhu School of Neo-Confucianism (*lǐxué* 理學), emphasised "personal practice of the principles" rather than just empty talk. In Kangxi's own exposition, the true practitioner of *lǐxué* was "someone who says nothing about *lǐxué* but conducts all things in compliance with the principles" (Gong 2007, 2). The learning of Li Yong provided the emperor with a perfect example that he could use to shape the scholarly exposition of Neo-Confucianism into the official ideology of his regime. At the same time, the scrutiny of Li Yong's works ordered

by the emperor was a reminder to literati that censorship was always available to ensure their compliance with the official ideology.

However, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692), a Ming *yimin* scholar and thinker who was regarded as highly as Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu, questioned the legitimacy of Manchu rule in his famous *Du Tongjian lun* 讀通鑒論 (On the *Comprehensive Mirror*). Wang commenced writing this work when he was around 60 *sui* and it took him about ten years to complete it. His anti-Qing sentiments were embedded in his comments on the alien rulers of the past. He said that there were *zhitong* 治統 (the lineage of rule) and *daotong* 道統 (the lineage of Dao), in which the former referred to the seat of the Son of Heaven (*tianzi zhi wei* 天子之位) while the latter to Confucian teaching (*shengren zhi jiao* 聖人之教). He equated the alien rulers (*yi di*) to mean men and thieves, and accused them of stealing the seat of the Son of Heaven. He predicted that such thieves would not be able to rule for long as Heaven would punish them. Also, they might have stolen Chinese culture with the help of corrupt scholars, but they would never become sagacious rulers (以文致之為聖賢) because they could not acquire the essence of Chinese civilisation (Wang 1971, 242). Wang Fuzhi further commented that while a dynastic government could be destroyed, and the lineage of a royal family could become extinct, the Way of Confucianism would not vanish, as it was This Way of Ours (*si dao* 斯道) (ibid., 295).

The Kangxi emperor proclaimed the legitimacy of Manchu rule, arguing that he achieved a unity of *zhitong* and *daotong* through the promotion of Confucian tradition. In 1677 his preface to *Rijiang Sishu jieyi* 日講四書解義 (The daily exposition of the Four Books) stated that he, being both ruler and teacher (*yijun yishi* 亦君亦師), acted sagaciously to ensure the unity of the *daotong* (promoting Confucian teaching) and *zhitong* (Qing rule). He further claimed that the book elucidating the *Four Books* was intended to promote Confucian teaching in society, an effort he made in order to emulate the sage kings of antiquity (*Da Qing Shengzu Ren [Kangxi] huangdi shilu* 2.948).

It appears that the views of Wang Fuzhi and the emperor were diametrically opposed to each other, reflecting the tension between the Ming loyalists' denial of the legitimacy

of Qing rule and the early Qing court's image of the emperor as the legitimate son of Heaven (Kong 2009, 189-197). The promotion of Confucian tradition, nevertheless, represented a common ground where both parties advocated the lineage of the Way - Confucian teaching - and emphasised the importance of the continuity of Chinese civilisation. The Kangxi emperor's praise of Li Yong's scholarship reflected his endeavour to construct a self-image as *yi jun yi shi*, perhaps perceived as analogous to the sage king Shun 舜 and King Wen of Zhou 周文王 who, according to Mencius, "got their wish, and carried their principles into practice throughout the Middle Kingdom" (得志行於中國), despite their barbarian background (Legge 1893, 316-317).

After the 1679 *boxue hongru* special examination, there were more Chinese scholars who eagerly acknowledged the Kangxi emperor's accomplishment in upholding Chinese tradition. Apart from Qiu Zhao'ao, others, such as Quan Zuwang, Huang Zongxi's self-appointed follower, extolled the virtues of the Kangxi emperor who "made every effort to promote Confucian scholarship" (表章儒術,不遺餘力) (Quan 1969, 5b). The evidence he used to support this acclaim was the case of Huang Zongxi. In 1690 when Huang was already 81 *sui*, the emperor expressed his wish to have Huang Zongxi in Beijing as one of his advisors. Xu Qianxue indicated that it would be unlikely that Huang would make a trip to Beijing because of his age and poor health. Xu also informed the emperor that his brother Xu Yuanwen had previously put the same request to Huang, who had turned it down on the same grounds. (Huang Houbing 1969, 39b). Quan Zuwang described a similar account to this but emphasised the emperor's eagerness to recruit talented scholars. According to his narration, the Kangxi emperor and his high officials were all eager to have Huang Zongxi in Beijing, and the emperor even promised that Huang would be allowed to come and go freely:

He [Huang] may be summoned to Beijing. I won't ask him to undertake any tasks. If he later wants to go home, I shall order the officials to escort him home.

可召之京。朕不授以事。如欲歸，當遣官送之。(Quan 1969, 5b)

Upon learning that Huang would not come, the emperor sighed that "it is so difficult to get a talented person" (上因嘆得人之難如此) (ibid.).

In his narration, Quan exalted the Kangxi emperor's soft approach to Confucian scholars of the time, despite their anti-Qing government background. A worthy point here is Quan Zuwang's comment that Huang Zongxi, as a surviving subject of the Ming dynasty (*shengguo yichen* 勝國遺臣), escaped narrowly from death many times (*bin jiusi zhi yu* 瀕九死之餘) but at the age of 81 *sui* he ultimately obtained the emperor's recognition as a great Confucian scholar (*daru* 大儒), while still maintaining his integrity as a Ming loyalist (*zhong bao wan jie* 終保完節) (ibid.).

Quan's comment suggests that under the Kangxi emperor's soft power it was difficult for Huang Zongxi to insist on his non-cooperative position. As mentioned earlier, some scholars questioned Huang Zongxi's *yimin* integrity when he approved his son and disciples working on the Ming History project. From the above account we may see that under the pressure of being constantly pursued by the government, Huang had no alternative but to compromise with his pursuers. Moreover, Huang Zongxi had a lofty reason for the compromise he made, as he believed that "making a clear and correct record of the right and wrong in the history of the Ming is what a commoner could do to serve his old country" 一代是非，能定自吾輩之手，勿使淆亂，白衣從事亦所以報故國也 (Huang 1936, 462).

Indeed, many scholars in the Ming-Qing transition period were keen to pursue the truths of the past in order to understand their present problems. Ming loyalist scholars, such as Huang Zongxi, Wan Sitong, Gu Yanwu, and Wang Fuzhi, all made valuable contributions to this particular intellectual accomplishment (Ng & Wang 2005, 223-38; Cao 2014, 266-81). The case of Zhuang Tinglong 莊廷鑑 (?- 1655), also known as the Ming History case (1661-1663), which occurred at the beginning of the Kangxi era, however, dampened this scholarly enthusiasm (Hummel 1943-44, 205-206; Cao 2014, 272-274). After the Qing rulers gained more confidence in their claim to legitimacy and felt the need to make an official version of Ming history, an edict in 1665 encouraged the submission of private materials to the Bureau of the *Ming History*. Whereas the case of Zhuang Tinglong still cast a shadow over Chinese scholars, the *boxue hongru* special examination and the reopening of the Ming History project would have softened many Chinese scholars' attitudes to Qing rule. Huang Zongxi's compromise with the Qing government in regard to his son's and disciples'

participation in the Ming History project may have reflected this historical context in which the Kangxi emperor successfully presented himself as the great custodian and protector of Chinese cultural tradition by displaying his strong interests in Confucian classics and history. It was under such circumstances that Huang Zongxi and Wan Sitong were motivated to make their contributions to a true history of their *guguo*.

Nevertheless, this seemingly relaxed atmosphere does not mean that scholars such as Wan Sitong had the freedom to write what they believed was a true history. In 1687 Wan Sitong recommended Liu Xianting 劉獻廷 (1648-1695) for the project of *Da Qing yitong zhi* 大清一統志 (Gazetteer of the Great Unified Qing Empire). Also, Huang Baijia, Huang Zongxi's son, arrived in Beijing to join the *Ming History* project. Liu invited Wan Sitong, Dai Mingshi 戴名世 (1653-1713), and others to work together with him on a history of the Southern Ming, which they could not do within the official *Ming History* project. Wan Sitong agreed to this proposal and planned to go to Suzhou with Liu after the departure of Xu Qianxue, the former head of the Bureau. However, he was invited by Wang Hongxu 王鴻緒 (1645-1723) and Chen Tingjing 陳廷敬 (1638-1712), the new directors of the Bureau, to continue his work on the existing project.

After he moved to Wang Hongxu's residence, however, Wan was distressed and longed for home (先生不自得，抑抑思歸) (Liu 1936, 1a). This was partly due to his mourning for Liu Xianting who died at home in 1695, and because the materials Liu had collected for the project of the Southern Ming were all lost. Wan was worried that the information related to the history of the Southern Ming would disappear with the death of old Ming *yimin* and therefore asked his disciple Wen Ruilin 溫睿臨 (*juren* 1705) to collect such information, intending to carry forward this project after he returned home.²⁶ His distress was also caused by his disagreement with Wang Hongxu regarding the recording of historical facts. Wan Sitong insisted on recording them truthfully (*shixin* 事信) which, as a principle, was agreed upon by the former director

²⁶ Wen later completed *Nanjiang yishi* 南疆譯史 (Elucidation of the history of the southern regions).

Xu Qianxue. However, Wang Hongxu would rather sacrifice historical truths for the sake of avoiding taboo (Zhang 2009, 63-65).

Wang Hongxu's approach of selectively recording history was understandable. Like all government officials and scholars, he had every reason to be fearful of the potential consequences of his decisions. The case of Dai Mingshi in 1711 illustrates the danger of writing a history that was undesirable to the government. Dai was accused of denying Manchu authority by expressing his interest in collecting the records of the Southern Ming courts and in writing a true history of that period (Hummel 1943-44, 701-702; He 1987; Durand 1992). This interest subsequently cost Dai his life. As mentioned above, Wan Sitong actually shared this interest with Dai Mingshi. This case also suggests that while the Kangxi emperor adopted a soft approach toward the Chinese scholarly community, any challenge to the authority of Manchu rule would not be tolerated.

Apart from the threat of literary inquisition, the members of the *Ming History* Bureau had to contend with the Kangxi emperor's constant interference with the project – he often directly involved himself in the editorial process and loved to make substantial changes to existing documents. In so doing the emperor presented himself as an erudite scholar of Confucian classics and history while exerting his authority over this scholarly project, through which he ensured his control over the writing of Ming history and advanced his version of history (Ng & Wang 2009, 241; He 1998, 155-184).

The Kangxi emperor's soft power and its impact on the intellectual milieu of the time can also be illustrated by his patronage of the study of mathematics and astronomy. The encounter between the emperor and Mei Wending facilitated a new scholarly trend that changed the status of mathematical and astronomical studies from a largely neglected field of study to a fashionable area for intellectual inquiry (Bai 1995, 36-73). At the same time, the Kangxi emperor endeavoured to reconstruct the knowledge of mathematics he had learned from the Jesuits. In 1712 Mei Juecheng replaced the Jesuit scientists and became Court Mathematician. Later the emperor established the Mengyangzhai 蒙養齋 (Studio for the Cultivation of Youth) where Mei Juecheng together with a team of scholars worked on the imperial project *Collected Basic Principles of Mathematics* (*Shuli jingyun* 數理精蘊). It is noticeable that no Jesuits were involved in this project (Elman 2005, 179-80). Furthermore, the *Collected Basic*

Principles of Mathematics was prefaced with the claim of Chinese origins for Western learning (*xixue zhongyuan* 西學中源). Willard Peterson examines how Kangxi's patronage of Li Guangdi and Li's patronage of Mei Wending contributed to the formation of this idea, showing "What had been the new knowledge of mathematics and astronomy was codified in the encyclopaedic compilations" of the imperial projects such as the *Collected Basic Principles of Mathematics* (Peterson 2002, 387–88). In other words, the Kangxi emperor's patronage of mathematical and astronomical studies and encyclopaedic compilations ensured imperial control of the study and diffusion of Western learning (Jami 2002, 28–49 & 2007, 163; Jami & Han 2003, 88–110). He surely achieved his intentions.

In 1687 Wan Sitong met Mei Wending in Beijing and they remained friends until 1693 when Mei left Beijing for his hometown. Wan wrote "Song Mei Dingjiu nanhuan xu" 送梅定九南還序 (Farewell to Mei Wending returning home) to express his admiration for Mei, who was equipped with both traditional Chinese and Western knowledge of mathematics and astronomy. In Wan's view, Mei's work revealed that much of the so-called new knowledge that westerners boasted of actually originated in traditional Chinese knowledge. However, Wan acknowledged what was unique in Western knowledge, which complemented what was lacking in traditional Chinese knowledge (Wan 1936, 7.19b). Wan Sitong's account provides us with a glimpse of how scholars like Mei Wending helped disseminate the emperor's ideology amongst a circle of scholars who then led the intelligentsia and developed the scholarly norm that moulded academic activities and guided scholarly intellectual inquiry.

Conclusion

Liang Qichao contended that in 1672–1673, instead of continuing to coerce people into submission, the Kangxi emperor adopted a conciliatory approach to Han Chinese, especially toward scholars (Liang 1924/1989, 15–16). Modern scholarship by and large has agreed that the 1679 *boxue hongru* special examination was a landmark in the Kangxi emperor's new cultural policy. By that time the emperor was confident of maintaining his rule, due to triumphant military campaigns and the social stability that

the Qing had gradually achieved. Under such circumstances, most scholars accepted the legitimacy of Qing rule and craved a *jīn cheng* opportunity or an audience with the emperor; however, a few Ming loyalists, such as Li Yong, chose to use passive resistance to maintain their moral integrity. Such resistance no longer posed a threat to Qing rule as it had already secured its footing. Therefore, there was no need to suppress such Ming loyalists as the emperor had done with the Three Feudatories (Xiao 1972, 774). The Kangxi emperor now focused on conquering the minds and hearts of the Chinese, especially of influential scholars from the Ming dynasty.

The *jīn cheng* phenomenon discussed in this paper illustrates the tactics the Kangxi emperor employed to engage diversified groups of Han Chinese scholars in his imperial, social, and cultural projects, aiming to restore peace and establish cultural legitimacy and thus stabilise Qing political rule. In this context, the scholarship of Li Yong and Qiu Zhao'ao, although quite different, was incorporated into the official ideology to serve Kangxi's regime. Kangxi's endorsement of Li Yong's moral integrity, and his disregard for Huang Zongxi's anti-Qing background, cleverly moulded a Ming-loyalist persistence into the moral behaviour that the Kangxi government highly recommended. The emperor was willing to utilise Ming loyalists such as Li Yong, Huang Zongxi, and Wan Sitong because their deeds and writings, to a certain extent, endorsed the idea of a civil order above personal gain or immediate career interests, which helped promote the central and civil authority of Qing rule. This, together with the emperor's patronage of mathematical and astronomical studies and encyclopaedic compilations, became an integral part of a well-engineered plan to strengthen the Kangxi emperor's control of the scholarly world of the time. From this perspective, we may say that the soft power of the Kangxi Emperor achieved what could not be accomplished through coercion (*bīpò*). This aspect of Kangxi's soft power evolved as a new strategy in the mid-Qianlong period. While the Kangxi emperor's soft approach successfully transformed the Ming-loyalist stance into moral integrity, the Qianlong emperor in 1775 initiated a campaign to commend the self-sacrifice of Southern Ming loyalists in order to further the imperial policy of promoting Neo-Confucian ideology and absolute loyalty in society.²⁷

²⁷ Chan (2000) presents an excellent study of the Qianlong emperor's project to commend late-Ming loyalists.

Semi-official patronage played a significant role in helping the Kangxi emperor entice reputable Chinese scholars to work for the Qing government. Those in high government positions, such as the Xu brothers and Li Guangdi, had to satisfy the emperor's interests by encouraging, supporting, and even nurturing scholars like Mei Wending and Wan Sitong who, as private scholars, were pivotal to the imperial projects. Such government officials rendered their service to the emperor by recommending well-established scholars and their works to the emperor who, in turn, rewarded them with imperial favour. More importantly, their semi-official patronage functioned as a middle ground where Ming loyalists such as Huang Zongxi and Wan Sitong could participate in imperial projects either willingly or involuntarily, while still maintaining their identity as Ming loyalists.

Hence the scholarly *jìn cheng* in the Kangxi era represented a new relationship between the emperor and literati, in which a patronage system operated in order to establish and reinforce the cultural and ideological legitimacy of the Qing reign. As argued throughout this article, however, government censorship and literary inquisitions were paired with the emperor's *huairou* of Chinese scholars. One may compare Kangxi's cultural policy with Qianlong's literary inquisition through the *Siku quanshu* 四庫全書 (Complete Library of the Four Treasuries) project between 1772 and 1793. The *Siku* project invoked a nation-wide book collection which enabled the government to purge anti-Manchu literature (Guy 1987). This blatant censorship appears to be the antithesis of the soft approach adopted by the Kangxi emperor, the grandfather of Qianlong. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the *huairou* strategy employed by the Kangxi emperor does not equate to the modern use of the term 'soft censorship', or 'indirect government censorship', which refers to official actions intended to influence or manipulate media outlets and public opinion. Such actions may include, for example, the manipulation of media coverage by government agencies through financial means such as the allocation or withdrawal of government media spending. The use of financial instruments in this manner can effectively evoke pervasive self-censorship that ensures media coverage supports government policies, while maintaining a facade of media freedom. The soft approach adopted by the Kangxi emperor, however, while less restrictive, served to ensure that the success and standing of scholars within society at the time was ultimately governed by the emperor.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Reading between the Lines of a Classical Chinese Prose Anthology: *Guwen guanzhi* as a Subtle Challenge to State Orthodoxy

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Guwen guanzhi, first published in 1695, is the most renowned anthology of classical Chinese prose, and is still widely read in schools within Greater China. This article challenges the conventional assumptions that such anthologies in general echoed the imperial orthodoxy, and could not favour heterodox views, and that *Guwen guanzhi* in particular was just an ordinary anthology based on an imperially approved model, *Guwen yuanyuan*, without any other independent merits than its concise size. The analysis in this article suggests that *Guwen guanzhi* promoted diversity of thought and autonomous virtue both in terms of its approach to education and its critique towards authoritarianism. While it is impossible to say how intentional this was on the part of the anthology's compilers, *Guwen guanzhi* is nevertheless an example of how unorthodox ideas could have been promoted in a subdued manner.

1695 年首次發行的《古文觀止》是中國最知名的一部文言散文選集，至今仍在大中華地區學校中被學生廣泛閱讀。長期以來，學界認為該選集代表了對帝國正統觀念的認同，不讚同任何異端觀點。而《古文觀止》本身只是以官方認可的《古文淵鑿》作為模本，除了簡明扼要這一特點之外別無長處的一本普通選集。本文試圖對這些看法提出挑戰。作者認為就提供了教育的途徑及對權威主義的批評而言，《古文觀止》促進了思想的多樣性和獨立自主的品德養成。如今學者已經無法得知選集編纂者的具體用心，儘管如此，《古文觀止》仍然是一個表明非正統觀點曾經是通過柔和的方式推廣的良好範例。

Keywords: Literary Chinese, anthologies, orthodoxy, censorship, *Guwen guanzhi*

關鍵詞：中國文學，選集，正統觀念，審查制度，《古文觀止》

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Introduction

Guwen guan zhi 古文觀止, ‘*For classical prose, look no further*’, is the most renowned classical Chinese reader still in circulation. It is an anthology of literary Chinese prose originally published in the 34th year of the Kangxi 康熙 emperor’s reign (1695). The anthology soon became widely circulated, and has remained the most popular classical Chinese reader ever since.

Guwen guan zhi (hereafter *GWGZ*) was not the only classical Chinese reader in the early Qing, and it is not even the only one that has survived to the present day, but its overwhelming popularity is a remarkable phenomenon. Today it can be said that every Chinese with an intermediate-level education is familiar with it. The *GWGZ* matches in fame the anthology *Tangshi sanbai shou* 唐詩三百首, ‘*300 Tang poems*’, of 1763 (Li 2017, 340).

There are two common presuppositions about *GWGZ*. The first presupposition regards the origin of *GWGZ*, and labels the anthology as merely an abridged copy of some authoritative anthology serving the needs of students aiming to take the civil service examinations. The second, related presupposition regards the nature of the anthology, and summarily categorises *GWGZ* as one of the many anthologies with nothing more than literary ideals and pedagogical means behind its selection of texts, void of any political content. This article questions these presuppositions, and challenges the view that *GWGZ* was “nothing too extraordinary” (Clifford 2017, 226–227, xxxvii), and that it – or similar anthologies – could not “favor heterodox views” (see Laughlin 2004).

This article introduces first *GWGZ* and its compilers, and then discusses the place of *GWGZ* among other similar anthologies in its time, and the originality of the anthology. Then it lays out the societal background for its publication, leading into an analysis about the nature of the anthology, and its special characteristics. This article is based on a comparative study with a dozen classical Chinese readers in use during the early Qing dynasty, the time when *GWGZ* was first published. That study was approved as a Licentiate Thesis in East Asian Studies (Sinology) by the Faculty of Humanities,

University of Helsinki (Kallio 2011). The thesis was preceded by translating 105 texts from the GWGZ into Finnish, published in the form of a trilogy by Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press (Kallio 2005, 2007 and 2008).

Guwen guanzhi and its compilers

The original GWGZ is divided into 12 fascicles (*juan* 卷, ‘scrolls’), and altogether contains 222 texts.¹ The total length of the texts (notes and commentaries [*pingzhu* 評註] not included) is approximately 110,000 characters. The texts are arranged by period, ranging from pre-Qin dynasty until the Ming dynasty. There are 56 texts from the Zhou era (1045–221 BC), including 34 texts from *Zuozhuan* 左傳; 17 texts from the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC), including 14 texts from *Zhanguo ce* 戰國策; 31 texts from the Han dynasty (206 BC–220); six texts from the Six Dynasties (222–589); 43 texts from the Tang dynasty (618–907), including 24 texts by Han Yu 韓愈; 51 texts (by 12 writers, all from Northern Song) from the Song dynasty (960–1279); and 18 texts (by 12 writers) from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

Most of the texts are prose written in the ‘ancient style’ that *guwen* 古文 refers to. The consensus from the Tang dynasty onwards was that *guwen* meant ‘unrestrained prose’ (*sanwen* 散文), essays that were not written in parallel prose (*pianwen* 駢文). However, the borderlines between *sanwen* and *pianwen* have always been flexible.² GWGZ also includes three (or four) pieces written in parallel prose, as well as three *ci* 詞 and four *fu* 賦 prose poems.

Guwen also had the implication of the ‘ancient style’, the “unadorned and versatile style of historians and [Tang and Song] writers” whose main proponents during the Tang dynasty, Han Yu and Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元, had started a Campaign for the

¹ Perhaps the most reliable edition available today, which also contains the original notes and commentaries, is by Zhonghua Shuju (*Guwen guanzhi* 1987); its ‘critical notes’ (*jiaokanji* 校勘記) are copied (without mentioning the source) from Wang Wenru (early Republican era, see *Guwen guanzhi* 1998).

² Han-style *fu*-poems (*Han fu* 漢賦) have “always” been considered to be *sanwen*, whereas *ci*-poems began to be categorised as *sanwen* after the Song era (Xiong 2000, 27).

Ancient Style (Chow 1996a, 186). They regarded language as a vehicle for promoting the Way (*wen yi zai dao* 文以載道). This made *guwen* “more than a style of writing. It is a prose ideologically grounded in the Confucian Classics and the [Neo-Confucian rationalist doctrine of Cheng Yi 程頤 and Zhu Xi 朱熹] and methodologically steeped in” the ancient style (*ibid.*). Thus the term *guwen* is not void of political connotations.

GWGZ was compiled and edited by two village school teachers, Wu Chucai 吳楚才 and Wu Diaohou 吳調侯. Very little is known of the former, Wu Chengquan 吳乘權 (sobriquet Chucai 楚才, ‘Talent from the Jiangnan region’, 1655–1719). The latter, his younger nephew Wu Dazhi 吳大職 (styled Diaohou, 調侯), remains virtually unknown. Wu Chucai was from present-day Shaoxing. We know that he never became part of the established literati (*Shaoxing xian zhi* 1999, 2079; *Shaoxing shi zhi* 1996, 3098).

Wu Chucai’s uncle, Wu Xingzuo 吳興祚 (sobriquet Liucun 留村, ‘Lingers in the countryside’, 1632–97), was a high imperial official, a patron of the arts, and a poet himself. A native of Shanyin county in Shaoxing prefecture, Wu Xingzuo passed the county level examination in 1650. He was appointed surveillance commissioner (*anchashi* 按察使) for Fujian in early 1675, and there he captured the rebellious forces of a Ming-loyalist commander. As a consequence, Wu Xingzuo was promoted to the post of governor (*xunfu* 巡撫) in 1678, and he started mobilising troops for the take-over of Taiwan. He captured Xiamen in 1680. Wu Chucai, then 24 years old, joined his uncle in Fujian in 1678 and worked as his private secretary (*mubin* 幕賓) and as a tutor for his sons. That is when Wu Chucai started working on an anthology of classical Chinese prose (*Shaoxing xian zhi* 1999, 2079; *Shaoxing shi zhi* 1996, 3092–3).

Wu Chucai continued this work when he followed his uncle, who had become the Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi in 1682, to the south. It was there, if not earlier, that he was joined by his nephew Wu Diaohou (*Shaoxing xian zhi* 1999, 2081). It is not known when Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou returned to Shaoxing. In any case, the preface of the 1697 edition of GWGZ is dated in Shanyin county of Shaoxing prefecture.

Guwen guanzhi among classical prose anthologies

With regard to the first presupposition, it has been commonly assumed that GWGZ is based on the imperially approved selection of texts in the anthology *Guwen yuanjian* 古文淵鑑, published in 1685. After all, the commentaries of the latter became the standard for the civil service examinations. For example, Gao Yang 高陽 states that *Guwen yuanjian* must have served as a model for *Guwen Guanzhi*, which according to him is demonstrated by the fact that both begin with a selection from *Zuozhuan* (Gao 1987, 2). There have been two master's theses (Wang 2005; Zhang 2007) written in either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China on Taiwan about GWGZ,³ and both assume that the majority of texts would have been selected from *Guwen yuanjian*. Understandably, they also assume that GWGZ was purely a study-aid for the imperial examinations.

Guwen yuanjian (or *Yuxuan guwen yuanjian* 御選古文淵鑑, 'Imperially Commissioned Profound Mirror of Ancient Essays') was one of the major literary undertakings during the beginning of the Qing dynasty. The Kangxi emperor was personally involved in the selection (Creel 1949, 250). The anthology consists of approximately 1,000 texts in 64 fascicles, covering the period from pre-Qin until the Song dynasty. No poetry is included, and the term *guwen* in the title seems to refer to 'ancient style'. The texts are arranged by era, beginning with texts from *Zuozhuan*.

The following statistics illustrate the similarities and differences between *Guwen yuanjian* (1873) and GWGZ:

(1) In *Guwen yuanjian*, texts from *Zuozhuan* total 59. Out of the 34 *Zuozhuan* texts in GWGZ, 19 are the same as in *Guwen yuanjian*.

(2) In *Guwen yuanjian*, texts from *Zhanguo* total 19. Out of the 14 *Zhanguo* texts in GWGZ, six are the same as in *Guwen yuanjian*.

³ Based on an internet search and searches conducted in the National Libraries both in Beijing (December 2007) and in Taipei (April 2006) of their databases of the Master's theses and PhD dissertations written in the People's Republic and the Republic of China, respectively. An updated search in December 2019 on Wanfang Data revealed no further theses in the PRC which study GWGZ per se.

(3) *Guwen yuanjian* includes 12 texts from *Gongyangzhuan* 公羊傳 (GWGZ includes three, one of which is the same as in *Guwen yuanjian*), and nine texts from *Guliangzhuan* 穀梁傳 (GWGZ includes two, one of which is the same as in *Guwen yuanjian*).

(4) *Guwen yuanjian* includes ten texts by Cheng Yi and 36 by Zhu Xi. GWGZ has no texts from either.

(5) In *Guwen yuanjian*, both Southern (Chinese) and Northern (non-Chinese) Dynasties are equally represented by one fascicle each; GWGZ uses the period title ‘Six Dynasties’, which excludes the Northern Dynasties.

These statistics show that the selections in the two anthologies are significantly different. Only one third (74 in total) of the 222 texts in GWGZ are also in *Guwen yuanjian*, and the proportions of selections from different sources do not match in the two anthologies. A closer look further reveals that even the texts which both the anthologies share appear under different titles, and have been selected in differing lengths. Furthermore, neither the notes nor the comments appear to have any similarities. Therefore, I conclude that it is most improbable that Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou based any part of their work on *Guwen yuanjian*. In fact, they may never have seen it. At the time when Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou were compiling their anthology, the availability of *Guwen yuanjian* was possibly not very widespread; it was also probably expensive due to its massive size of 64 fascicles.

However, those who have questioned the originality of GWGZ are right. There was indeed a “blueprint” for GWGZ, namely *Guwen xiyi* 古文析義, ‘*Elucidation of ancient-style prose*’,⁴ published in 1682. None of the GWGZ editions I have consulted for this study mention the role of *Guwen xiyi*, and neither do Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou in their preface. Instead, they explain themselves in a rather roundabout way as follows: “Should one make selections of *guwen*? The answer: It is useless.” Good and bad texts are accumulating all the time, so how could one make a selection? “Therefore the two of us do not dare to speak of selecting, but of compiling. How do we compile? In order to compile writings by ancient men, we compile from what ancient and modern men have selected”, complementing, systematising and correcting

⁴ Translation of the title by Cynthia J. Brokaw (2007).

along the way, exercising extreme caution and relying on many years' experience.⁵ The similarities between *Guwen xiyi* and GWGZ have been noted in only a few other sources. *Fuzhou shi zhi* (2000, 548), notes that “*Guwen xiyi* preceded GWGZ and had a strong influence on it”. In addition, in a book review in *Zhonghua dushu bao*, Feng Xu 馮虛 calls *Guwen xiyi* a “blueprint” for GWGZ (Feng 2003).

Guwen xiyi consists of two volumes, the ‘original’ *zhengbian* 正編 and the ‘sequel’ *xubian* 續編 or *erbian* 二編. It is unclear whether both were published at the same time. The ‘original’ volume has 231 texts from 76 writers or sources in six fascicles, ranging from pre-Qin until the Ming dynasty, and organised in periods. The ‘sequel’ has 360 texts from 102 writers or sources in eight fascicles. My comparison shows that 86% of the texts in *Guwen guanzhi*, i.e. 190 texts, seem to originate from *Guwen xiyi*, mostly from its first volume.⁶ Even the relative proportions of the different writers or sources are rather similar. The following statistics illustrate the similarities and differences between *Guwen xiyi* (2011) and *Guwen guanzhi*:

- (1) *Guwen xiyi* has 84 texts from *Zuozhuan*, equalling 14% of all the texts. GWGZ has 34, equalling 15% of all the texts. Of these 34 texts, 32 are the same as in *Guwen xiyi*.
- (2) *Guwen xiyi* has 38 texts from *Guoyu* 國語, equalling 6% of all the texts. GWGZ has 11 texts, equalling 5% of all the texts. All these 11 texts are the same as in *Guwen xiyi*.
- (3) *Guwen xiyi* has 51 texts from *Zhanguoce*, equalling 9% of all the texts. GWGZ has 14 texts, equalling 6% of all the texts. Out of these 14 texts, 12 are the same as in *Guwen xiyi*.
- (4) Of the 100 texts from the Six Dynasties, Tang, and Song periods in GWGZ, 91 are the same as in *Guwen xiyi*.

⁵ 古文宜選乎。曰、無庸也。… 且余兩人非敢言選也、集焉云耳。集之奈何。集古人之文、集古今人之選… 云耳。

⁶ According to Feng (2003), 88% of the texts in GWGZ have been selected from *Guwen xiyi*. Feng does not provide a list of texts which he sees as originating from *Guwen xiyi*, so I am unable to explain the two percentage-point discrepancy.

(5) *Guwen xiyi* has 42 texts from the Ming period, equalling 7% of all the texts. GWGZ has 18 texts, equalling 8%. Of these 18 texts, seven are the same as in *Guwen xiyi*. *Guwen xiyi* includes texts from 42 Ming era writers, GWGZ 12. Out of these 12 writers, 11 are the same as in *Guwen xiyi*. Of the so-called Seven Masters of Ming (*Ming qianhou qi zi* 明前後七子), GWGZ selected only texts from Wang Shizhen 王世貞 and Zong Chen 宗臣, exactly like *Guwen xiyi*.

If these statistics are not sufficient proof that GWGZ has its origins in *Guwen xiyi*, a further analysis leaves no room for doubt. First, a selection from *Liji* 禮記 does not appear in any other collection before GWGZ than *Guwen xiyi*, and the selected six texts are exactly the same. Second, some texts have sections that have been rewritten or abbreviated in exactly the same manner (e.g. the beginning of text #27 *Yanzi bu si jun nan* 晏子不死君難 has been similarly rewritten, and text #61 *Yan Chu shui Qi wang* 顏觸說齊王 has been abbreviated similarly by deleting a section from the middle). Third, mistakes or alterations in characters are repeated in both books (e.g. in text #115 *Chunye yan taohuayuan xu* 春夜宴桃花園序 by Li Bo 李白, ‘peach blossoms’ (*taohua* 桃花) are changed into ‘peaches and plums’ (*tao li* 桃李); and in text #127 *Hui bian* 諱辯 by Han Yu, the character *ji* 機 is used instead of its homophone 飢; see An 1987, 319, note 2).

It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that the commentaries and notes in GWGZ are not copied from *Guwen xiyi*. In fact, the comments do not appear similar to any other commentaries I have seen. Therefore, one has to assume that they have been independently produced by Wu Chucui and Wu Diaohou.

Guwen xiyi was compiled and edited by Lin Yunming 林雲銘 (1628–97). He was a mid-ranking official (*tongpan* 通判) who had passed the metropolitan examination in 1658. Despite several attempts, he never succeeded in getting a post in the capital, and after having lost an official position, he retired to literary work in his native place, Fujian. Later he moved to Hangzhou, where he earned a living as a writer and as a travelling village teacher. His literary undertakings include a collection of *ci*-poems and a study of the structure of *Zhuangzi* 莊子 (*Fuzhou shi zhi* 2000, 548; *Zhongguo lidai*

renming dacidian 1999, entry ‘Lin Yunming’). Unlike GWGZ, *Guwen xiyi* was destined to become one of the many anthologies of the late imperial era to fall into oblivion.

Interestingly, the paths of Lin Yunming and the Wus may have crossed. Lin had been imprisoned by a Ming-loyalist general in early 1674, and he remained in captivity for eighteen months until the rebel forces surrendered (*Fuzhou shi zhi* 2000, 548).⁷ A scholar-official of some distinction, Lin Yunming may well have met Wu Xingzuo after his release. At that time, at least the first volume of *Guwen xiyi*, which was published in 1682, must have been close to completion. We know that an early version of the manuscript “is said to have been lost in the course of the ‘Fujian troubles’ ...” (Brokaw 2007, 359). It seems a remarkable coincidence that both Lin Yunming and Wu Chucui were in the same place at the same time, and that some aspects of GWGZ can be regarded as plagiarising *Guwen xiyi*.

Later, several competing anthologies, some of which can be seen as plagiarising GWGZ, entered the market. In particular, two anthologies resemble GWGZ in size, and seem to copy both GWGZ and *Guwen xiyi* in the selection of the texts. One of them, *Guwen shiyi* 古文釋義, ‘*Explaining the meaning of guwen*’, was compiled and edited by Yu Cheng 余城 (Qing dynasty, the year of publication is unclear). *Guwen shiyi* has 147 texts in eight fascicles, and a great majority of all the texts—71%—seem to have been selected from *Guwen guan zhi*. Moreover, of the remaining 43 texts, 21 can be traced to *Guwen xiyi*. The other, *Guwen pingzhu quanji* 古文評註全集, ‘*A complete compilation of ancient prose with notes and commentaries*’, was compiled and edited by Guo Gong 過珙 (Guo Shanghou 過商侯) in 1703 in present-day Wuxi. The anthology has 233 texts in twelve fascicles. Of these texts, 164 seem to be selected from GWGZ.

⁷ Why Lin Yunming had been captured by the Ming loyalists is unclear. Lin was no longer in office when he was living in Fujian.

Decentralisation, independent self-cultivation, and money-making

The time when GWGZ was compiled, the early Qing, was a very conservative era. Confucian social order was reduced to Sixteen Maxims (*Shang yu shiliu tiao* 上諭十六條) promulgated by the Kangxi emperor. They were devised to form the orthodoxy (de Bary 2000, 71–72). The Manchus' aim of gaining absolute control was also reflected in the field of education and literature. The Kangxi emperor was personally involved in the compilation of *Guwen yuanjian*, which was to become the standard material for preparing for the essays in the civil service examination. In 1699, the Kangxi emperor appointed a special board to create a new edition of the commentaries to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. The major objective of this work was to condemn all those passages which asserted that an unworthy or tyrannical ruler had no claim to loyalty (Creel 1949, 250), resembling the censoring of *Mencius* by the first emperor of the Ming three centuries earlier (Fuehrer 2018, 238–241).

This conservatism was met with resistance on at least two different levels. First, the ideological orthodoxy based on the correct doctrine – exemplified not only by the maxims but also by the state-sponsored dominance of the School of Principle among philosophical Neo-Confucianism – gave rise to ideological opposition. As Prasenjit Duara has remarked, “It is widely accepted that there was a Confucian tradition of literati autonomy and dissent which developed most particularly in the Ming-Qing transition during the seventeenth century”, aiming to free Confucian ideals from the exclusive service of imperial government (Duara 1996, 153). The members of the opposition, like Gu Yanwu 顧炎武, aimed to reconstruct the social order of high antiquity and bring Confucianism back to its roots (Chow 1996a, 204; Chow 1996b, 54–55). Many scholars, such as Gu Yanwu, also turned against excessive unification policies, and spoke for the benefits of decentralised rule (Chow 1996b, 80–84), which they referred to as *fengjian* 封建, ‘divided enfeoffment’ in J. Spence’s (2001, 166) translation. (In other contexts, *fengjian* is most often translated as ‘feudal system’ because the term referred to a system of semi-autonomous duchies under the overlordship of the Son of Heaven, forming a nominally unified empire.)

A second form of resistance came from developments at the grass roots level, corroding orthodoxy and unity from below. Many scholars have argued that many characteristics of a civil society emerged at that time, interlinked with the rise of the printing press (Duara 1996, 150). Since the late Ming, commerce had been booming both within China and with foreign nations. As a result, cities were growing and new market towns were springing up. As a consequence, a middle class was beginning to take form, comprising merchants, artisans, and scholars without an official position. The members of this group possessed wealth, power, and literacy, and an ambition to provide their offspring with tools for social climbing (Lufrano 1997, 5). Commerce was no longer looked down upon, but started to be regarded as a respectable career for someone who had not been successful in climbing the imperial examination ladder. From the merchants' perspective, there was a recognition that Confucian teachings could actually help them earn money in a similar manner to how those teachings helped the scholar-officials to rule the country (Yu 1987, 544-545).

There was a strong "self-cultivation approach to commerce" (Lufrano 1997, 23). The teachings of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) were crucial for this social change. "Its proponents ... seeking to make their teachings relevant to the daily needs of the subordinate classes, declared that any member of society regardless of class could achieve sagehood. Their teachings thus propagated the radical notion of the intrinsic equality of all" (Lufrano 1997, 43). The Taizhou branch of the Yangming School reached out to non-elite people by establishing private academies and sponsoring large public lectures. Merchants, especially, actively sought contact with the school. It is noteworthy that the scholars representing Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, who were responsible for setting the standard for the civil service examinations - to be known as the Tongcheng School (桐城派) in the 1700s - showed little interest in commerce while their opponents often enjoyed the support of wealthy merchants (Chow 1996a, 186-187, 199-200).

The growth of the middle class benefited the traditional scholars. There was money to be made through the production of materials to fulfil the learning needs of this group. Many commercial printing houses started publishing popular encyclopaedias, primers, morality books, travel guides, self-help books, and even fiction, and those

books needed writers (Lufrano 1997, 17, 33).⁸ In the beginning of the Qing dynasty, the demand grew for textbooks that helped the integration of the Manchu aristocratic youth, and similar materials were also in demand among the middle class. There was even a proliferation of classical literature compilations.⁹ After all, mastery of Literary Chinese was the sign of a gentleman.

It is very likely that this proliferation is the reason for GWGZ's existence. While Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou could hardly have hoped for their work to compete against *Guwen yuanjian* or other prose compilations produced by well-known scholars for a prominent position among the materials used for coaching students for the civil examinations, the two village teachers could nevertheless have had a market among the rising middle class. A rare glimpse of the situation regarding readers in Literary Chinese during early Qing is provided by Cynthia J. Brokaw in her work, *Commerce in Culture—The Sibao Book Trade in the Qing and Republican Periods*. The list of books available in a rural shop in Fujian includes some twenty different *guwen* anthology titles, among others *Guwen xiyi*, *Guwen shiyi*, and GWGZ (Brokaw 2007, 516, Appendix G, 11-12).

Against the demand for orthodoxy by the Imperial Government, many literati in the early Qing era, especially those living in the Jiangnan region, were calling for more freedom and space in ideology as well as government. A time-honoured fashion for expressing criticism in China has been to resort to the quoting of ancient texts, superficially unrelated to the contemporary society. Instead of voicing a direct critique, you could discuss a historical event or account in an allegorical manner. For example, if you wanted to say that the Emperor should trust his subjects, then you could write about mythical rulers who did so, and the benefits that followed.¹⁰ You could also subtly guide your readers to think in a certain way by promoting texts that supported the desired viewpoint. Therefore, even an innocent anthology of Literary Chinese was

⁸ Lufrano writes of merchant manuals, but the situation was likely to also have been the same for other types of textbooks.

⁹ Hong et al. 2001 includes a non-conclusive but nevertheless impressive list of classical literature compilations from the different dynasties. These numbers based on that list are probably at least indicative: the number of compilations published during the Song dynasty was 62, with the Yuan, Ming and Qing having 5, 24 and 80 respectively.

¹⁰ One example is Ouyang Xiu's 歐陽修 essay *Pengdanglun* 朋黨論, #162 in GWGZ.

potentially a tool for political propaganda, depending on the selection and presentation of the texts.

What is unique about *Guwen Guanzhi*: comments, selection and content analysis

With regard to the second presupposition, mentioned in the Introduction, GWGZ is commonly regarded as “nothing too extraordinary” or even “unbearably boring” (Clifford 2017, 226–227, xxxvii). Along similar lines, Charles Laughlin categorised GWGZ as one of the standard premodern anthologies which “generally favor formal essays of serious import that cleave to Confucian values” in contrast to “more modern collections” which “increasingly favor heterodox views, and include more ‘individualistic’ essays on small, private matters” (Laughlin 2004).

Taking into account the societal background of GWGZ, illustrated above, the question arises: Are there signs in the GWGZ indicating that its compilers may have been hiding passive resistance against and criticism towards the political system and realities of its time? In order to shed light on this question, this article makes an effort to measure the relative extent to which the texts manifest centralism and unity, which would have been the preferred orientation of the Imperial Government, and their opposing forces, localism and pluralism.

First it is necessary to take a deeper look at the special characteristics of GWGZ. While the GWGZ is greatly indebted to *Guwen xiyi*, there are characteristics that set them apart. We may find those by looking at the comments which are unique to the GWGZ, as well as those texts which are not included in *Guwen xiyi*.

Studying the comments in GWGZ, the most noteworthy and special characteristic of GWGZ is the educational ideology it manifests. Unlike Lin Yunming, the editor of *Guwen xiyi*, Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou included Han Yu’s *Shi shuo* 師說, ‘On Teachers’ (text #124), in their anthology. During the Song dynasty, Yu Wenbao 俞文豹 accused Han Yu of not understanding that teaching is a life-long vocation, although

“he presumably seeks employment as a teacher himself”¹¹ (Zhu 1997, 168–169). Lin Yunming echoes the assumption that Han Yu wrote the piece for his own livelihood’s sake, and goes on to state that it does not follow any traceable logic and is exhausting to read (Hong 2001, vol. 2, 447). Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou disagree in their commentary to the text:

He says all people everywhere can be teachers, no matter whether they are old or young, rich or poor; as long as there are people, one can choose a teacher for oneself. ... This piece is all about his wish that young master Li [to whom this piece is dedicated] can get an [proper] education. Hence it is not correct to say that Han Yu wrote this in desperation, in order to seek employment as a teacher, and in order to draw followers to him (*yi chang houxue* 以倡後學).

The preface to the 1695 edition of GWGZ (*Guwen guanzhi* 1899), written by Wu Xingzuo, contains what has generally been regarded as the motto for *Guwen guanzhi*: *Yici zheng mengyang er bi houxue, que gong qi qianxian zai* 以此正蒙養而裨後學，厥功豈淺鮮哉, usually explained to mean: “When they thus set right the educational practices at traditional private schools and aid the younger student generations, how could their achievement be regarded as trivial!” Indeed, Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou avoided the overly difficult texts that many teachers tended to use in order to flaunt their own expertise, and made their explanations as clear and concise as possible. They wanted to offer help to those in need, as in *bi houxue* 裨後學, ‘assisting the less advantaged students’,¹² thus following the very ideals of Han Yu.

Furthermore, Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou held in very high regard the essay by Wang Yangming, *Zunjingge ji* 尊經閣記, ‘Pavilion for Revering the Classics’ (text #212), which they also selected in *Guwen guanzhi*, although it was not included in *Guwen xiyi*. In their commentary to the text, Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou state:

The Six Classics are not outside my heart; my heart itself contains the Six Classics (*wu xin zi you liu jing* 吾心自有六經). Why do the students of the Way

¹¹ 蓋以師道自任

¹² *Houxue* stands for *houjin xuezhe* (後進學者), ‘those studying who come after us’, and as such can refer to either students of a younger generation or to less advanced, or even less privileged students.

seek (the truth) from afar? Return to your heart, and you may grasp the essence of the Six Classics to guide you forward. Master Yangming has guided people all his life always to use their innate knowledge and instinct to probe into the roots of man's true nature (*yi yi liangzhi liangneng genjiu xin-xing* 一以良知良能、根究心性). For that aim he wrote this reminder.

Yu Yingshi sees a connection between Chan-Buddhist “illumination” and Han Yu’s “dispelling of fallacies” (Yu 1996, 479), thereby making Han Yu a forerunner of Wang Yangming in this respect. The idea that people should shun blind belief in generally accepted truths and that anyone can intuitively understand the Classics was unorthodox (see e.g. Lodén 2006, 123). It is therefore remarkable to find such an essay in a textbook such as *GWGZ*. All in all, Wu Chucai’s and Wu Diaohou’s pluralistic and individualist views regarding education fall in line with the grassroots cultural climate of the time and place where they were living.

Furthermore, some of texts selected for *GWGZ* by Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou can be deemed controversial. The inclusion of such a Gong’an School (*Gong’an pai* 公安派) leader as Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道 has been called a proof of exceptional insight on the part of Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou (Chen 200x, 2-3). The text #221 *Saotan zhumengzhe* 騷壇主盟者 accuses the Later Seven Masters of blindly copying the form of old writings without understanding the real essence of the *guwen*. However, the selection may also have been motivated by the fact that the text is a short biography of a Shaoxing-born celebrity, Xu Wei 徐渭 (Xu Wenchang 徐文長), and it is possible that Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou selected the text simply out of civic pride. More noteworthy is the fact that neither Zong Chen’s famous political parody, text #216 *Bao Liu Yizhang shu* 報劉一丈書, nor the sarcastic allegory of mandarin oranges, text #208 *Maiganzhe yan* 賣柑者言, by Liu Ji 劉基, is found in any preceding anthology. The most striking “rebellious” act is ending the anthology with the “pro-anarchic” essay by Zhang Pu 張溥, text #222 *Wu ren mubei ji* 五人墓碑記, which relates to the events leading to the rise of the Restoration Society (*Fu she* 復社), a conservative-Confucianist literary school that transformed into a social movement fighting

corruption.¹³ Zhang's essay (see also discussion on content analysis, below) shares the tendency of the famous lamentation by his contemporary, Gu Yanwu: "That humanity and righteousness are lost to the extent that beasts are led to devour people and that people are on the point of eating each other, is called losing [the right to rule over] All-Under-Heaven."¹⁴ All these controversial texts, tinged with compassion for the plight of the common people, manifest a strong emphasis on innate virtue at the expense of state-defined morals.

A similar emphasis is also revealed through a content analysis. I used as a sample the 105 texts which I have previously translated. Those texts I have studied in the detail necessary for the requirements of a content analysis. They compose a sample that has the same relative amount of texts from all the eras, by which the texts are organised in the *GWGZ*, as the entire anthology. The translated texts consist of an equal proportion (ca. 47%) from all eras.¹⁵ Therefore, they can be considered to form a representative and random sample. The texts have then been analysed with a method corresponding to a conventional content analysis, meaning a qualitative analysis of the manifest content of text data (Holsti 1969, 2-5), made quantifiable through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes as well as their underlying categories (Holsti 1969, 94, 116-117; Neuendorf 2017, 50). Content analysis follows the standards of scientific method, including objectivity and replicability (Holsti 1969, 3-14; Neuendorf 2017, 10-14).

Guided by the research question, I have identified three themes (or dimensions; x, y, z). The first theme (x) is the relationship between the state (the ruler) and the people. There the content categories to be identified in each sample text include loyalty, pacifying the commoners, good of the state vs. humane authority, rights of the people. The second theme (y) is the relationship between state-defined morals and innate virtue (dogmatism, emphasis on authority vs. emphasis on virtue and autonomous ethics).

¹³ The same text is in *Guwen xiyi* (the 'sequel') as well, but in a less prominent location.

¹⁴ 仁義充塞而至於率獸食人人將相食謂之亡天下 (Gu 1782, 013-7a). Through paraphrasing two philanthropic verses in Mencius, I.A.4 and VII.B.13, Gu was expressing his anti-Manchu feelings (Chow 1996b, 45).

¹⁵ Furthermore, the sample includes an almost equal proportion of texts originating from *Guwen xiyi* (88/190) and those not included in *Guwen xiyi* (17/32), the difference from entirely equal proportions amounting to 2 texts (90/190 and 15/32 both equal 47%). For a more detailed discussion on the randomness, see Kallio 2011, p. 102-103.

The third theme (z) is the relationship between territorial unity and the *fengjian* ideal (unity, heavenly order vs. regional rule, opposing hegemony).

Each theme of a text was coded with a numerical value (-1 for relative monism/orthodoxy/centralism, 0 for no correlation/not relevant, 1 for relative pluralism/heterodoxy/localism). For the sake of simplicity, no decimal values (such as “-0.7”) have been used, and the analysis has consciously erred on the conservative side, i.e. assigning “0” value when the case is not clear. Three examples of the coding practice are given below:

(1) In text #7, *Ji Liang jian zhui Chu shi* 季梁諫追楚師, Ji Liang’s answers to the Marquis of Sui form the message of the text. Ji Liang suggests that the ruler should focus on the wellbeing of his subjects.¹⁶ This manifests a desire for humane authority, and therefore I coded $x=1$. Ji Liang also laments that the Marquis’s subjects fail to realise that sacrifices to the gods are needed for the public good, and just follow their own will.¹⁷ This manifests a utilitarian approach, dismissing the desirability of being virtuous for virtue’s sake, and therefore I coded $y=-1$. With regard to the third theme, Ji Liang advises against attacking the neighboring state.¹⁸ This manifests a preference for regional rule and opposition to hegemony, and therefore I coded $z=1$.

(2) Text #60, *Fan Ju shui Qin wang* 范雎說秦王, contains the words of a peripatetic advisor. The emphasis is on the orderly rule of the state and the success of its ruler, with no agency given to the people,¹⁹ so I coded $x=-1$. The theme of the story is the integrity of the advisor overriding his sense of loyalty and obedience, though he knows that this could cost him his life.²⁰ Therefore, I coded $y=1$. Finally, the advisor’s point of departure is the desirability of unity under heaven.²¹ This is the reason for coding $z=-1$.

¹⁶ 今民綏而君渥欲、祝史矯舉以祭、臣不知其可也。…是以聖王先成民而後致力於神。

¹⁷ 故務其三時、脩其五教、親其九族、以致其禋祀、於是乎民和而神降之福。故動則有成。今民各有心、而鬼神乏主。

¹⁸ 臣聞小之能敵大也、小道大淫。…君姑脩政而親兄弟之國、庶免於難。

¹⁹ 臣死而秦治、賢于生也。

²⁰ 知今日言之於前、而明日伏諸於後、然臣弗敢畏也。…可以少有補於秦、此臣之所大願也、臣何患乎。…臣之所恐者、獨恐臣死之後、天下見臣盡忠而身斃也。

²¹ 故文王果收功于呂尚、卒擅天下、而身立為帝王。

(3) Zhang Pu's essay, text #222, mentioned above, states plainly that the people are more important than the state,²² so I coded $x=1$. It also extols the independent upright-ness of five commoners who rose up against injustice,²³ and therefore I coded $y=1$. Zhang considers political opposition against despotism justified and suggests that the ultimate reason for the local uprising was the very nature of centralised rule which allowed eunuch Wei Zhongxian (魏忠賢) to usurp power.²⁴ This is why I coded $z=1$.

The results of the coding are as follows. With regard to the first theme, 29 texts were coded ($x=-1$), 51 ($x=0$) and 25 ($x=1$). With regard to the second theme, 34 texts were coded ($y=-1$), 12 ($y=0$) and 59 ($y=1$). And with regard to the third theme, 25 texts were coded ($z=-1$), 60 ($z=0$) and 20 ($z=1$). The results of both the first (x) and third (z) theme follow a bell curve.

YJ	XY1	XY2	GWGZ (# and title of the text)		x,y,z
周文					
X	X		001	左傳·鄭伯克段于鄆	0,-1,-1
X	X		007	左傳·季梁諫追楚師	1,-1,1
X	X		008	左傳·曹劌論戰	0,-1,-1
X'		X	010	左傳·宮之奇諫假道	-1,1,1
	X		013	左傳·子魚論戰	0,-1,-1
	X		015	左傳·介之推不言祿	-1,1,-1
X	X		016	左傳·展喜犒師	0,1,1
X	X		017	左傳·燭之武退秦師	0,-1,0
X'	X		018	左傳·蹇叔哭師	1,0,0
X	X		020	左傳·王孫滿對楚子	0,1,1
X'	X		026	左傳·子產告范宣子輕幣	-1,1,1
	X		027	左傳·晏子不死君難	1,1,0
X	X		030	左傳·子產論尹何為邑	-1,-1,0
	X		033	左傳·子產論政寬猛	-1,-1,0
		X'	034	左傳·吳許越成	0,-1,-1

²² 亦以明死生之大、匹夫之有重於社稷也。

²³ 而五人生於編伍之間、素不聞詩書之訓、激昂大義、蹈死不顧、亦曷故哉。

²⁴ 且矯詔紛出、鉤黨之捕、遍於天下、卒以吾郡之發憤一擊 … 不可謂非五人之力也。

X	X		036	國語·召公諫厲王止謗	1,-1,1
X		X	040	國語·里革斷罍匡君	0,1,0
X	X		042	國語·叔向賀貧	0,1,1
X	X		045	國語·申胥諫許越成	-1,-1,-1
		X	049	穀梁傳·鄭伯克段于鄆	0,-1,0
	X		051	檀弓·晉獻公殺世子申生	-1,1,-1
	X		053	檀弓·有子之言似夫子	0,-1,0
	X		054	檀弓·公子重耳對秦客	0,1,-1
	X		056	檀弓·晉獻文子成室	0,1,0
秦文					
	X		057	國策·蘇秦以連橫說秦	0,-1,1
X	X		058	國策·司馬錯論伐蜀	-1,-1,-1
	X		059	國策·范雎說秦王	-1,1,0
X	X		060	國策·鄒忌諷齊王納諫	-1,1,-1
	X		061	國策·顏觸說齊王	1,1,0
X		X	062	國策·馮煖客孟嘗君	1,-1,0
X			065	國策·觸轅說趙太后	-1,-1,0
X	X		066	國策·魯仲連義不帝秦	0,1,1
			068	國策·唐雎說信陵君	0,1,0
	X		069	國策·唐雎不辱使命	0,1,1
X	X		071	李斯·李斯諫逐客書	1,1,1
漢文					
	X		075	史記·項羽本紀贊	0,1,1
X	X		078	史記·孔子世家贊	0,1,0
X	X		080	史記·伯夷列傳	0,1,1
	X		083	史記·酷吏列傳序	-1,1,0
			086	史記·貨殖列傳序	1,1,0
		X	088	司馬遷·報任少卿書	0,1,0
X			090	文帝·文帝議佐百姓詔	1,1,0
X	X		093	賈誼·賈誼過秦論上	-1,1,1
X			095	鼂錯·鼂錯論貴粟疏	1,-1,0
	X		098	李陵·李陵答蘇武書	1,1,0
X	X		099	路溫舒·路溫舒尚德緩刑書	1,1,-1
			102	馬援·馬援誡兄子嚴敦書	0,-1,0

X	X		103	諸葛亮·諸葛亮前出師表	-1,1,-1
六朝文					
	X		106	王羲之·蘭亭集序	0,0,0
		X	108	陶淵明·桃花源記	1,0,1
		X	109	陶淵明·五柳先生傳	1,1,0
唐文					
	X		112	駱賓王·為徐敬業討武曩檄	-1,-1,-1
	X		115	李白·春夜宴桃花園序	0,0,0
	X		116	李華·弔古戰場文	1,0,1
	X		117	劉禹錫·陋室銘	0,-1,0
X	X		119	韓愈·原道	-1,-1,0
	X		121	韓愈·獲麟解	0,1,-1
			122	韓愈·雜說一	-1,1,0
			123	韓愈·雜說四	-1,1,0
X			124	韓愈·師說	0,1,0
	X		128	韓愈·爭臣論	-1,1,0
		X	129	韓愈·後十九日復上宰相書	0,-1,0
	X		135	韓愈·送李愿歸盤谷序	0,1,0
	X		136	韓愈·送董邵南序	0,-1,-1
		X	139	韓愈·送溫處士赴河陽軍序	0,-1,-1
X	X		141	韓愈·祭鱷魚文	-1,-1,-1
X		X	143	柳宗元·駁復讎議	0,-1,0
	X		146	柳宗元·捕蛇者說	1,0,0
		X	147	柳宗元·種樹郭橐駝傳	1,0,1
		X	148	柳宗元·梓人傳	-1,1,0
	X		152	柳宗元·小石城山記	0,1,0
宋文					
		X	154	王禹偁·待漏院記	-1,1,0
	X		156	李格非·書洛陽名園記後	0,1,-1
	X		158	范仲淹·岳陽樓記	-1,1,0
	X		159	司馬光·諫院題名記	-1,1,0
			160	錢公輔·義田記	1,1,0
		X	161	李觀·袁州州學記	-1,-1,0
X		X	162	歐陽修·朋黨論	-1,1,-1

X	X		163	歐陽修·縱囚論	0,-1,0
X	X		168	歐陽修·五代史宦者傳論	-1,0,-1
X	X		170	歐陽修·豐樂亭記	1,-1,0
	X		171	歐陽修·醉翁亭記	0,0,0
	X		172	歐陽修·秋聲賦	0,0,0
			177	蘇洵·心術	0,-1,-1
			179	蘇軾·刑賞忠厚之至論	1,-1,0
	X		185	蘇軾·喜雨亭記	1,-1,0
		X	186	蘇軾·凌虛臺記	0,1,0
	X		188	蘇軾·放鶴亭記	0,1,0
X	X		190	蘇軾·潮州韓文公廟碑	-1,1,0
	X		192	蘇軾·前赤壁賦	0,0,1
	X		193	蘇軾·後赤壁賦	0,0,0
		X	195	蘇軾·方山子傳	0,1,0
X		X	196	蘇轍·六國論	0,1,1
	X		200	曾鞏·贈黎安二生序	0,1,0
	X		201	王安石·讀孟嘗君傳	0,1,-1
			202	王安石·同學一首別子固	0,1,0
明文					
			206	宋濂·閱江樓記	-1,-1,-1
			208	劉基·賣柑者言	1,1,0
			209	方孝孺·深慮論	0,1,-1
			211	王鏊·親政篇	0,1,-1
			212	王守仁·尊經閣記	0,1,0
	X		216	宗臣·報劉一丈書	1,1,0
			217	歸有光·吳山圖記	1,-1,0
	X		221	袁宏道·徐文長傳	0,1,0
		X	222	張溥·五人墓碑記	1,1,1
YJ = <i>Guwen yuanyjian</i> , XY1 = <i>Guwen xiyi</i> (zhengbian), XY2 = <i>Guwen xiyi</i> (xubian)					
X = contains the text, X' = contains the text but with marked differences (including notably different titles)					

Table 1: The sample texts, their occurrence in *Guwen yuanyjian* (YJ) and *Guwen xiyi* (original, XY1, and sequel, XY2), and their coded values (x, y, z)

The second (y) theme forms an anomaly. The majority of the sample texts were coded (y=1) instead of (y=0). This shows that the sample texts are biased toward virtue and autonomous ethics instead of dogmatism and authority. Interestingly, among the 59 sample texts in the (y=1) category, 30 belong into the group of 55 texts not included in *Guwen yuanjian*. This indicates a clear difference in the selection of texts in GWGZ in comparison to *Guwen yuanjian* with regard to emphasis on innate ethics. Furthermore, a great majority of the texts coded (y=1) are also coded (z=0), and among them, there are ten texts coded (-1, 1, 0) which is a major factor in the imbalance between (y=1) and (y=-1).²⁵ These ten texts lament the need to sacrifice one's individual virtue for the good of the state (but with no preference to a unitary or non-unitary form of state). For example, text #123 *Zashuo si* 雜說四 by Han Yu, speaks of good horses and bad horsemen. Horses cannot survive without the horsemen, but because they maltreat the horses, everyone thinks that there are no good horses, and the horses' whinnying has no effect.²⁶ It is a metaphor for the scholar-officials whose ability to manifest their virtue relied on the whims of the Emperor. Remarkably, only one of these ten texts is also included in *Guwen yuanjian*.

Statistics also show that this anomaly is predominantly "inherited" from *Guwen xiyi*. Omitting those 19 sample texts which are unique to GWGZ (i.e. are not included in *Guwen xiyi*) does not change the relative distribution. However, since a great majority (12) of those 19 sample texts fall in the (y=1) category, it can be surmised that Wu Diaohou and Wu Chucai were probably inclined to prefer similarly biased texts when making their selection from the *Guwen xiyi*.

To make the analysis one step more quantifiable, the sum values (x+y+z) of each sample text can be placed on a diagram. The statistical spread of the values -3...3 forms a normal distribution-like bell curve,²⁷ and drawing the diagram shows that the sample texts (see bar graph in Fig. 1) would also follow the same bell curve (confirming that

²⁵ A smaller imbalance between the texts coded (y=1, x≥0, z≥0) and the texts coded (y=-1, x≤0, z≤0) would still remain even without these ten texts.

²⁶ 策之不以其道、食之不能盡其材、鳴之而不能通其意、執策而臨之曰、天下無馬。嗚呼、其真無馬邪、其真不知馬也。

²⁷ We can imagine a Rubik's cube made of 27 (3x3x3) smaller cubes, each small cube representing the value of the sum (x+y+z). There are seven small cubes with the value 0, one with the value -3 (and one with the value 3), etc. Turned into a graph, these values (1/27, 3/27, 6/27, 7/27, 6/27, 3/27, 1/27) form a bell curve.

the sample can indeed be considered random), were it not for the skew towards the positive values caused by the anomaly in the y-dimension. As to the skew, while not overwhelming, it is nonetheless statistically significant.²⁸ On the whole, it can be said that the sample texts manifest *some* bias towards heterodoxy.




Fig. 1: Distribution of the sum values (x+y+z) of the 105 sample texts in a bar graph (Source: Kallio 2011, 109.)

Conclusions

My comparison of *GWGZ* with other anthologies (Kallio 2011) shows that the main assets of *GWGZ* were its size, the relative comprehensiveness of its selection, and good notes and comments. It avoided the overly difficult texts that many scholars tended to use in order to flaunt their own expertise, as well as an overly moralistic or tendentious approach, and the explanations are as clear and concise as possible. This made *GWGZ* especially suitable as a practical study aid, even for self-study. This is also the probable reason for the continued popularity of the anthology.

²⁸ The statistical significance, also taking into account the margin of error, is discussed in detail in Kallio 2011, 100, fn. 208.

So *GWGZ* was first and foremost produced as a practical study aid, but there is more to it. According to the conventional presuppositions, the content of *GWGZ* must have been based on the imperially approved *Guwen yuanjian*, and in consequence, it should be regarded as nothing more than an “ordinary”, non-heterodox anthology. In contrast, this article shows that neither presupposition is correct, and furthermore suggests that *GWGZ* promoted diversity of thought and autonomous virtue in terms of both its approach to education and its critique towards authoritarianism. It can therefore be argued that the anthology may have had a role in cracking wider the inevitable fault-lines in China’s state-enforced orthodoxy.

The unorthodox ideas which *GWGZ* promotes – diversity and autonomy – were sure to find a receptive audience among the less advantaged “subordinate classes” who had the desire to cultivate themselves but who were looked down upon by the traditional scholar-gentry. Studying the Confucian classics would have enabled the merchants to tap into the power of language that was previously the monopoly of the scholarly elite. *GWGZ* perfectly filled the need for a general reader, and was therefore well received especially by those students who were not solely intent on success by climbing the imperial examination ladder, such as members of the merchant class.

It is not possible to know how intentionally Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou made their anthology different from the imperially approved *Guwen yuanjian*. Nevertheless, the differences between the selections suggest that the approach of Wu Chucai and Wu Diaohou was not altogether orthodox. It also remains unknown if *GWGZ* was ever subject to any censorship or approval procedure. If that had been the case, the recommendation by Wu Xingzuo would probably have weighed strongly in favour of the publication. It is also possible that as a “mere” reader produced by unknown village teachers, the book escaped the eyes of the censors. This seems to have been the case also during the modern era, and the *GWGZ*’s value in literary education has apparently diverted attention away from its “between the lines” content.

Intentionally or not, *GWGZ* nevertheless contains a bias that is certainly unorthodox. Its message, hidden in the commentaries and reflected in the selection of the texts, echoes with other voices from the era of its publication, promoting educational egalitarianism and calling for individualist ethics. The rising middle class, composed mostly

of merchants, studied literary Chinese and Confucian ethics not because they wished to become scholars, but because they wanted to be considered equally sophisticated and enjoy a similar societal status to the scholarly elite. The ethos of GWGZ was well suited for that purpose. Therefore, I find it apt to paraphrase the “motto” of GWGZ, mentioned above, as follows: “When they thus rectified methods for the enlightenment of the youth and assisted even the less-advantaged on the Way of learning, how could their achievement be regarded as trivial!”

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

A Uyghur Concubine and a French Juggler Resisting Japanese Imperialism: Jue Qing's Aesopian Language in Manchukuo's Official Literature

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Contrary to general knowledge, there was a vibrant literary world in Manchukuo. One of the most accomplished writers in this Japanese puppet state was Jue Qing (1917-62). After the Japanese surrender, he was labeled "a traitor to the Chinese nation" and, until recently, his fiction works were erased from the history of Chinese literature. However, some of his works seem to express anti-colonial sentiments. This paper analyses two stories from 1943, namely "Xiang Fei" (The Fragrant Concubine) and "Yiren Yang Kun" (The Acrobat Yang Kun). It focuses on their intertextual references to the Chinese legend of Xiang Fei and a story about a juggler by Anatole France (1844-1924), respectively. This study suggests that Jue Qing uses Aesopian language in these stories to bypass official censorship. More specifically, it explores how he uses intertextual references and other rhetorical devices to camouflage praise for resistance against the Japanese coloniser and, at the same time, to draw the reader's attention to it.

與常識相反，滿洲國的文學世界曾經非常活躍。在這個日本傀儡政權裡，爵青（1917-1962）是最有成就的作家之一。日本投降後，他被貼上“漢奸”的標籤，而到了最近，他的小說作品也從中國文學史上被抹去了。但是，他的一些作品似乎表達了反殖民的態度。本文分析了兩篇 1943 年出版的小說，《香妃》與《藝人楊崑》。本文的重點在於它們對中國香妃傳說以及阿納托爾·法朗士（1844-1924）的《聖母的江湖藝人》的互文引用。本研究試圖指出，爵青使用伊索式語言來繞過殖民地文化審查制度。具體而言，本文探討了他如何使用互文參考和其他修辭手法以掩飾起其作品的反日本殖民主義批判，而同時引起讀者的注意。

Keywords: China, Manchukuo, literature, censorship, Jue Qing (1917-62)

關鍵詞：中國，滿洲國，文學，審查制度，爵青（1917-1962）

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Between 1932 and 1945, Manchukuo, *Manzhouguo* 滿洲國, was a Japanese puppet state established in the Chinese Northeast.¹ The new capital Xinjing 新京 was built in the old city of Changchun. Instead of a supreme leader, it was ruled by the Japanese Kantō army; thus, it can be characterised as a “military fascist” regime (Duara 2003, 60–6). Historians of East Asia have often taken an overly schematic view of it, regarding it simply as a place where the local inhabitants were cruelly oppressed by the Japanese. Furthermore, Manchukuo’s Chinese-language literary production was erased from the history of Chinese literature, that is, until recently. This applies also to the work of Jue Qing 爵青 (1917–62),² one of the most accomplished writers in Manchukuo, who remains nearly unknown today.³

In the 1950s, Jue Qing was labeled “a traitor to the Chinese nation,” *Hanjian* 漢奸. He was sentenced to prison for treason, and five years in captivity led to his early death at the age of forty-five (Personal interview with Liu Weicong 劉維聰, b. 1941, Jue Qing’s daughter, 18 September 2019, in Changchun). To be sure, there were solid grounds for accusing him of supporting the Japanese-controlled puppet state: he not only published in official literary journals and was a member of the official Manchukuo art institutions, but he also worked as a translator for the Kantō army. Furthermore, some of his works can be read as supportive of the colonial regime. On the other hand, such condemnation does not reflect the efforts he made after 1941 to delegitimise the coloniser.

¹ This output was created as part of the project “Places of Clashing: Strategic Regions between Europe, North Africa and Asia,” subproject “Resistance and Collaboration in Jue Qing’s Fiction” realised at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University, with additional financial support from a specific university research grant in 2019. I am most grateful to Olga Lomová, Eva Chou, Alexis Lycas, Liu Xiaoli, Liu Shuqin, and the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughts and comments.

² Jue Qing is the most prominent penname of Liu Pei 劉佩, born in Changchun. He also used the pen names Liu Jueqing 劉爵青, Ke Qin 可欽, Liao Ding 遼丁, and A Jue 阿爵. For biographical information, see Xie (2017).

³ In the People’s Republic of China, Manchukuo literature research was established in the 1980s. Liu Xiaoli (2008) was the first published study to closely analyse Jue Qing’s fiction. Since then, Taiwanese scholars have also focused on Jue Qing. Liu Shuqin (2014) explores how literary modernism spread from Shanghai to Jue Qing’s Harbin. Cai Peijun (2017) analyses the identity of modern man depicted in two of Jue Qing’s tales. Junko Agnew’s dissertation (2009) includes a chapter on two short stories by Jue Qing. As far as I know, this is the only published text in English dealing with this writer so far. Culver and Smith (2020) provides many deep insights into various aspects of Manchukuo literature, but none of the chapters is devoted to Jue Qing’s fiction works in detail.

Jue Qing was a very active member of Manchukuo's official literary world. From 1935, when he was only eighteen years old, onward, he was involved in editing the Manchukuo literary journal *Xin qingnian* 新青年 (*New Young Man*).⁴ His first short story, "Harbin" 哈爾濱, was published in *Xin qingnian* in 1936; it met with great success and was translated into Japanese the same year. When he received the Greater East Asia Literature Award, *Da Dongya wenxue shang* 大東亞文學賞,⁵ in 1943 for his novel *Huangjin de zhai men* 黃金的窄門 (*The Golden Narrow Gate*), he became even more famous in the Japanese colonial empire. Contemporary literary critics in Manchukuo recognised his superb writing abilities and referred to him as a "genius," *guicai* 鬼才.

Jue Qing's oeuvre can be divided into three periods. His early stories such as "Harbin" were significantly influenced by Shanghai's modernist authors and most importantly by Taiwan-born Liu Na'ou 劉訥鷗 (1905-40) and Mu Shiyong 穆時英 (1912-40) (Liu Shuqin 2014: 38-46). In these works of fiction, Jue Qing reveals the poverty of the working class in Manchukuo and dramatises the social unrest of the period. They feature male protagonists who are shocked by the poor living conditions of workers but also tempted by various modern phenomena (technological progress, "modern girls," etc.). Indirect criticism of fascism can be found in these works (45).

Cai Peijun has noted a major change in the focus of Jue Qing's literary output around 1938, concluding that his works transformed from "urban criticism" into "feudal family criticism" because the tightening literary control in Manchukuo (discussed

⁴ The English subtitle "New Young Man" was used on the cover together with the Chinese title, which is identical to the title of the famous May Fourth journal published from 1915 to 1926 at Beijing University. It had the French subtitle "La Jeunesse," usually translated as "New Youth." Based in Fengtian (the former name of Shenyang), *Xin qingnian*, published from 1935 to 1940, was one of the most prominent literary platforms in Manchukuo in this period.

⁵ Following the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan promoted the concept of Greater East Asian literature. For this purpose, the three sessions of the Greater East Asian Writers' Congress, *Da Dongya wenxue zhe dahui* 大東亞文學者大會, were held in 1942, 1943, and 1944. They were attended by representatives from various Japanese-held territories, including North China, Shanghai, Taiwan, Korea, and Manchukuo (Gunn 1980, 32-3). At the second congress, convened in Tokyo, the first Greater East Asia Literature Award was presented to several writers, including Jue Qing (Smith 2007, 55-6).

below) made it no longer possible to publish works of “urban criticism” (2017, 464–5). In 1939 Jue Qing moved from Harbin, where he had been working for about five years, back home to Xinjing to get married. At that time, he also participated in launching a new literary journal *Yiwenzhi* 藝文志 (Record of Art and Literature)⁶ together with Gu Ding 古丁 (1914–60) and others. The group of writers associated with *Yiwenzhi* advocated artistic freedom and independence; however, they were criticised by other Manchukuo writers for creating “art for art’s sake,” for a lack of nationalism, and for their “pro-Japanese inclination” (Liu Chao 2020, 143–5).

Indeed, some of Jue Qing’s works from this period seem to express his indirect support for the coloniser.⁷ It is possible that the changes in the political situation and his family situation put stronger pressure on him to which he succumbed. At the same time, he apparently believed, at least partially, that independent Manchukuo under Japanese leadership (discussed below), although not ideal, was tolerable. Duara has noted that many politicians, merchants, landowners, and others promised support for the Manchukuo regime in return for stability (2003, 64).

After the Pacific War broke out in 1941, Jue Qing’s literary works changed significantly once again. This paper suggests that in this period he rejected the colonial regime and began depicting China much more favorably.⁸ To express his newly aroused anti-colonial sentiments (discussed below) to the reader and bypass the censorship of the official press, he mainly used two strategies. First, in several stories he adopted the genre of historical fiction to camouflage his subversive messages. Second, in most of his other stories published after 1941 he used intertextual references to literary works by Western authors, mainly from France. Like the historical settings of historical fiction, references to famous French tales allowed Jue Qing to hide his subversive meanings and, at the same time, to draw the reader’s

⁶ This Xinjing-based journal that was established in June 1939 focused on literature. Only three issues of *Yiwenzhi* were published, the last one in June 1940 (Liu Xiaoli 2008, 69).

⁷ For example, the main protagonist of Jue Qing’s story “Dang’er” 盪兒 (Prodigal Son, 1939) condemns the “backward” traditional society and hopes for a “new world and life,” *xin de shijie he rensheng* 新的世界和人生 (Jue Qing 1941, 139), which can be read as his affirmation of colonial rule and the ideology of “New Manchuria,” *Xin Manzhou* 新滿洲. For more on this ideology, see Liu Xiaoli 2020.

⁸ In this paper I address Jue Qing’s resistance efforts and his collaboration as revealed in his literary work; I do not attempt to judge his personal choices.

attention to them. Both of these strategies involve the specific use of Aesopian language as described by Lev Loseff.⁹ This paper examines Jue Qing's Aesopian language by focus on two tales from this period, namely the 1943 historical short story "Xiang Fei" 香妃 (The Fragrant Concubine) and "Yiren Yang Kun" 藝人楊崑 (The Acrobat Yang Kun) in which Jue Qing refers to a tale by Anatole France (1844-1924).¹⁰ The analysis of these two short stories is preceded by a discussion of their historical context and the tightening censorship in Manchukuo in this period.

The Demise of the Idea of Independent Manchukuo

In the earliest days of Manchukuo, the colonial government presented itself as the ruler of a sovereign nation that embodied noble ideas--multiculturalism, the universalism of "Eastern" religions, and the notion of creating a modern state (Duara 2003, 60-1). Manchukuo was allegedly intended to synthesise the traditional East and the modern West, to blend the best each had to offer. Therefore, the building of a modern state went hand in hand with the traditional Chinese ideal of the "kingly way," *Wangdao* 王道, which strove to establish a harmonious Confucian society.

Incorporating regional traditions into the Manchukuo ideology was meant to gain the local inhabitants' support and the recognition of Manchukuo as a sovereign state by the League of Nations. Besides purportedly following the kingly way, by adopting the name *Manchukuo* and enthroning Puyi 溥儀 (1906-67), the last emperor of the former Qing dynasty who had been dethroned, the state presented itself as the successor of the Manchu dynasty. Furthermore, an important part of Manchukuo ideology was the concept of "harmony of the five ethnicities," *wuzu xiehe* 五族協和,

⁹ In Russian cultural circles the practice of making aesthetic changes to literature affected by censorship has been referred to as using "Aesopian language" for more than a century (Loseff 1984, x). Lev Loseff's theory of Aesopian language (introduced below) has thus far been applied mostly to fiction created in Russia and East-Central European communist regimes.

¹⁰ As far as I know, nobody has previously analysed these stories in detail. Only Liu Xiaoli has explored some aspects of "Yiren Yang Kun." However, in a chapter called, symptomatically, "Jue Qing zhi mi" 爵青之謎 (Jue Qing Mysteries), she does not attempt to interpret the story (2008, 217).

which was supposed to ensure equality between the Han (who made up the majority of the population), Manchus, Japanese, Koreans, and Mongolians in the state (Shao 2011, 141).

The Manchukuo ideology clearly contrasted with the Japanese assimilation strategies applied in Taiwan and Korea. This is certainly one reason why many of the members of Manchukuo society, from local Manchu and Han elites to “war weary masses,” were willing to support the regime despite Japanese military control (Duara 2003, 64). However, by 1937, and especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War, “the symbolic independence of Manchukuo was seriously compromised, as it increasingly became an important supply base for the Japanese war machine in mainland China” (66–7). At this time, the principle of “ethnic harmony” became an empty phrase, and Manchukuo’s ethnic groups were lumped into a single “independent nation” that was granted lower status than the Japanese (Shao 2011, 152).

Manchukuo ended as a fascist state that did not represent its ethnic groups any more but represented only itself (Duara 2003, 253). Jue Qing referred to these events in his 1943 autobiographical essay “*Huangjin de zhaimen qianhou*” 《黄金的窄门》前后 (Before and After *The Golden Narrow Gate*) published in the journal *Qingnian wenhua* 青年文化 (Youth Culture),¹¹ in which he describes his mood when he was writing the award-winning novel. In this essay he states that in the fall of 1942 he felt so anxious and isolated that he found himself on the verge of suicide:

[During my nearly thirty years of life] I heard tens of doctrines, tens of theories. At that time, those who instilled these doctrines and theories in me were full of confidence, they had no doubts, but it is a pity that now they are gone. No, I can still meet some of them from time to time. We meet, and let’s suppose that I want to express deep thanks for the doctrines and theories that he instilled in me, but he looks annoyed and says: “Strange! Has such a thing ever happened? I was talking with you about doctrines? Theories? It must be a joke! Oh! Yes,

¹¹ This journal was established in 1943 to build on the tradition of *Xin qingnian*, which had ceased publication in 1940. Both these periodicals were created to spread the official Manchukuo ideology, but at the same time they also published many valuable literary works. The Xinjing-based *Qingnian wenhua* was the most important Manchukuo literary journal of this period; it published novels, short stories, drama, poems, etc. (Liu Xiaoli 2008, 171–2). Jue Qing published several essays, stories, and translations in *Qingnian wenhua* from August 1943 to February 1945.

maybe I really said that, it's difficult to say if I really said that or not; however, times change, what does it matter now?" I do not doubt doctrines, nor do I doubt theories. For those who instill these doctrines and theories with good intention, I only feel gratitude. But it gave me a hard time. And not only a hard time; I am actually quite pitiable.

[像我這樣將近三十歲的人] 我聽過數十種教義，聽過數十種說法，把這些教義和說法灌輸給我的人，當時雖都自信滿滿，毫無疑色，可惜的很，如今卻都不見了。不，有的也還能時常見到，見到之後，假設對於他所灌輸的教義和說法，要想再往深處領教一番，他卻要面現不悅之色，說：“奇怪！世間曾有過這種事情嗎？我還給你講過教義？說過法？笑話！啊！是的，也許我真講過，真說過也未可知，但是，此一時，彼一時，那有什麼關係？”我不懷疑教義，也不懷疑說法，對於好心灌輸這些教義和說法的人，也只有感謝之一念。然而卻苦了我自己；豈只是苦，簡直是有些可憐了。(Jue Qing 1943a, 83)

Even though Jue Qing only hints at the reasons for his depression, his statement can be understood as an expression of disappointment over the fact that the original concept of Manchukuo that he had supported in his earlier writings had been abandoned. In different circumstances, in the 1930s and 1940s, other Chinese intellectuals also found it difficult to cope with the collapse of social order: for example, the suicide of historian and aesthician Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877-1927) is mostly attributed to Qing loyalism, and writer Shen Congwen 沈從文 (1902-1988) tried to kill himself in 1949, when the communist revolution engulfed Chinese society, including his family (Wang 2015, 52-3; 79). Jue Qing seems to have been driven to the verge of death by the demise of the idea of independent Manchukuo.

In “*Huangjin de zhaimen qianhou*,” he describes how, at the time of his deepest crisis, he looked up at the starry sky:

I awakened; I realised that there was nothing that could save me, the only thing that could save me was my life, the only thing that can transcend death and crisis

is the vigor of life itself. From the windy night I went back inside, leaned over the table and wrote the piece called “Joy” that people consider a stupid work, to commemorate my rebirth.

我覺醒了；我知道什麼也不會拯救自己，拯救自己的，只有自己的生命，超越了死和危機的生命，才是生命自身的活力。我由夜風中退回房裡，伏在桌子上，就寫了那篇人們評為愚作的《喜悅》，紀念了我的再生。(Jue Qing 1943a, 84)

The 1943 short story “Xiyue” 喜悅 (Joy) depicts a male protagonist who goes to the mountains to commit suicide, but at the last moment the scenery and stars amaze him so much that he rediscovers his love for life (Jue Qing 1943d, 68). The works I analyse in this paper are among those that Jue Qing wrote after his rebirth following the outbreak of the Pacific War. It seems that it was the experience described in “*Huangjin de zhaimen qianhou*” that made Jue Qing reject the Japanese colonial regime in his work.

Censorship of Manchukuo Literature and Aesopian Language

During the second half of the 1930s, “cultural control had been relatively lax and did not intrude into all dimensions of cultural production” (Duara 2003, 224). The Manchukuo government made significant efforts in 1936 and 1937 to control public opinion; however, it lacked personnel and resources to enforce censorship of literature extensively (Smith 2007, 44–5). Later, when Japan allied itself with Germany and Italy in September 1940, cultural control in Manchukuo intensified dramatically. In February 1941, through the State Propaganda Office, the government announced the “Eight Abstentions,” *ba bu* 八不, which under the threat of imprisonment forbade in literature rebellious tendencies, criticism of national policy, exclusive use of darkness to depict the life of the nation, the use of decadent thoughts as the main point, abnormal sexual desire, excessive cruelty, and exaggerated descriptions of the “entertainment districts” (50).

In March of the same year, the “Gangyao yiwén zhǐdǎo” 綱要藝文指導 (Summary of Guidelines to Art and Literature) was issued to fundamentally transform the role of arts and culture in the state. The guidelines dictated the adoption of Japanese literary traditions to create Manchukuo’s “independent” literature (51). In July 1941, the Manchurian Writers’ and Artists’ Association, *Manzhou wenyijia xiehe* 滿洲文藝家協和, was established. All writers in Manchukuo were required to register with this organisation. Jue Qing and Gu Ding, who were well known for their good relations with the Japanese, were appointed committee members (Ying 2014, 307). The main goal of the new cultural policies was to increase literary production and thus contribute to establishing a Manchurian identity that would be independent of China and, at the same time, inferior to the identity of the Japanese (Duara 2003, 224–5).

The promulgation of cultural policies was followed by the mass arrest of writers in December 1941 known as the Harbin Left-Wing Literature Incident, *Ha’erbin zuoyi wenyue shijian* 哈爾濱左翼文學事件. During the incident, more than 160 people were arrested and more than 20 executed (Feng 1992, 102). Consequently, many important Manchukuo writers fled to Beijing, where they continued to publish (Smith 2007, 54).¹² The high-profile writers who stayed in Manchukuo were mobilised to promote the Greater East Asia Sacred War. And that was the case of Jue Qing. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, his declarations glorifying the Japanese empire appeared in the official press from time to time.¹³

During the Pacific War, Jue Qing also served as the assistant head of the Censorship Office’s second division, *Shencha di er bu* 審查第二部 (Liu Huijuan 2013, 258). He described his work as a censor in one of the articles that directly support the coloniser, the August 1944 “*Shenchezhe de hua: Ganxiang*” 審查者的話：感想 (The Censor’s Words: Impressions), which was published in *Qingnian wenhua*:

¹² Although Beijing was also occupied by the Japanese, surveillance of writers there was looser than in Manchukuo (Smith 2007, 54).

¹³ Xie Chaokun has noted that such declarations enabled Jue Qing to survive and strengthen his position as a writer in Manchukuo but also made him feel guilty. That is reflected in some of his fiction works (2017, 10).

I was in charge of investigating six or seven books altogether; after numerous detailed readings I thought that only Yi Mei's *Tropic* deserved to be called a work for the contemporary time. ... Only this literary work that strengthens the military power necessary to annihilate the US and the UK is a work that embodies the spirit of Greater Asia; only this work intensifies the spirit of the nation.

我擔任審查的作品共有六七部，詳讀數遍之後，我以為只有乙梅作的《回歸線》還稱得起是現時下的作品。... 唯有這增強戰力殲滅美英的文學作品，才是包蘊了大東亞魂的作品，才是深湛了國心的作品。(Jue Qing 1944, 36)

Censorship became so commonplace in Manchukuo that writers openly discussed their impressions of investigating other writers' books. However, Norman Smith has pointed out that even though the surveillance intensified rapidly, it had only limited success in altering the content of literature in Manchukuo. In this period, Chinese-language journals "typically blended pro-Manchukuo, pro-Sacred War news with dark and pessimistic literature. Most journals were structured with officially sanctioned news editorials in the front sections, followed by literature in the back" (Smith 2007, 51-52). Because censorship was not applied comprehensively, some of the most subversive works to date were published in Manchukuo in 1943 and 1944 (56).

Like the editors of Manchukuo journals who tried to sidetrack the censors by including positive news in the front pages, writers in Manchukuo commonly put on masks under which another face was sometimes hidden (Liu Xiaoli 2018, 90). This paper suggests that Jue Qing was one such writer: while he was examining the work of other authors, he was also publishing subversive literature. As a result, the censor Jue Qing's work was being subjected to censorship.

We know this from a 1943 secret report on Manchukuo literature written by police censors called "Guanyu dui yiwu yanju huodong zhong de sixiang yundong jinxing zhencha de baogao" 關於對藝文演劇活動中的思想運動進行偵察的報告 (Report

on Undertaking Investigation of Thinking in Arts, Literature, and Performance).¹⁴ Whereas the first part of the report focuses on Manchukuo films, the second part titled “Zuijin Manzhou zuoyi zuojia de miaoxie qingxiang” 最近滿洲左翼作家的描寫傾向 (The Recent Tendency of Writings by Manchukuo Left-wing Writers) is dedicated to literature:

Because Manchukuo left-wing literature has doubted the political situation right since its inception, it takes abstract appearance and ambiguous form as its starting point. And therefore other nations [particularly the Japanese], which lack knowledge about this literature, have difficulties grasping the core thought. Especially when the government adopted reporting and repressions against the anti-Manchukuo Resist-Japan movements after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the left-wing writers' vigilance increased and their works became more abstract and ambiguous than before.

因滿洲的左翼文學從其誕生起便顧慮政治情勢，從抽象的表面含糊的形式出發，因此對本文學缺乏認識的他民族，在中心思想的把握方面就更困難了。尤其是大東亞戰爭爆發後，政府對反滿抗日運動者採取檢舉彈壓等對策，越發引起了左翼作家的警覺，作品比從前愈發抽象和曖昧了。(Anon. 2017, 371)

The third part of the report, titled “Zuoyi zuojia zuopin de faxian” 左翼作品的發現 (Findings about the Left-wing Works), analyses the writings of several authors, including Jue Qing.¹⁵ Some of the censors' interpretations are quite direct. For example, they make the following comment about “Ming” 鳴 (Howl) by Wu Ying 吳瑛 (1915–61):

¹⁴ The order to write this report came on 25 June 1942, and it was submitted on 29 November 1943. It was discovered by Howard Goldblatt in Taiwan (Okada 2017, 362).

¹⁵ Considering his early works of social criticism, it is not surprising that the censors regarded Jue Qing as a left-wing writer.

The husband refers to Japan, the wife refers to Manchuria, the father hints at China. The writing says that the extremely greedy Japan occupied Manchuria, after that invaded China, and is trying to annihilate the Chinese nation.

丈夫指日本，妻子指滿洲，父親暗指中國。文章是說，無比貪婪的日本佔領了滿洲，進而侵略中國，企圖滅亡中華民族。(382)

As suggested above and illustrated below, in this period Jue Qing published fiction that expressed anti-colonial sentiments. Police censors, however, did not focus on his fiction but instead on his 1943 essay “Mei yue pinglun: Wenxue he guojing” 每月評論：文學和國境 (Monthly Review: Literature and National Territory), in which he claims that imbuing literature with an international character is beneficial for everyone, but nonetheless, also states that a good literary work must be rooted in its own “national territory,” *guo jing* 國境. He mentions examples of classical literary characters such as Miguel de Cervantes’s (1544–1616) Don Quijote and Lu Xun’s 魯迅 (1881–1936) Ah Q, 阿 Q, who, in Jue Qing’s opinion, succeed in reflecting universal human foibles precisely because they depict the national (Spanish, Chinese) character. In his criticism of overcoming national borders he goes as far as to say that “seeking to discard national borders is only idiotic dreaming” 要想棄開國境，那只是癡人的夢想 (Jue Qing 1943b, 81). Even though this statement can be quite clearly understood as a declaration of resistance against increasing Japanese demands that Manchukuo be subordinate to Japan and that Manchukuo literature follow Japanese literary trends, the censors did not judge Jue Qing as harshly as Wu Ying and only summarised that he stressed that Manchukuo literature should not “lose its national consciousness” (Anon. 2017, 380–81). The fact that Jue Qing based his argument on a quote from Japanese writer, literary critic, and war propagandist Kobayashi Hideo 小林秀雄 (1902–1983)¹⁶ (Jue Qing 1943b, 80) obviously took the wind out of the censors’ sails.

¹⁶ Jue Qing quoted Kobayashi’s statement that Japanese people read Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) not from a Russian perspective but “from a Japanese perspective” 用日本的觀點 (Jue Qing 1943b, 80), thus implying that in Manchukuo, people read foreign literature from their own perspective and not the Japanese one.

This paper focuses on Jue Qing's works of fiction that can be read in a way somewhat similar to the censors' reading of Wu Ying's "Ming," that is, as allegories veiling references to the contemporary political situation. The possibility of such readings of Jue Qing's works written after 1941 has already been suggested by scholar Liu Xiaoli. Namely, she has noted that Jue Qing's historical short stories can be understood as commentaries on contemporary Manchukuo society (2018, 102-3). No detailed study, however, has yet been made to support this argument.¹⁷

Lev Loseff's theory of Aesopian language can be applied to interpret allegorical meanings hidden in literature subjected to official censorship. In the study *On the Beneficence of Censorship* (1984) Loseff examines basic methods used by Russian writers to bypass censorship in both the Tsarist and Soviet eras. When an author wishes to transmit a taboo message to the reader, he or she creates an ambiguous text that aims to baffle the censor. Fundamental elements of such texts are "screens" and "markers." Screens are stylistic devices used to conceal a hidden message (they may take the form of a segment that is agreeable to the censor or which distracts the censor's attention), whereas markers draw attention to it and open up a space for reading between the lines (Loseff 1984, 51). By drawing screens and markers from an area of knowledge with which only learned readers are familiar or with which the censor is believed to be unacquainted, the author allows a limited circle of readers access to the allegorical meaning (87). Loseff has also defined six Aesopian genres: historical fiction, exotic fiction, science fiction, nature-writing parables, anecdotes, and translations. He defined the most common rhetorical figures that function as screens or markers as allegory, parody, intertextual references, inconsistencies, and puns (53-121).

Besides the theory of Aesopian language, James C. Scott's theory of relationships between superiors and subordinates within systems of domination informs some of my interpretations. His book *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (1990) analyses hidden forms of popular resistance as a counter-ideology that provides "a general normative form to the host of resistant practices invented in self-defense by any

¹⁷ Norman Smith has analysed the tropes used to criticise Manchukuo rule in fiction written by Manchukuo female authors. See Smith 2007, 106-25.

subordinate group” (Scott 1990, 118). His characterisation of “hidden transcripts” includes forms of disguise, such as trickster tales and rituals of symbolic reversal that represent the counterculture to a dominant transcript of hierarchy (162–79).

The Resisting Fragrant Concubine

Jue Qing’s 1943 short story “Xiang Fei”¹⁸ is an adaptation of a legend about Qing emperor Qianlong’s 乾隆 (1711–99) imperial concubine, a story that has been known in East Asia since the eighteenth century.¹⁹ The various tales about Xiang Fei that exist are based on Manchu records about a Uyghur Muslim woman known as Rong Fei 容妃 who was part of the Qing imperial harem between 1760 and 1788 (Millward 1994, 431). In China, these stories were especially popular from the 1910s to the 1930s, when Xiang Fei was featured as the main protagonist in many romances and plays, including works of Beijing opera (427). These early-twentieth-century adaptations of the legend of Xiang Fei mostly reflect the authors’ political attitudes toward Xinjiang’s position in the Qing empire (431).

Most versions of the legend describe Xiang Fei as the consort of Khoja Jihan (d. 1759) who resisted the Qing invasion of southern Xinjiang (Altishahr) in the mid-eighteenth century. At that time, Qianlong heard about the beauty of this woman whose body was

¹⁸ “Xiang Fei” first appeared in February 1943 in one of the most prominent journals of the Japanese Empire, *Huawen Daban meiri* 華文大阪每日 (Chinese Osaka Daily), which was published from 1938 to 1945 in Japan and distributed across Asia. Even though it was an instrument for spreading Japanese propaganda in the Chinese language, the editors claimed to be independent of the Japanese state and army. In fact, in addition to articles supporting Japan’s leading role in Asia, it is indeed known for publishing highly critical works by Manchukuo authors on subjects officially prohibited in Manchukuo (Smith 2007, 53). In November 1943, “Xiang Fei” was included in Jue Qing’s collection of short stories *Gui xiang* 歸鄉 (Returning Home) published in Xinjing.

¹⁹ Besides “Xiang Fei,” Jue Qing also wrote three other historical stories from 1942 to 1945. First, in his 1942 “Chang’an cheng de youyu” 長安城的憂鬱 (Melancholy in Chang’an) Jue Qing modifies the story “Lu Yong” 陸顯 (Lu Yong) from *Taiping guangji* 太平廣記 (Extensive Records of the Taiping Era) and “Du Shiniang nu chen baibaoxiang” 杜十娘怒沉百寶箱 (Du Shiniang Angrily Sinks Her Jewel-Box) compiled by Feng Menglong 馮夢龍 (1574–1646). Second, Jue Qing’s 1943 sketch “Sima Qian” 司馬遷 refers to the story of humiliation of the historian Sima Qian (145–85 BC). Third, his 1945 “Beitiao Shizong he Yuanjue Dashi” 北條時宗與圓覺大師 (Hōjō Tokimune and Master of Perfect Enlightenment) is modelled on the tale about the Japanese ruler Hōjō Tokimune 北條時宗 (1251–1284) who repelled an attack by the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368).

said to emit a mysterious fragrance and sent General Zhaohui 兆惠 (1708–64) to bring her back to the capital of Beijing. She was captured, but because she was committed to avenging the loss of her husband and country, she decided to remain chaste in the harem. Qianlong tried to win her over slowly by building a mosque next to the imperial palace and presenting her with Hami melons. But these acts did not relieve her homesickness. Later on, as Xiang Fei remained defiant, the empress dowager grew anxious for her son's safety. One day, when Qianlong left for the Temple of Heaven, she fulfilled Xiang Fei's wish to be killed and ended her life before the emperor returned (428–29).

James Millward has noted that whereas the Manchu documents about the Muslim concubine stress the marital alliance that was supposed to consolidate Qing rule in Xinjiang, the later Han versions of the story are rather “Orientalist” and describe Xiang Fei as an exotic femme fatale who was as uneasy in the imperial harem as was Xinjiang in the empire.²⁰ However, a common denominator can be found throughout the various versions of the story: “As a Uyghur woman whose marriage to the Manchu emperor coincided with the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, she appears as a symbol of Xinjiang; her induction into the palace serves as an allegory for the incorporation of Xinjiang within the Qing empire, and, later, the Chinese nation. Conversely, her defiance mirrors the perennial resistance of [her homeland of] Altishahr to rule from Beijing” (431).

In contrast with the earlier stories that focused mainly on the Manchu court, the 1933 Beijing opera *Xiang Fei hen* 香妃恨 (The Fragrant Concubine's Grief) shifts attention toward the concubine herself. The implicit meaning of the play is revealed in a passage that depicts Xiang Fei being driven to Beijing with other captives. During the journey, she blames her nation for its corruptibility and insufficient patriotism, using standard terms associated with Chinese nationalism, such as *aiguo* 愛國 (patriotism), *zuguo* 祖國 (fatherland), and *tongbao* 同胞 (compatriots) (Anon 1985, 292–93). Millward has pointed out that through the use of nationalist language, Han audiences sympathised

²⁰ Millward has also drawn attention to the Uyghur version of the story, which was obviously inspired by the Chinese version. However, it is not relevant for this analysis (Millward 1994, 448).

with Xiang Fei and perceived the Manchus as an enemy. In the face of foreign aggression, such exhortation to unity and selflessness “was probably intended as a commentary on China’s dilatory resistance to Japanese encroachment” (Millward 1994, 443).

Another dramatic work about the Fragrant Concubine from this period is Gu Qinghai’s 顧青海 1934 *Xiang Fei* 香妃. As in *Xiang Fei hen*, the concubine’s Muslim origin is downplayed so that the protagonist can easily function as a symbol of the subjugated Chinese nation. For example, in the first dialogue of Gu Qinghai’s script, as three guards heat alcohol, one admonishes one of the others for carelessly preparing the king’s chopsticks (Gu 1985, 311). The mention of alcohol might have diminished the Muslim identity of the soldiers, and their use of chopsticks could have made Chinese audiences identify more closely with them.

Gu Qinghai’s story highlights the concubine’s unyieldingness in the face of the Qing army’s imminent attack, which contrasts with the timidity of the soldiers. Even the “king of the desert” loses his determination. On the eve of the battle he calls his men to arms and says that he is not “a spy who sells his own country,” *maiguo de jianxi* 賣國的姦細 (a term that was often used in China to refer to collaborators with the Japanese). However, after getting drunk he suggests to Xiang Fei that they hide together in the mountains. But Xiang Fei insists that they must defend their country to the death. When the king is killed and she ends up a prisoner, she is equally adamant. Although after six months of captivity she feels affection for Qianlong, who is very kind to her, in order to maintain her honor, she asks the empress dowager to kill her (311–43).

A comparison with Gu Qinghai’s 1934 autobiographical travelogue *Jichou Dongbei de yiban* 劫後東北的一斑 (A Glimpse of the Northeast after Its Fall) about a business trip to occupied Manchuria in 1933 may help clarify the implicit support of the Chinese resistance against Japan contained in his drama. Some of the events described in this record resemble scenes from the dramatic work. For example, the following is Gu Qinghai’s description of how he traveled with his young and timid assistant in a train full of Japanese soldiers:

Actually, we did not encounter too many problems at the places that we passed during the journey or where we transferred. Just once, when we were in the sleeping car, we heard a bang. My assistant was startled and turned white in the face. He thought it was a pistol. He poked his head out into the corridor and looked to all sides. I spoke a few words to him, telling him that he should not be flustered and, more importantly, that he should not meddle in other people's business. Anyway, we have already been entrapped. In the best case, there will be nothing to do with us. If something happens, we will need to think of a last-minute solution. Afterwards, I quietly observed that the sound was the wind blowing shut the door next to us! The Russians sitting with us smiled as well.

一路經過的地方，下站，換車，到也很少麻煩。就是一次，在睡車小房中聽到乒的一響，我的助手把臉都駭白了，意謂是手槍，他伸着頭向車子的小衙衙裏四望，給我好說了兩句，叫他不用慌張，更不用管閒事的亂看。反正，我們是已經走進了網裏，沒有我們的事情那是最好；有事，也得再想臨時辦法。後來我默默的觀察，這一聲原來是風刮關了旁邊的車門！我們同坐的俄國人也笑了。(Gu 1934, 6)

In the play, the guardians of the desert kingdom's palace seem to be as afraid of the Qing soldiers as were Gu Qinghai and his assistant of the Japanese:

A: Don't make trouble. I am panicking already. The Qing soldiers are terrible.

(A whistle outside the window, very loudly, and clattering again, the guardians begin to scream. "A," very scared, breaks the glass in his hand into pieces. "B" turns in confusion, looks out of the window. "C," wanting to hide under the small table, screams loudly. Finally, "B" calms down, approaches the table, and kicks "C.")

B: It is the changing of the guards! Haha! You are just little rabbits. Weren't you scared?

...

(Two laughing dancers come on stage.)

乙：你們別胡鬧罷。我心裡怪慌的。清兵真是兇呀。

（窗外一陣胡笳，分外響亮，又間丁當金甲聲，衛士傳呼聲。乙驚極，把手中盃打碎。甲亂轉，忽趨向窗外望。丙想鑽入几底，大叫。終於甲一手按心，走到桌側，踢丙）

甲：是巡夜的換班！哈哈。你們簡直是小兔子。嚇壞了沒有？

...

（二舞女笑上）(Gu 1985, 313)

The presence of Chinese nationalist vocabulary, such as the term *zuguo* in the two plays about Xiang Fei, and the connection between Gu Qinghai's play and the record of his journey to Manchukuo support Millward's thesis that the legend of Xiang Fei was used in the Republic of China as an allegory of Chinese resistance against Japan. As indicated above, the authors further allowed for allegorical readings by downplaying the Uyghur identity of the defiant concubine and her nation, so that the Chinese audience could more easily identify with her and her people.

Now, let us return to Jue Qing and focus on his short story. The main message about the concubine defying the emperor remains unchanged. However, the plot differs in many ways from the above-mentioned plays.²¹ Above all, Jue Qing uses different rhetorical devices to open up space for an allegorical reading. Indeed, Jue Qing could hardly afford to drop hints as transparent as those contained in the plays that were published in the Republic of China before the Japanese invasion.

In his story about Xiang Fei we can identify screens and markers that he used to simultaneously hint at and conceal an allegorical reading. Jue Qing's use of the historical-fiction genre undoubtedly acts as a screen. Lev Loseff has provided accounts

²¹ The main differences between Jue Qing's story and the two plays are as follows: First, Jue Qing's story is depicted exclusively from the perspective of Xiang Fei. At the beginning, Xiang Fei remembers how, before her wedding to Khoja, a prophet warned her that she would be punished for her beauty--her greatest sin. In this manner, Jue Qing emphasises the predestined fate of the protagonist. Second, Jue Qing's version highlights her homesickness rather than her desire for revenge. Third, a significant difference between Jue Qing's story and the two plays lies in the open ending. Whereas in the plays the concubine dies at the end, Jue Qing's main protagonist rejects Qianlong and then "only" finds herself in a hopeless situation: looking out of a window, remembering home, but seeing not Xinjiang's Tianshan Mountains 天山 in the west but only the palace chambers (Jue Qing 1943c, 33-38).

of how describing life in the time of Ivan the Terrible (1530–84) became one of the main devices used by Russian authors to refer to contemporary Soviet reality in the years of Stalinist terror (1984, 62–4). This paper suggests that Jue Qing, similarly to the Russian authors, used the historical story to address contemporary issues.

Additionally, the emphasis on the exotic origin of the desert kingdom's inhabitants (unlike in the two above-mentioned plays) can be considered the main screen of Jue Qing's "Xiang Fei." In contrast to Gu Qinghai, who calls Xiang Fei's husband "the great king of the desert," Jue Qing refers to him as "Khoja," *hezhuo* 和卓 (Jue Qing 1943c, 33). Indeed, whereas the above-mentioned plays avoid references to the Uyghur world almost completely, Jue Qing's story abounds with designations such as "Islam," *Yisilan* 伊斯蘭, and "a prophet," *yuyanzhe* 預言者 (34). For example, the following scene describes Xiang Fei's prayer in Beijing:

First, the concubine and the slave performed the ritual washing. During the prayer, they faced the direction of the Qibla as usual; nonetheless, they did not have an Imam as in Yili, nor could they practice communal prayer with other worshippers. There were only two slaves captured in Yili, one qalandar, and that was it.

妃和奴隸先小淨了身體，禮拜的時候雖然如例朝向開希拉，可是既沒有伊犁城中那樣的伊媽目，也沒有眾人排列著，只有由伊犁虜來的兩個奴隸和一個海蘭達爾而已。(34)

Apparently, besides the Aesopian genre of historical-fiction, "Xiang Fei" also falls into the category of exotic fiction, which Lev Loseff describes as "the attribution of properly Russian concerns to realms which are geographically far-removed" (1984, 64). Like the Russian authors analyzed by Loseff, Jue Qing uses these screens to distract the attention not only of the reader but also of the censor.²²

²² In order to make the story understandable, the original text is supplemented with explanatory notes to clarify the terms. For example, "Khoja: Muslim religious leader" 和卓—回民的教長 or "Qalandar: responsible for the prayer of the followers, analogous to a Taoist priest" 海蘭達爾—專司祈禱之教徒，類似道士 (Jue Qing 1943c, 38).

We can also find markers in Jue Qing's story. Take, for example, the remarkably ambiguous style with which the author depicts Qianlong:

The emperor was an extremely exceptional hero. Since his enthronement, the yellow soil of the Eastern country was even more glorious. The emperor's ancestors raised the great project of building the state from the North, the emperor lengthened the ancestors' imperial epoch, expanded the ancestors' great plan, subjugated the four borderlands, and established a domain with vassal states that the previous generations had never heard of.

帝是百代不遇的英主，自從踐祚以來，東邦的黃土更見輝耀了。帝的先祖是由北方興起了肇國的大業，帝為祖先闡明了皇紀，拓展了先祖的宏謀，鎮服了四疆，而確立了前代未聞的版圖和藩屬。(36)

In this passage we can discern several markers that correspond with the dual nature of Aesopian utterances as described by Loseff (1984, 51–52). Here we find motifs that refer to the Qing empire but which are at the same time also strikingly suitable for describing Japan's imperialist expansionism. In Jue Qing's story the Qing empire is consistently referred to by the unusual name of *Dongbang* 東邦, literally "Eastern country." On the fundamental narrative plane this designation makes sense because China truly does lie east of Xinjiang. However, in standard Chinese, the name *Dongbang* refers either to Qilu 齊魯 (another name of Shandong 山東) or to Japan (Luo 1989, 827). Therefore, it might also hint at an allegorical plane on which the Qing empire symbolises the Japanese empire.

Furthermore, the mention of the country's founders coming from the north can be understood not only as reference to the Manchus who defeated the Ming dynasty but also to Emperor Meiji, who began the colonisation of China from the north by gaining control over the Liaodong Peninsula after the First Sino-Japanese War. References to pacifying the borderlands and establishing vassal states can be understood as applying to Manchukuo in a similar way.

Finally, this excerpt also mentions *huangji* 皇紀, which I translate as "imperial epoch." However, while this is not a common word in Chinese, in the Japanese language *kōki*

皇紀 means “Japanese imperial year,” a unique calendar system used since 1872 in Japan that emphasises the Japanese imperial dynasty’s long history.

When we also consider the patriotic message of the Xiang Fei legend in the Republic of China, the depiction of the powerful Qianlong can clearly be read as a reference to the Japanese coloniser. Moreover, such reference seems to be meaningful considering that Qianlong, who is well known for his literary inquisition, apparently hints at the Japanese coloniser that imposed censorship on literature. Subsequently, the possibility of understanding Xiang Fei’s unyielding resistance as a symbol of anti-colonial resistance in Manchukuo is obvious.

At first sight, using the Chinese emperor’s expansionism as a symbol of Japanese aggression against China may seem absurd. However, exploring mostly examples from European popular culture, James C. Scott has described several analogous voices under domination. For example, he has analysed the European tradition of “world-upside-down” drawings and prints that were popular especially in the sixteenth century and depicted “a topsy-turvy world in which all the normal relations and hierarchies were inverted. Mice ate cats, children spanked parents, the hare snared the hunter. . .” (1990, 167). Even though this tradition did not have any political significance, Jue Qing’s “symbolic inversion” uses the same logic of envisioning a world upside down to hint at a mirror image, a world right side up, described as a cultural negation by Scott (168). In the same way the image of a conquering China can be understood as a reference to China that was being conquered.

In this light, some of the other details in Jue Qing’s “Xiang Fei” can be read allegorically as well, for example, the cruelty of Qianlong. During his conquest of Xinjiang, he spared Xiang Fei’s life during the “great massacre in Badakshan in which even the old, the young, the women, and the children turned into corpses stained with blood that covered the mountainous area” 在巴達克山的大戮殺, 連老幼婦孺都變成血肉模糊的屍體, 擺滿了山野 (Jue Qing 1943c, 37). Badakshan corresponds to a place where a real Qianlong-era battle was fought by the Qing army against the Altishahr Khojas in 1759. However, on the allegorical plane, this description can be understood as a reference to the massacres committed in China by the Japanese.

The Sincere Acrobat Yang Kun

In the short story “The Acrobat Yang Kun”²³ Jue Qing uses a similar strategy of Aesopian utterances to bypass the censorship of Manchukuo literature. However, this time his source material that functions as the main screen is not a Chinese legend but the 1892 French short story “Le Jongleur de Notre-Dame” (The Juggler of Notre Dame) by Anatole France.²⁴

The narrator-character of Jue Qing’s story is a famous writer. He recalls his friend Yang Kun, whom he met in August 1931 when he was fifteen years old, just before the Mukden Incident, *Jiu yi ba shibian* 九一八事變, of 18 September 1931.²⁵ At that time, Yang Kun, who was about twenty, became the leader of a group of “wandering youngsters” who met regularly under a bridge in Changchun (to win respect, he beat up two boys who did not want to obey him). Yang Kun’s background was somewhat mysterious: allegedly, he came from Harbin, where he was fired from a job, and, because he had no family, became a wanderer who slept on a park bench. In August he moved to Changchun.

Yang Kun was older than the rest of the boys, who all feared him. He is also described as having a comical face with sunken cheeks that makes him look like a chimpanzee. The young narrator became friends with him. After the Mukden Incident, Yang Kun began putting on juggling performances as part of a magic show, which, thanks to his ape-like appearance, became famous. Even though Yang Kun’s favorite prostitute did not appreciate his show (she watched it impassively and was more concerned with the seeds she was cracking), Yang Kun became rich and could often visit her. To make

²³ “The Acrobat Yang Kun” was published in August 1943 in the first issue of *Qingnian wenhua*.

²⁴ References to Western fiction are common in Jue Qing’s essays and stories; he frequently mentions works by Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616), William Shakespeare (1564–1616), Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849), Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–81), and others, and he was obviously familiar with them. However, French writers were his favorite. He translated several of André Gide’s (1869–1951) stories, and besides “Le Jongleur de Notre-Dame” he also alluded to stories by Stendhal (1783–1824), Auguste de Villiers de L’Isle-Adam (1838–89), Maurice Barrès (1862–1923), and others. Jue Qing has noted that in his teens he read Gide’s works in Japanese translation (Anon. 1944, 13). Later, he seems to have read in French. His daughter claims that he translated directly from French and was fluent not only in Japanese and French but also in English, German, and Russian (Liu Weicong, interview, 2019).

²⁵ In Jue Qing’s story it is referred to as the “Manchurian Incident,” *Manzhou shibian* 滿洲事變. This is a noteworthy mention because in Manchukuo literature direct references to the Japanese occupation, including representations of Japanese people in Manchukuo, were extremely rare. This was due to the racist nature of Manchukuo society, where “direct Chinese criticism of Japanese rule was impermissible” (Smith 2007, 125).

his show even better, he tried hard to emphasise his ape-like appearance. Therefore, the narrator perceived him as a great artist comparable to Michelangelo (1475–1546):

He used the great effort of cutting his jaws and losing weight to transform his own body, to make himself descend from being a member of the human race to being a chimpanzee. On the stage, he spared no effort to enthrall the audience, to persuade the audience with every single movement that he really was a chimpanzee. This effort was equally matched with that of Michelangelo when he designed St. Peter's Basilica in Rome with his skilled hand. When he took to the stage to make art, he went so far as to completely forget that he was Yang Kun, he thought that he really was a chimpanzee brought to the stage from the African jungle. . . The artistic spirit he adopted was how to discard human nature, how to descend from human nature to ape nature.

他用削骨瘦身的努力，改造著自己的肉態，使自己由人類的一員下降為黑猩猩，在舞台上盡力征服著觀眾，讓觀眾在自己的一舉手一投足之間，發現他就是黑猩猩。這努力和米開朗其羅設計羅馬聖彼德寺院的靈腕是不相上下的。他登上舞台作藝，居然到了完全忘指自己本是楊崑的心境，而覺得自己真是由菲洲的大密林裡被帶到舞台上來的黑猩猩。... 他所採取得藝術精神，是怎樣拋棄人性，由人性下降到猿性去。(Jue Qing 1943e, 96)

The narrator tells us that ten years later he became a famous writer, nicknamed *guicai* (a genius, the same nickname that was applied to Jue Qing), and forgot about Yang Kun. One day he received a letter in which Yang Kun, who was now poor and sick, asked him for financial help. But the narrator put off meeting with his former friend for so long that Yang Kun died in the meantime. On the day of his funeral, the narrator finally learned from Yang Kun's wife (the former prostitute) how Yang Kun's career developed since they had last seen each other. After Yang Kun became famous in Changchun, he went to Beijing and Shanghai with the magic show and became well known throughout China for his chimpanzee performance. However, because he missed his beloved prostitute, he returned to Changchun (which had been already

renamed Xinjing), redeemed her from prostitution and married her. At that time, his performance ceased to flourish because he became fat and no longer resembled a monkey. He ended up at a circus where he performed a miserable magic act called “the immortal picks beans,” *xianren zhai dou* 仙人摘豆. In the end, he died of disease (91-7).

At the end of the story, the narrator mentions Anatole France’s tale about the juggler Barnabé:

France’s story called “Le Jongleur de Notre-Dame” also described a juggler. This juggler became a monk in a monastery and wanted to praise the Virgin Mary. But because he had no skills, he could not praise her virtues with noble talent like the other monks. He felt ashamed and questioned himself; after that he went secretly in front of the Madonna’s altar to play with his six copper balls, of which he was most proud. Eventually, he moved the Virgin Mary, and made her manifest herself, so that she came down from the altar and wiped away the sweat from this juggler’s forehead with her azure robe.

法朗士的一篇題名《聖母的江湖藝人》的小說裡，也寫過一個江湖藝人。這個江湖藝人到僧院裡做修道僧，要讚美聖母，但是因為身無一技長，不能和其他的同道一樣用崇高的才能去讚美的諸德，捫心自愧，就私自到聖母瑪利亞的祭壇前面耍其最得意的六個銅球來，終於感動了聖母，使聖母由祭壇上走下來顯了聖，用青色的外套給這個江湖藝人擦額角的汗。(97)

In the story “Le Jongleur de Notre-Dame,” which France included in the 1892 collection *L’étui de nacre* (Mother of Pearl), France develops a medieval European legend about a poor juggler who experiences a divine miracle. In the above-quoted excerpt Jue Qing summarises the core of the story. Nonetheless, he omits the ending, in which Barnabé is standing on his head in front of the altar, juggling. The prior sees him through a hole in a door. At first the prior cries out against this sacrilege, but then, to his surprise, he witnesses how the Virgin Mary on the altar bows to Barnabé. The prior falls to the ground and exclaims “Heureux les simples, car ils verront Dieu!” (Blessed are the simple-hearted, for they shall see God!; France 1899, 93-105).

This short story can be understood as an expression of France's nostalgia for simple medieval beliefs whose disappearance he equated to society's loss of innocence. Indeed, it is mostly read as a depiction of simple, whole-hearted faith (Ziolkowski 2018, 211-2). It seems that simplicity and sincerity are the values that Jue Qing appreciated in France's short story too. In the last paragraph of "The Acrobat Yang Kun," the narrator compares Yang Kun to himself:

I am ashamed that I have never managed to become the wandering youngster whose sincerity moves heaven. Neither have I managed to become the writer whose sincerity moves heaven. I was only looking for some kind of God of arts who could save me. But now I don't need to open my eyes to look for some kind of God of arts anymore. When I pray for Yang Kun's happiness in the afterlife, it is as if I feel God's love, I feel unusually peaceful and happy. People with a heart under heaven, let's kneel down together and pray for the great artist's happiness in the afterlife.

我很慚愧，不曾作到至誠感天的浮浪少年，也不曾作到至誠感天的文士，只想找什麼藝術之神來拯救自己，可是現在不必睜開眼再去找什麼藝術之神了。為楊崑祈求冥福的時候，我就像受著神寵一樣，覺得自己是非常和平而幸福的。天下的有心人，我們來一同跪下為這位大藝術家祈求冥福罷。(Jue Qing 1943e, 97)

As indicated above, the narrator, who is the rich writer referred to as "a genius," is an apparent autobiographical protagonist representing Jue Qing.²⁶ He became a famous "member of the literati" 文士, but only because he also became an "overanxious and forgetful gentleman" 多慮而健忘的君子 (94) and "was only looking for some kind of God of arts who could save him." If we consider Jue Qing's writing career, the "God of arts" may refer to the concept of artistic freedom and independence that was advocated by Jue Qing and other *Yiwenzhi* writers in the above-mentioned literary

²⁶ Jue Qing's protagonists were often considered autobiographical by contemporary literary critics. For example, see Gu Ding's 1940 review of Jue Qing's story "Mai" 麦 (Wheat): "Jue Qing has created a protagonist: Chen Mu. To carve this statue, he used precisely his own 'naked chest' as a model." 爵青創造了一個人物：陳穆。這完全是用他自己的"裸然之胸廓"為模特兒雕成的塑像 (Gu Ding 2017, 219).

debate, at the time when Jue Qing published several fiction works that were indirectly pro-Japanese. Therefore, the above-quoted excerpt can be read as the declaration of a writer who succeeded thanks to his opportunism.

However, to analyze the allegorical meanings of this enigmatic story, it is crucial to interpret the symbolic role of the protagonist Yang Kun. This paper suggests that he can be understood as a representation of the Northeastern female writer Xiao Hong 蕭紅 (1911–42), known at the beginning of her career as Qiao Yin 悄吟, a famous member of the anti-Japanese literary movement in Harbin after the Japanese occupation, who fled Manchukuo in 1934 (Duara 2003, 223). She and her husband, Xiao Jun 蕭軍 (1907–88), “produced a radical literary culture that survived even after their departure from the region” (145–6). Such a reading interprets the development of Yang Kun’s juggling career as a reference to Xiao Hong’s career as a writer.

Before we turn to Jue Qing and analyze his short story, it should be stressed again that censorship was not applied comprehensively in Manchukuo. Therefore, references to Xiao Hong in Manchukuo’s official press were not necessarily uncommon. In China proper, Xiao Hong’s death was commemorated in a spate of eulogies, articles and poems (Goldblatt 1976, 132). In Manchukuo, Shan Ding 山丁 (1914–97), also known as Liang Shanding 梁山丁, one of the prominent writers who did not emigrate, published the 1943 poem “Liaoyuan de hai’an: Dao Qiao Yin” 遼遠的海岸：悼悄吟 (Distant Shores: Mourning Qiao Yin).²⁷ In it, he sums up her and Xiao Jun’s emigration, expresses his love for her novel *Sheng si chang* 生死場 (The Field of Life and Death) and the collection of her and Xiao Jun’s essays *Shangshi jie* 商市街 (Market Street), remembers the day he met both of them personally in Harbin, and mourns her death (Shan Ding 1998, 349–51). Wu Ying openly discussed Xiao Hong, too. In her May 1944 essay “Manzhou nüxing wenxue de ren yu zuopin” 滿洲女性文學的人與作品 (Female Writers and Their Works in Manchuria), published in *Qingnian wenhua*, she commemorated Xiao Hong’s premature death and proudly called her the founder of “Manchurian women’s New Literature” (Wu Ying 1944, 24).

²⁷ The poem was originally published in 1943 in the Xinjing-based journal *Xing Ya* 興亞 (Flourishing Asia), no. 10.

However, the possibility of reading Jue Qing's "Yiren Yang Kun" as a reference to Xiao Hong has thus far remained screened from scholars of Manchukuo literature.

Now let us explore the markers that hint at the possibility of such an interpretation. Some of Yang Kun's biographical information presented by the narrator corresponds to that of Xiao Hong, especially dates. By performing simple arithmetic, we can assume that Yang Kun, who was "about twenty" at the time of the Mukden Incident, was born in 1911, like Xiao Hong. Yang Kun began putting on juggling performances shortly after the Mukden Incident. Similarly, Xiao Hong's first poems were published in the spring of 1932. Yang Kun soon became famous and started touring Manchuria as part of a magic show. "This happened ten years ago" 以上是十年前的事情, says the narrator (Jue Qing 1943e, 94). Thus, we can assume that this happened in 1933 (ten years before the story was published), the same year when Xiao Hong and Xiao Jun's first collection of stories and essays, *Bashe* 跋涉 (Arduous Journey), was published in Harbin (Goldblatt 1976, 31). After that, Yang Kun left Manchuria:

Ten years ago, Yang Kun left Xinjing and went to the regions of Jing-Jin [Beijing and Tianjin] and Jiang-Zhe [Jiangsu and Zhejiang] to perform. Less than three years passed, and he, as he said in his letter himself, really became a famous clown of the Eight Great Sea Ports.

楊崑在十年前離開了新京，到京津江浙一帶賣藝，未出三年，正如他自己在信裡所說的一樣，真個成為八大海口的有名小丑。(Jue Qing 1943e, 96)

This excerpt can be seen as a reference to Xiao Hong's escape from Manchukuo to China in the spring of 1934. Yang Kun's becoming a famous clown throughout all of China in less than three years seems to hint at the publication of Xiao Hong's first novel *Sheng si chang* in December 1935. Thanks to Lu Xun's help with publishing, Xiao Hong (and Xiao Jun) became "overnight sensations among leftist circles" (Chou 2017, 468).

However, after "two or three years," Yang Kun got married and became fat. Again, the decline of Yang Kun's career evokes the literary career of Xiao Hong, who

returned from Japan to Shanghai in 1937 and, together with Xiao Jun, fled to Wuhan. There, she separated from Xiao Jun because of his violent behavior and began a relationship with another Northeastern writer, Duanmu Hongliang 端木蕻良 (1912-96), whom she later married. In the two years after her return from Japan, for both personal and political reasons she rarely wrote anything (Goldblatt 1976, 77-9). Howard Goldblatt has remarked that “the little writing she did publish in Wuhan bespeaks a somewhat half-hearted attempt to write in accordance with the Association’s [the nationalist Chinese Writers’ Anti-Aggression Association] policy of strident wartime propaganda” (78). Let us compare this statement with Jue Qing’s narrator’s assessment of Yang Kun’s performance in this period, when his career was damaged by “love desire”: “After that [becoming fat], every show that he appeared in became a failure” 其後，凡是有他出演的劇目，竟都成了失敗的場面 (Jue Qing 1943e, 96).

At the very end of his career, “two years ago,” says the narrator, Yang Kun ended up at a circus (97). This can be read as roughly corresponding to Xiao Hong’s departure from Chongqing to Hong Kong in the spring of 1940. After his short circus career, Yang Kun died of dysentery. Xiao Hong died of tuberculosis in January 1942, that is, one and a half years before Jue Qing published “Yiren Yang Kun.” The acrobat’s funeral was very simple; “they didn’t even hire music” 連一場吹鼓也沒有僱 (Jue Qing 1943e, 95). Correspondingly, Xiao Hong was buried in a simple grave (Goldblatt 1976, 115).

Although some of the turning points in the careers of Yang Kun and Xiao Hong occurred within months of each other, they mostly match up perfectly. We can also find many other striking similarities between Yang Kun and Xiao Hong. For example, Yang Kun came from Harbin and “had no family.” Before he came to Changchun, “at night, [he] slept on a wooden bench on Central Street”²⁸ 晚上睡在中央大街的木椅上 (92). Xiao Hong came from Hulan, a suburb of Harbin, where she attended the First Municipal Girls’ Middle School. She lost her mother when she was nine, and in 1930 she ran away from home when her father arranged a wedding for her. After that,

²⁸ The famous main street in the city of Harbin.

“a long period of aimless wanderings” (Goldblatt 1976, 17-32) left her physically and mentally worn down. She was a famous wanderer, indeed; “You [and Xiao Jun] were a pitiful gypsy, expelled by people, roaming here and there” 你們是一隻可憐的茨岡，給人趕出來了，到處流浪， wrote Shan Ding about Xiao Hong in the above-mentioned poem (Shan Ding 1998, 349).

Not only Harbin, but also most of the other places related to Yang Kun’s career evoke those that were important for Xiao Hong. Besides the region of Jiang-Zhe, which is apparently a reference to Shanghai, where she rose to prominence, in his letter in which he asks the narrator for financial help, Yang Kun tells the narrator that he has also been to Tianjin and Jinan (Jue Qing 1943e, 94). In this context, his reference to Jinan evokes Xiao Hong’s well-known stay in Shandong, where she in reality lived in Qingdao (Goldblatt 1976, 33).

In addition, some of Yang Kun’s psychological features also seem to hint at those of Xiao Hong. For example, Xiao Hong revealed in her autobiographical essays her “overpowering need to be dependent on others, primarily men” (130). When Yang Kun finished the first show to which he invited his impassive girlfriend, he came to her and whispered in her ear: “This is all for you!” 這都是為了你呀！ (Jue Qing 1943e, 94). Considering the distinctive personal appeal of Xiao Hong’s writings (Goldblatt 1976, 134), Yang Kun’s eagerness to transform his body to improve his juggling show can be interpreted as a reference to Xiao Hong’s willingness to include autobiographical elements in her works.

The name of the short story can be seen as another important marker. Apparently to draw attention to the allegorical plane on which Yang Kun represents not merely an acrobat but possibly a more serious artist, Jue Qing chose to title the story “Yiren Yang Kun” 藝人楊昆 (The Acrobat/Artist Yang Kun) and not “Jianghu yiren Yang Kun” 江湖藝人楊昆 (The Juggler Yang Kun).

At this point in my interpretation, most of the screens that Jue Qing deploys in the story to camouflage the taboo meaning seem to be obvious. First of all, Yang Kun’s male gender is one such screen. Considering this aspect of “Yiren Yang Kun,” this

story, like “Xiang Fei,” falls into the category of symbolic reversals, or the “world upside down” allegory, which James C. Scott describes as veiled expressions of subordinate groups’ cultural resistance. Specifically, this allegory corresponds to the reversal of gender roles mentioned by Scott (1990, 166–8). However, some of Yang Kun’s “masculine” features, for example, his violent nature, apparently refer to Xiao Hong’s husband Xiao Jun, who was infamous for beating her (Goldblatt 1976, 77). Therefore, this specific screen functions as a rhetorical device that veils the allegorical meaning but also indirectly hints at Xiao Hong through a reference to her husband.

Beyond gender, many of Yang Kun’s other characteristics that are obviously unrelated to Xiao Hong, some of which are rather bizarre, function as screens, that is, they draw attention away from possible similarities to Xiao Hong. For example, towards the end of the story, after he became fat, Yang Kun has plastic surgery on his face in a German hospital in Tianjin to make him resemble a monkey again. Yang Kun’s ape-like appearance though seems to function not only as a screen but also as a marker. Interestingly enough, in traditional Chinese literature, we can find a well-known story featuring a monkey protagonist that refers to a real famous artist. The Tang dynasty (618–907) tale “Bu Jiang Zong *Baiyuan zhuan*” 補江總白猿傳 (A Supplement to Jiang Zong’s *Biography of a White Ape*), written by an anonymous author, is sometimes regarded as one of the earliest examples of a *roman à clef* in the history of Chinese fiction.²⁹ It ridicules the early Tang calligrapher Ouyang Xun 歐陽詢 (557–641) (Chen Jue, 76–7). Given Jue Qing’s interest in traditional Chinese literature, which is manifested in his historical stories published from 1942 to 1945 (see above), we can guess that he used this device to indicate to a learned reader that Yang Kun also represents a real artist.

One more screen is vital for conveying the allegorical meaning hidden in Jue Qing’s story to the reader. Namely, Jue Qing uses intertextual references to Anatole France’s tale in order to confuse the censor. Hence, Yang Kun resembles not only Xiao Hong but also Barnabé. For example, Yang Kun’s devotion to the prostitute is explicitly compared with that of Barnabé’s to the Virgin Mary (Jue Qing 1943e, 97). Most

²⁹ A *roman à clef* is a kind of European novel that presents real persons under fictitious names.

importantly, at the end of the story, when the narrator praises the sincerity of Yang Kun and indicates that he is the real “God of arts” that he was looking for, Jue Qing makes the reader, as well as the censor, think that it is the abstract value of sincerity, for which Barnabé was redeemed, that the author worships.

This strategy can be understood as a specific case of adopting exotic fiction, one of the Aesopian genres defined by Loseff. The use of this screen in “Xiang Fei” is analogous to Russian cases that shift the locale of tales to geographically remote surroundings (Loseff 1984, 64). However, the story of the acrobat is set in Manchuria, and hence the exotic screen in “Yiren Yang Kun” seems to function in a more complex way. Specifically, to veil the message that China had an artist as great as Yang Kun, at the end of the story the narrator presents information about a similarly great artist who once lived in France.

To gain access to the allegorical meaning, readers must do more than closely analyse the story’s many details. Above all, they need to have a good knowledge of Xiao Hong’s biography. Therefore, we can conclude that “Yiren Yang Kun” involves the use of Aesopian language that draws screens and markers from an area of knowledge with which only learned readers were familiar or with which the censor was believed to be unacquainted, as described by Loseff (1984, 87).

As Liu Xiaoli has noted, one contemporary literary critic thought that the comparison of Yang Kun to Michelangelo was redundant and believed that it detracted from the work’s gravity and depth (2008, 217). Indeed, on the fundamental plane of meaning, when the narrator compares the chimpanzee-like Yang Kun with Michelangelo, the great artist the narrator admires the most (Jue Qing 1943e, 96), he comes off as mocking his friend. Therefore, this comparison can be seen as another screen in Jue Qing’s story because it makes the story look like a parody.

Nevertheless, however absurd it may seem, this comparison makes the reader think about the symbolic role of the protagonist. Loseff has noted that such figures, which he defines as “*reductio ad absurdum*,” can be found in Tsarist-era Russian literature (Loseff 1984, 111). In the case of “Yiren Yang Kun,” in addition to functioning as a screen, this figure can be also seen as a marker that compares Yang Kun with Xiao

Hong, who is considered by some to be “probably the most successful and talented woman writer in China during most of her short career” (Goldblatt 1976, 133). Moreover, the pathetic comparison of Yang Kun to Michelangelo and the repeated praise of Yang Kun as a “great artist” draw attention to the possibility of reading “Yiren Yang Kun” as a eulogy, a genre for which such pathos and praise are characteristic-- that is, a eulogy written by probably the most well-known Manchukuo author, who was associated with Harbin, Jue Qing, for the most famous Harbin female émigré.³⁰

Presumably, it was very daring to commemorate Xiao Hong’s death in Manchukuo’s official press as openly as Shan Ding and Wu Ying did. However, their openness was apparently tempered by their somewhat ambiguous and weak form of expression. Shan Ding does recall that the two Xiaos were driven out of Manchuria, but he also states that before he learned about Xiao Hong’s death, he had been looking forward to meeting them again on the “day when East Asia wins the war” 東亞勝戰的一日 (Shan Ding 1998, 350). Wu Ying does not employ figures of speech associated with Japanese propaganda; however, she commemorates Xiao Hong merely as a feminist writer who was skilled at describing the Manchurian countryside (Wu Ying 1944, 24).

At the end of Jue Qing’s “Yiren Yang Kun,” the autobiographical narrator, who admits that he was not always sincere in his work (he was a “forgetful gentleman”), declares that he “no longer needs to open his eyes to look for some kind of God of arts anymore.” It seems that he has already found one – Xiao Hong. However, Xiao Hong, as represented by Jue Qing through the character of Yang Kun, is not merely a feminist author. Before Yang Kun came from Harbin to Changchun, he had allegedly been in prison for theft, and he had a scar on his knee “which was evidence that he had been tortured” 就是他受過拷問的證據. The narrator, alongside recounting the events of the Mukden Incident, also mentions that in addition to “some mental defects” 心理上有什麼缺陷, such as kleptomania, “the instinct of mankind lies in desire to attack”

³⁰ Jue Qing’s daughter Liu Weicong claims that “some people say that in Harbin, Jue Qing was in contact with the two Xiaos, but they had different opinions.” However, any materials that could have documented this claim were burned during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) by his family (2019, interview). I can only state with any certainty that they potentially could have met in Harbin. In the February 1937 autobiographical essay “Yiguo qingdiao” 異國情調 (Exotic Atmosphere), Jue Qing notes that he had already been living in Harbin for three years at that point. If this figure is accurate, it means that he was already living there in the spring of 1934, that is, before the two Xiaos emigrated (Jue Qing 1937, 3). In the same period, Shan Ding met them in Harbin (Wang Yue 2020, 159).

人類的本能在攻擊欲。When the narrator describes how he peered from the street into a cheap brothel, he says that “I have kept that memory of the helplessness of life in the time of the defeat in my heart until today” 那種人生在敗北時的莫可奈何的印象，至今還留在我的胸裡 (Jue Qing 1943e, 91-3). Considering the suggested interpretation of the story, and in the context of portraying the Mukden Incident from the perspective of the defeated, these hints can be understood as implicit criticism of Japanese aggression and of the persecution of leftist writers in Manchukuo. Hence, Xiao Hong, as represented and commemorated by Jue Qing through the character of Yang Kun, can be seen as engaged in the fight against the colonial regime.

Conclusion

Liu Xiaoli has noted that in many literary works from Manchukuo indirect criticism of the colonial regime goes hand in hand with aspects that seem to support the government (2018, 101-2). This observation clearly applies to the above-mentioned poem by Shan Ding, which commemorates the rebellious Xiao Hong but which at the same time can be accused of spreading Japanese propaganda. We can also argue that it applies to Jue Qing’s “Xiang Fei” and “Yiren Yang Kun.”

The routing of cruel Chinese warlords and bringing security from warlord disorder were significant achievements that Manchukuo propaganda attributed to the new regime (Duara 2003, 71). The rule of the cruel emperor Qianlong in “Xiang Fei,” in addition to the interpretation mentioned above, can also be read as an allegorical representation of the former Chinese warlord regime; hence this story reflects ideas present in Japanese propaganda. In “Yiren Yang Kun,” the sad end of the acrobat’s career could be read as an imagining of the fate of an artist in Manchukuo who was as sincere as the French juggler Barnabé. If the story is understood in this way, its moral would be that one should be cautious and satisfied with one’s well-being and that standing out from the crowd might result in sharing Yang Kun’s unhappy fate.

However, I suggest that such readings only apply to the layers of these texts that are agreeable to the censor but deliver hidden allegorical meanings to the reader. This study of Jue Qing's short stories "Xiang Fei" and "Yiren Yang Kun" in the context of the political and cultural changes in Manchukuo brought about by the outbreak of the Pacific War indicates that after 1941 Jue Qing began to use Aesopian language to reject the colonial regime and dissociate himself from his earlier works that had supported it. After this man of many faces became a member of Manchukuo's official art and censorship institutions, he managed to camouflage taboo messages and bypass censorship by including references to Chinese and French tales, which acted as literary screens.

In the specific context of censored official Manchukuo literature, among the variety of interpretations offered by these stories, it is possible to recognise subversive readings. Jue Qing's version of a legend about Qianlong's concubine can be read as a rejection of the cruelty of the Japanese colonial regime, represented here by Emperor Qianlong, and as an expression of compassion for the oppressed Chinese subjects, represented here by the Uyghur concubine. Jue Qing's version of a medieval European legend about a poor juggler can be understood as a rejection of opportunism and praise for the leftist writer Xiao Hong, a member of the anti-Japanese movement. As a result, "Xiang Fei" and "Yiren Yang Kun," written by a Manchukuo censor and "traitor to the Chinese nation," Jue Qing, can be considered subtle literary attempts at delegitimising the Japanese colonial regime.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Wang Meng and Self-censorship: Cultural Unity and Socialist Values in 1950s China

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The early work and experience of writer (and later Minister of Culture) Wang Meng provides a useful study in the "slow creep" of active, optimistic efforts on behalf of both political authorities and the people to create a unified cultural subject, as they move toward a more recognisable form of censorship and control. Although parts of Wang Meng's first novel *Long live youth* were published in the late 1950s, it was not published in its entirety until 1979. The plot revolves around a group of high school girls who value spontaneity and freedom, rather than discipline and organisation. The small group of main characters develop strategies of inclusion and exclusion, mimicking society at large while shielding themselves from the contamination of politics and national affairs. By the time he wrote the novella *A Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department* in 1956, Wang Meng had reformulated his protagonist to recognise the insidious danger of self-censorship. Lin Zhen retains the values of "good cheer" and hard work but falls into doubt and confusion. The story's portrayal of Lin's colleagues in the Organization Department as lazy, cautious, and unenthusiastic is also part of a literary investigation into the kind of censorship that is woven into daily work life, emerging from the structures of bureaucracy.

上世紀 50 年代曾任文化部長的王蒙寫的兩部小說《青春萬歲》和《組織部新來的年輕人》呈現了中國 50 年代積極向上的樂觀主義精神。《青春萬歲》寫的是一群追崇自由，隨性爛漫，不喜被組織和紀律約束的高中女生。她們對他人包容和排斥的策略，既是當時社會制度和風氣的體現，又展示了年輕人未經政治風雨及世俗侵染的青春和純潔。《組織部新來的年輕人》揭露了官僚機構中逐漸滲透到日常工作中的審查制度。王蒙塑造了一個能自我審查隱患的主角林震。雖然其組織部的同事在小說中被描述為懶惰、謹慎並缺乏熱忱，林震自己也時常陷入懷疑和困惑，但他保留了“打起精神”和努力工作的價值觀。通過研究王蒙這兩部小說中所展現出來的樂觀主義精神，本文揭示了那個時代的當權者和民眾是如何將這種樂觀向上的價值取向逐步演變成政治審查的要素，從而構建起一個統一的文化主題。

Keywords: Wang Meng, China censorship, 1950s China, Socialist bureaucracy, Chinese socialist novels

關鍵詞: 王蒙，中國審查制度，中國五十年代，社會主義官僚主義，中國社會主義小說

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Introduction

Severe and obvious censorship may be easy to recognise and condemn, whereas the more ambiguous aspects of social engineering—encouragement or discouragement through recognition, opportunities, and the allocation of resources—are difficult to pin down. Recent research understands censorship as a complex concept within knowledge-production involving actors from every organisation, small and large—the state, religious institutions, the university, and so on—as well as individuals and the community. It can work objectively and subjectively. Without the benefit of hindsight, differences between censorship and allegiance to a unified vision, which can involve many different parties fully or partially committed to the same goal, can be difficult to analyse, especially before extremes are reached.

This ambiguity and sophistication concerning censorship muddies the water in terms of identifying the “line crossed” at any historical period. Yet from our present vantage point, we can identify clear strategies and practices of literary censorship that emerged in China during the 1950s, following principles developed earlier. The desire to extract “unconditional loyalty” from artists and writers was plainly expressed at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art in May, 1942 (Fisac 2012, 131). The most basic guidelines for literature in the PRC were set at that time, and the overarching goal was to “serve the masses” (*wei renmin fuwu* 为人民服务). However, this phrase was an abstraction that demanded constant attention to exactly what would serve the masses, and how. Although some principles regarding topic, style, language, and perspective eventually were developed, the process of establishing literary practices for serving the masses was neither simple nor easy. Even more onerous was the problem of how to identify and deal with writers whose works did not fulfill the demand to serve the people.

Publishers in China were under state control beginning in 1950, and Party committees were quickly established to review upcoming publications. Texts published earlier could be revised or banned. Censorship occurred through many layers of literary practice, including the establishment of a style readily accessible to everyone. Within the three categories that Taciana Fisac (2012) establishes in her study of Ba Jin 巴金

(1904–2005)—self-censorship by authors, publisher intervention, and decisions by the Chinese Communist Party—the first, self-censorship, offers several advantages. It requires no unsavoury intervention, it can be communicated indirectly, and, most importantly, it can create a thick grey line between anything that can be called actual censorship and the desire to create and live by communal guidelines. It is this muddy realm of doubt—where both writers and their literary characters barely begin to sense that their enthusiasm for unity and cooperation has occluded clarity and gutted ideals—that my inquiry lands. This focus is solidly located in concern about the present rather than in allowing or encouraging the discomfort of the past to bubble up in image or speech.

In her work on media censorship, Sei Jeong Chin (2018) argues that the reason censorship in 1950s Shanghai was so effective was exactly because of the inability of journalists to draw a line between self-censorship and the ability to understand and follow party policies. Pre-publication censorship was prohibited for Party newspapers and freedom to report “truthful news” was guaranteed by the Common Programme of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference in 1949 (961).¹ In the 1950s, there was no official body responsible for enforcing censorship. Instead, an informal system developed that held newspapers and their editors responsible for content, emphasising self-censorship.² Chin’s conclusion is that the informal self-censorship system caused the term “censorship” to disappear from the public realm (971). Chin recognises that punitive methods also could be enforced, while arguing that media control was largely achieved informally. For literary texts, the publishing system also was gradually nationalised over the early years of the PRC, with official institutions for professional writers—such as the China Writers Association (*Zhongguo zuojia xiehui* 中国作家协会, founded in 1949)—functioning as the bureaucratic apparatus through which self-

¹ Chin (2018) details the anti-censorship position that the CCP held throughout the Sino-Japanese War and the Civil War, whereas the Nationalist government implemented censorship, which was criticised by the CCP as fascist (961–962).

² Some newspapers were allowed to send representatives to attend meetings of the Shanghai propaganda department and read party documents, giving them an inside view of which direction to take the articles in the newspaper.

ensorship could be nurtured.³ In his study of literature under socialism, Perry Link (2000) also argues that self-censorship was the most common and pernicious method of controlling writers, detailing the strong relationships between journal editors and state propaganda departments. Like Chin, Link notes that the way to put the Party's directives into play in texts was not clear, producing a guessing game for both writers and editors. Both Chin and Link state that coercive methods could be invoked if self-censorship did not produce the desired results.

The dominance of a well-developed system of self-censorship, which is supported by ample historical evidence, may partially explain another 1950s experience. Many contemporary Chinese writers, critics, and ordinary people regard this post-war nation-building era—at least until the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957—as a time when Chinese socialism was more unified than coercive. They recognize flaws but also insist that a valuable communal life, which disappeared in post-Mao China, existed in the 1950s.⁴ What we now would call self-censorship was often engaged in voluntarily and based on a genuine desire to create and participate in a common culture, they argue. The government's role in building a unified society by setting and enforcing guidelines seemed justifiable to many, and with some important exceptions, was generally supported by writers.⁵ As Chin explains, “censorship was not necessarily perceived as something to evade or resist” because there was no necessary antagonism between the state and the media (Chin 2018, 958). The perpetually optimistic gaze, focused on the future, the self-sacrificing socialist literary hero, and the overall good cheer in the face of difficulties and challenges embodied genuine, shared emotional states. With this

³ Hong (2007) argues that although participation in the China Writers Association was supposedly voluntary, its actual purpose was to “exercise political and artistic leadership and control of a writer's literary activities, and to guarantee that literary norms were implemented” (27).

⁴ This kind of conflicted sentiment runs through Cai Xiang's 蔡翔 well-received 2010 book, *Geming/Xushu* 革命/叙述: 中國社會科學主義文學—文化想像 (Revolution/narrative: Chinese social-scientist literature—cultural imaginaries), which has been edited and translated into English by Rebecca E. Karl and Xueping Zhong.

⁵ See Fokkema (1965). Fokkema deals with the period leading into the Anti-Rightist Movement, when persecution of writers was at its most serious. However, some writers were branded as enemies of the people and persecuted in the early days of the PRC or before. See also Goldman (1969). One of the most famous cases of literary persecution involves the writer Wang Shiwei 王实味 (1906–1947), who was executed in 1947 when he criticized Mao Zedong's relationships with women and the privileges of the Communist Party in his essay “Ye baihehua” 野百合花 (Wild lilies). See Dai Qing (1994), and also Cheek (1984), who details the argument about national forms in literature between Wang Shiwei and Chen Boda 陈伯达 (1904–1989), Mao's personal secretary, in the early 1940s, tracing a history of dispute that predated Wang's execution.

mixed and often contradictory situation looming before us, how should we think of censorship in the 1950s literary realm?

The early work and experience of writer (and later Minister of Culture) Wang Meng 王蒙 (1934 -) provides a useful study in the “slow creep” of active, optimistic efforts—by both political authorities and the people at large—to create a unified cultural subject, as they move toward on one hand the set forms of cynical governance, and on the other, hesitation and doubt. Although parts of Wang Meng’s first novel *Qingchun wansui* 青春万岁 (Long live youth, henceforth *Long Live Youth*)—written in 1953 when he was only 19—came out in the late 1950s, it was not published in its entirety until 1979. The plot revolves around a group of high school girls who value spontaneity and freedom, rather than discipline and organisation. This novel, full of the naiveté of youth, cannot tell us much about censorship. Only when put up against Wang’s later controversial novella, *Zuzhibu xinlaide qingnianren* 组织部新来的年轻人 (A young man arrives at the organization department, henceforth *A Young Man*), which was published in 1956, do the structures and themes of censorship become apparent. *A Young Man* expresses the author’s growing sense that something is no longer right, although it may not be exactly clear what is wrong. Protagonist Lin Zhen 林震 retains the values of “good cheer” evident in the early work, but a confusing atmosphere throws him into an ambiguous mental state.⁶ The story’s portrayal of Lin’s colleagues in the Organization Department as lazy and cautious shows a kind of censorship—of enthusiasm, hope, and vigour—that emerges from the structures of bureaucracy, is woven into daily work life, and bleeds out into other realms.⁷

Below, I first discuss contemporary approaches toward censorship, with special attention to censorship under socialism. The volume *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present* amply demonstrates that socialism as developed by the Soviet Union was a powerful model that widely influenced Chinese society in the 1950 (Bernstein

⁶ The novella was originally published in *Renmin wenxue* 人民文学 and was translated into English by Hualing Nieh (1981), along with several important pieces of criticism. Translations in this paper are by Nieh unless otherwise noted, with names changed from Wade-Giles to *pinyin*.

⁷ Wang Meng’s memoir, *Wang Meng: A Life* was published in an abridged edition in 2018. Some chapters in the memoir had been published as separate essays; I have made use of several in this paper. Unless otherwise noted, the translations are by me.

and Li, 2010). In her chapter on literature, Donghui He explains that after 1949, the Chinese equivalent of the Western notion of great books, as well as a generalised notion of progressive culture, came from the Soviet Union.⁸ Yan Li (2018) traces heavy Soviet influence in architecture, fashion, music, food, imagery, language study, film, and literature. As authorities tried to focus on models of party allegiance and collective ideals, the consumption of Soviet culture in China became a gateway to the world, functioning as a government-sanctioned pathway into the outside: “It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union meant the whole world to [those growing up without alternatives]” (9). Identification with and fondness for Soviet culture far outlasted the political relationship. Li aptly quotes Wang Meng to begin her introduction: “To me, youth is about revolution, about love, about literature, and about the Soviet Union...The Soviet Union is my nineteenth year, my first love, and the beginning of my literary career” (1).⁹ This deep subjective affinity makes it easier to see that the lines between unity and purpose versus self-censorship may have been difficult to recognise and interpret.¹⁰ This short history of literary censorship in socialist countries provides insights about censorship theory or ways to analyse and think about censorship; as I show below, it also is relevant in my analysis of Wang Meng’s early work.

In the second part of this article, I lay out the background of the two literary pieces, which were written at a time when political leaders were trying to build a world-vanguard society that would simultaneously lift China out of wartime deprivation and establish its position as a leader in global socialism. Within a literary context, these socialist ideals were rarely challenged, although writers did discuss the best ways to meet their demands. Third, I analyse the novel and novella in relationship to each other, with a focus on *A Young Man*. In the transition from *Long Live Youth* to *A Young Man*, Wang Meng suggests that the emphasis on being part of a unified

⁸ The title of He’s chapter is “Coming of Age in the Brave New World: The Changing Reception of *How the Steel Was Tempered* in the People’s Republic of China” (393–420). Her research highlights the importance of Soviet literary models that were sanctioned by nationalised presses and writers’ organisations.

⁹ The quote is from Wang Meng’s *Sulian ji* 苏联祭 (A tribute to the Soviet Union), 2006, i, 21.

¹⁰ For a related and yet different concept and practice of “public secrecy,” see Hillenbrand (2020). Arguing that a focus on censorship “treats enunciation as a preeminently public act,” Hillenbrand develops “public secrecy” as, among other things, the subject’s lack of an urge to speak out about the past because of “pain, fear, complicity, guilt, or shame” (13–14). In this provocative analysis, public secrecy overlaps with self-censorship, but can also include the protection of private secrets.

communal society is exactly what later becomes the basis of censorship in all its forms. He highlights the role of language modification in creating a strange bureaucratic atmosphere within which a tense, murky mood contributes to pernicious self-censorship. The creation of confusion in *A Young Man*, with its implications on how to belong, becomes a literary strategy that engages a darker side of the same collective consciousness that inspires joy and creativity in *Long Live Youth*.

Censorship Under Socialism

Modern approaches to censorship generally reject the idea that it occurs solely or primarily in authoritarian regimes, although it may take more extreme forms of expression under such governments. The fact that censorship exists all over the world is basically accepted, and a vast literature documents its forms.¹¹ As Sue Curry Jansen (1988) explains,

Canons of Enlightenment thought maintain that the abolition of censorship was the decisive achievement of the Enlightenment...According to the dominant wisdom, then, the Enlightenment set thought free from the distortions of church and state censorship and patronage. This wisdom maintains that Enlightenment severed the knot that had always bound knowledge to power. It made free inquiry, scientific progress, and objectivity possible...In short, Enlightened discourse views censorship as something others do: a regressive practice of un-Enlightened (non-Liberal) societies. (4)

Arguing that censorship is an “enduring feature of all human communities,” Jansen rejects the idea that the Enlightenment abolished censorship, claiming instead that

¹¹ A few examples of general treatment of the concept in monographs available in English: Jansen (1988); McCormick and MacInnes (1962); Amey and Rasmussen (1997); Long (1990); Haraszti (1987). See also Holquist (1994), who argues that “the persecutor-victim model is inadequate” in many censorship cases and that it is a mistake to assume that “censorship is a vice to be overcome through morally guided will” (16). As with Jansen, Holquist believes that censorship always exists; the question is how repressive it is. For an example of how censorship can be recognised in contemporary culture, see Halberstam (2017). Halberstam discusses recent requests from college students to remove texts on the syllabus that they found objectionable. For censorship in music, see Anttonen (2017). Anttonen discusses the association between violence and metal music, and the meaning of censorship in a genre that presents itself as subversive.

church and state censorship were replaced with market censorship (4). This contemporary understanding of censorship is based on the conviction that knowledge-power systems always have both emancipatory and repressive elements. As the most powerful socialist force in the world for a long time—and certainly the biggest influence on 1950s China—the Soviet Union eventually became highly restrictive, while justifying censorship through Marxist theory. Jansen contends that although Stalinism was a perversion of Marxism, Stalin’s interference in the arts was not a perversion of Marxist theory. It was rather a logical extension of principles within Marxist-Leninism, which fix on control of communication as an essential part of the development of socialist culture. Western Marxists have tried to explain the betrayal of critical Marxism through reference to Russia’s underdeveloped economy or the tradition of Czarist censorship but Jansen believes the key lies in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, a slim book often known as the *Communist Manifesto* (written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848), which called for the centralisation of communication in the hands of the state.

Because of these foundational origins, Jansen argues, Soviet censorship developed as both restrictive and prescriptive. In cultural areas, this process began in the 1930s, but often is traced to Lenin’s contradictory 1905 essay “Party Organisation and Literature,” where he both recognised individual autonomy while stating that literature must become “party literature” (Jansen 1988, 106).¹² Marx was ambivalent toward Western concepts such as literary freedom and style, whereas Lenin argued that real freedom comes only with a tight relationship between the writer and the proletariat. Because “words are action,” literature and the arts were important instruments of socialist development (107). Jansen also credits Maxim Gorky (1868–1936)—who was a major literary figure in 1950s China—for helping to develop the ideas behind the control of literature and the prescriptive elements of literary policy. Getting rid of noxious elements, including those embedded in language itself, was a strategy to promote the development of the positive hero crucial to socialist realism.

Whereas Jansen lays out some well-known but relevant aspects of Soviet literary censorship—especially the attention given to the correct language—Dominic Boyer (2003)

¹² Jensen credits André Gide (1937), “Party member and tourist of the revolution,” for stating that critical Marxism had disappeared by the 1930s (1988, 106).

goes one step further, questioning the separation of censorship from other forms of intellectual activity. Working with another socialist regime, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Boyer takes advantage of the fact that archives have been opened, examining in detail the role played by the censor him-or-herself. Publishing only fifteen years after Jansen, Boyer accepts without question the once controversial notion that censorship is part of all knowledge-building.

Expanding on the restrictions imposed on language that Jansen details, Boyer argues that, in the GDR, the perfection of a “public language” was indicative of “the natural vehicle of the incipient *Volk*’s awareness of itself” (Boyer 2003, 515). The concept of the *Volk* roughly maps onto the Chinese Communist idea of the “people.” Like Miklós Haraszti in *The Velvet Prison* (1987), Boyer explains that censorship was seductive and alluring as often as it was frightening: “The everyday life of censorship in the GDR was, from the perspective of its practitioners, suffused with a gentle, progressive aura not unlike the elusive vestiges of vocationalism present in any intellectual profession embedded in an institutional context” (515). After all, censorship contributed to the “greater welfare of the *Volk*,” for whom a concept of Germanness was crucial (515). And just as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) developed *Putonghua* 普通话 (Mandarin, or the common language) to unify all Chinese speaking peoples, GDR intellectuals objectified the German language, which would anchor a set of principles and traits crucial to being German. Therefore, mass cultural production was rationalised and centralised, to a degree much greater than occurred during the Nazi regime: “The incontrovertible first maxim of the socialist cultural programme states that all *Kultur* belongs to the *Volk*.”¹³

These near-transcendent aspects of cultural production explain why intellectuals in the GDR participated “so actively and unapologetically” in activities that in the West were considered mindless and repressive (Boyer 2003, 520–521). The focus on consciousness—so reminiscent of 1950s Chinese socialism—melded perfectly with the high-minded goals, or to quote Stalin, the “engineering of the soul” (Jansen 1988, 109). Because the soul had to be engineered for a higher collective purpose, self-censorship,

¹³ This embedded quote by Boyer (520) is from Hans Poerschke and Harry Grannich (1983), 230.

or the individual's constant effort to live by the ideals of the day, was the logical conclusion. The self-censored mind then became the collective consciousness of the real world as well as a guarantee of "wholeness" in social experience (Boyer 2003, 540). Boyer's astute recognition of the close relationship between a subjective sense of unity and self-censorship is useful in helping us understand why many, including Wang Meng, refuse to wholly condemn the so-called Seventeen Years from 1949 to 1966. As I will show, this conundrum informs the ambivalence and bewilderment of the main characters in *A Young Man* as they try to sort through their contradictory emotions.

In Rome, the censor had the ability to decide who was a member of the community. Likewise, in 1950s Chinese terms, inclusion within the category of the "people" was crucial to membership in the new nation. Yet, as Michael Holquist (1994) has explained, censorship creates parabolic texts and sophisticated readers that always seek to fill in what is missing. This aspect of censorship is often noted in the context of Chinese literature at different times, but particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, where reading between the lines and protesting in subtle ways were common. Censorship can function in blunt and subtle ways, as Michaela Wolf's (2002) work on the Habsburg Monarchy has shown; her term "cultural blockage" describes the far end of censorship, perhaps intersecting with the spot where Margaret Hillenbrand's (2020) "public secrecy" begins to be more relevant. From the perspective of cultural unity, with its mandatory and desirable collective consciousness and sense of inclusion, translation—or the introduction of ideas and sensibilities from the "outside"—can be a dangerous act. Translation can open doors, but it also can close them or simply define their shape. Translators must make a range of decisions about what to keep, what to omit, and how to phrase; they can work as gate-keepers and censors.¹⁴

Censorship in socialist China has not been as widely or deeply studied as censorship in the GDR, probably because archives are not completely open, and because China

¹⁴ There is a solid literature on translation and censorship. The Canadian journal *TTR: Traduction, Terminologie, Rédaction*, which published Wolf's 2002 article, devoted two issues to the topic of censorship and translation (N.2, V.15, 2002; N.2, V.23, 2010), and several monographs on the topic have been published. The journal *Translation Studies* also conducted a forum on translation and censorship (V.4, N.3, 2011; and V.5, N.1, 2012). Holquist (1994) suggests that all translations are acts of censorship.

continues to engage in much more overt censorship than is evident in Western countries. Investigations tend to revolve around the concept of “banned books” (*jinshu* 禁书), which is preferred to “censorship” (*shencha zhidu* 审查制度 or *jiancha zhidu* 检查制度). Zaixi Tan (2015) places the focus of research in five areas that span the banning of books from early times to the modern period, with emphasis on histories, novels, and later media. Tan also notes that severe banning of books occurred during times when “there was a lack of self-confidence in the ruling class” or when “culture experienced no or little progress” (315). In the 1950s, China maintained active ties with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Soviet literary influence was powerful, with over 3,500 literary pieces from the USSR translated and a circulation of more than 82 million copies, “amounting to over 60% of the total amount of translated foreign literature across the country” (332).¹⁵ During the same period, only 460 works by British or American authors were translated, and most were the authors of classic texts. Since the late 1990s, the PRC has loosened its approach toward censorship in translation, especially as concerns the representation of erotic relationships or material that used to be considered decadent or bourgeois.¹⁶ Political challenges to the regime, whether in printed literature or on the internet, are still widely censored, and self-censorship is common.¹⁷

From Long Live Youth to A Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department

Wang Meng began writing *Long Live Youth* in 1953, when he was only nineteen years old, and finished it in 1956.¹⁸ It was based on his experience as a member of the

¹⁵ For a discussion of how translators tried to adopt a global rather than national context in their work, see Volland (2017).

¹⁶ For a list of banned books in China, see Ruan (1995).

¹⁷ See Ng (2015). As Ng details, Yan Lianke felt he had no choice but to engage in self-censorship to get his works published (236).

¹⁸ For a longer discussion of Wang’s first novel, see my unpublished paper “The Socialist Bildungsroman and Global Youth: Wang Meng and Jack Kerouac,” presented at the conference *Coming of Age in Sinophone Studies* at the Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies, University of Zurich, March 20–23, 2017. As the title suggests, my approach

Communist Youth League from the ages of fifteen to nineteen. Despite the author's efforts, only part of the novel was published in the 1950s. He revised the manuscript in 1956, and portions were published in 1957 in *Wenhui bao* 文汇报. When he undertook revision for publication in 1979, Wang felt embarrassed at the naiveté of the fictional characters and the juvenile energy of the writing. But in that same year, the novel was developed into a film, directed by Huang Shuqin 黄蜀芹, and by 1981 was recognized by middle schoolers as some of their favorite reading. A version more closely following the 1953 original was published in 2003.

This information comes from a 2013 essay in which Wang Meng laid out a detailed description of the novel's publishing vicissitudes, pinpointing the writing's appeal and its ability to grasp and express a transformational moment:

The reason that we young people of that era could make a fresh start is because from our childhood to our teens, we were in the midst of the earthshattering transformation of old China into new China. We were living in a crucial historical moment. We caught the right moment! And then we caught the historical shift from the victorious song of revolution to the peaceful times of [national] construction. I saw it with my own eyes, I personally experienced the disintegration of old China, the atrocious power of reactionaries, the revolutionary crushing of the rotting wood, the way new China undertook the rejuvenation of everything left undone. Everything became new and fresh. (Wang 2013b, 5)

Wang goes on to note that when he started writing, he knew that in the long term, the exuberant mood could not form the basis of daily life over the long duration. But he felt it was his duty to record a "history of the heart of youth" (*qingnian de xinshi* 青年的心史) (5). Wang's novel went through multiple levels of vetting. After asking his younger sister and a co-worker to copy the manuscript out for him, Wang asked for his father's assistance in passing it on to Fan Zhiding 潘之汀 (1913–2005), a friend at the Beijing Film Company. Fan praised the manuscript and Wang's talent and sent the manuscript on to the China Youth Press, where it was handed to Liu Lingmeng

toward the novel in that paper is to compare the youthful exuberance in *Song of Youth* with the radical depiction of youth in Jack Kerouac's novel *On the Road* (1958), with the goal of analysing "ways of being in the world that reject the centering of historical progress, with its powerful notions of improvement and the future" (4).

刘令蒙 (1920–) for reading. But it turned out that Liu was unfavourably involved in the Anti-Hu Feng campaign and, eventually, Wang Meng received notice that his manuscript had been turned over to the associate director of the China Writers Association, Xiao Yan 萧殷 (1915–1983). Xiao Yan invited Wang to his house and told him that although the novel had a fine literary sensibility, it lacked a main thread and needed more work.

Wang was able to get three months of vacation, supported by the Writers Association, to work on the revisions. He had already published the story “Xiao Dou’er” 小豆儿 (Little Dou’er) in *Renmin wenxue*, and another story, “Chunjie” 春节 (Spring festival), was published in *Wenyi xuexi* 文艺学习 (Literary research). Wang participated in a conference for young writers in spring, 1956, where he asked the poet Shao Yanxiang 邵燕祥 (1933–) to read the introductory poem to *Long Live Youth* and was happy to get a positive response and some useful suggestions. In 1957, *Wenhui bao* published some sections of the novel, amounting to 70,000 words. China Youth Press accepted the entire novel for publication, and the final proof was ready to go.

The Hundred Flowers Movement began in April, 1956 with Mao Zedong’s proclamation to “let a hundred flowers bloom” (Nieh 1981, xii). It lasted for around one year. Questions of literary content and value were openly debated, as was the relationship between politics and writing. But when the debate became threatening, the Party shut it down and followed with the repressive Anti-Rightist Movement in mid-1957. Wang’s emergence as a writer occurred exactly at this time, and political turbulence delayed the publication of *Long Live Youth*. Wang relates that in 1961, literary restrictions loosened, and he tried again to publish the novel. But editors were concerned about the book’s positive sentiments toward the Soviet Union—which China had broken with by 1960—and with its inattention to class struggle. Ultimately, no one was willing to risk recommending the novel’s publication.¹⁹

Wang’s novella *A Young Man* was published in 1956, just when he was trying to get *Long Live Youth* published. Because Chairman Mao seemed to be on the side of

¹⁹ For a history of the Anti-Rightist Movement that places it within historical autocratic Chinese tradition, see Fu (1993).

debate and discussion, and stated as much in March, no one was sure what would happen. In his memoir, Wang quotes Mao as directly addressing *A Young Man* at a meeting, and commenting “I do not know this Wang Meng, he is no relative of mine, but I cannot agree with the criticism heaped on him...How can anyone claim there is not bureaucratism in Beijing?” (Wang 2018, 77). And although Mao seemed open-minded at first, the second phase of the Hundred Flowers Movement that began in May launched heavy criticism directed at the Party. It was followed in June by a clamp-down (Nieh 1981, xxv-xxvi). For Wang Meng, the result was disastrous. He was branded a Rightist, was sent to the countryside for labour reform, and eventually took a position at the Xinjiang Writers Union, where he lived and worked for some twenty years.

The criticism directed at *A Young Man* shows the confusion of the times, which also is reflected in Wang’s autobiographical account.²⁰ Critics went back and forth on the merits of the novella, recognising problems while also finding literary merit. They struggled with Wang’s devastating portrait of the work of the Chinese Communist Party and lazy, inefficient cadres, because as even Mao Zedong seemed to recognise, this unflattering picture was at least to some degree based on reality. In criticism today, *A Young Man* is generally considered to be a critique of the excessive bureaucracy that developed within the Party during peaceful times after 1949. The language and behaviour of the character Liu Shiwu 刘世吾 is often at the center of the debate, although other characters and issues are discussed. In the next section, I will analyse relevant parts of both *Long Live Youth* and *A Young Man* with the goal of uncovering the metamorphosis of the ideals of community and fellowship that we see in the earlier novel into the hesitancy and doubt that occurs in the latter. This trajectory identifies a transformation that sheds light on both the way in which censorship develops and on the process through which a society and individuals normalise and naturalise its mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, it also suggests that bureaucracy under socialism should be viewed as a powerful form of social control much as it is in capitalist societies, an issue that I discuss in my conclusion.

²⁰ Several critical essays are translated in Nieh (1981), 519–563. For a summary of critique over fifty years, see Wen (2006).

Collective Consciousness, Constructive Unity: Building the New China

Long Live Youth tells the story of several young women in their final year of high school during the early period of the PRC's existence, from 1952 to 1953. The novel's presentation of Communist youth is unique in China. The conventional model generally featured an immature, politically unaware young person who, through arduous experience, learns to understand the new political regime, deeply grasping its logic and recognizing its superiority. This project of individual transformation with clear ideological implications is replaced by another story, within which characters are transferred into "the world of sensuality," where they innocently celebrate the energy and newness of youth (Song 2009, 135). If we consider the novel from the perspective of censorship, we can identify yet another dynamic and theme: the importance of sociality, or the heightened value of the community. Strategies of inclusion and exclusion are seminal to social cohesion; the enthusiastic efforts at inclusion in the first novel become the techniques of self-censorship in the later novella. An important element in the development of constraint or censorship is language: whereas the language in *Long Live Youth* is lively and raw, in *A Young Man* it becomes formalised, working as a vise that traps the expression of thought, at the same time confusing mental processes and emotions.

Although the new China was just emerging as Wang Meng finished a draft of *Long Live Youth*, the novel is far from a political tract. While the young women who are at its centre are not anti-government protesters, nor do they show much interest in the socialist ideas of class consciousness or struggle. Even the character who is the most involved in politics, Zheng Bo 郑波, rarely discusses political topics. Instead, it is the daily life they share and the emotions that they experience that take centre stage. The feelings of the energetic main character, Yang Qiangyun 杨蔷云, are central to the plot. Several members of this small society have problems that must be resolved by deeper inclusion within the group. They include Wu Changfu 吴长福, a plump and buoyant classmate who pathetically wants to please; Su Ning 苏宁, from a wealthy family; Hu Mali 呼玛丽, raised in a religious orphanage and still a believer; and Li

Chun 李春, who refuses to put group dynamics first, instead fighting for personal academic achievement. These half-in, half-out women represent historical situations—a lack of confidence, vestiges of the old bourgeois society, the presence of religion, a focus on self-achievement—that must be rectified by the values of new nation. Within these characters and their relationships, therefore, the structure for a conventional ideological transformation is in place.

Yet what the outsiders are absorbed into is not a new nation bound by political solidarity, but rather the intense emotional connection of a group of young women whose energy is invested in the here and now of lived experience, grasping life as it is lived. An in-the-moment approach that defies emphasis on the past and the future, this feeling of being fully in the world also is reflected in fresh and expressive language:

Then the sun came up and a new day began. The girls welcomed each day in the camp, each day was a priceless moment in the lives of youth. Everything was newly discovered, everything belonged to us. The blue sky was there to lie over us, the clouds were there to dazzle us, the earth was there for us to run on, the lakes and rivers were there for us to swim in, the bugs and birds were there to enjoy the pleasure of life together with us. From morning to evening, we hiked, picnicked, caught dragonflies, went fishing and rowing, picked wild grasses and flowers, climbed high to look far away... ..until we were exhausted to the bone. So many happy things under the sky, things we had never done before! We couldn't finish them all in a day, time went by so quickly! (Wang Meng 2013a, 5)

The animated, emotive words merge with a sense of immanence to suggest authenticity in life, work, and human relations.

It is only from the perspective of *A Young Man* that the drive toward group inclusion, the focus on correct language, and the importance of consciousness can be understood as clues to the emergence of self-censorship. Written only a few years after *Long Live Youth*, *A Young Man* revolves around the story of Lin Zhen, a young teacher and new Party member who is assigned to the Organisation Department. Lin Zhen has trouble figuring out what kind of work the organisation does and what he should be doing, but he is soon assigned to recruit and develop Party members at the Second Factory Party

Branch. His immediate supervisor is Han Changxin 韩常新, chief of the Party Building Section. On his fourth day at work, Lin goes to the Tonghua Gunny Sack Factory to investigate Party recruitment, where he learns that Factory Director Wang Qingquan 王清泉 has exhibited problematic behaviour many times. No one seems willing to discipline Wang. Lin takes on the problem, first reporting to Han Changxin and then to Liu Shiwu, without results. Although Lin becomes increasingly disillusioned, eventually he convinces a superior to post a letter about the problem. The letter—signed by a group of workers—is printed in the *People's Daily*, Liu Shiwu initiates an investigation, and Wang is dismissed from his post in the factory and his Party membership.

The novella begins with Lin Zhen's arrival at the District Party Committee worksite. The pedicab driver sees the sign and says, "No charge, if that's where you're going" (Wang 1981a, 473). This apparently innocent gesture of support for the Chinese Communist Party takes on new hues as the story goes on. By the end, it is impossible to avoid the implication that this initial act could be either a bribe or an expression of fear. These three options—that the Party inspires admiration, that it can be manipulated through bribing its representatives, or that it induces fear—form the framework within which an aura of censorship and self-censorship develops. Minimally, those working in the Party organisation get special privileges, a clear separation of cadres from the people.

Anyone familiar with the work of George Orwell (1903–1950) or with others who have written about the compression of language under socialism will not be surprised to see that by 1956, China had its own form of linguistic censorship. The notion of "Maospeak" (Maoyu 毛语 or Mao wenti 毛文体) was developed by the critic Li Tuo 李托 to critique the language used by Chinese writers.²¹ Geremie R. Barmé's (2012) article on "New China Newspeak" or Maospeak argues that this kind of language evolved long before 1949, and notes that Mao Zedong traced it to the May Fourth

²¹ Li Tuo wrote many essays on the topic, for example, Li Tuo (2019 [1993]).

period and derided it in 1942 as “Party eight-legged essays” (Dang bagu 党八股).²² One of Mao’s comments relevant to *A Young Man* is that Party language “strikes a pose in order to intimidate people” (Barné 2012). Indeed, the issue of language comes up very quickly in *A Young Man*, and we see how it both reassures and confuses Lin Zhen. The linguistic liveliness of *Long Live Youth* makes an appearance in *A Young Man*, when Lin Zhen arrives at work and is met by the Organisation Department Secretary Zhao Huiwen 赵慧文, whom he knows from his earlier work in the primary school. Zhao’s eyes express a friendly welcome, and she speaks in common language about topics familiar to everyone in their daily lives, reassuring Lin that he has arrived at a healthy, well-functioning workplace: “Lin Zhen was happy that the moment he had entered the gate of the District Party Committee to begin his new life, he had met a very warm person” (Wang 1981a, 474). But what immediately follows is his first meeting with Liu Shiwu, who seems to speak first with an irony that cannot be interpreted, and second in stock, formal phrases that he rattles off:

If the house isn’t well cared for, the Party loses strength...What do we do to the house? We develop the Party and consolidate it. We augment the Party organisation and enhance its fighting power. We build Party life on the basis of centralised leadership, criticism, and close ties with the masses. If we do this well, the Party organisation will be solid, lively, with the power to fight. The Party will be capable of leading the masses in fulfilling better and better the task of socialist construction and transformation... (Wang 1981a, 475).

Although Lin recognizes the “very profound” concepts, he cannot figure out what Liu is saying (475).

There are many examples in *The Young Man*, such as the strangeness introduced by set phrases such as “the five links in the classroom” or “intuitive visual aids” (Wang 1981a, 437). Han Changxin stuns Lin Zhen with a blatantly false report about recruiting filled with clichés and platitudes: “The broad mass of activists rallied around the Party factory branch; educated by the model deeds of Chu Xxx-xxx and Fan Xxx-xxx

²² Barné also has a chapter on Maospeak in his book *Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader* (1996), especially see pages 224–227. See also Theodore Hutters (2011), who suggests that constricting language leads to a repression of original ideas and thought.

and urged by their determination for Party membership, they developed their positiveness and creativity and magnificently completed or exceeded their production quotas for the quarter” (485). When Lin Zhen rereads the report, he doubts that he went to the factory at all. However, the story does not so much expose this common form of linguistic corruption and censorship-from-above as it addresses the mind-numbing qualities the language produces in someone who believes fervently in socialist ideals: “Strangely, Lin Zhen was unable to say clearly whether his new environment was good or bad” (487). Overall, what later became known as Maospeak creates the complex mental and social environment within which Lin cannot decide what is right and wrong. His ability to judge his colleagues is made more difficult by their occasional ability to cut through the cloudiness and come up with good ideas:

Lin Zhen sat at one of the work sessions of the organization department and found it strange. The discussion was over a temporary task assigned by the Municipal Party Committee; everyone smoked, joked, digressed. It dragged on for two hours with no results. Then Liu Shiwu, having meditated for some time with knitted brows, put forward a proposal. An animated discussion ensued and filled Lin with amazement and respect. Many people contributed such brilliant ideas that the final thirty minutes of the meeting were ten times more effective than the first two hours. (486)

Wang portrays linguistic manipulation as a form of human engineering with bizarre results. Because it directly articulates the group’s collective beliefs and commitments, the deceptive transformation of language is difficult to recognise and, even when recognised, hard to decipher. The novella emphasises the way in which Lin Zhen’s consciousness is muddled through the expression of the right ideals stuffed into a rigid framework, which itself becomes a form of constriction. This environment becomes intractable through the second part of Wang’s attempt to describe Lin’s situation in his new work place, focusing on the inclusionary and exclusionary aspects of human community, or human sociality. The combination of fervent ideals, pervasive control on expression, and the pressure of community tells us how censorship—especially in the form of a deep, all-inclusive, cloudy self-censorship within the subject—evolves and is slowly accepted as the normal way of life.

The officials in charge of the Organisation Department spend their work time reading novels, playing poker or chess, smoking and chatting, and churning out unreal reports. Lin is expected to go along or to insert himself into the group of bureaucrats fully adapted to their work. He often cannot figure out why nothing is happening, why a report is hyped or simply false, and in general how things work. When he tries to say directly what he thinks and describe what he observes, Lin is criticised as being young, emotional, and rash. When the case against Factory Director Wang is finally resolved, things come to a crisis when Lin directly states his views: “...I feel our indifference, our procrastination, our irresponsibility in our work, is a crime against the masses” (Wang 1981a, 506). Responding to a colleague’s stilted response, Lin comes close to bursting into tears. There is simply no way to speak directly and honestly. Lin Zhen’s inability or refusal to join the group could be a sign of his residual innocence or/and a suggestion that something has gone awry in the heart of the CCP. Critics have interpreted it both ways, although it is the critique directed at the Party, and the implication that Wang’s portrayal of the Party is meant as a large-scale, general critique, that landed Wang in Xinjiang.²³ In a discussion with Literary Commissar Zhou Yang 周扬 (1908–1989), Wang denied that he developed Lin Zhen as a positive hero (Wang Meng 2018, 76).

Lin Zhen has multiple opportunities to position himself within the environment of the Organization Department or, in other words, to proclaim his membership within the community. But the mixed and contradictory environment of laziness and discipline, stupidity and intelligence, obfuscation and clarity, inaction and action create a plethora of puzzling emotions. This perplexity produces in Lin an affective roadblock and an inability to determine a clear path forward. The perfect clarity of ideals existing with a lack of an affective foundation behind them—testified to by both Lin Zhen and Zhao Huiwen—slowly dampens their enthusiasm, destroys their will, and makes them question their abilities and even their sanity. Although he cannot put his finger on the problem, Lin suspects the emotional core that sustains Party work has been irreparably damaged. He believes that Liu Shiwu suffers from “a terrible indifference” despite his

²³ The issue of typicality and literary representation, which was hotly debated in the 1930s, is relevant; see Wen 2006, 65. For an analysis that treats the portrayal of Lin Zhen as more in line with the novels centring on youth than on critique, see Wei (2010).

oft sharp analyses (Wang 1981a, 496). Zhao agrees, adding, “He no longer loves and he no longer hates” (496). These comments speak to a deadening of the youthful spirit of engagement and reconciliation that motivates the characters in *Long Live Youth*.

However, what baffles Lin Zhen even more is his recognition that Liu Shiwu is a complicated person with a complex history, who despite his weaknesses can often be an excellent leader. Challenged by Lin at a meal, Liu directly defends himself:

“Aren’t you young and zealous anymore?” Lin asked tentatively...Liu toyed with his empty cup. “Of course I’m not,” he said. “But the point is I’m really so busy that everything has become a tiresome habit. I haven’t slept eight full hours on a single night since liberation. I have to deal with this man and that man, and I haven’t had time to deal with myself.”...Lin Zhen was moved by Liu’s deep sincerity. Liu continued in a depressed voice: “...We Party workers have created a new life but, as a result, this new life is incapable of arousing us...” (Wang 1981a, 503)

This self-awareness and directness in Deputy Director Liu inspire admiration and respect in Lin Zhen. He wants to speak, but Liu stops him with a wave of his hand. Instead of going forward with his personal confession, Liu mentions to Lin that Zhao Huiwen is becoming fond of him.

Deputy Director Liu’s deferral and subsequent segue into Lin’s personal life signals the deeply censoring influence of the corrupted environment. And yet, as Cai Xiang (2010) has suggested, a critical binary of public/private will not help us understand the literature of the Seventeen Years. Private life during this time was not erased, as is commonly thought, but rather was reconceptualised within the emerging ethos of communality. Implicitly understanding this new vision, Wang Meng juxtaposes its late 1950s degraded state with Lin’s affection for a married colleague, and hers for him. Zhao is a few years older than Lin. She has gone through the same process of disillusionment, leaving her silent and frustrated. Although they like each other, Zhao is married to a man who has completely sold out to the deadening bureaucratic system around them, and she also has a child. When Zhao invites Lin to join her for a meal,

the novella remarkably joins the sense of loss and alienation that infiltrates the work environment with their mutual desire:

“Well, actually, I’ve just eaten,” he said hesitantly.

Zhao refused to believe him and went to get the chopsticks. He repeated that he already had eaten. She had to eat by herself, unhappily. Lin sat uneasily at one side. He looked here and there, rubbed his hands, shifted in his seat. That same indescribable feeling of warmth and pain welled up in him again. His heart ached as though something had been lost. He simply did not have the courage to look at her beautiful face, which was reflecting the pink of her red dress.

“Lin, what’s wrong?” Zhao stopped eating. (Wang Meng 1981a, 507)

Lin tells Zhao about his frustrations in the Department. He gets up his courage to ask Zhao if she is happy, telling her that Liu Shiwu had mentioned that she seemed to like Lin and he should be cautious. Although Zhao makes it clear that she does like Lin, she also tells him that she is married, and anyway, he is just a child. The language is meandering and poetic. When Lin leaves, he is beset by feelings of loss and confusion, which mirror his feelings about his work: “A strange feeling came over him. He felt he had lost something precious. During the past few months, the work he had done was too little and the progress too slow...No, for the first time, he seemed to have tasted the bitterness of love” (Wang 1981a, 510).

The novella conflates the murky work atmosphere with the emotional frustrations of the love relationship. In this section, Lin can just barely grasp the life-changing qualities and existential consequences of the damaged linguistic and affective environment. The writing is replete with the unease of attempts by both Lin and Zhao to position their emotions in relation to the failings of the Organisation Department.

Writing for *The People’s Daily* in 1957, Wang Meng admitted that the general import of the story is the “glamourisation of Lin Zhen and Zhao Huiwen; they have the author’s loving care and sympathy” (Wang 1981b, 513). Yet Wang also mentioned that he did not describe Lin’s antagonist Liu Shiwu as fully and simply bureaucratic, but “chose to emphasise his spiritual attitude of taking everything for granted” and used “his mastery of the rules governing his work to protect and disguise his indifference”

(513, 514). Although Liu is clever and capable, Wang argued, he became a cadre without a strong connection to the masses. “I am opposed to the separation of the spirit of socialism from the realities of life,” Wang stated (516). This comment brings us back to the central issue of censorship in Chinese socialism, its implications, and the novella’s contribution to understanding how it worked.

Censorship within Bureaucracy

A Young Man appears to be such a clear indictment of the evils of bureaucracy that reading it through the broad concepts of censorship and self-censorship may seem to be a stretch. A short discussion of the problem of bureaucracy in socialism will help clarify the relationship between bureaucracy and censorship. Long a topic of discussion within Marxism, theorists took various approaches to understanding the role of bureaucracy. Although Marx thought bureaucracy, a form of political alienation, eventually would vanish with class-based states, for Leon Trotsky (1879–1940) bureaucrats would play a central role in socialist societies, as indeed they did (Krygier 1985).²⁴ The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China both vastly increased the number of bureaucrats working for the government; in China there were eight times as many state cadres in 1958 as in 1949 (Bianco 2018, 172). Bureaucracy can be regarded as both enabling and coercive, as it was by different commentators (Adler 2012).

Writing in 1978—before the devastation of the Cultural Revolution was completely apparent to Westerners—Francis Hearn’s work on bureaucracy is particularly relevant to *A Young Man*. Hearn noted that the Maoist approach to avoiding such evils contributed to a Marxist theory of bureaucracy. The relationship between bureaucracy and revolution always plagued Marxist theory, because of the suspicion that “rational decision making within a large-scale organization [can] only come at the direct expense

²⁴ For detailed research into Trotsky’s theories of alienation and a solid bibliography on the subject, see Twiss (2014). Twiss notes that although the views of Marx and Engels on bureaucracy evolved over time, the term was always used “as a pejorative for a state apparatus that had come to stand over and dominate society as a whole” (16).

of participatory democracy” (37). Some of the questions that swirl around this problem could spring directly from *A Young Marx*:

Can this movement become bureaucratized and still retain its enthusiasm and moral force? And, after the revolution, when problems of coordination, communication, integration and development urgently present themselves as requiring an expeditious response, is bureaucracy inevitable? Must the ideals which guided and sustained the revolutionary movement then be sacrificed to bureaucratic imperatives? (37)

According to Lenin, the bureaucratic state should wither away after the transition to communism, a prediction that no country has been able to actualise. Max Weber (1864-1920) claimed that modernisation is the extension of rationalisation and bureaucratisation, a prediction that seems to have come true. Is there no modernisation without an “elitist, unresponsive and oppressive bureaucratic apparatus,” a “centralized, specialized and hierarchical structure” that promotes efficiency through demoralisation and impersonalisation (Hearn 1978, 38)? If bureaucracy is the most appropriate form of organisation for capitalism, what works for socialism?

In Hearn’s analysis, Marx’s treatment of bureaucracy as transitory is insufficient, and Lenin erred in limiting worker control to the administrative aspects of organisation and leaving expertise to experts, or outside the realm of politics. Thus although party and industry experts were able to modernise Russian society, they did so by detaching themselves from “the political will of the masses” and creating a powerful, repressive, and elitist bureaucratic state (Hearn 1978, 42). The theoretical problem lies in the existence within Marxist theory of two kinds of rationality, that of technique and of consciousness. The technical experts were to concern themselves with problems in the material world, whereas a politicised consciousness was supposed to be part of everything else. Workers in any given area would be heavily engaged with the decisions that did not require specific expertise that they did not have. This rationalisation of consciousness would prevent the separation of society into classes and thus avoid the domination of one class by another.

But Lenin did not realise that any kind of “domination or unfreedom,” not just technical, can result in social fracturing (Hearn 1978, 43).²⁵ Contrasting work on bureaucracy by Max Weber and Lenin, Hearn showed how Maoism resolved the contradiction between bureaucracy and revolution through the concept of cultural revolution. Chinese socialists, Hearn argues, attacked the problem through their rationalisation of consciousness. This move valorised consciousness in all citizens, including “experts”. Thus modernisation could not occur at the expense of political consciousness. Along these lines, Meisner argues that Maoism “replaces the Marxist belief in objective laws of history with a voluntaristic faith in the consciousness and the moral potentialities of men as the decisive factor in sociohistorical development” (Meisner 1982, 61). This insistent emphasis on the value of political consciousness—which, Hearn states, somewhat lessened in the 1950s—is precisely what lay behind cultural revolution, or “that aspect of modernization which concerns the rationalization of consciousness” (Hearn 1978, 46). The goal is “an ideologically infused bureaucracy in which revolutionary spirit, mass participation and extensive discussion of alternatives furthers the rationalization of consciousness and, by doing so, harnesses the rationalization of technique to the quest for emancipation” (47). In struggling to make this theory a reality, the CCP underwent a series of movements that involved first establishing a strong Party, and then subjecting it to attack. As Hearn wryly notes, this method is both “risky and disruptive” but may be the only way to reconcile democracy and centralism in an underdeveloped society (50).

A Young Man appears to be working within these theoretical parameters. Liu Shiwu presides over a Party organisation riddled with inefficiency and demoralisation. For a very long time, he cannot or is unwilling to address the abusive and ineffective behavior of Factory Director Wang Qingquan. Meetings are mostly a waste of time, and their work time often is frittered away. A more complex character than his colleagues, Liu Shiwu could be the author’s inquiry into the failure of the Maoist vision of modernisation, with its bureaucracy as both red and expert. In other words, Liu has genuinely

²⁵ Habermas also interpreted rationality, suggesting that the red-vs-expert binary could be resolved by developing a bureaucracy where “technicians are joined with workers in meaningful dialogue, and technical expertise is circumscribed by political discourse” (Hearn 1978, 44). See also Habermas (1970).

tried (and therein lies his melancholy and complexity), but he also has seen that there is no hope. With a heavy workload and not enough cadres to help, Liu has resigned himself to doing what he can and fudging the rest. His statement, “We Party workers have created a new life but, as a result, this new life is incapable of arousing us” is deeply troubling (Wang 1981aa, 503). As for Lin Zhen, despite Wang Meng’s disclaimer, he indeed is a kind of positive (if naïve) hero. He and Zhao Huiwen represent the theory that insists on the subordination of technical experts—here Party cadres—to political imperative, i.e. the benefit of the masses or working *for the people*. Lin and Zhao embody the radical continuation of revolutionary spirit under the conditions of peace, or the theory of permanent revolution.²⁶

Perhaps the novella should be considered a tale of dueling rationalities and their bureaucracies, with Lin and Zhao slowly losing to the tilting of power toward “expert” and away from “red.” From this perspective, it is easy to see that all bureaucracies put various regimes of censorship in place. However, the story also shows how it is none other than communal life that becomes a vehicle, embodiment, and enforcer of censorship. Under the demands for unity, correct language can quickly become censoring language.

And finally, the novella brings out the deep affective damage that is both a cause and a result of censorship and self-censorship. As a final example that shows all three elements of censorship—language, community, and consciousness—I turn to the description of Lin’s attempt to address inadequacies in the Organisation Department after Factory Director Wang is dismissed. Although the result has been reached, the oppressive environment does not dissipate. In discussing the gratitude of the factory workers when the dismissal of Wang Qingquan was announced, Liu Shiwu implies that things worked exactly as they should have:

“One old worker burst into tears while he was speaking at the rostrum. Everyone spoke of their gratitude to the Party and to the District Party Committee.”

“Yes,” said Lin in a subdued way. “Just for those reasons, I feel our indifference, our procrastination, our irresponsibility in our work, is a crime against the

²⁶ For more on the historical development of the concept of permanent revolution, see van Ree (2013); Löw (1981); Skilling (1961); also Xue, Xin, and Pan (1984), especially pages 106–173.

masses.” He raised his voice. “The Party belongs to the people, the heart of the working class. We don’t permit dust in the heart, we can’t permit defects in the Party organs.”

Resting his clasped hands on his knees, Li Zongqin spoke slowly as if deliberating, forming words while speaking. “I believe there are two main bones of contention between Lin Zhen, Liu Shiwu, and Han Changxin. One is the question between abiding by the national law and taking the initiative, the other—”

“I hope you will not confine yourself to just making a cool, well-rounded analysis—” Lin butted in audaciously but was unable to continue for fear he would burst into tears. (Wang 1981a, 506)

Lin Zhen cannot speak freely, because to do so marks him as an outsider in the new communal society that is striving for the unity of the new nation. Maospeak creates a framework for linguistic control in which all the words are correct, but overall the sentiment is wrong. This passage shows the profound emotional wound that censorship produces in the most idealistic. On this last point, Zhao Huiwen is like a ghost from the future. She has long ago given up trying, confining herself to a self-improvement project which she describes as a “competitive system for myself, pitting myself today against myself yesterday” (Wang 1981a, 510). For Zhao, thinking of herself as a participant in communal work is a long-gone ideal. The once-grand national and global project has become a system of improving her work only as an individual, with a sharp dividing line that has effectively censored her voice and cut her off from the community.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Screening without China: Transregional Cinematic Smuggling between Cold War Taiwan and Colonial Hong Kong

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How can research into film policy inform us about the nature of power and cultural politics regarding film censorship? How does censorship affect the aesthetics and identity of film-making produced under political and market constraints? Focusing on the geopolitical regions of British Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China, this article delineates the impact of British colonial film censorship and the politics of cinematically representing revolutionary China during the Cold War. It reveals that British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy in the 1970s and 80s from suppressing mainland Chinese films to inhibiting films that might offend China from screening in Hong Kong. The evidence points to a distinctive picture of transregional smuggling and cinematic boundary-crossing, namely, the dangerous trafficking and interception of movie images, ideologies, and propaganda. Film screening of 'China' in Hong Kong and Taiwan was subject to strict official surveillance to quarantine undesirable public visibility and political discourses. The study examines film's ambiguous expressions of China and Chineseness as it constantly negotiated the factors of colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and Cold War transnational politics.

電影政策的研究如何揭示電影審查的權力機制及其文化政治的本質？在政治和市場的約束下，審查制度又如何影響電影製作的美學和自我定位？本文將聚焦英殖香港、台灣和中國這三個地緣政治區域，探討英國在殖民地實行的電影審查制度的影響，以及冷戰時期電影革命對中國政治的指涉。1970至80年代期間，英殖香港的電影審查員改變了以往審查策略，從打壓中國大陸的電影變成禁止在香港放映可能會冒犯中國的電影。從這種策略上的改變可以看出跨地域“走私”音像影視對意識形態和宣傳領域的獨特影響。在當時的香港和台灣，放映和觀看有關「中國」的電影受到官方的嚴格監控，以杜絕可能惹是生非的公眾現象和政治話語。本文將呈現冷戰時期的港台電影及其在中國和中國性這兩個概念上模稜兩可的表達，研究在這種視覺記錄中，人們面對和處理殖民主義、中國民族主義和冷戰跨國政治等問題的過程。

Keywords: Cold War, Cultural Revolution, Hong Kong cinema, film censorship, propaganda

關鍵詞：冷戰、文化大革命、香港電影、電影審查、政治宣傳

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This article delineates the impact of British colonial film censorship and the politics of representing revolutionary China in cinema during the Cold War in Hong Kong.¹ Adopting an archive-based cultural-historical approach, this study reveals that British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy in the 1970s and 80s from suppressing mainland Chinese films to inhibiting films that might offend China from screening in the colony. In 1974, Hong Kong independent woman film-maker Tang Shu-shuen 唐書璇 made *Zaijian Zhongguo* 再見中國 (*China Behind*), which depicted four Chinese students fleeing into Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution. The film was banned when it met mounting attacks by pro-communist newspapers. In 1981, Taiwan director Bai Jingrui 白景瑞 released *Huangtian houtu* 皇天后土 (*The Coldest Winter in Peking*), a film about the atrocities of the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution. The film was screened for only one day in Hong Kong when it was abruptly withdrawn from public viewing. The Hong Kong government banned the film because it contained “political propaganda”, and screening the film would run the risk of “damaging good relations with other territories” (“Film Censorship” 1980–1983). Another Taiwanese production, Wang Tong’s 王童 *Jiaru woshi zhende* 假如我是真的 (*If I Were for Real*), was rejected in the same year. Telling the story of how a young man extorted a fortune by claiming to be a son of a Chinese general, colonial authorities prohibited the film from screening because it was “likely to be used as propaganda” and was “not in the best interests of Hong Kong” (“Film Censorship” 1981–1982).

How can research into film policy inform us about the nature of colonial power regarding film censorship? Focusing on the shifting geopolitical and diplomatic relationships of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Britain and the PRC, I delineate a picture to show how Cold War tactics and colonial censorship affected the production, circulation, reception, and imagination of films in the circuit of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China during the 1970s and 1980s. This study maps out a distinctive picture of transregional smuggling and cinematic underflows, namely, the dangerous trafficking and interception of movie images, ideologies, and propaganda. Cinematic projections of ‘China’ in

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Hong Kong and Taiwan were subject to strict official surveillance to quarantine undesirable visuality and political disputes from the public.

In facing both Chinese national politics and global Cold War stratagems, the Hong Kong government tactfully maintained neutrality between the PRC and the ROC, adjusting its film censorship policy to evolving political circumstances to target communist or anti-communist films at different times. What is really at issue is not only British colonial film policy but also Cold War geopolitics in the Asian front. The changing diplomatic relationships of London and Hong Kong with China and Taiwan are pivotal when it comes to understanding the cultural and political frictions generated from controversial Taiwan-related movies and images. Based on press coverage, historical accounts, and declassified documents, the study reveals a high level of anxiety felt by colonial administrators about the turmoil provoked by the Cultural Revolution in China.

This period witnessed the rise of Hong Kong as a vibrant center of film production and entertainment business particularly for the Southeast Asian regions, yet the impact of the global Cold War on the cinematic economy and expressions in Hong Kong is seriously understudied. Perusing the multi-archival materials and reading them between the lines against the responses of film-makers and the viewing publics, I venture to illuminate the identity politics of the Hong Kong people as it was mediated through the colonial film policy changes. How did censorship affect and interact with the aesthetics and identity of film-making produced under political and market constraints? What did the Cold War geopolitics mean to the citizen audience and how was this manifested? The study examines film's ambiguous expressions of China and Chinese-ness as it constantly negotiated the factors of colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and Cold War transnational politics. It calls for a dynamic cultural-artistic approach to probe the ambiguous interplay of state ideology, film policy, film form, and audience reception to ponder how filmmakers and audiences could get around the legal apparatus of censorship to engage in the alternative discourses of political freedom and the right to the truth.

Film Censorship and Cold War Hong Kong Geopolitics

Cinema, as a form of compelling storytelling and spectacle, has been historically subject to the manipulation of the state and cultural agents to shape the identity and ideology of a place and its people. Regarding colonial film censorship, British governments directly exercised censorship authority in their colonies in India and Africa (Chowdhry 2000; Vasudev 1978; Burns 2002). In Hong Kong, before the Japanese occupation of the city in 1941, the authority of censorship was assigned to the police in order to maintain public order and eliminate undersirable representations on screen perceived to be harmful to the native Chinese population (Newman 2013, 167). The draconian measures of cultural control were diametrically different from what Western regimes did in their homelands, as Britain (Trevelyan 1973) and America (Randall 1968; Doherty 1999; Grieveson 2004) had unofficial censoring bodies formed by the industries themselves, but they did not have any legal powers to enforce or regulate.

Since the late 1940s, with the onset of the Cold War, British Hong Kong had been turned into a battleground between the Communists and the Guomindang on political and cultural fronts. The cinema became a vital arena for the combat for hearts and minds. Colonial authorities secretly practised film censorship to contain Chinese nationalist and communist propaganda on screen to avoid political turmoil in Hong Kong. In 1953 the government issued the Film Censorship Regulations after the British suppressed communism in the Federation of Malaya in 1952 – a time that coincided with the end of the Korean War. The 1953 Regulations reserved official power for the government to exercise censorship in secrecy. The colonial administration tightened its grip on film inspection to curb communist propaganda and leftwing film activities as many influential filmmakers fled to Hong Kong from the mainland after the war (Barbieri 1997, 77–78). Yet the regulations, while granting limitless power to official censors, provided only guidelines for the manner of censorship, but not prescriptions of legal rights upon which films should be censored. The colonial film censorship system had been operating without legal authority (Ching 1987). The clandestine censorship reveals the nature of British Hong Kong rule and policy toward

cinema and mass culture, in which colonial officials diplomatically dealt with international politics and big powers through intervening in the distribution and exhibition of film and public visibility at large.

The historical trajectory manifests the shifting stance of British colonial authorities in exercising censorship behind the Hong Kong film scene. It showcases British-style pragmatism in handling the exhibition of mainland films and the representation of China in films in the colony. The film censorship policy has to be contextualised in order to make it meaningful to the cultural Cold War in East Asia.

British global power declined substantially after WWII. Asia, except for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, became peripheral to British foreign policymakers. Britain's early recognition of the PRC in 1950 was only a pragmatic approach to preserving British economic interests in the mainland and Hong Kong. Whereas economic interests dominated Britain's foreign diplomacy in dealing with China and Taiwan, the colonial power had to maintain its special relationship with the U.S., which was pursuing a proactive policy of containment against China. The British were never concerned about the unification or division of China, nor did they intend to produce a two-China situation. The China issue mattered to them only when it had wider implications for regional peace and security (Tsang 2006, 196).

In 1958 Mao Zedong triggered a new Taiwan Straits crisis when the PRC troops shelled the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Britain formed a de facto, albeit temporary, strategic partnership with Taiwan to support the U.S. without promising to provide further military aid to defend Taiwan. Steve Tsang (2006) contends that Britain and the ROC constituted the "Cold War's odd couple". British officials were keen to retain commercial links and an informal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan through Hong Kong, yet British officials believed that Taiwanese sovereignty under the Guomindang regime was shaky. Britain opposed any possibility of a 'Two China' solution. To London, the crucial issue was to prevent the Taiwan question from triggering a war in East Asia, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950. Britain and the ROC had become "unwitting partners" by the late 1950s in pursuit of their respective goals (Tsang 1994, 105-6).

As the geopolitical conflict between the PRC and Taiwan escalated in 1958, Hong Kong censors toughened their policy on PRC films while they showed favouritism toward Taiwan films. Taiwanese documentaries *Jinri baodao - Taiwan* 今日寶島—台灣 (*Today's Taiwan*) and *Ziyou zhenxian zhi sheng* 自由陣線之聲 (*Voice from the Free World*) were passed for screening, but the mainland documentary *Ode to the Motherland* was banned in Hong Kong. The two Taiwanese documentaries should not have been passed because they contained shots of pictures of Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist flag, and the slogan “*Fangong dalu*” 反攻大陸 (“Reclaim the Mainland”). The existing Panel’s criterion censored from films all shots of Chinese leaders, political rallies, and national flags regardless of their Nationalist or Communist affiliation. It was on the same criterion that the mainland Chinese documentary on the 1957 National Day celebrations in Beijing was banned, for it included shots of the PRC national flag and leaders (Du 2017, 127).

Hong Kong censors’ preferential decisions on Taiwan propaganda over the PRC counterpart engendered vehement protests from the local communist press and institutions in August and September 1958. The New China News Agency and Southern Film Corporation (the distributor of PRC films in Hong Kong) condemned the Hong Kong government for clandestinely exercising a “two-Chinas plot” through film censorship. Allowing national icons to be seen on screen could be interpreted as recognising Taiwan’s status as an independent nation. Even the leftist movie celebrity Xia Meng 夏夢 had to toe the party line to accuse the Hong Kong government of plotting a “two-Chinas conspiracy” (Lee 2013, 29). Du (2017) relates the Hong Kong authorities’ bias toward Taiwanese over PRC films to the Taiwan Straits crisis, when Britain unwittingly forged an informal strategic partnership with the ROC to support the United States (129). The timing of Britain’s foreign and diplomatic cultural manoeuvre could not be more apposite. Britain sought to maintain a balance of power without committing its military forces to Taiwan’s defence. It was therefore expedient for Hong Kong’s colonial censors to express diplomatic support for Taiwan on the cultural front. Beside the factor of the immediate geopolitical conflict, indeed, the colonial authorities’ harsh measures against mainland propaganda stemmed from their fear of communist influence in Hong Kong in the volatile 1950s.

Nonetheless, British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy of political censorship from the mid-1960s, from prohibiting mainland Chinese films to banning films that might offend China from being screened in Hong Kong. Zardas Lee (2013) suggests that after the mid-1960s, censors tended not to treat the Nationalist government in Taiwan in a positive light as they did with the United States and Chinese governments. And colonial officials resolved to protect the images of America and other friendly countries. “The communists’ demand for keeping scenes and commentary that demeaned the United States, Britain and its allies was hardly acceptable to the Hong Kong government” (54). Since the late 1960s, Lee indicates, “Hong Kong had been banning Taiwan films that referred to Chinese communists as “bandits”, but allowing Chinese films that demeaned Chiang Kai-shek in the same way. The government protected Chinese films and also China’s image” (102–3). The British Hong Kong authorities were evidently distancing themselves from the government of Taiwan and becoming friendlier with that of the PRC.

British Hong Kong’s tendency to disfavour Taiwan-related movies had much to do with Britain’s diplomatic gesture to develop its “friendly relations” with China in spite of the propagandistic rhetoric of anti-communism and ideology characteristic of the Western bloc. The political goals of improving Sino-British relations and lessening Cold War conflicts in East Asia dictated the political censorship of PRC films in Hong Kong. Different from the American policy of containment and military threat, Britain opted for compromise and the PRC’s admission to the United Nations. The British efforts to establish full diplomatic relations with China were, however, complicated by the success of Sino-American rapprochement with Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1971 (Mark 2017, 162).

Even before the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the 1970s, Britain was confident in developing normal diplomatic relations with China despite the Vietnam War and the 1967 riots (Lee 2013, 102–3). In film censorship, Hong Kong officials pragmatically kept on revising their internal censorship regulations to soften their position against PRC films. The 1960s guidelines indicated a more lenient attitude toward political subjects in films with certain constraints. The Film Censorship Board of Review stipulated in “A Statement of the General Principles” (1965) that “no

film should be banned simply because it is political in nature or has propaganda for the sole or main purpose,” on condition that “its showing in public to any audience likely to include political opponents would not cause a breach of the peace, would not on its own inspire individuals or small groups to organise seditions or subversive underground bodies in their places of work, schools, etc.” Censors were advised to adopt more tolerant directives, stipulating that “films purporting to eulogise life or conditions in other countries or under other regimes should be passed for public showing, provided they do not include offensive attacks on other governments or national leaders or on other people’s ways of life, or make derogatory comparisons.” Yet, censors were cautioned to “bear in mind particular sensitivities on both sides of the camp to implied recognition of ‘Two Chinas’”.

The “Annual Report on Film Censorship” (1970) mentioned that nine films from Taiwan (features and shorts) were submitted for censorship for the event of a Taiwan “Mandarin Film Week” held at the City Hall in June. “Four of them were approved, while three were cut and two were banned for excessive military significance.” By contrast, eight films from mainland China were submitted for censorship, and all were approved. These mainland films included some documentaries (four about the “9th National Congress” and one on the completion of the “Nanking Bridge” as well as potentially militant films (two about the Sino-Soviet border clash under the general title “New Tsar,” and a war drama about guerrilla activities in Japanese occupied territory).

In the years 1965–1974, 34 films (out of 357 banned movies) were excluded on political grounds. These controversial political films came from countries including China, Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Israel, the United States, Canada, Britain, and France. In 1973–1987, 21 films (out of 8,400 films submitted) were banned on political grounds: eight from Taiwan, three each from Hong Kong and Vietnam, two from China, and one each from North Korea, the United States, France, Japan, and Italy (Pomery 1988, 79). The archival evidence shows that the Hong Kong government was alert to films that might offend China or depict China in an unfavourable light. Films depicting the recent political event of the Cultural Revolution and

those produced by Taiwan with anti-communist themes attracted repeated interference from Chinese representatives in Hong Kong.

The shifting criteria of censorship in the 1960s and 70s show us the expedient nature of colonial manipulation of the policy after considering the regional geopolitics and the local Hong Kong situation. By the late 1960s the British share of world commerce was declining. As Malaysia and Singapore were de-colonised and became sovereign and independent states, Hong Kong remained Britain's only military outpost in East Asia. At the same time, the postwar period saw the coming-of-age of the locally born post-war generation who had benefited from the city's rapid economic development and improved living conditions in housing, education, and social welfare. By the 1970s the colony had been turned into a service hub with global links to the U.S., Japan, and Asian countries. The flourishing therein of popular culture based on the Cantonese vernacular reflected a confident sense of local identity as well as the cosmopolitan outlook of the young. The Chinese identity that most Hong Kong people subscribed to was a "complex and convoluted one", as Steve Tsang (2004) notes, for "being Chinese in Hong Kong was primarily an ethnic and cultural affiliation and generally did not mean being a Chinese citizen or national of the PRC" (195). The traumatic disturbance of 1967, as a spillover from the Cultural Revolution that could have posed a serious challenge to the colony's governance and social stability, had proved to be a historical turning point for an emerging Hong Kong identity. Whereas most local young residents were critical of the colonial government in the era that saw the rise of the civil rights movement and decolonisation worldwide, they were equally distancing themselves from the PRC, especially when China was plunging into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

The socio-economic and cultural transformations of Hong Kong would have contributed to a shift in the attitude of colonial officials towards relaxing censorship of PRC films from the mid-1960s as they observed the Hong Kong audience's general antipathy to political films and propaganda. In 1970, the government noticed that communist films had very restricted outlets in Hong Kong and were seldom seen by a wide uncommitted audience (Director of Information Service 1970). This assessment of the unpopularity of PRC productions could have been a reason for officials to ease control

on mainland films. During the Cultural Revolution the Southern Film Corporation was allowed to show some propaganda films in Hong Kong (Xu 2005, 231–35). Not surprisingly, communist movies had already lost their appeal to Hong Kong movie-goers. At the same time, colonial officials did not want to infuriate local leftist radicals by severely limiting their films, especially after the 1967 riots in Hong Kong (Ng 2008, 29).

The government's tendency to approve more PRC films for screening in the colony can be seen in the reports by the Panel of Censors. The Chief Film Censor William Hung (1972) stated that "political films from China Mainland have showed a continued increase" with eleven films submitted for censorship (two Korean War films, four documentaries, three stage operas, one ballet, and one ping-pong-game film), which were all approved for exhibition. The Southern Film Corporation distributed a number of political films—six from North Vietnam and four from North Korea—which were all approved. Four films were submitted from Taiwan by Hong Kong and Kowloon Cinema and Theatrical Entertainment Free General Association. The films had little political interest as they were intended for exhibition in a "Mandarin Film Week" held at Caritas Social Centre on December 9–12. However, the Board still banned two of them.

While the film censors were instructed to filter out mainland pictures glorifying Mao Zedong or displaying communist military might, they were vigilant about excluding Taiwan and English-speaking films with derogatory remarks on mainland China or Chinese leaders. Taiwan films submitted for censorship in 1979 were mostly sword-plays, love stories, and domestic dramas. But one Taiwan film that made reference to a "commune" and "refugees" was cut with consent (Hung 1971). Hung (1970) warned that some U.S. films in the late 1960s had a fashion of "inserting into films some scenes or remarks about Red China, Red Guards, Mao Tse-tung, etc." Although these dialogues or commentaries were meant to be jokes or amusing remarks mostly in jest, the censors should realise the risk of approving such jesting scenes or remarks as they were likely to be misunderstood or become offensive to those lacking a sense of humour.

The control over provocative non-PRC film materials could be seen as a pragmatic strategy adopted by Hong Kong censors to scale down local leftist pressures. The left-wing press in Hong Kong and the Southern Film Corporation had been more vociferous than their Taiwan counterparts in accusing the government of discriminating against PRC films through film censorship. That colonial censors gave PRC films more lenient treatment toward the 1970s manifested the Cold War factor in Sino-British diplomacy, in which Britain continued to develop a ‘friendly’ relationship with the PRC. Another aspect that needs addressing is the local politics of film censorship. As the panel’s reports subtly suggested, under British command Hong Kong officials could maintain a significant degree of agency and autonomy by making expedient directives to force off screen materials that might offend China. Observing that didactic political films had lost the favour of local middle-class movie-goers, moreover, they tended not to impose rigid control on communist films so as to avert imminent political agitation from local left-wingers.

Through manipulating the censorship rules, the colonial government hoped to shape Hong Kong’s audiences and citizens to be politically apathetic towards Chinese politics and contemporary history. How does censorship affect the aesthetics and identity of local film-making produced under political constraints? How did Cold War cultural politics interfere in the Hong Kong film scene in the transnational exchange with Taiwan and the PRC? I highlight some remarkable local and Taiwan-related film productions in the 1970s and 80s that became controversial censorship cases, and explore how the Cultural Revolution figured as a living event and lived memories on screen.

Politics of Art and Identity: *China Behind*

In 1974, Hong Kong woman producer-director Cecille Tang Shu-shuen made *China Behind*, a.k.a. *Ben* 奔 (*The Dissidents*). Set in 1966 at the advent of the Cultural Revolution, the film tells of the agony of four Guangzhou students who attempt to flee China to Hong Kong. This independent film follows the escapees from China, who struggle to sneak into the colony by land only to find life not as rosy as they expected.

Painting a bleak portrait of Chinese society as it did, the film was equally critical of the materialistic city of colonial Hong Kong.

China Behind was submitted to the Panel of Film Censors in October 1974. Local leftists denounced the film as being “anti-China” and “counter-revolutionary.” Their mounting attacks forced Tang to withdraw the film from screening. The film was re-submitted to the censors in December, and was again rejected for public screening. Pierre Lebrun, the Chief Film Censor, explained the ban was imposed because the film “contains certain materials which are believed to be damaging to the good relationship between Hong Kong and another territory” (“Censors Ban Film on China”). Tang’s decision to withdraw it was made in view of the “unfavorable reaction from local left-wing groups.” Tang expressed an apolitical viewpoint in gesture by emphasizing the film as “a work of art”, while she did not want to “spark off any sort of political row” (Chu 1974). Behind the scenes, however, the film-maker would have been aware that covert negotiations and collusions were in place between the colonial government and representatives of the PRC in Hong Kong. The Xinhua News Agency in Hong Kong invited the director over for a “chat” about *China Behind* after the film had been submitted for censorship. Xinhua was curious to know the source of funding or if it was from the camp of “Soviet Revisionism.” The PRC representatives asked Tang for a copy of the film to preview before it could ever make it for public screening (Yau 2015, 166).

The ban on *China Behind* in 1975 continued until 1980, when the political advisor recommended that the Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA) clear the film for private cinema-club showings. Indeed, the local prohibition of *China Behind* throughout the 1970s would have had to do as much with the Cultural Revolution as with the escalating Vietnam War and the impact of Vietnamese refugees escaping to the colony. The film about the mainland dissidents in their exilic journey to Hong Kong could have resonated with a picture of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese boat-people, driven by the fear of the new communist leadership after the war, fleeing to a safer refuge in Hong Kong. Colonial officials had to take the external political situation into consideration when they assessed the possibility of releasing the film for public viewing.

China Behind was permitted for general viewing in 1981. By that time public memories of the Cultural Revolution and refugees had waned in Hong Kong. The film was shown only in a local film society in March as the film's distributor D&B Studio assessed that "the film would have failed commercially" (Stoner 1987). The film's distributor D&B Studio decided to resubmit the film in 1987 to challenge the current film censorship system. It was approved for showing on the commercial cinema circuit in May 1987.

The film's production context of Taiwan infuriated left-wing opponents in Hong Kong, who accused it of being a propagandist film from Taiwan, an "effort of a small Chiang clique to tarnish the achievements of the Cultural Revolution" (Chu 1974). Ironically, Tang's crew did the shooting illegally in Taiwan as they smuggled props like the five-star red flags, Mao statues and Little Red Books (Chairman Mao's Quotations), and revolutionary-era costumes into the land which was still under the reign of the White Terror (Lei 2016; Sa 2012). The film production could not be done in the mainland as the Gang of Four was still in power.

The story starts in the spring of 1966 at the advent of the Cultural Revolution. It opens with scenes of the swimming team-mates in the regular drills at Guangzhou University, with blurred water images and swimmers' bodies to foretell the protagonists' later escape by swimming through dangerous waters to the coast of Hong Kong. The modernistic imagery would be reminiscent of thousands of mainlanders who reportedly fled China during the Cultural Revolution, many of them failing to make their way in the sea with their dead bodies found near the coast.

Shot on a low budget, the film is reminiscent of Italian neo-realism in deploying amateur actors, location shooting, natural light (with more night scenes) and sound, hand-held camera, and voice-over. Sung Chuan, a final year medical school student from a capitalist family, cannot stand his bleak future and decides to leave China. His voice-over at the beginning gives a poignant sense of the human stories of his co-conspirators. With minimal technical support and skills, the film's cinematographer Chang Chaotang's black-and-white documentary style helps to reveal "a sense of alienation" and "coldness" behind the human dramas (Yau 2004, 74).

The narrative is infused with incisive sympathy with the escapees who are torn between the ideological fervours of the two (communist and capitalist) worlds. The film ends with the protagonists' successful mission to land in Hong Kong, only to find themselves shocked at the city's contradictory pictures of economic inequality. The couple (Han Lun and Sung Lan) reside in a cramped flat on a public housing estate. Han Lun becomes a minor clerk at the stock exchange company. Noises of the stock market in Hong Kong and sounds of horse-racing are juxtaposed with loudspeaker broadcasts of Mao's political slogans in mainland China. Sung Lan is seemingly suffering from a nervous breakdown as seen from her expression of bitter laughter while having her hair done in a barber shop.

China Behind was the first film made by an ethnic Chinese woman film-maker about the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1970s, when the Gang of Four was still in power, the Cultural Revolution was mythicised as a great achievement of the Chinese people. *China Behind* proved to be Tang's most courageous and visionary venture to deliver her critical view of the political tragedy in China. Whereas pro-communist groups cynically smeared the film as a "black movie containing poisonous elements to blemish the image of China", Tang defended her work less as a political indictment than as an existential inquiry about the human condition in extreme living circumstances. Her film "tries to show the frustrations of young people when asked to choose between idealism and reality" (Chu 1974). Tang's broad concern with the human existential condition as seen in the plights of the characters was doomed to misapprehension and politicisation.

What did the geopolitics of the Cold War mean to an engaged film-maker and how was this manifested? Implicit in Tang's depoliticised gesture and her reaction to film censorship is the identity politics of the Hong Kong film-maker mediated through the changes in colonial film policy as the Cold War entered a different stage in the 1970s. Supporting the censorial measures on *China Behind*, the chief censor Lebrun argued that the conservative Hong Kong colonial police and legislature in the 1970s was only a "reflection" of the dominant conservative escapism in society (Yau 2004, 78). The evolution of colonial censorship policies functioned to shape a depoliticised community of ethnic Chinese Hong Kong citizens who kept on distancing themselves from

contemporary Chinese politics. The postwar youths who were nurtured in Western culture and values, however, would have acquired a cultural nostalgia for China. At the same time, they did not identify with the undemocratic political systems in the mainland and Taiwan, as much as they were resistant to British colonial rule and western hegemony in Asian countries in the era of decolonisation, the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement, and the “Defend Diaoyu Islands” movement.

In this sense, *China Behind* was emblematic of the marginalised position of Hong Kong vis-à-vis the British colonial and Chinese communist powers. The film’s core narrative of Chinese refugees swimming across the border exemplified the border-crossing experiences of the Hong Kong people, who were mostly migrants from mainland China. Sarcastically, the moral degeneration and spiritual disillusionment of its characters revealed the dehumanising effects felt by people from both sides of the border. The film ventured to lay bare the clash of communist and capitalist ideals in the protagonists, manifesting the clashes of Cold War ideologies as well as foreshadowing Hong Kong people’s identity crisis and their wish to escape from the communist authorities and values after the 1997 handover. By emphasising her film’s existential concern and moral criticism, Tang defied the sociopolitical context of censorship and the interpretation of her film as political advocacy. Her attempts to explore the essential human condition in the film, and to question how a human being lives and changes in a particular socio-economic environment, constituted an idiosyncratic political vision of a Hong Kong film-maker.

Transnational Censorship: *The Coldest Winter in Peking* and *If I Were for Real*

Having elaborated how an independent film-maker dealt with censorial pressures from left-wing groups and colonial officials to address the issues of identity politics and film aesthetics, this section further explicates how Cold War geopolitics affected the nature of trans-border exchange between Hong Kong cinema and Taiwan films. In its pragmatic diplomacy, Britain maintained a consulate in Taiwan until 1972, following the

establishment of an embassy in Beijing. In Hong Kong, the ROC and PRC both maintained extensive intelligence networks and commercial links with the colony. To avoid political friction on the cultural front, the government continued to grant censors much discretion to police Chinese-language films. The investigative report of Frank Ching (1987) revealed that since 1973, colonial officials had operated illegal rules to block films that depicted China unfavourably, causing public fear of a ‘conspiracy’ between the Chinese and Hong Kong governments in constraining Taiwan films in the colony.

In the same year, 1987, when *China Behind* was resubmitted to Hong Kong’s censorship board, Taiwan’s state-owned Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) simultaneously asked for reclassification of two films – *The Coldest Winter in Peking* and *If I Were for Real* – as a test. Different from Hong Kong’s independent film *China Behind*, *If I Were for Real* and *The Coldest Winter in Peking* were Taiwan-based productions that had got on the nerves of Hong Kong film censors when they came out in 1981.

Financed by the state-run CMPC, *The Coldest Winter in Peking* was made at the historical juncture when diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan had just been severed and a wave of patriotism swept the Taiwanese populace (Yau 2015, 180). On its public release in Taiwan on 5 February 1981, the film caused a sensation and became a box-office smash (Liang 2004, 243). This big-budget production that cost about US\$ 2 million recruited Taiwan stars to act, including Qin Xianglin 秦祥林, Hu Huizhong 胡慧中, Lang Xiong 郎雄, Gui Yalei 歸亞蕾, and Ke Junxiong 柯俊雄. Based on the misfortunes of an overseas-trained Chinese scientist, who returns to work in China during the Cultural Revolution, the film centers on his tumultuous experiences of broken families and betrayed love.

The Hong Kong government slapped an immediate ban on the film effective from midnight after only one day’s regular showing in town on March 26, 1981. About 17 theatres mostly in the Shaw Brothers network of movie houses throughout Hong Kong were ordered to withdraw the film immediately. It was the first time that the board had

banned a film on seemingly political grounds after initially passing it.² Lebrun explained that his earlier decision to pass the film was because he “interpreted it as an entertainment drama based on a series of well-known historical facts”. He thought the film was a “Chinese version of *Gone with the Wind*” (“Filmmakers in Taipei Plan Appeal on Ban”), comparable with *Dr. Zhivago* in terms of its epic scope and sentimentalism. But on a second review, Lebrun noticed that “the film has political overtones which are liable to be exploited” (Chugani 1981).

The South China Morning Post (“Officials Brush off Censor Rumpus”) revealed an untold story from internal sources. The ban apparently followed representations made by Hong Kong-based mainland Chinese officials to the Political Advisor’s Office, which called for a second review of the film. The review came to the conclusion that Lebrun might have misjudged the film as the reviewing officials expressed “an element of surprise that the film was passed for public viewing in the instance”. The officials believed that it was true that 90 per cent of the film could be seen as an “entertainment drama based on well-known historical facts”; however, the remaining 10 per cent of the film was “unambiguous propaganda”, linking what happened during the Cultural Revolution to the current leadership in China. One official pointed out the symbolic message of “the rising sun of the Nationalist flag”, and was quoted commenting on the political overtones as implying: “Look, that’s what had happened during the Cultural Revolution, can you trust the present leaders now? Trust the KMT (GMD) instead.” These comments allegedly coming from the Political Advisor drove Lebrun to look at the film again, resulting in his reversal of his previous judgment all on his own.

As the news of the ban spread during the evening, crowds of Hong Kong spectators flocked to the theatres to see the 9:30 pm and midnight shows. Many of them were young people who were curious about the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution. Some expressed disappointment at the government’s move to ban the film as it should let people decide for themselves whether the film was biased or not. Older members of the audience considered that the ban was brought about because “the Government

² The case of *The Coldest Winter in Peking* was the first time the Film Censorship Board banned a film for political reasons after first passing it. It was, however, the third time since 1973 that a film had been withdrawn while being screened, but the previous two films’ cases were concerned with explicit sex scenes, namely, *Sex on Wheels* and *Erotic Dreams of the Red Chamber*. See Leonard 1981.

wanted to maintain its good relations with China” (“Sensitive Film Grinds to a Sudden Stop”). About 43,000 people reportedly went to see the film’s premiere on that day (Leonard 1981). During the showing in the Jade Theatre, it was reported, laughter burst out from some of the film-goers who thought the film was exaggerated in some of the scenes from what they saw in China. But five out of seven people interviewed by a local newspaper thought there was no need for the ban, as the Chinese in Hong Kong should have the right to be informed what was happening in China (“Movie Fans Hit out at Decision”).

Apparently, Lebrun’s decision was swayed after strong protests from the New China News Agency in Hong Kong. The Chinese representatives were understood to have been angry at “the Taiwan treatment of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four issues” (Chugani 1981). Before issuing the ban, Lebrun had an emergency meeting with Nigel Watt, the Commissioner of TELA. Lebrun added that the film was being used and was likely to be further used by certain sections of the media in Hong Kong and abroad for propaganda purposes. Taiwan’s CMPC protested against the film ban and threatened to launch a lawsuit against the Hong Kong government to obtain compensation for the losses incurred by the film’s distributors through the fault of the censors (Leonard 1981). “The decision for censoring the film was obviously politically motivated,” Ming Chi of CMPC said, “because Hong Kong authorities examined the film at least three times and held numerous discussions before they issued a three-month license on March 12.” CMPC insisted that the movie itself was strictly “commercial, artistic and factual” rather than political as reassessed by Hong Kong’s film censor (“Film Ban Company Threatens Law Suit”). At the same time, CMPC appealed to the Shaw Brothers Motion Picture Co. to negotiate with the Hong Kong government. Movie mogul Sir Run Run Shaw called on Governor Sir Murray MacLehose to revoke the ban, but without success.

Soon after the Film Censorship Board of Review rejected CMPC’s appeal against the prohibition of *The Coldest Winter in Peking* on May 6, the Taiwan film company was considering the production of a video cassette tape of the banned film for Hong Kong and Southeast Asia. But CMPC hoped to release the tape after the movie had been shown in Singapore and Malaysia, in order not to affect the box office takings in the

two countries (“Film Ban Appealed”). To beat the ban in Hong Kong, Taiwan promptly campaigned for tourist and film-going events in Taipei targeting the Hong Kong people and overseas Chinese audiences. The Taipei First Hotel offered free rooms and cinema tickets for Hong Kong tourists to fly to Taipei to see the film. The Hong Kong visitors were all given two-day-one-night complimentary accommodation plus free tickets to watch the show. The Taiwan authorities allegedly sped up issuing visas “tremendously” to help Hong Kong people join the tour (“Firm Takes Film Ban Fight to Appeals Board”). All of the theatre’s 1,000 seats were reportedly filled at each showing, and the audience included an average of 400 overseas Chinese and 50 Western visitors a day. CMPC and the Taipei hotel owner claimed that their organised “protest activities” were not publicity gimmicks but were actuated by “a strong sense of patriotism”. They were “simply dedicated to the cause of anti-communism—and nothing else” (“Taiwan Tries to Get Ban Lifted”).

Significantly, the issues of transnational screening, trans-media politics (film and video), and propaganda campaigns were crucial to the controversy over this Taiwan film about the Cultural Revolution. After Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, the Cultural Revolution officially came to an end. Nonetheless, political tensions persisted between the PRC and the ROC. As Taiwan was under the reign of martial law (1949–1987) with propagandistic promotion of anti-communism in the early 1980s, the transnational Cold War politics still troubled colonial censors and their political advisors in making cultural policy decisions. They consistently ignored the voices of Hong Kong film-makers and audiences and deprived them of their rights to consume Chinese story-telling on screen. The press coverage of the Hong Kong spectators testified to the fact that young citizens were eager to know about the Cultural Revolution and contemporary China, while the general audience did not necessarily take the film as mere propaganda.

Whereas Cold War politics unfolded as the intricate intertwining of proxy cultural wars, espionage, diplomatic manoeuvring, and media campaigns in the cinematic circuits of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the way in which its local experiences were manifested in everyday life is worth scrutiny. Implicit in this line of questioning is the nature of intercultural exchange in film-making and reception as they are mediated through

the politics of film censorship. *If I Were for Real* was a transcultural production involving a Taiwanese screen adaptation of a Shanghainese play based on a nineteenth-century Russian drama, enhanced in commercial value by Mandopop music and Cantopop film stardom. The film was adapted by director Wang Tong from a 1979 Chinese satirical play in six acts written by Shanghai-based playwright Sha Yexin 沙葉新. The play was inspired by the March 1979 arrest of Zhang Quanlong 張泉龍, a young man who impersonated the son of Li Da 李達, deputy head of the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department. While the Chinese film title was adopted from Teresa Teng's famous Mandopop album, the story was also inspired by Nikolai Gogol's satirical play *The Inspector General* (1836), rewritten by Sha Yexin into a play about a Chinese swindler to expose the corruption of communist officialdom.

At the end of the 1970s, Li Xiaozhang 李小璋 (Alan Tam/Tan Yonglun 譚詠倫), a 26-year-old sent-down youth at a state farm, is frustrated as he cannot obtain a transfer to the city. His pregnant girlfriend Zhou Minghua 周明華 has already returned to the city. Without his securing the transfer, her father will not let them marry. Realising that tickets to a popular play (Nikolai Gogol's *The Government Inspector*, about an impostor) are unavailable to commoners but reserved for cadre members and their families, he poses as the son of a high-level cadre to gain entrance to the play. Soon many cadres and high communist officials all fawn over him in the belief that he will in return use his connections for their selfish gains. Li enjoys a privileged life for some time during his stay in Shanghai, and almost succeeds in receiving his transfer. His impersonation is exposed in the end and he is brought to trial. Admitting his guilt, he poignantly reminds the audience that if he were really this son taking bribes from fawning underlings—"if I were for real"—everything would have been completely legal and accepted. It is the impersonation but not corruption itself that is the crime.

The original Shanghai-based play was produced in August 1979 by the Shanghai People's Art Theatre. The play exposed corruption in the establishment and lampooned the impostor's "victims". After a brief run in a few major cities, the mainland authorities imposed a ban on its public performance. In January 1980 Hu Yaobang gave the order to halt the performance of the play (Fong 1987, 213). In the same month, the

text of the play, which had been issued in China only as a restricted circulation publication, was “smuggled” to Hong Kong and published in *The Seventies* (*Qishi Niandai* 七十年代), a Hong Kong magazine. The screen adaptation in Taiwan turned the satirical comedy into a political drama to condemn Chinese communism. Probably for political reasons, the movie won the Golden Horse Awards in 1981 including Best Feature Film, Best Actor (Alan Tam), and Best Adapted Screenplay (Chang Yung-hsiang). It was selected as the Taiwanese entry for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film at the 54th Academy Awards, but it failed in the nomination.

At issue here is the use of the story for different political purposes. In the Shanghai stage version, Li Da takes pity on the impostor and speaks up for him, blaming his actions on the Gang of Four’s policy of sending urban youth down to the countryside and on cadres for their toadying behaviour. The Taiwan film adaptation underwent some major dramatic changes to augment its criticism of human nature and the corruption of Chinese society. The film disregarded some of the “inherent ambiguities in the play” to sharpen its condemnation of communism (Fong 1987, 233–53).³ For instance, the film introduces a licentious and corrupt character Wang Yun, deputy mayor of Shanghai, who keeps an innocent actress as his mistress, thus strengthening the negative impression associated with the ruling elite in mainland China. In the film, Zhou Minghua’s pregnancy is revealed much earlier than in the play. As a result, the opportunistic prankster Li Xiaozhang is portrayed, in a positive light, as a hero fighting for the survival of his future family. The play ends with Li Xiaozhang on trial and Zhou Minghua in the hospital. In the film, Zhou Minghua drowns herself (and her unborn baby), while Li Xiaozhang cuts his wrist and inscribes with his blood the words “If I Were for Real” on the cell wall before his death. The main characters do not kill themselves in the end in the original play.

In Hong Kong, TELA issued a ban on the film on August 25, 1981, saying the film “is likely to be used as propaganda and not in the interest of Hong Kong” (“Taiwan Movie Banned”). Lebrun insisted that the ban was an independent decision of the censorship authorities without any intervention from the New China News Agency. “I

³ For an analysis of the play and adaptation, see Barmé 1983, 319–32; for a translation of the play, see Sha, Li, and Yao 1983, 198–250.

don't think Hong Kong can afford to have polemics between groups of different ideologies," Lebrun noted, implying that the decision was made to steer clear of potential conflicts between Taiwan and the PRC ("Film Censorship" 1981-1982).

The Coldest Winter in Peking and *If I Were for Real* were resubmitted to the censor board of Hong Kong in 1987, but the ban on the two films was not lifted until 1989. *The Coldest Winter in Peking* was submitted for censorship on 7 June, 1989, that is the third day after the June Fourth Massacre that marked an end to the 1989 Democracy Movement begun in April 1989; the government censors approved the film, and the film was released again in Hong Kong on 22 June, 1989. *If I Were for Real* also successfully passed the censor board and was released on 4 May, 1989, before June Fourth (Yau 2015, 180-1). Were the resubmissions of these two films based on an opportunistic business motive? The democratic student movement in Beijing in 1989 certainly alarmed Hong Kong citizens about their uncertain future after 1997, which would have fueled public interest in seeing the two films about the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath. What was the government's political motive for allowing the two provocative films to be publicly screened?⁴ Political speculation has indicated the ongoing Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong, as Britain could gain more bargaining power by stirring up public opinion against communist China (Yau 2015, 181).

The two controversial Taiwan-related film cases attest to the dynamics of transnational Cold War politics, in which the changing political climates and shifting audience receptions were crucially tied up with the historical relationships of colonial Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. In view of the overt political anti-communist messages of the films as understood by colonial censors within a larger geopolitical framing, what is noteworthy is how local audiences could read the manifold meanings of the films as imaginative story-telling. The two films can be read as exposés of political catastrophes and human suffering to denounce the socialist system. Yet they also reach beyond the surface of political accusations. The emotional treatment of tragic romances and

⁴ The author personally got to view the two films in commercial theatres in the summer of 1989, as he recalls, a few weeks after the Tiananmen tragedy in Beijing. The author has yet to gain permission to access confidential documents to understand how the censors passed the two films, which were previously prohibited, in the changing sociopolitical circumstances in 1989.

thwarted human relationships in the films deliver a new interpretation of the work of “Scar Literature” with profound humanism. At once political and thought-provoking, the two films probe issues of individuality and human freedom when powerless individuals are opposing and protesting against the inhuman political system as a whole.

Reflections

This study draws on primary research from colonial archives and press coverage to unveil the behind-the-scenes history of Hong Kong film censorship. It reveals the practice of colonial censorial constraints on screen exhibition in relation to the trans-border exchange of film productions between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China at the height of Cold War paranoia. It observes a shift in the British censorship in the 1970s and 1980s regarding mainland films and the representation of China in films. Having conducted adequate research on the censorship-related cases and untold stories, the study attempts to contextualise the film censorship policy regarding the geopolitics of the Cold War in Asia, in particular Britain’s diplomatic negotiations with China and Taiwan, to understand how the cultural Cold War was played out in East Asia, and particularly the vital role of the Hong Kong film scene.

The study interrogates how the relentlessly changing practices and apparatuses of colonial censorship can illuminate the local politics of Hong Kongese officers in response to the ever-adjusting policies, and ponders the identity politics of the citizen audience in reaction to official censorial measures. The controversial cases have demonstrated the vulnerability of the censorship system to international politics that shaped erratic official decisions in dealing with the changing Cold War situation. British-style pragmatism and managerial expediency were most acutely manifested in how flexibly—and sometimes awkwardly—Hong Kong officials handled thorny issues and social crises arising from the danger of exhibiting controversial films and propagandist newsreels imported from mainland China and Taiwan in this period. I believe that the proclaimed political ethics of “even-handedness”, which the colonial authorities invariably used to justify their positions and objectives of playing a fair game between the

PRC and ROC regimes, may be simplistic and crafty excuses for colonial decision-makers.

Arguably, Hong Kong censors could have maintained some degree of cultural autonomy in adjusting censorship policies vis-à-vis both British rule and the propaganda war between the PRC and Taiwan in this period (Du 2017, 117). What is most revealing and fascinating, however, is how local film-makers and audiences countered the censorship policy to negotiate a local identity in everyday life. Tang Shu-shuen's tactic of screening China demonstrates how a creative film-maker moved beyond the ideological divides and deployed cinematic story-telling to articulate a notion of contested Chinese identity that was different from the Cold War rhetoric of anticommunism or Chinese patriotism. This questioning of Chineseness, which cannot simply be reduced to political allegiances, was ambiguously expressed by the Hong Kongese audience in their move against the ban on viewing prohibited films with the tabooed subject of the Cultural Revolution. Such illuminating cases offer us new insights that censorship studies is not so much about prohibiting, silencing, or erasing memories of a populace as about producing and creating new forms of memories of the past and expressions of local identities in flux.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

More than Conformity or Resistance: Chinese "Boys' Love" Fandom in the Age of Internet Censorship

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One of the most popular literary and cultural practices particularly in the digital age, "boys' love" (BL, danmei 耽美) manga and fictional works are fantasies on romantic or homoerotic male-male relationships, and therefore are often naturally associated with homosexuality and pornography, two "morally" suspicious targets of government censorship in the heteronormative Chinese culture. This article aims to examine the various, indeed often opposite, strategies and tactics taken by BL participants and by some conscientious netizens on popular social media to illustrate how those who are under the threat of censorship grapple with harsh reality. In this article I argue that the BL practitioners' responses to Chinese government's anti-pornography campaigns are not simply a passive or reluctant "reaction." I will first study the web adaptation of Priest's BL story *Zhenhun*, demonstrating Priest's as well as her fans' tactful collaboration with the consumer culture and willing conformity to official discourse. Forming a sharp contrast with Priest's commercial success, the controversial ten-year jail sentence of another BL writer, Gouwazi Tianyi, for profiting from producing and selling BL fiction has caused widespread outcry from both BL fans and ordinary netizens on Chinese social media. This case not only questions the dated criminal laws on obscene articles, but also challenges the patriarchal and problematic social institutions.

作為數字時代最受歡迎的流行文學和文化實踐，耽美漫畫和虛構作品是對男男浪漫的戀愛關係或性關係的想像，因此常與同性戀和色情聯繫起來。而在以異性戀為正統的中國文化中，常常成為政府審查制度針對的“道德”目標。本文旨在研究耽美參與者和一些有良知的網民在社交媒體上採取的不同甚至相反的策略，以展現人們如何應對嚴酷審查的現實。本文通過研讀網絡耽美劇《鎮魂》的接受情況解讀了耽美作家 Priest 及其粉絲與消費文化和官方話語的共謀。同時通過探討耽美作家狗娃子天一因寫作和銷售耽美小說而被判刑的案例，展示了耽美參與者和網民對陳舊法律的質疑，以及對父權制的社會制度的挑戰。

Keywords: BL, danmei, censorship, fandom, media studies, *Zhenhun*, Gouwazi Tianyi

關鍵詞：BL, 耽美, 審查制度, 粉絲研究, 媒體研究, 鎮魂, 狗娃子天一

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One of the most popular literary and cultural practices, particularly in the digital age, “boys’ love” (BL, a.k.a. *danmei* 耽美 in China) manga and fictional works, primarily by women and for women, are fantasies on romantic or homoerotic male-male relationships, and therefore are often naturally associated with homosexuality and pornography, two “morally” suspicious targets of government censorship in the heteronormative Chinese culture. At the same time, because of the fact that BL and its early-stage form, *yaoi*,¹ often deal with teenage boys or minors, BL is also considered “virtual child pornography” and sometimes, debatably, paedophilia in many western countries which legally accept homosexuality and adult pornography (McLelland 2005, 61–77). Anything not in the realm of official and mainstream cultures is by nature subversive (and therefore dangerous), because of its distinctive difference from and transgression against the dominant culture. Although Chinese people are not unfamiliar with various forms of pornography in the history of literature, art, and religion (such as *fangzhongshu* 房中术, sexual practices in Daoism), China has a centuries-long record of officially banning pornography (Yan 2014, 338). Under the current Criminal Law of China, article 363 lists the definition, circumstances, and penalties of the criminal offence of producing, possessing, duplicating, publishing, circulating or disseminating obscene articles (Zhongguo Renda wang 1997). Article 364(4) particularly states that anyone who disseminates obscene articles to minors under the age of eighteen shall be severely punished, and a jail sentence up to ten years can be imposed. On the other hand, BL writers are mostly women in their twenties or thirties, while the age of its readers ranges from teenagers to readers in their thirties. Legally speaking, anyone who writes about erotic scenes in their BL works risks being punished for producing, publishing, selling, and disseminating obscene articles, and if their readers are under eighteen, their punishment will be even more severe. BL readers who possess, read, and circulate works containing obscene descriptions are also breaking the law, and if they circulate, sell, and trade such works to minors, they face severe punishment, too. However, Article 367 further states that medical and scientific works are not pornography, and that literature and art works with artistic value (*yishu jiazhi* 艺术

¹ *Yaoi* is an acronym for “yama nashi, ochi nashi, imi nashi,” or roughly “no climax, no resolution, no meaning.” Although it is a global label, it has been used particularly for male-male erotic manga and anime since early 1980s.

价值) can have graphic depictions of sexual conduct. However, the law does not clarify what criteria can be used to decide whether a work has artistic value. In other words, the current laws only provide a vague definition of “obscenity” as graphic depictions/descriptions of sexual conduct or explicit pornography, excluding the highly subjective cases with artistic value (Zhongguo Renda wang 1997; Yan 2014)²

At the same time, there is currently no law in China regarding homosexuality or child pornography. I have argued elsewhere that although BL fiction is not gay fiction, the BL community has shown a strong sentiment towards understanding and supporting sexual minorities, whereas the government in recent years has become more cautious in drawing a delicate line between BL practice and homosexuality, addressing them differently when practising censorship (Tian 2020, 104–126). In other words, the government does not censor BL work *explicitly* for presenting same-sex relationships. It is also crucial to note that although there is no written law on any form of child pornography in China, in recent years BL communities across the country have voluntarily condemned and policed stories involving sex with minors, adopting a zero tolerance policy (Yang 2019, 198). Hence, “pornography” (or “alleged pornography”) is the dominant factor that triggers government censorship of BL practice.

As BL is a subcultural product and phenomenon primarily mediated by the Internet, the practice, fandom, and censorship of it mostly happen and appear in the cyber world. New media in the Internet age have unprecedentedly granted and enlarged individuals’ “speech space” and “public opinion space” (Qin 2018, 81). One’s traditional understanding of “Self” is also challenged and overridden by new technologies (Surratt 2001, 211). Among all the multiple new relationships that one builds up online and offline, fan identity is undoubtedly crucial for anyone (deeply) involved in popular culture (arguably any cultures). Like other fandoms, BL fandom in China, where the government takes pains to control cultural production to various degrees (Zhang and Zhang 2015, 200), first and foremost needs to secure its existence. As Weiyu Zhang (2016, 134) has observed, in China the politics of fandom is “a politics of survival first, then a politics of recognition,” especially under the harsh government censorship. However, many BL fans are not satisfied with merely being recognised by the official

² Meining Yan (2014) discusses the regulations on pornography in mainland China in detail.

and mainstream cultures, even though recognition is not yet fully achieved. They are eager to “poach” and change the dominant culture,³ and to further participate in the production of dominant culture. BL fandom is never monolithic; the differences among fan communities are substantial. As Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu argued, “there is no unified response or resistance to state censorship. Each community has its own stakes, concerns and survival strategies” (Yang and Xu 2016, 165). Indeed, BL practitioners’ responses to the Chinese government’s anti-pornography campaigns are not simply a passive or reluctant “reaction.” There is circumvention, conformity, and collaboration. There is also revulsion, resistance, and resilience. There is fear. There is also hope.

BL writers, readers and publishers are in constant fear of violating the law, and thereby are constantly guessing and testing the bottom line of government censorship, especially by using various tactics and technologies. BL manga was first introduced to mainland China in the early 1990s, both directly from Japan and via Taiwan, which had already been exposed to Japanese BL culture. Entering the 21st century, *slash* fiction in the English-speaking world joined the existing BL culture in China. The term “slash” refers to a fandom convention originating within the *Star Trek* franchise in the early 1970s. *Slash* often depicts an erotic and romantic relationship between two originally straight male characters (such as Kirk/Spock or K/S) from popular media products. Thus, the Chinese BL fandom currently comprises three major circles: the original BL circle (*yuandan quan*, 原耽圈) that creates and consumes original Chinese-language BL, the Japanese circle (*rixian quan*, 日系圈) that focuses on translation of Japanese BL works and their fan works, and the Euro-American circle (*oumei quan*, 欧美圈) that translates and creates *slash* works (Yang and Xu 2016, 165). Among these three prominent circles, as well as in the Chinese ACGN (Animation, Comic, Game, and Novel) world, the online literature, especially works produced by the original BL circle, is undoubtedly the most developed, and most visible to the dominant culture (Wang 2018, 86). The female-oriented online literature website Jinjiang wenxue cheng 晋江文学城, or Jinjiang Literature City (henceforth Jinjiang), is one of the largest and

³ Henry Jenkins (1992) discusses the idea of “poaching” the dominant culture.

the most influential online literature websites in China, therefore the top target of government censorship, and consequently the one most cautiously practising self-censorship. Both Jinjiang and its contracted writers have been more than once severely punished by the government; some of the writers have even ended up in jail (Yang and Xu 2016, 173–174). Therefore, teacher-student love affairs, bestiality, and sex with minors have been avoided in leading original BL websites like Jinjiang as a result of self-censorship since the 2014 anti-porn campaign (Yang and Xu 2016, 173). For years, Jinjiang has strictly applied the “above the neck” rule (*bozi yishang* 脖子以上), which means the most explicit description of intimacy and sexual behavior can only be kisses and caresses above the characters’ necks. However, as the conventional BL stories are made up of male-male romance and homoerotic elements, many readers are accustomed to, and expect to see, more sexually-graphic scenes between the main characters. Under such circumstances, writers resort to other web platforms and/or private file-sharing services, microblogging and social networking websites, such as Sina Weibo (henceforth Weibo), Wechat, and LOFTER (www.lofter.com), and other bulletin boards. Among all the alternative and supplementary platforms, Weibo is most often used by BL writers and fans, due to its large number of users, multiple functions and prominent social influence. However, precisely because of its increasing accessibility and social impact, Weibo has become notorious for over-practising censorship on its users.⁴ Technologically speaking, a pure text consisting of sequences of characters is much easier to censor than an image with text in it. Hence, BL writers first resorted to posting text images of the erotic scenarios of their works on Weibo, as supplements to the censored versions on Jinjiang. But in recent years, as technologies have developed, images with text can no longer easily pass censorship. To circumvent the image censorship, the users creatively come up with new tactics, such as posting upside-down or distorted images, or adding a sufficiently large border to the smallest dimension of the image (Huang 2020).

Current studies on BL and censorship mainly focus on the impact of censorship on BL community and practice (Yi 2013; Jacob 2015, 113–114; Yang and Xu 2016). In

⁴ Weibo’s indiscriminate ban on BL content and gay content caused a serious backlash from both its users and the government, resulting in the reversal of the ban on BL and gay content two days after its release. See Tian 2020.

this article I will examine two cases that have affected a larger realm of Chinese culture and society, other than the fan circles only. I will first scrutinise a renowned BL writer, Priest, and the adaptation of her BL story *Zhenhun* 镇魂 (The Guardian 2018) into a highly successful web drama, demonstrating Priest's as well as her fans' tactful collaboration with consumer culture and willing conformity to official discourse. Forming a sharp contrast with Priest's commercial success, the controversial ten-year jail sentence of another BL writer, Gouwazi Tianyi 狗娃子天一 (henceforth Tianyi), for profiting from producing and selling obscene BL fiction, showcases not only BL fans' but also ordinary yet conscientious netizens' responses on social media to severe censorship online and offline. Both cases under discussion have made themselves known to people who may never have paid any attention to BL or any fandom, known as *chuquan* (出圈). As the following sections will show, these two cases demonstrate the ever complex picture of subversive cultural practice negotiating with censorship as well as with any rigid system behind it. They have impacted and will continue to impact general BL practice and fandom as well as people's expectations for social changes. I will particularly discuss the various, indeed often opposite, strategies and tactics undertaken by BL participants and by some conscientious netizens on Weibo to illustrate how those who are under the threat of censorship grapple with harsh reality.

The Empowered Fans: The Success of Priest and “Zhenhun nühai” 镇魂女孩 (The Guardian Girls)

In discussing the Chinese government's 2014 anti-porn campaign, Ling Yang and Yanrui Xu examine various tactics adopted by three major online BL communities, including “secretly nibbling away at government policy, voluntarily keeping a low profile, behind-the-back complaints and so forth” (Yang and Xu 2016, 178). These strategies are still prevalent among BL fans who have been considered “perverted” since the inception of the genre. Such an observation defines the nature of BL practice as “cautious resistance and calculated conformity” (Yang and Xu 2016, 178) which inevitably emphasises the “reaction” and therefore “passivity” of the BL world when facing the antagonistic official and mainstream cultures. However, recent cases show that fans

can be more active in their dynamic with the official and mainstream cultures. In this section, I will examine the phenomenal success of the BL web drama *Zhenhun*, adapted from the 2012 novel of the same title by Priest, one of the best known BL writers. The web series was released on Youku 优酷, one of the leading video streaming websites in China, on June 13, 2018. The series was so successful that by the time it ended in July 2018, it had garnered over 3 billion views on Youku. Until January 2019, on the most influential Chinese social media site Weibo, the “super topic” hashtag #Wangban Zhenhun 网版镇魂 (webdrama Zhenhun) still remained the top popular topic in the TV series category, having 160.5 billion views and 511,000 posts. Even the party mouthpiece *People’s Daily* website recommended the drama for its “zhengnengliang” 正能量, or positive energy and influence (People.cn 2018). I will further argue that *Zhenhun* fans, self-proclaimed *Zhenhun nühai*, or *Zhenhun* girls, as well as the crucial role they played online in promoting the web drama, the novel, and the main actors, actively and strategically “poach” rather than passively respond to the mainstream and official cultures, in the hope of gaining recognition from the mainstream culture and further participating in its production.

Chinese original BL works have notoriously been the victims of plagiarism committed by writers of heterosexual romance. For years, due to government censorship, legislation, and general cultural discrimination, BL writers whose storylines/plots are “borrowed” by heterosexual writers have not dared to take legal action and seek justice to protect their intellectual property, fearing that they would be prosecuted instead (Yang and Xu 2016, 178). On the other hand, BL writers have to endure the fact that the TV or web adaptations of BL works are often turned into heterosexual romances by the producer in order to pass censorship. To accomplish this, these adapted TV and web series usually add a completely new female main character as a love interest, or change one of the male characters to a supporting character. Dramas that dared to retain the original male-male romance have without exception been censored and banned, such as the total ban on the 2016 web drama *Shangyin* 上瘾 (Heroin, a.k.a. Addiction or Addicted). Under such circumstances, BL stories that do not elaborate on romantic relations and that do not contain graphic sexual depictions are more likely to pass censorship and find a niche in the mainstream market.

Priest's stories naturally possess the advantages that facilitate success in a culture hostile to "abnormal" thoughts and deeds. Either because of her disposition and literary taste or commercial and ideological prudence, highly likely both, Priest has for years been well-known for writing "pure water" (*qingshui* 清水) BL stories. As opposed to "fleshy" (*rou* 肉) works, "pure water" stories do not contain any graphic sexual scenes. Actually, in recent years, rather than writing stories of romance between two men, Priest has been more interested in creating detective or fantasy works that loosely fall into the traditional "bromance" category. Her works do have a male couple but readers who do not favour same-sex romance can easily brush the romantic storyline aside without seriously ruining their reading pleasure. John Fiske points out that both fans and mundane viewers draw and agree on a clear line between the fan community and the mundane world. Knowledge of the target work determines if one is inside the fan circle or outside (Fiske 1992, 34–35 and 42–43). Hence, both Priest's writing strategies and the above-mentioned adaptation practices attempt to transgress the boundaries between the fan community and the mundane world, or *chuquan* (出圈), and ultimately to gain economic and cultural capital from and in the mainstream culture.

Moreover, Priest herself also keeps a low profile on the Internet. Like other online literature writers, she has a Weibo account and official fan clubs on QQ. But unlike most writers who actively interact with readers, show fans part of their daily lives through Weibo updates, or share their comments on hot social issues, Priest uses her Weibo account only as a means to advertise her work to a minimal degree, normally simply posting generic messages to inform readers that a new chapter has just been posted or a new book is about to come out. Such voluntary action to keep "a low profile," as Yang and Xu point out, despite whatever Priest's intentions may be, in reality effectively build up an image of a BL writer who is more interested in intriguing stories than homoerotic stories, and who focuses only on (commercial) writing and nothing else. As famous as she is, Priest voluntarily exerts minimal influence on her readers, and exists more like a popular writer "within the system." Her political prudence and "right" moral preference not only bring her commercial success while garnering her millions of readers who may be sexually "transgressive", but also allow her to walk the fine line between losing the BL essence and being censored. "Impersonal"

usage of public social media and keeping a low profile are effective strategies for self-protection (and hence self-censorship) by the best-known web literature writers such as Priest, which help to avoid public discussion of the author and unnecessary interaction with unknown netizens, and therefore reduce unwanted attention from both the government and other competitive players in the field.

When Priest's fantasy novel *Zhenhun* was adapted into a web series, the setting of the story was changed from China to alien planets, so the main characters are of alien races. More importantly, the main characters are only close friends sharing profound brotherly love. For ordinary audiences who have not read the fiction, the brotherly love between the two men may be slightly excessive but still "normal" in a society with a long history of homosocial practices like China. But for audiences who are book fans and know very well the "true" relationship between the main characters and the reason why a BL story has been changed to a bromance, their knowledge "increases the power of the fan to 'see through' to the production processes normally hidden by the text and thus inaccessible to the non-fan" (Fiske 1992, 43). The book-fans turned web-audiences therefore are empowered and superior, as they possess knowledge that is at once public and obvious (for the fans), and hidden and secret (for the non-fans).

"Knowledge, like money, is always a source of power" (Fiske 1992, 43). The *Zhenhun* fans who not only possess both public and hidden knowledge of the drama but also actively use such knowledge to advertise the book, the drama, and the main actors have created a special name and popular social media hashtag #*Zhenhun* nūhai. The web series of *Zhenhun* was the bombshell of 2018 mainly because people were bewildered by the fact that such a low-quality web drama suddenly went viral. The answer lies in the *Zhenhun* girls. Equipped with the "true" knowledge of the main characters, the *Zhenhun* girls excelled at decoding every single "normal" interaction between the two characters and were able to see the true love between them. Like most fans, they relished the subtle, sweet romantic exchange of the couple, and celebrated the verisimilar performance of the main actors who bring the fictional characters to life. They also created fan videos, *Zhenhun* memes, paintings, and essays to advertise the series and the actors. Among all these typical fan activities, memes of the series and of the two characters invaded and occupied all popular social media platforms soon after the

drama was released. Even the official Weibo accounts of *people.cn* (2018) and the China Meteorological Administration used *Zhenhun* memes (Zhongguo qixiangju 2018); the National Meteorological Center of CMA called the *Zhenhun* characters “*zijiren*” 自己人, or “our own people” (Zhongyang qixiangtai 2018). The wide usage of *Zhenhun* memes by official accounts showcases the successful infiltration of *Zhenhun* into the official and mainstream cultures. For the official culture, incorporating the latest products of popular culture may primarily be a means to popularise itself, adding a more “human face” to its commonly aloof image. However, appreciating, borrowing, recontextualising, and (re)creating (new) images of the *Zhenhun* characters is undoubtedly a form of collusion with the BL and its fan culture, as it illustrates the broad range of transmediating the *Zhenhun* text and its media products into various audiences’ own use.

In order to further increase the publicity for the two actors, the *Zhenhun* girls created another hashtag #*Zhenhun nühai C wei chudao* 镇魂女孩 C 位出道. “*C wei chudao*” is jargon used in the East Asian entertainment industry, imported from Korea. “*C wei*” is the “centre position of a group of actors” while “*chudao*” means one’s professional debut. Hence, only the best actor can occupy the centre spot on the stage. “*Zhenhun nühai C wei chudao*” aims at different goals, the first one of which apparently is the *Zhenhun* fans’ best wishes for the two actors as well as the *Zhenhun* show, hoping that they can be eminent actors in their careers. Moreover, since the subject of “*C wei chudao*” is the *Zhenhun* girls, they are actually the creators of the two rising stars (in reality, they are), and thereby the creators of a commercial commodity, which reverses the dynamics between fan culture and the cultural industries, from making fan culture out of cultural industries (Fiske 1992, 46–47) to producing commercial commodities for the cultural industries. In this sense, the *Zhenhun* girls achieved their goals when both actors were invited to participate in the 2019 Chinese New Year Gala, the most watched official New Year celebration. To everyone’s surprise, “*Zhenhun nühai*” eventually did “*C wei chudao*” and became the “stars” themselves, when they made their debut on the electronic billboards of the Twin Towers at Shanghai Global Bay after collecting 6.66 million “loves” from the VIP users of Youku (Jincudao 2018). Hence, the creation and promotion of *Zhenhun* as well as the *Zhenhun* girls is an achievement in obtaining social and cultural identity and recognition that the BL fans

have never received from the dominant and official cultures. In other words, fans “perform their constructed selves” (De Kosnik 2016, 242 and 248). “Zhenhun nūhai C wei chudao” is also a celebration of a new identity: these Zhenhun girls have transformed themselves from fans who struggle to gain recognition from the mainstream culture to creators of mainstream culture. *Zhenhun* is indeed *their* (the Zhenhun girls’) show, as they rather than the producers of the drama possess the object of their love and enthusiasm (Fiske 1992, 40-41). In the summer of 2018, *Zhenhun* and the Zhenhun girls were indeed successfully lifted out of the fan circle, or *chuquan*, and dominated the cultural scene in China.

Nevertheless, the fear of being censored is a constant concern for BL participants. Just like Priest’s hermetic attitude towards the public, fans also practice an ideal sharply contrasting with *chuquan*, the idea of *quandi zimeng* 圈地自萌, which literally means “claiming your own land, enjoying yourself on your own ‘territory’.” “*Quandi zimeng*” underscores a “closed-door,” self-protective strategy adopted by fans who do not want to be judged and interfered with by people from other fan circles and from the mundane world. The idea also emphasises the basic freedom that everyone should enjoy, even though sometimes it can be used as a safe haven for illegal activities. As mentioned above, “*quandi zimeng*” apparently runs at odds with the Zhenhun girls’ *chuquan* ambitions, but it never recedes from the *Zhenhun* fans’ minds. When *Zhenhun* and its hashtags swept the Internet, many fans as well as the producers started to worry that the drama might have been too successful and drawn unnecessary attention from government censors. The fans therefore voluntarily abandoned one of the most trending hashtags used by the drama, hashtag #Shehuizhuyi xiongdìqing 社会主义兄弟情, socialist brotherly love, to avoid being mixed up with other BL dramas and becoming implicated, and also to try not to make fun of anything “socialist.” Despite the fans’ proactive moves to “cool down the heat”, eight days after the final episode was aired, the *Zhenhun* series was removed from Youku on August 2, 2018, for unknown reasons. If the government does not give clear reasons for its actions, its ban on the *Zhenhun* series is more likely intended to regulate and restrain the fan power than to police the text, because of “the dominant culture’s need to maintain the disciplinary distance between the text and reader” (Fiske 1992, 41). The cultural capital

produced by the fans is dangerous and subversive for a government that strives to instruct its people on living “morally and positively”, and that has been increasingly emphasising the didactic message of literature and art, unwilling to recognise their function as pure entertainment. However, as shown above, in their contest with the government, the *Zhenhun* fans and the cultural commodities they have produced clearly “poach” the official culture and beat the government policy, especially when, after additional edits and revisions, the drama was back on Youku on November 10, immediately receiving over 52 million views for its playback in seven days (Xunye 2018).

Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that no matter how many “romantic moments” the fans decoded from the series, the web drama *Zhenhun* does not violate the tightened regulations on the production of film, TV, press, and radio. At the same time, censoring a drama in which an actor plays does not necessarily lead to the censoring of the actor. For example, although the web drama *Shangyin* was banned in China, the main actor Huang Jingyu’s career took off, and he has been highly recognised by the official culture after playing a series of patriarchal roles in several nationalist films. In this sense, the success of *Zhenhun* actors and the *Zhenhun* girls should be better seen as a “reward” by the official culture for voluntarily and creatively following the official rules and helping the official culture recruit, incorporate, and tame subversive powers.

Restless “Monkeys”: The Tianyi Case Controversy

Like a patriarch, if the official culture rewards its docile children, of course it punishes the naughty ones. As most BL practitioners celebrated the success of *Zhenhun*, in the same year many were chilled by the Tianyi case. In November 2017, BL writer Tianyi was arrested, and on October 31, 2018, sentenced to ten years and six months in jail, for making and selling obscene articles for profit. According to the official report, Tianyi made 150,000 yuan profit selling erotic BL books written by her. Although there are many cases of online literature writers being arrested for writing and selling “pornographic” content, the news usually shakes and affects mainly the online

literature community. Tianyi's case differs from all the previous ones in that it immediately drew public attention and has caused a widespread outcry from both BL fans and ordinary netizens on Chinese social media, for its sentence seems too heavy for such a "minor" crime. In other words, it is a *chuquan* case that has a larger social impact. In this section, I will discuss the responses from Tianyi's sympathisers and the strategies they adopted in an attempt to influence the judge's opinion on Tianyi's appeal, as well as the consequent challenges to China's outdated state apparatus and problematic social institutions. These challenges may not lead to immediate social change, but they have undoubtedly planted seeds of bottom-up democracy in the younger generations.

In Tianyi's case, one of her books, *Gongzhan* 攻占 (Occupy), was the main source of the profit that she made. *Gongzhan* is about a homoerotic relationship between a high school teacher and his seventeen-year-old student. This book is classified "Gao H" 高H among BL stories. "Gao H" is a combination of the Chinese word *gao* (high) and the Japanese word *hentai* 変態 in ACGN culture, meaning highly sexually abnormal. Homoerotic content (sometimes between/with minors) has characterised Japanese *yaoi* and Anglo-American *slash* practices, and has been an essential category in Chinese BL, despite government censorship. Therefore, Tianyi's *Gongzhan* is not a unique case among non-compliant BL participants. Due to the heavy censorship, legally publishing BL works in China is almost impossible. For years, well-received works have been published in either Taiwan or Hong Kong, or made into high quality private publications without obtaining an ISBN from the government in China. Tianyi is not the first or last writer self-publishing her work; nor has she made the most profit among self-published writers.⁵ She took the road that many BL writers have taken, only with less caution and less luck. Under such circumstances, the government adeptly used the old trick of "killing the chicken to teach the monkeys a lesson" (*shaji jinghou* 杀鸡警猴) to make an example of Tianyi.

However, rather than being intimidated, the "monkeys" were immediately enraged. As social media platforms like Weibo have become a tool for people to draw public

⁵ For more information on arrested and/or sentenced BL writers, see Yang 2019, 212-213.

attention and further seek justice, Tianyi's sympathisers also resorted to a public appeal in the hope of influencing the judge's opinion on her case. Nevertheless, the public responses and tactics ranged widely, from conformism to democratic reformism, demonstrating the fundamentally divided views on the state apparatus and social institutions. For the moderates, writing highly homoerotic BL stories is legally and morally wrong, and Tianyi deserves to be punished for making and circulating obscene materials. But they recognise that the pertinent laws were made in 1998 when making a profit of 30,000 to 50,000 yuan was considered a "serious crime", and a profit of 150,000 yuan (Tianyi's case) "extremely serious." However, as the Chinese economy has developed so fast in the past two decades, making a profit of 150,000 yuan can no longer be considered a serious crime in the public eye. Therefore the moderates suggest respecting the law but focus on persuading the judge that such a degree of penalty is too harsh for a young woman who simply wants to make a living. Thinking along this line, many others are afraid that a public appeal may irritate the government and cause a further crackdown; they "kindheartedly" suggest that BL writers should practise tighter self-censorship to avoid inviting unnecessary trouble (Beida wenxue luntan. 2018). Such pragmatic views aim to protect as many as possible within the state apparatus, whereas "truth" and "justice" are not the priority.

In her analyses of the philosophy of the ACGN world and fandom, Yusu Wang suggests that for younger generations the existing orders represent certainty, and a "normal" world that one falsely believes to exist. The young people prefer to accept and respect any existing law and order not because these are more just and/or more reasonable, but simply because following them is easy and simple, and such actions are protected by the state apparatus (Wang 2018, 101). Wang calls this tendency to avoid responsibility and to follow orders a kind of cynicism (Wang 2018, 101). Sue Curry Jansen also tells us that "the Powerful do not just have the first and last say. They do not just control access to podium, presidium, or press room. They also determine the rules of evidence, shape the logic of assertion, define the architecture of arguments" (Jansen 1988, 7). To respect the existing law on pornography is to accept the rationale and procedure of defining and identifying pertinent crime, and to follow the official logic on regulating the press and publishing. It not only illustrates the cynicism of a group/generation of people, but also unfolds in front of us how the official education

system has successfully and systematically affected and trained its receivers' way of perceiving the world, analysing the sources of information, and processing evidence. After all, the law is rather a human institution that changes from time to time than an immutable guardian and representation of justice and truth.

Veteran writers like Priest unfortunately showcase the social reality analysed above. Unlike what the *People's Daily* web account suggested in its complimentary comments, Priest does not demonstrate "positive power and influence." At best, she provides the masses and fans with an example of how to be commercially successful in a censored world. At worst, she helps to create an illusion and blind confidence that the existing censorship does not punish people for no good reason. At the same time, following the official regulations points to the fans' desire to enter or self-identify with the "normal" mainstream culture and the mundane world. It also shows the dilemma of resorting to public opinion and democratic force in a country with a long history and experience of censorship. Massive and strong public opinion on certain issues in China is always at the risk of becoming "sensitive" and being treated as "democratic protest", and therefore suffering a severe backlash from the authorities.

On the other hand, many BL practitioners, especially less commercialised writers and readers, regard Tianyi's penalty as deliberately targeting marginalised cultures—online literature and BL culture—for the following reasons: 1) Under the current judicial system, in practice, laws are not effectively applied to the ubiquitous adult ads on social media. 2) The current laws on the definition of pornography and obscenity are too vague. Whether a depiction of graphic sex is obscene is determined by its aesthetic value, while aesthetic value belongs to a highly subjective realm. In fact, many readers give personal experiences of reading classic literature as pornography. 3) It is the government's duty to establish and develop rating systems for film, TV shows, books, and other online content, but lacking such systems, the government punishes victims for its own wrong-doings (Shijiu yaoyiyao 2018a). A total ban on obscene content inevitably reduces adults to reading or communicating only what is fit for children (Heins 2007, 166). 4) Pornography is not harmful, and there is no scientific or psychological evidence proving it has a negative impact on adolescent development. 5) The government has amended or revised many laws in recent years, such as by

reducing the penalty on tax evasion and bribery, but never revisits laws on producing, publishing, selling, and circulating obscene articles, for which the penalty remains sentences from ten years to life (Wang Zhenyu lüshi 2018). 6) There is still no law against any form of child pornography. Real life child pornography and sexual harassment have been largely ignored and denied in the conservative culture. The public is particularly incensed by the sharp contrast between the Tianyi case and the well-known actress Fan Bingbing's tax evasion case of the same year: Tianyi was sentenced to more than ten years in jail for making a profit of 150,000 yuan, while Fan Bingbing was fined totally 890 million yuan for unpaid taxes and penalties without serving a single day in jail (Xinhuanet 2018). Tianyi's case not only touches a nerve with the public on legislation, demonstrating the increasing social injustice, inequality, and corruption that many Chinese experience daily, but also reveals that patriarchy is deeply rooted in the society and its institutions. Tianyi's sympathisers compare this case with how real child pornography, real paedophilia, domestic violence, child abuse, and rape are ignored and/or receive little penalty in life (Sohu 2018), pointing to the fundamental paradox between the deep fear of sexual freedom as well as lack of sex education in the society and the fierce encouragement of marriage and reproduction by the government as well as by the conservative, patriarchal culture. When the discussion goes beyond the ACGN world, it transgresses the boundary between fandom and the mundane world, creating a temporary common ground and solidarity among marginalised groups, victims of the patriarchal institutions, and the down-trodden in general. Through Tianyi's case, social media connect individuals of various identities, and offer them a platform to vent their dissatisfaction with the increasingly sensed social injustice and institutional corruption.

Had such public discussions successfully "evolved into formally organized collectivities, in which roles, norms, and tradition become fixed", they would lead to social changes (Zhang 2016, 5). But if the means of communication were not available, they would never form any new social entities. Not long after Tianyi's case appeared on the public's radar and evoked heated discussions, the government took a series of actions to crack down further on the BL community, such as deleting Weibo accounts and posts, banning BL websites, and policing publishers. More importantly, on many social media platforms, such as Weibo, Douban, and Jinjiang, more users have started

to report pornographic or inappropriate content to the authorities through the easy-to-use report mechanism.⁶ The last action is detrimental in every respect. In the past, there was an unwritten agreement and mutual trust between writers and readers. The writers took risks and employed various means to provide the readers with “sensitive” content, and believed that the readers would secretly enjoy the difficult-to-produce fruits and together protect the authors. BL fans also believed that trading and circulating “sensitive” materials were merely personal deeds, as they did not cause any harm to the public. But after the government reinforced the laws and regulations on pornography and obscene articles and applied more easy-to-use report mechanisms, anyone—a homophobic netizen, a concerned parent, a grudging reader, a jealous competitor, a moralist, an ordinary person who wants to make a little money—can secretly report anyone who produces, circulates, possesses, or trades BL works *with or without* pornographic content. Tipping off the authorities about someone on the Internet has never been so easy, whereas clearing one’s name has never been so hard. One may eventually prove to be not guilty, but the time and money invested are priceless, while the “whistle blower” does not suffer any penalty for providing false information. Fearful of being reported and wrongly punished, writers quickly deleted their old posts on document-sharing websites, publishers halted ongoing projects, and readers did not dare circulate previously-saved works to other unknown fans, all resulting in a new round of self-censorship. Although Jinjiang is notorious for its self-censorship and complete conformity with the government regulations, at the time of writing, in May 2019, it was once again reported by an unknown person to the authorities for having published works containing pornographic content. On May 23, 2019, Jinjiang announced via its Weibo account that two of the sections (those where the alleged pornographic works were published) under pre-modern BL stories would be closed immediately for fifteen days, so that the whole website could further scrutinise its works (Jinjiang wenxuecheng 2019). On May 24, Bingxin 冰心, the top administrator of Jinjiang, informed the public on Weibo that she was safely back home

⁶ Rumours indicated that the authorities increased the reward money given to citizens who report pornographic content to police. But one can never verify such “behind the scenes” information from the government.

(from arrest and/or police interrogation). More importantly, she warned the writers and readers that:

As long as you write about sexual conduct, sexual thoughts or any description related to sexual organs, be it long or short, concrete or stream of consciousness, using substitute adjectives or metaphors, about one person or the intercourse between two, as long as others can tell that it is about sex, it is of high risk. The book that has been reported and banned contains a paragraph of fewer than four hundred characters; there is no specific sexual organ mentioned, no intercourse, but it has been considered as the highest level of pornography.

只要你写了性行为性心理或其它涉及性器官的任何描写，无论是字数多少，无论是不是意识流，无论是不是用了各种形容词代称粉饰，是不是用了各种比喻，是一个人的行为还是两个人的交互，只要让人看出你这是写了性相关，就属于高风险。被封文章中有一段不足四百字描写，没有具体器官名称，没有交互动作，已经被鉴定中心鉴定为色情等级最高的淫秽描写。(Bingxin 2019)

She therefore pleaded with the writers and readers to apply higher regulation and self-censorship, not to attempt to write anything involving sex to the slightest degree, and to report to the website authority if they see anyone writing about sex. She emphasised that reporting pornography is not personal revenge or fierce competition among writers; it is being responsible for oneself and for all the writers at Jinjiang (Bingxin 2019). In other words, if one does not practise full-scale (self) censorship, it is likely that others who write at Jinjiang as well as the website itself eventually will be (has already been as reality shows) implicated and heavily punished. Bingxin was right in her pessimistic prediction: two months later Jinjiang was completely shut down for fifteen days, for full-fledged self-censorship and pertinent technical upgrades (Guanliyuan 2019).

Encouraging tip-offs not only “purifies” (*jìnghuà* 净化) the Internet as the government aims to do, and destroys the mutual trust shared by the fan communities, but also challenges one’s belief in humanity and one’s hope for a good future. Reader 冷死辣

崽(Lengsi lazai) commented on the Tianyi case and the government censorship under BL writer 十九瑶一瑶's (Shijiu yaoyiyao) Weibo post:

Sadly many people think this has nothing to do with them. Allow me to be blunt: when every historical incident happened, the masses thought it was an ordinary day. They did not even know why such things would happen, let alone anticipate anything.

悲哀的是还有很多人以为与自己无关。恕我直言，每一个历史事件发生的时候民众都认为这只是普通的一天，别说苗头了，甚至有人连为什么会发生都不知道。

The writer replied:

Everyday (he/she) watched someone being decapitated, and then went back home, saying how this person deserved death. Fewer and fewer people were left, until one day (himself/herself) was beheaded... That's how things go.

每天围观一次菜市口砍头，然后回家嗑瓜子，说这人死的怎么怎么活该，直到人越来越少，某天自己也被拎去砍头.....大致如此。(Shijiu yaoyiyao 2018b)

The masses' numbness, stupidity, and enthusiasm for spectacle-watching unsurprisingly reminded people of Lu Xun's well-known works on the Chinese national character a hundred years ago. Such a dismaying analogy is echoed in a post by another writer 十九岁子弹 (Shijiusui zidan), who wrote, "What makes me heartbroken is that I am only in my twenties but have already found out the world is rotten to the core, but I have to continue to live."⁷ Renowned BL writers are more cautious (interestingly, everything remained normal and peaceful in Priest's Weibo posts). For example author 徐徐图之 (Xuxu tuzhi) thanked her readers for their inquiries and comfort, and very obscurely yet humorously suggested that:

⁷The original text was post on November 17, 2018, but it was deleted later.

This harsh winter is cold, stay warm. Go to bed early and get up early...drink more hot water, and spend less money. I hope tomorrow is a good day. Thank you.

寒冬天冷，大家多穿衣，早睡早起...多喝热水，省着点花。希望明天是个好天气，谢谢你们。(Xuxu tuzhi 2018)

Her followers immediately decoded the message, knowing that she suggested that they keep safe and not buy BL books, at least for a while. This sense of disillusionment first and foremost enhances the opposition between BL fans and the official and dominant cultures. It also further complicates BL fandom and practice, and creates a sentiment of dystopian carnival. Some BL practitioners may hope to achieve more successes like *Zhenhun* by severe self-censorship, some may shed tears with Tianyi, and others may enjoy whatever they can get and lament the “good old days” (in fact BL days have never been good) before the apocalypse. Tianyi’s case and people’s various responses to the government’s actions once again demonstrate that the BL world is full of different and sometimes opposite views and practices, and its complicated dynamic with the government censorship illustrates the younger generations’ understandings and expectations of their country’s future.

Conclusion

Because of their political naiveté, their cynicism, and their idealism, but also because of their successes and failures, participants in different BL communities have formed a paradoxical relationship with government censorship and the state apparatus. On the one hand, they look for public recognition and acceptance. On the other hand, they strive to keep their unique and subversive features, resisting assimilation by the dominant culture. They are eager to be the owners and producers of their own culture, but they voluntarily offer free cultural labour to and are used by the dominant culture. They are the victims of censorship. They can also be the collaborators with and contributors to censorship. They witness, experience, survive, or perish. But ultimately, many of them are enlightened (and perhaps disillusioned at the same time), which has

planted seeds of courage for some to question and challenge what the government has told them, and to fight for a better future. Practice always appears to precede censorship. History and reality have shown us that although the government may take all kinds of actions to reinforce its censorship, it is always one step behind people's practice, and always one step behind their circumvention. I believe that as both BL practice and government censorship evolve, the dynamics between the two will only become more complicated and intriguing, inviting more scholarly study on the topic and in the field.

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SPOTLIGHT

Working Around the CCP's Insecurities

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Language is a sensitive matter for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a fact made clear by the well-documented mechanisms of party-state censorship and propaganda, which aim to repel criticism and set the agenda in the CCP's favor. Less widely acknowledged, however, is the extent to which even terms of praise and devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China. Two recent catchphrases in particular that speak anew to deeper anxieties about the image of the CCP and its top leader, Xi Jinping. These are "low-level red" and "high-level black," odd phrases in English that invite some elucidation. The terms, which first emerged on the internet, refer in both cases to covert or unintentional acts of criticism. "Low-level red," or *dijihong* (低級紅), refers in official parlance to language or conduct that is intended to praise the Party or government, but which ultimately has the opposite effect because it is patently false, cheap, or ill-considered. "High-level black," or *gaojilei* (高級黑), refers on the other hand to more deliberate and skilful acts of disguised sabotage, in which language is deployed in obscurely humorous ways, or cloaked in academic respectability, in order to criticise or ridicule.

對中國共產黨來說，語言是一個敏感的問題，這在中國的審查和宣傳機制中得到了充分的證實。審查的目的是為了排斥批評，營造有利於中國共產黨的輿情。然而，鮮為人知的是，在中國，即使是讚美和奉承的詞彙也會受到審查。尤其是最近的兩個流行語——"低級紅"和"高級黑"，再次體現了人們對中共及其最高領導人習近平形象的深層憂慮。這兩個詞最早出現在互聯網，均為隱蔽或無意的批評。"低級紅"指的是那些旨在讚美黨或政府的語言或行為，但最終卻因明顯的虛假、低級或考慮不周而產生相反的效果。而"高級黑"則指更有心機、更有技巧的變相貶低。它以隱晦幽默的方式運用語言，或披上學術的外衣，以達到批評或嘲笑的目的。

Keywords: Censorship, CCP, Xi Jinping, Low-level red, High-level black, language, discourse, public opinion guidance, Xi Jinping Thought

關鍵詞: 審查, 中共, 習近平, 低級紅, 高級黑, 語言, 話語, 輿論導向, 習近平思想

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Language is a delicate matter for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). And nowhere is the leadership's hypersensitivity to language more obvious than through the well-documented mechanisms of party-state censorship and propaganda (Brady 2009, 9-30) which, building on a much older tradition of CCP media control under Mao Zedong (2003), have since 1989 sought to maintain regime stability under the rubric of "public opinion guidance." This is itself a raw-nerved reference, deeply tinged with insecurities about the Soviet collapse (Zhao 2010), to the press policies deemed by senior officials to have been fatally misguided in the run-up to the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement on June 4, 1989 (Qian 2009). Today, the same work of directing public views and restraining dissent is achieved through an elaborate and multi-layered system of technological and human controls, from daily and even hourly calls from propaganda officials to media outlets, to chat messages disappearing from social media in real time and the blocking of sensitive keywords (O'Neill 2009).

Less widely acknowledged, however, is the extent to which even terms of praise and devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China, lest they throw unwanted shade on the leadership. Insights into the CCP's insecurities about praise and much else are possible thanks to another permutation of the Party's hypersensitivity to language – the production, on a constant basis, of an evolving canon of political discourse that for the careful observer can make its inner doubts more salient. Reading through official discourse, following László Ladányi's counsel to "[look] at China through Chinese spectacles," and, above all, "read the small print," (Ladányi w.y.) what glimpse do we have of the CCP's state of mind?

The "Core" is Sensitive

There are two recent catchphrases in particular that speak anew to deeper anxieties about the image of the CCP and its top leader, Xi Jinping. These are "low-level red" and "high-level black," odd phrases in English that invite some elucidation. The terms, which first emerged on the internet, refer in both cases to covert or unintentional acts of criticism. "Low-level red," or *dijihong* (低级红), refers in official parlance to language or conduct that is intended to praise the Party or government, but which

ultimately has the opposite effect because it is patently false, cheap, or ill-considered. Perhaps the most classic case of *dijihong* occurred in November 2018 as He Yinli, a Chinese runner competing in the Suzhou Marathon, was interrupted by a race volunteer who handed her a Chinese flag during her final sprint to the finish line (Zuo 2018). As a result of this interruption, she narrowly lost the race, and the incident became closely associated with “low-level red” – in this case, a cheap display of nationalism or pro-Party feeling that backfired in its absurdity. “High-level black,” or *gaojihei* (高级黑), refers on the other hand to more deliberate and skilful acts of disguised sabotage, in which language is deployed in obscurely humorous ways, or cloaked in academic respectability, in order to criticise or ridicule. In other cases, “high-level black” may involve interpreting CCP ideals, principles, policies, and discourse in such a way as to achieve a critical, or “black,” result.

Such acts of indirect or even unintended criticism may seem beneath the notice of high-level CCP leaders, who are presumably concerned with loftier and more pressing matters of national governance. But they are in fact regarded as a serious matter, meriting clear and decisive action – but even more, clear and decisive language. This is why, when the CCP (2019) released in February 2019 its *Opinion on the Strengthening of Party Construction* (中共中央关于加强党的政治建设的意见), meant to promote stricter governance within the Party, the document included mention of both “low-level red” and “high-level black” (CCP 2019). Referring explicitly to the “two safeguards,” CCP jargon for the need to safeguard Xi Jinping as the “core” leader and to ensure the authority of the CCP’s Central Committee, the document read: “[We] must with correct recognition and correct action firmly exercise the ‘two safeguards,’ resolutely preventing and correcting all erroneous words and deeds that deviate from the ‘two safeguards.’ [We] must not engage in any form of ‘low-level red’ or ‘high-level black,’ and resolutely must not permit outer devotion and inner opposition toward the CCP Central Committee, allowing double-dealing or ‘pseudo-loyalty.’”

Several months later, the official journal *Seeking Truth* (求是) commented that some officials tended to “over-simplify, vulgarise, go to extremes, or employ low-brow tactics to deceptively express ‘pseudo-loyalty,’” in this way “drawing ridicule” (Wu 2019). What could account for such extreme insecurity over questions of sincerity?

One possible explanation is that this sensitivity results from Xi Jinping's own position of waxing grandeur within the Party leadership, unprecedented in the reform era (Johnson 2010). Xi's elevation, evidenced early in his first term, began in earnest in October 2016 with his designation as the "core" leader (以习近平同志为核心的党中央) in the communiqué emerging from the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee (Buckley 2016). He was the first leader since Jiang Zemin to have been designated as the "core," but the language, "powerful political currency," signalled that Xi had in fact attained a level of personal power not seen since Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. There were signs in early 2017, months in advance of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, that Xi Jinping's still unannounced "banner term," the political catchphrase used to encompass his policies and legacy, might be the first since "Deng Xiaoping Theory" (邓小平理论), to include his personal name, something neither Jiang Zemin nor Hu Jintao had managed with the "Three Represents" (三个代表) and "Scientific View of Development" (科学发展观), respectively (Qian 2012). By the time the Congress commenced in October 2017, Xi's moves to assert and secure his personal dominance were clear. His new banner term, "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era" (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), indeed bore his name (what Chinese political scholars referred to as an act of "crowning"), and would need only slight abbreviation to become "Xi Jinping Thought" (习近平思想), putting China's latest "core" leader on the same level as Mao Zedong. The banner term, and therefore Xi's name, was formally added to the CCP's constitution. "China tilts back towards a cult of personality," reported the *Financial Times* (2017b). Term limits on the state presidency – the only limits to which Xi was subject – were removed from the state constitution months later at the National People's Congress.

Since Xi has consolidated power, stacking the CCP leadership with acolytes and associates (Financial Times 2017a), dispensing with the façade of collective leadership, and effectively taking China back to the era of "personalistic rule" (Shirk 2018) few have dared to criticise him. To the extent that China has returned under Xi to "an orthodox form of personalist authoritarianism," (Düben 2018) turning away from consensus-driven collective leadership, the substance of power relies increasingly on its

manufacture through rituals of loyalty-signaling more reminiscent of the pre-reform era (Qian 2020). Sincerity is crucial in this context because the genuine participation of CCP officials in rituals of leader worship is a way of achieving the key function of coordination with the “core” leader’s agenda. In a 2018 case study on the leadership cult of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, scholar Xavier Márquez (2018, 265) might have been talking about Xi Jinping’s China as he addressed the “persuasive aspects of cult messages,” the “construction of charismatic authority,” and the need for credible participation (my emphasis):

From this point of view, what is most striking about leader cults is not the production or over-production of particular positive representations of the leader, the exclusion of alternative images, or even the excessive praise addressed to the leader in official media, but the degree to which many people participate in rituals of leader worship, where they are expected not merely to consume leader propaganda passively but to act in ways that credibly indicate high levels of respect, or even adoration, for the leader. Here, as we shall see, the key function of a leader cult as a political strategy is coordination, and the main question of interest concerns the way in which participation in such rituals signals support or enhances commitments to the leader or some larger group, including the state.

As Márquez (2018, 266) suggests, the act of signalling, a form of participation, is absolutely critical in the “construction of charismatic authority.” This, I suspect, is also where the CCP’s redoubled sensitivity about sincerity enters the picture. It is important, when the manufacture of charismatic power displaces the need for consensus, to ensure that participation is heartfelt, and that it is not undermined through covert criticism. The bricks of devotion must be built of stern stuff.

The danger in the “new era” of charismatic power is that Party or government officials might simply parrot the “core” leader, or that they might resort to satire, twisting official discourse so as to achieve a critical effect. Or, alternatively, they might damage the Party’s credibility through excessive zeal. These fears of disproportionate praise were in fact sufficiently serious that in November 2017, right on the heels of the 19th National Congress, the Party released a “Decision” on the implementation of the “spirit” of the

Congress(中共中央关于认真学习宣传贯彻党的十九大精神的决定) that included three phrases that could acceptably be used to describe the status of Xi Jinping (CCP 2017). The phrases were: “Endorsed by the entire Party” (全党拥护); “loved and respected by the people” (人民爱戴); and “fully worthy and deserving [of core leadership status]” (当之无愧).

Pause for a moment to consider the absurdity of the situation facing the CCP leadership: the construction of legitimacy around charismatic leadership requires positive representations of the leader, and ever-mounting acts of adulation and loyalty-signaling; this language of praise must be sincere, lest disingenuousness (“high-level black”) become an undermining force, or the power of the leader seem to be imposed; and finally, and here is where the dog seems to bite its tail, the language of praise must be carefully scripted so as to avoid the appearance of insincerity. Let that logic sink in for a moment. Scripted sincerity, mandated from on high.

The Highs and Lows of Adulation

Despite Xi Jinping’s apparent near-cult status, the evidence suggests the Chinese Communist Party does not feel sufficiently secure to allow sincerity to speak for itself. One important case in point came shortly after the release of the list of acceptable phrases. On November 9, 2017, not long after the 19th National Congress, Guizhou’s *Qianxinnan Daily* (黔西南日报), a local CCP paper, published a front page that included an airbrushed image of Xi Jinping with the caption, “Great Leader General Secretary Xi Jinping.” The term “great leader,” or *weida lingxiu* (伟大领袖), has been used in the past only to refer to Mao Zedong, and this extreme expression of loyalty to Xi was a step too far – particularly as overweening propaganda (and plans already announced to scrap presidential term limits) put the Party on the defensive over the apparent re-emergence of a cult of personality (Reuters 2017).



Page One of the May 1, 1974, edition of the People's Liberation Army Daily

Though the “great leader” reference appeared in a small regional paper, it was shared with undertones of scorn on Chinese social media, and it did not escape notice by Hong Kong media and overseas Chinese websites (Yang 2017). This was a point of embarrassment for senior leaders, and *Qianxinan Daily* was forced to quietly remove the front page from its online archive, replacing it with a fake version. So much for sincerity. Was the *Qianxinan Daily* use of “great leader” a case of “high-level black,” intended to damn Xi Jinping through insincere enthusiasm? Or was it a case of true sincerity, so intensely felt that a local leader lost all sense of proportion? To recap, there is a word for such an embarrassment of praise: “low-level red.”

As new formulations in the official discourse, “low-level red” and “high-level black” might be seen as symptoms of this renewed sensitivity over the terms of power-signaling as charismatic authority comes to dominate the political field in China. At first glance, their presence might seem oddly out of place. After all, why should such insecurities come to the fore at the very moment when Xi Jinping’s position seems assured? But these dynamics of power and insecurity will not seem strange to anyone with a grasp of CCP history. The drive for overarching control can lead to an almost compulsive fear of criticism hiding between the lines, and of peril lurking in the smile. There are many such cases in the history of media in the People’s Republic of China, most taking us back to the pre-reform era. And one of the most illustrative for Xi’s

“new era” might be the so-called “Black Box Scandal” (黑框事件) that unfolded in 1974 at the *Liberation Army Daily* (解放军报), the official mouthpiece of China’s military and one of three publications dominating the press during the Cultural Revolution.

Reading Peril Between the Lines

The scandal at the *Liberation Army Daily*, which ultimately would result in the disgrace of two editors, was unknown to staff at the paper until a meeting was urgently called in the newspaper’s conference room on the evening of July 8, 1974 (Zhang 2015). When the paper’s senior editors had finally gathered, a deputy editor from the Criticise Lin Biao, Criticise Confucius Office (批林批孔办公室) sternly presented them with a copy of the May 19 edition. He spoke of an unacceptable “overlap” between page one and page two. Page one of the edition included two photographs of Mao Zedong meeting with Makarios III, the first President of the Republic of Cyprus. In one of these images, the leaders were shaking hands. In the second image, Mao was seated in a semi-circle with Makarios III and several others, including his translator.



Page One of the November 9, 1974, edition of the *Qianxinan Daily*.

Both photographs were acceptable. What could possibly be the problem? Page two of the edition included several reports, including one about an earthquake in Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. But the issue was with an obituary printed at the bottom right-hand side of the page. This was for Lu Han, a respected former Kuomintang general who had defected to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, an obvious point of pride for the PLA. The photo of Lu was surrounded by a thick black box, typical in China for photos of the deceased.



The inside page of the May 1, 1974, edition of the *People's Liberation Army Daily*, with an image of deceased general Lu Han.

The problem had nothing to do with language. Each page was fine on its own. But the trouble became clear when the paper was held up, as many readers might do, and the black box around the image of General Lu Han on the inside page could be seen hemming in the image of Mao Zedong on the front page.



Composite image of the first and second pages of the May 1, 1974, edition of the *People's Liberation Army Daily*.

Suddenly, the implications were catastrophic – an intimation of the death of Chairman Mao, an act of unspeakable carelessness. But it was not regarded as mere carelessness by the leadership. “The appearance of this problem is surely not an accident,” the paper’s editors were told. “This is a serious political error.” In fact, Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s wife, had demanded a full investigation of the scandal. An investigation was carried out, and two of the paper’s editors, Wu Yongchuan and Xue Zhen, were forced to make public admissions of guilt.

The scandal resulted in another change at the newspaper. From that day forward, all page proofs had to be inspected carefully using a specially created desk with a bulb under a glass pane, allowing editors to spot any overlaps or juxtapositions that might suggest dissent or criticism. In an article in 2015, one of Wu Yongchuan’s former colleagues, Zhang Xinyang (2015), said this process, which involved what they called the “searchlight table” (探照桌), was even used to inspect the Chinese characters

appearing on the back sides of photos, ensuring words like “criticise” (批判) or “overthrow” (打倒) were not printed atop images of Party leaders.

“I think readers today would find it difficult to imagine such trials in getting a paper to press, or such a way of reading a newspaper,” Wu Yongchuan concluded in his own December 2000 account of the “Black Box Scandal.” At the turn of the century, however, China was in a period of evolving collective leadership, which also corresponded to a period of rapid commercialisation during which Chinese media were exploring their professional roles in a changing society. Openness was the name of the day, and journalists were ready to reimagine themselves. Censorship was ever-present, but the space for criticism – even for hard-nosed investigative reporting – could also be found. Fast forward to March 2016 and we have a case in Xi Jinping’s “new era” with astonishing similarities to the “Black Box Scandal” and belying Wu Yongchuan’s sense of progress – around the question, no less, of press controls.

The Soul of the Media

On February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping paid a high-profile visit to three central-level “news units,” the *People’s Daily*, Xinhua News Agency, and China Central Television. By this point, just 15 months after he assumed leadership, Xi was already surrounded with an unmistakable halo of devotion, referred to fondly (even in song) as “Uncle Xi,” with a carefully crafted myth emerging around his past, including his youth in the countryside, and his image becoming nearly ubiquitous (Ramzy 2014). During Xi’s visit to Xinhua that day, one deputy editor, Pu Liye, found it impossible to restrain his adulation. In a poem positively quivering with excitement, making reference to the “camel bells of the Belt and Road” (它伴随一带一路的驼铃), and to the “mighty wind of the high-speed rail” (以及巨轮高铁暖风浩荡), Pu wrote:

General Secretary, my eyes follow in your wake, 总书记，您的背影我的目光

And in these eyes, my verse takes shape. 我的目光催生这首诗

My mobile grows hot as my fingers move. 我的手指正让手机滚烫

How long this verse of mine has brewed. 这首诗我酝酿了很久 (Bandurski 2016)

Devotion was also the chief message of Xi Jinping's speech later that afternoon at a conference on "news and public opinion work" attended by propaganda officials and representatives from party-state media. Xi demanded the unquestioning obedience of the media, which he said must be "surnamed Party" - meaning that they must remain faithful to the CCP's Central Committee and recognise that their role is to "love the Party, protect the Party, and serve the Party" (爱党、护党、为党).

As love and devotion crested, inundating media and politics, it was difficult to escape the appearance of tawdriness. Pu Liye's verses were the object of ridicule on the Chinese internet, and in the Hong Kong media he was compared to the twentieth century poet-politician Guo Moruo, who "never forgot to eulogise [Mao Zedong for] his unprecedented achievements and his unchallengeable leadership of the Chinese Revolution" (Yang 2016, 147). As for the scandal that unfolded the next day at *Southern Metropolis Daily*, one of the country's leading commercial newspapers, the jury is still out today on whether what happened was an intentional act of criticism by stealth, or merely a colossal error.

For papers like the *Southern Metropolis Daily* (南方都市报), which for more than a decade had managed to find some limited space for professional news coverage, sometimes running afoul of the leadership, Xi Jinping's renewed claim to lordship over the media was a tragedy unfolding over many months, beginning in January 2013 with the *Southern Weekly* incident, in which authorities ultimately tamed what had long been regarded as China's "greatest newspaper" (Repnikova/Fang 2015). But few dared to speak openly about the worsening of the CCP's censorship regime.

On the morning of February 20, the front page of the Shenzhen edition of *Southern Metropolis Daily* reported news of Xi Jinping's media speech the previous day with a bold headline across the top of the page: "Party and Government Media are Propaganda Positions and Must Be Surnamed Party" (党和政府主办的媒体是党和政府的宣传阵地，必须姓党). This would have been mandated as the top news of the

day, to be given exactly this sort of prominent treatment. Directly underneath this headline was a photograph taking up most of the page that showed a funeral at sea held near Shenzhen for Yuan Geng, one of the chief founders of the Shekou Industrial Zone. Yuan had died two weeks earlier, and now his ashes were being scattered. The headline superimposed on the photograph read: “A Soul Returns to the Sea” (魂归大海).



Front page of the February 20, 2016, edition of the Shenzhen edition of *Southern Metropolis Daily*.

As in the 1974 scandal at the *PLA Daily*, the problem was juxtaposition. Newspaper readers and Chinese internet users soon realised that the two headlines, if read vertically, became what is referred to in Chinese as a “hidden-head” message:

媒体
姓党
魂归
大海

*Media Are
Surnamed Party
Their Souls Return
To The Sea*

Read in combination, the headlines seemed a desperate cry from journalists facing a level of Party control that fundamentally threatened their hopes of even marginal independence. Was this an intentional act of protest against the worsening information landscape under China's new strongman? Or was this a garden-variety error, as in the case of the "Black Box Scandal"?

Whatever the case, Liu Cuixia, the *Southern Metropolis Daily* news editor immediately responsible, was fired from her job, and the Nanfang Daily Group, the paper's Party-run publisher, sent out a release internally to staff that called the incident "a serious matter of guidance" (BBC 2018). Interviewed anonymously by the *New York Times*, however, one of Liu's colleagues suggested such an act of intentional sabotage would be unthinkable given the new level of controls facing media: "It can't have been deliberate. It's just very, very serious. And these days no one would dare to do something like that." (Tatlow 2016)

Circum-invention

The problem with seriousness is that it begets ridicule in its most subtle forms. The CCP has grappled with this dilemma through much of its history. Consider the "veiled attacks" on Mao Zedong conceived in the early 1960s by the so-called "Three Family Village" (三家村), a trio of writers and senior propagandists consisting of Deng Tuo, Wu Han, and Liao Mosha (MacFarquhar 1997). It alleged that Deng, a poet who had served as editor-in-chief of the *People's Daily* until 1958, had even "feigned a correct posture" while seemingly criticising a "reactionary" drama by Wu Han (Cheek 1981). Deng's lampooning of Mao Zedong was "high-level black" of the highest order.

Humor and subterfuge have also long been important characteristics of "online contention," which has supported a vibrant "meme culture," employing "creative practices

that sidestep the mechanics of internet censorship in China.” (Yang 2009) One prominent example in the 2000s was the emergence of the term “river crab,” or *hexie* (河蟹), a homophone of the word “harmony” (和谐), to subtly critique Hu Jintao’s notion of the “harmonious society,” which had been used to justify internet censorship (An 2014). Siu-yau Lee (2016, 1061) has referred to these as “satirical tactics,” noting that “satirical campaigns are most likely to survive when activists adopt the tactic of ‘parodic satire,’ whereby activists mimic a specific practice of the state and skilfully transplant it to other contexts.”

Cases of direct and outspoken criticism have become exceptionally rare in the Xi Jinping era. Back in April, Ren Zhiqiang, a prominent former real estate developer and CCP member, penned an article that circulated online criticising the substance of a February 23 teleconference on China’s response to the Covid-19 epidemic. Though not mentioning Xi Jinping by name, Ren implied both incompetence and a grasping desire for power. “I saw not an emperor standing there exhibiting his ‘new clothes,’” he wrote, “but a clown who stripped naked and insisted on continuing being emperor. Despite holding a series of loincloths up in an attempt to cover the reality of your nakedness, you don’t in the slightest hide your resolute ambition to be an emperor, or the determination to let anyone who won’t let you be destroyed.” (Rudolph 2020) Ren noted that attention in the February 23 meeting had focused on “great accomplishments,” and that there had been an utter lack of critical opinions. Soon after the post circulated, Ren was incommunicado, apparently under detention. Finally, in April, the CCP announced that he was under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.”

But when criticism must hide, it becomes an invisible force – feared all the more for its ability to strike unanticipated, rising suddenly from the depths of public anger. This is the dilemma of charismatic power: that even as devotion surges, the beloved leader cannot feel entirely secure in the authenticity of the love to which he feels entitled. Sometimes, the emperor realises his own nakedness. He dreads the moment when the thin veil of deception falls in the midst of his grand procession – all because a child notices the obvious.

Hans Christian Andersen's folktale of the vain emperor, the substance of Ren Zhiqiang's critique, was replayed in March this year in the city of Wuhan, ravaged by the coronavirus epidemic and the lockdown that followed. On March 5, Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan visited Wuhan ahead of a planned tour by Xi Jinping that was supposed to mark a key turning point in the "war" against the virus. At one point, as Sun and her entourage processed through a gated community of residential high-rises, residents shouted from their windows: "Fake! Fake! Everything is fake!" (假的! 假的! 都是假的!) This was captured in a video that briefly spread like wildfire across Chinese social media, before being expunged from the internet inside China. The next day, the new top leader in Wuhan, Wang Zhonglin, surely embarrassed by the incident, was quoted in the local CCP newspaper as suggesting during an internal leadership meeting that there was a need to "carry out gratitude education among the citizens of the whole city," giving them a greater appreciation of the efforts of Xi Jinping and the Party (Bandurski 2020). Wang's remarks became a full-blown crisis on the internet, necessitating an emergency video conference in which propaganda officials across the country assessed what had gone wrong in what was called "a classic case of public opinion created by our own work."

As outrageous as Wang's remarks were, they perfectly illustrated the problem inherent in devotion politics. As an official deeply invested in the system, Wang understood implicitly that devotion was now the most valued currency. Understandably, he was eager not just to secure praise and validation for his own work and for Sun Chunlan, but to reflect it upwards to the "core" leader as well. But his crass exposure of this political culture of praise - which of course also was his own expression of devotion - ultimately became yet another instance of self-inflicted ridicule through excess of zeal. As one commentator wrote on an overseas Chinese news platform: "Using this 'low-level red' means of demanding thanks from the people to show political loyalty [to superiors] harms not only the image of the ruling party and the government, but also seriously hurts the feelings of the people, ultimately becoming a form of political disloyalty."

"Low-level red" can also occur at the highest of levels. In late February, even as China still struggled to contain the epidemic and its social and economic fallout, the CCP's

Central Propaganda Department released a book in six languages called *A Great Nation Battles the Epidemic* (大国战“疫”). According to the official Xinhua News Agency, the book was “a concentrated reflection of General Secretary Xi Jinping as the leader of a great nation, having feelings for the people, taking on the mission, showing strategic foresight and outstanding leadership” (Xinhua News Agency 2020). On March 8, just two days before Xi Jinping’s tour of Wuhan, media in Hong Kong reported that the book, which had drawn derision on social media, had been pulled from shelves. The Hong Kong outlet HK01 explained that such acts of “low-level red” are a symptom and legacy of authoritarian political cultures, even going back to China’s feudal era, in which civil servants stood to benefit from such flattery. “This ‘low-level red’ may seem to be cloaked in an outer garment of ‘political correctness’ conveying loyalty, but in fact it harbors an extremely selfish psychology of opportunism,” the article said. “What it actually accomplishes is to take the image of the leader and the nation and roast it over the fire, deconstructing rather than strengthening the image and power of the leader and the nation.” (HK01 2020)

Ridicule surfaced again from the depths as Xi Jinping made his high-profile visit to Wuhan, meant to signal that China had successfully brought COVID-19 under control. This was a serious opportunity to project an image of strength, of Xi Jinping as the commander who had led the people to victory in the war against the coronavirus. Censorship of the media and the internet was correspondingly severe, the authorities keen to ensure that nothing spoiled the atmosphere of devotion. As controls snuffed out all attempts to counteract the all-consuming CCP narrative, Chinese on social media platforms reached dizzying heights of creativity to make themselves heard.

The day of Xi’s tour, a series of feature stories had been published in China’s *People* magazine. They included a lengthy interview in which the director of an emergency department at one local Wuhan hospital spoke out about her decision to share information back in December 2019 about a patient suffering from a case of atypical pneumonia – what would later, after weeks of cover-up, be designated COVID-19. Ai Fen and other local Wuhan doctors had been harshly disciplined for daring to share information about the emerging outbreak. In the interview, she affirmed the need to speak up, and said she regretted not having spoken out more forcefully.

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SPOTLIGHT

The New Censorship, the New Academic Freedom: Commercial Publishers and the Chinese Market

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Since 2017 the international Chinese Studies community has been shocked to discover that many of the major commercial academic publishers have been actively working with the Chinese censors to limit access to 'politically sensitive' books and articles within the country in order to maintain access to the lucrative Chinese market. This essay examines these incidents and the responses of the publishers upon being discovered—arguing that the convergence of China's increasingly assertive information control regime and the commercial academic publishers' thirst for ever more profits has resulted in a new form of institutionalised commercial censorship.

自 2017 年以來，國際漢學界震驚地發現，許多主流商業學術出版社為了維持自身在利潤豐厚的中國市場的地位，積極與中國審查機構合作，限制中國國內學者和學生對"政治敏感"書籍和文章的獲取。本文剖析此類事件以及出版社在問題曝光之後的回應，進而論證在中國日益嚴格的信息管控與商業出版社對利潤最大化訴求的結合下，一種商業審查制度化的形成。

Keywords: China, academic publishing, censorship, academic freedom

關鍵詞：中國、學術出版、審查制度、學術自由

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Since mid-2017 the international Chinese Studies community has been successively rocked by revelation after revelation that major commercial publishers are not only acceding to the Chinese censorship regime, but also actively cooperating with the censors to block certain content within the People's Republic of China (PRC) in order to retain access to the Chinese market.

The assault on academic freedom began in August 2017 with the discovery that Cambridge University Press (CUP) had blocked 315 articles on 'sensitive topics' from the *China Quarterly's* Chinese website at Beijing's request (Phillips 2017). The academic community reacted with immediate shock and outrage that the world's oldest scholarly publisher would agree to censor one of the most prestigious Chinese Studies journals. In the face of boycott threats and petitions, CUP reversed the decision and made all the previously blocked articles freely available, stating that the decision was necessary to 'uphold the principle of academic freedom on which the university's work is founded' (Kennedy and Phillips 2017).

Opening the Floodgates

In the wake of CUP's reversal, the Chinese Studies community revelled in its seeming victory over the forces of censorship; however, the self-congratulatory atmosphere was to be short-lived. In the months that followed, the extent of Beijing's efforts to limit what international publishers make available in China came into clearer focus, indicating that the CUP incident was just the tip of the iceberg. In anonymous interviews at the Beijing International Book Fair just days after the revelations about CUP, a number of publishers admitted to engaging in self-censorship to ensure they did not lose access to the Chinese market (SCMP 2017). At nearly the same time LexisNexis—which provides access to media, legal, and regulatory documents—revealed it was pressured to remove content by the Chinese government and had withdrawn two of its academic products from China (Reuters 2017a).

This was shortly followed by even more disturbing revelations that Springer Nature—the largest academic publisher in the world—had removed more than one thousand articles at the behest of the Chinese censors. Unlike CUP, Springer Nature was defiant

and refused to reverse the decision, declaring: ‘We do not believe that it is in the interests of our authors, customers, or the wider scientific and academic community, or to the advancement of research, for us to be banned from distributing our content in China’ (Reuters 2017b). After the burst of outrage over the CUP incident, the academic community seemingly had little remaining appetite for holding publishers to account. While a peer-review boycott was organised, it garnered only around one thousand signatures. Springer Nature was able simply to wait out the news cycle and in short order their ongoing censorship efforts largely faded into the background.

However, publishers’ censorship would come into full view again less than a year later. In early October 2018 the editors of the ‘Transcultural Research’ book series released a public complaint that Springer Nature had been removing articles on sensitive subjects at the request of the Chinese censors without even informing authors (MCLC 2018). Despite this public confrontation with high-profile academics, Springer Nature again remained defiant, not only refusing to reverse the decision but continuing to justify it as being in the best interests of the global academic community and necessary for the advancement of research (Redden 2018a).

In order to justify the decision to continue their censoring activities, Springer Nature falsely claimed that CUP had suffered blanket bans on journals and books in retaliation for their decision to reinstate the *China Quarterly* articles. CUP responded denying the allegations, saying that their entire catalogue remained available, but that subscriptions had fallen and that ‘Chinese importers decide which publications they will purchase for dissemination within China’ (Redden 2018a). This response inadvertently revealed how the Chinese censors’ tactics were evolving and diversifying. Instead of demanding that CUP remove specific articles, the censors were now working through the commercial paywall system to achieve their goals.

In December 2018 this censorship-through-paywall tactic came into full view as it was discovered that publishing giant Taylor & Francis had agreed to exclude more than 80 journals from subscription packages at the request of the Chinese import agency. Included in this targeted wave of subscription cancellations was the *Asian Studies Review*—which the publisher distributes on behalf of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA)—apparently because of an objection to six articles published in the

journal. Remarkably, when the ASAA asked for details about the specific articles that were objected to the publisher refused, stating that it was ‘commercially sensitive’ information—an ostentatious claim of ownership over a journal for which they are supposedly just the distributor (Redden 2018b; Shepherd 2018).

Finally, the first half of 2019 revealed other insidious patterns of censorship, this time undertaken by Brill journals. In early April, Timothy Grose accused the new journal *China and Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies* of attempting to censor a discussion of the mass internment camps in Xinjiang in a book review of Tom Cliff’s *Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang*. The editor of the journal, Han Xiaorong, denied the cuts constituted censorship and Grose ultimately published the review elsewhere. Brill reacted by initiating an investigation, issuing a statement that the journal ‘does not take any specific political viewpoint’, and committing to adding a clause on censorship to their publication ethics (Grose 2019; Lange 2019; Redden 2019b).

Later in the month, Lorraine Wong and Jacob Edmond penned an essay outlining their experience editing a special issue of *Frontiers of Literary Studies in China* (FLSC), in which an entire article was removed from the final proofs by the editorial office in Beijing (Wong and Edmond 2019). As Wong and Edmond came to discover, FLSC is jointly published by Brill and Higher Education Press, which is owned by the Ministry of Education of the PRC and thus subjected to the full censorship regime—a fact obscured by Brill’s involvement and an editorial board populated by established scholars based at Western institutions. More worryingly, when FLSC editor-in-chief Zhang Xudong was informed of the censorship he justified it as necessary and invoked his editorial prerogative to reject the excluded article. Wong and Edmond ultimately decided to move the entire special issue to the journal *Chinese Literature: Essays, Articles, Reviews*, and Brill has since terminated its relationship with Higher Education Press effective from 2020 (Redden 2019a).

While this was a welcome move, Brill nevertheless continues to have extensive dealings with a number of Chinese presses through their recently-opened branch office in Beijing (Brill 2017). And they are far from the only commercial press to seek (seemingly lucrative) partnerships with Chinese publishers. Indeed, unperturbed by the FLSC fiasco, Springer Nature continues to have a co-publication agreement with

Higher Education Press (*Frontiers of Education in China*), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (*International Journal of Anthropology and Ethnology*), and Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (*Financial Innovation*), to name just a few of the titles listed in their Belt and Road Initiative Collection.¹

These incidents occurring over the past couple of years—which, it must be stressed, are only the ones that have been made public—highlight some seriously disturbing trends. For one, the Chinese censors are becoming much more assertive in their attempts to subject international publishers to the PRC’s censorship regime. Secondly, they are achieving their goals by exploiting the normal business operations of the major commercial publishers—through threats of restricted market access, the targeted cancellation of subscriptions, and the establishment of lucrative partnerships with Chinese institutions. This is serving to embed Chinese censorship within the commercial academic publishers themselves and blur the lines between what is a censored Chinese publication and an uncensored Western one. Finally, with each successive incident, the collective outrage seems to become more muted, media coverage dwindles, and scholars continue to submit articles to, and review for, the offending publishers. As such, it has now become evident that active censorship undertaken by the major commercial publishers on behalf of the Chinese government—something that would have been unimaginable to most just a few years ago—is the new normal state of affairs.

¹ The Collection can be found here: https://www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/campaigns/belt-road-initiative?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_content=organic&utm_campaign=SRCN_IL_L_bri19_en_stw

International Academic Publishers and Censorship

Date	Publisher	Incident	Outcome
2017 August	Cambridge University Press	315 articles blocked from the Chinese website of the <i>China Quarterly</i>	Articles reinstated and made freely available
2017 November	Springer Nature	Over 1,000 articles blocked from Chinese websites of journals	Articles still blocked
2018 October	Springer Nature	Articles blocked from the Chinese website of the 'Transcultural Research' series without authors being informed	Springer Nature refused to reverse their decision so the editors of 'Transcultural Research' discontinued their agreement with the publisher
2018 December	Taylor & Francis	Over 80 journals excluded from subscription packages at the request of the Chinese import agency, including the <i>Asian Studies Review</i>	Taylor & Francis have continued to provide packages excluding the journals
2019 April	Brill	Editor of <i>China and Asia: A Journal in Historical Studies</i> is accused of trying to censor a review of the book <i>Oil and Water: Being Han in Xinjiang</i>	Brill has initiated an investigation and promised to add a clause on censorship to their publication ethics guidelines
2019 April	Brill	Entire article cut from final proofs of a special issue of <i>Frontiers of Literary Studies in China</i> by co-publisher, Chinese government-owned Higher Education Press	Brill cut ties with Higher Education Press effective from 2020 (other publishers, including Springer Nature, continue to co-publish with Higher Education Press)

Censorship, Who Me?

Few readily admit to participating in censorship, and the commercial publishers are no exception. As such, once discovered they have gone to great lengths to spin and evade responsibility for their actions. It is instructive to examine their responses when confronted, as they shed light on how these commercial publishers understand their own involvement in censorship and, more broadly, how they perceive their role within academia.

Publisher responses to revelations of censorship broadly fit into three categories. The first, typified by Brill's reaction, is dismay and confusion over how it could happen, followed by assurances that something will be done. To their credit, Brill cancelled their collaboration with Higher Education Press and have promised to address censorship explicitly in their publishing ethics guidelines—substantial actions in comparison with Springer Nature and Taylor & Francis. However, Brill took these steps only in response to being publicly called out and the approach seems to have the hallmarks of a PR strategy aimed at limiting damage to the business. These are reactions to symptoms rather than serious attempts to address the root causes of the problem. In the words of Jacob Edmond, the co-editor of the censored FLSC special issue, this is merely 'a small win in what is an ongoing battle against censorship creep However, I do not see this win as any particular cause for celebration... . I feel saddened that we should have had to speak out publicly before Brill chose to take this step' (Redden 2019a).

The second type of response is characterised by an appeal to consumer choice or legalism. For instance, Taylor & Francis issued a statement saying: 'To be clear, Taylor & Francis does not participate in censorship in China, or anywhere else. The ability to sell publishing services, or any other services, into China is controlled by import agencies. They have the right to select what they would like to import' (Taylor & Francis 2018). Springer Nature described their censorship as simply 'limiting' content, stating: 'This is not editorial censorship and does not affect the content we publish or make accessible elsewhere in the world. It is a local content access decision in China done to comply with specific local regulations' (Reuters 2017b). In both of these cases, the

publishers misrepresent and downplay their actions, presenting them as ‘normal’ business operations or legal imperatives. However, as the editors of the ‘Transcultural Research’ series point out: ‘There is no “law” in China that bans treatment of these topics but only an informal unpublished directive from the Communist Party’s Propaganda Department that discussions of the topics mentioned should be “managed” in the sense of being kept from the public’ (MCLC 2018). Cutting out specific journals from subscription packages is also uncommon and the Association of University Presses specifically warns against it, saying: ‘AUPresses encourages university presses generally to withhold their consent to any such request, whether made directly or via a third-party aggregator, even if doing so results in the unavailability of the entire digital collection within that market’ (Redden 2018a).

If we are considering the importance of following rules and regulations, it is worth pointing out that most Western—and some Chinese—academic institutions and societies have committed to upholding the principles of academic freedom that are undermined by this type of censorship. For instance, the Association of American Universities, the Australian Group of Eight, the League of European Research Universities, and the Chinese 9 Universities have signed onto the Hefei Statement, which declares that research universities must be committed to the ‘responsible exercise of academic freedom by faculty to produce and disseminate knowledge through research, teaching and service without undue constraint...’ (Association of American Universities et al. 2013; Pils and Svensson 2019). Arguably, disseminating research through publishers that engage in censorship contravenes this commitment. Ultimately, the appeals to consumer choice and local regulations are nothing more than a morally-bankrupt crutch that these publishers lean on to justify pursuing their own narrow self-interest at the expense of the core principles of academic freedom that they purport to support.

The third type of response seeks to justify the censorship of the few for the benefit of the many. Springer Nature’s defiant refusal to reverse course is emblematic. The publisher has attempted to downplay its capitulation by noting that the censorship only constitutes ‘a small percentage of our content (less than 1 percent)’. They go on, saying

that it was ‘a highly regrettable situation... but if we had not complied with this requirement we were facing very real and significant risks to our ability to distribute all our content in China – something we did not feel to be in the interest of the advancement of research and the academic community, both in China and world-wide’ (Redden 2018a). This response is disturbing, as it unapologetically jettisons the concept of academic freedom altogether. After all, academic freedom requires the defence of precisely that small ‘less than 1 percent’ of critical scholarship that is under threat by the powers that be. Springer Nature suggests that it is preferable to sacrifice this commitment to academic freedom in order to ensure their ability to distribute content, even suggesting that their decision is in the best interests of the global academic community. In reality, however, Springer Nature is doing nothing more than making a cynical rationalisation for censoring content on behalf of the Chinese government to ensure their own access to the Chinese market. This can in no way be seen as benefiting academia—rather, it represents a dangerous discursive shift aimed at hollowing out the concept of academic freedom, ultimately rendering it meaningless.

Recommitting to Academic Freedom

So, how do we effectively challenge this insidious censorship creep—one that is undertaken by the world’s largest publishers in their search for higher profits, is justified through the language of ‘expanding access’, and which functions through the normal operation of the commercial publishing system?

Perhaps most importantly we need to speak with clarity about what is happening in order to cut through the various forms of obfuscation aimed at rationalising the current state of affairs. It is necessary to reject unequivocally the Orwellian doublespeak employed by publishers to deny their actions are censorship. Blocking articles for political imperatives, allowing paywalls to be used as a way to restrict access to certain types of ideas, and partnering with entities that fall under the purview of institutional censorship regimes constitutes censorship, full stop. Publishers engaging in these practices cannot be considered free and open—nor can they claim to uphold the principles of academic freedom—regardless of how they contort themselves to justify the behaviour. This must

be stated clearly over and over again, and the ways in which we conceptualise and define the act of censorship in academia must be expanded to include this type of corporate censoring of content in the pursuit of profits.

It is also necessary to push back forcefully against the publishers' attempts to justify abandoning their duty to uphold basic guarantees of academic freedom in order supposedly to provide wider access to research findings. Firstly, this is laughable, as the commercial publishers and their 'great paywall' are the primary impediment to public access to academic knowledge (Loubere and Franceschini 2017). Secondly, this represents an insidious subordination of academic freedom to a narrow neoliberal framing of academic knowledge as a commodified good, with researchers creating 'knowledge products' that are made available on the 'marketplace of ideas' to consumers and users. This subtle, but seriously damaging, reconceptualisation equates academic freedom with market access and consumption, and is antithetical to the task of producing critical work that speaks truth to power. As such, we need to recommit to upholding a definition of academic freedom that is not reduced to commercial considerations, but rather is rooted in the pursuit of the common good. In the words of Joan Wallach Scott: 'the defense of academic freedom also means the defense of the covenant on which it rests, a belief that there is something we conceive of as a public good and that public good cannot do without critical thinking...' (Scott 2019, 13). In this sense the struggle against profit-driven censorship by commercial publishers is part of the wider struggle against the neoliberalisation and degradation of contemporary academia more broadly.

Practically, this struggle requires us to reclaim the machinery of academic knowledge dissemination from the profit-hungry—and currently dominant—commercial publishers. Those in the Chinese Studies field can find natural allies in the Open Access movement, as censorship in the service of profits is just one of the ways that the large commercial publishers are diminishing academic freedom and seriously harming academic research across disciplines and fields (Monbiot 2018). The fact that these massive commercial publishers are actively engaged in censoring content can serve as one of the many justifications for pushing universities and consortia to cancel the costly subscriptions to their journal packages. We can take inspiration from the recent, albeit

temporary, termination of agreements with Elsevier by Sweden, Germany, California, and others, which allowed struggling university libraries to retain crucial resources (Kwon 2018; McKenzie 2019). Subscription cancellations should be accompanied by strategies to flip key journals (i.e. make them open access), start new journals to replace those remaining under corporate control, and channel funding and other support to truly open-access, non-profit university presses. Only in this way can we remove the impetuses that have made capitulation to, and cooperation with, the Chinese censors the normal state of affairs in academic publishing, and reinvigorate a commitment to academic freedom as a common good that is the necessary foundation of truly free and critical academic inquiry.

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SPOTLIGHT

Marcel Granet (1884–1940)

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The history of French Sinology is marked by a series of axial dates and prominent names – Jean-Pierre Abel-Rémusat, the Marquis d’Hervey de Saint-Denys, Paul Pelliot and, above all, Édouard Chavannes – who made Francophone studies of China remarkable throughout the nineteenth century, the age of the birth of modern scientific research. Marcel Granet, whose fame outlived his premature death at the beginning of the War, on November 25th 1940, left a durable mark on this history through the alliance that he managed to weave between his sinological knowledge, his study of sociology, brilliant intuitions, and a pedagogical capacity rooted in a writing-style as elegant as it is instructive.

He had multiple scholarly talents but was unique in his gift for popularization. It would be possible to summarily divide his work into two great threads, sometimes remarkably entwined: inform the wider educated public about the roots and mysteries of ancient Chinese culture; and share his innovative readings of the documents that for more than two thousand years have formed the foundations of “China knowledge”. It was through this scholarly route that Granet embarked on a brilliant academic career, and that he traced out a path from which he would never depart: that of an innovative, sometimes iconoclastic, interpretation of documents from, for the most part, Antiquity.

Keywords: Granet, Ancient China, Shijing, history, sociology

關鍵詞：葛蘭言，古代中國，詩經，歷史，社會學

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I. Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine [Festivals and Songs of Ancient China]: the first decisive steps of “an entry into the matter”

The doctoral thesis that Granet defended in 1911 and published in 1919 is entirely consecrated to a sociological analysis of the first part of the *Shijing* 詩經 (*Classic of Poetry*). He maintains that these poems are “popular songs, as one senses” (Granet

¹ For a succinct history of European, and therefore French, Sinology, see the already old but precious small volume by José Frèches (Frèches 1975).

² See the longform interview with Jacques Gernet in Goudineau 1988, where Gernet underlines the foundational nature of Granet’s method as developed in his thesis and the fact that he never abandoned either the “mould” or the method. If he is reserved about the Granet of *La Pensée chinoise* [“Chinese Thought”; not translated into English] and *La Civilisation chinoise* [Chinese Civilization], he praises the innovative character of the textual investigation in *Festivals and Songs of Ancient China*.

1919, 6). The idea is to reveal what the poems had always been telling literati who had not wanted to listen to them: the poems are, for the most part, rhymed and rhythmical songs, and their study demonstrates that they were at the heart of rural festivals before they came to be used for political and moral ends. Granet's thesis was not "unheard of" insofar as scholars, and not minor ones at that, had already perceived the popular origin of these songs gathered and standardized by scribes in the service of the seigneurial and royal courts of the pre-Confucian era. The idea is already present in Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), and even more so in Yuan Mei 袁枚 (1716–1798)³ and in writers up to modern times, but had not been followed to its logical conclusion in an analysis of the *mentalités* of the authors of these songs. Granet's double dedication to "the memories of Émile Durkheim and Édouard Chavannes" gives a decisive direction to this socio-sinological approach, which borrows from both the French school of sociology and academic Sinology. Chavannes, regarded as the founder of modern Sinology, was his teacher and oriented him towards the study of Chinese Antiquity, the formative and structuring period of the thought (or rather the various schools of thought) of the vast geographical zone that is "the sinicized world", and a period whose structures were to endure up to modern times. The quality of Chavannes' works (studies and translations) seduced Granet and pushed him to choose this path, beyond which he would scarcely venture.⁴

The central idea of *Festivals and Songs* consists in extracting the outlines of an authentic peasant life – made up of love affairs, neighbourhood quarrels, struggles for prestige between communities, local cults, "relations of proximity" (what today we would call "social interactions"), including religious festivals around sacred places which were distinct from the official cults of the seigneurial courts – from the enveloping slag of the

³ See Yuan Mei 2011. The preface recalls Yuan Mei's penchant for the amorous relationships described in the *Shijing* (op. cit., 18.) Zhu Xi saw them as above all "songs of the debauched" – but this was also a first way of saying that they are not exclusively literati works.

⁴ This is not the place to give an overview – which can easily be obtained elsewhere – of Édouard Chavannes' scientific output. I will simply cite the prodigious quality of his analysis in Chavannes 1910b ("a model of erudition and precision", Granet would write) and Chavannes 1909. Of his numerous translations, I will only mention the five published volumes of the *Shiji* of Sima Qian (Chavannes 1895-1905, since republished), and of course Chavannes 1910-1911. Chavannes had been the student of the Marquis d'Hervey de St-Denys, Professor at the Collège de France, whose post he stepped into on his return from China. Granet repeats his pride at having been "the pupil of Chavannes and of Durkheim" at the end of his Introduction to *Dances et légendes de la Chine ancienne* [*Dances and Legends in Ancient China*] (Granet 1926, 56, and below, n. 9).

moralizing glosses. The first part of the *Shijing*, the *Guofeng* 國風, contains sociological riches rarely noticed by the Chinese scholastics, who, not only during Antiquity but throughout the imperial period, were preoccupied with the decipherment of archaic terms and their ethico-political exploitation. After having deciphered and translated these texts (no simple endeavour for a text as difficult as the *Shijing*), Granet sets out to interpret them, not according to “fashionable theories” such as animism, but according to a modern criticism limiting itself to the facts described and the persons present.⁵ He does not try to “search in ancient facts the origin of present facts” (Granet 1919, 4) or to look for the explanation of Chinese practices in practices outside of China (a foundation-stone in Henri Maspero’s work, who drew a parallel between the ancient Chinese and the modern Tai)⁶. His interpretation insists on the symbolic value of the details of these songs: he emphasizes this in discussing the plants and animals, which are not decorative but actors in a theatre playing out its mummery before us. Through these gestures and these characters a lost world that the literati had not wanted to see rises up. A world whose rural rituals are parallel to but not identical with the court rituals painstakingly described in the *Rituals*. “There is a possibility that the songs reveal old customs that predate classical morality” (Granet 1919, 7). Granet does not speak of “myths” here (the word’s time had not yet come), but he evokes the correspondence between ritual and belief, which is a way of underlining the bi-directional relationship between myth and ritual that Claude Lévi-Strauss would study. Finally, these morsels of verse are poems to be sung individually or collectively expressing and provoking sentiments, often communal emotions where “passion speaks in all purity” (Granet 1919, 11). The form of the translation and analysis of these songs must give account of and transmit their affective force. Granet undertook this with undeniable success, rendering the melody of their passions into a harmony of sounds, thanks to the rhythms of his translations and opportunely chosen words. He rejected the moralizing interpretation and certain philological digressions of the commentators, but not the information they gave on the society, symbolic relations

⁵ In his methodological principals, he mostly takes aim at de Groot 1886, and Wieger 1909, whom he regularly assassinates. See also de Groot 1892-1910.

⁶ See Maspero 1923 and 1929, republished in Maspero 1971, 221-276. Granet himself however would not hesitate to link the customs of the Lolo of Tonkin to those of the peasants of Chinese Antiquity in support of his theses on ancient marriage customs (see below).

and relation to the imaginary of this distant time that only they can know. In this respect, he recommends consulting all commentaries on a song in order to comprehend what can be understood of it in our time (Granet 1919, 18, n. 1). His ambition was two-fold in its aim and in its means: to discover, behind the formal expression of sentiments, the authentic social relations of the peasant masses (and above all relations between man and woman, including amorous relationships), and to utilise the totality of available textual elements, including those furnished by the glossers of the first centuries. The result is astonishingly true, in contrast to Séraphin Couvreur’s annotated translation which is overly reliant on Zhu Xi’s orthodox glosses and those of his successors from the Song to the Qing (“a useful aid for the missionary”, Couvreur would say). After a first section devoted to “the love-songs of the *Che king*”, Granet then extracts from them the literary vestiges of “ancient festivals” of forgotten periods of the Zhou. “Forgotten” because little touched on by the historical texts which, like the *Chunqiu* 春秋 and the *Guoyu* 國語, only tell us of the lives of the nobility of the Eastern Zhou. It is here that he reconstitutes the local festivities little regarded by the scribes, many being linked to wedding ceremonies, others to periods of ritual purification at the turn of the year or of the seasons. It is the seasonal rhythms that will largely determine the calendar (a Chinese art *par excellence*) and therefore the scansion of the moments for social activities and the cohesion of family groups and clan alliances. He also insists on the significance of the sacred places (cults of mountains, rivers, forests) whose importance in Chinese religious life we know, and tries to retrace in the parallel activities of the nobles, described in the official rituals (*Liji* 禮記, *Yili* 儀禮, *Zhou li* 周禮), the more spontaneous rites of rural populations. It is undeniable that Granet’s description of this peasant world has all the defaults of an ideal mental *reconstruction*, but he gives life to the texts and, more importantly still, to peoples that until then it had been difficult to see as living. In this regard, *Festivals and Songs* remains a model of the genre, in its own time and in ours.

II. Sociological studies, and the development of a method applied to Ancient China

The intellectual filiation of Granet is closely linked to his time, and particularly to the French school of sociology of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss.⁷ He regarded himself as a sociologist of China and his academic works belong to this innovative lineage. In a series of studies that appeared during the first years of the 20th century, he would use the whole body of ancient (that is to say essentially pre-imperial) literature to reconstruct a living system intended to give an exact image of China's original society and thought. From Durkheim, who died in 1917, he borrowed the notion of "total social fact", believing that all facts and gestures take place in a context where they are interdependent and symbolically linked to each other.⁸ He therefore concentrated on collective representations and on the various phenomena which might translate a social group's awareness of itself and of other groups or even of other ethnicities (at the time "other races" would have been used) such as the barbarians. It is not difficult to imagine that he would have read the founder of the French school of sociology's *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* [*The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*] or *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* [*The Rules of Sociological Method*] with profit. He focused especially on religious facts, as he had begun to in *Festivals and Songs*, knowing how to use official literati documents but being most interested by the study of the popular emotions that group phenomena (marriages, funerals, births, festivals and banquets, theatrical combats) imply. He borrowed a powerful concept, still in use today, from Marcel Mauss, who was also a friend of his, and his study *Essai sur le don* [*The Gift*]: the idea of the exchange of goods through gifts and counter-gifts. Granet had no difficulty in applying this concept to Ancient China, even keeping the Amerindian term *potlatch* (Granet 1926, 611, 613 n. 1), doubtless little suited to the Asian

⁷ Here I will reproduce certain points developed in my preface to the revised and annotated reissue of Granet 1994, VI ff.). At the head of a paragraph in his article "Le dépôt de l'enfant sur le sol...", see below), he cites a major methodological proposition of Mauss: "It is necessary to rediscover both the social sentiments and the social structures which these myths are only representations of, and these rites only the gestures of." Reciprocally, Mauss would say of Granet "All I know of China is what my colleague and friend MG has taught me" (Mauss 1938, 273). On the study of these two intellectual filiations, see the still pertinent analysis of Goudineau 1982, *passim*.

⁸ At the time (beginning of the 20th c.), Durkheim dominated the French intellectual landscape. Granet would be inspired by the ideal of giving an account of the logical totality of a society which "made up a system". Mircea Eliade wrote that Granet was "fascinated by Durkheim's sociology" (Eliade 1971, 306).

context. The gift created an obligation towards, and a dependence on, the giver on the part of the receiver, who would then try to regain the upper hand, feeling obliged to offer more in return through presents, at the risk of ruining himself but also of acquiring prestige. Granet insists here on the behaviour symbolised by the act of “ceding” (*rang* 讓) in order to conquer a superior position over the debtor who owed a present. The historical narratives of the *Shiji* 史記 and the *Zuo zhuan* 左傳 would supply him with a reservoir of examples to support this thesis, so evident today, on ancient social relations.

Among the works that he published along these lines, let us draw attention to the studies grouped together in a posthumous volume *Études sociologiques sur la Chine* [*Sociological Studies on China*] (Granet 1953). In a quite long article “La polygynie sororale et le sororat dans la Chine féodale. Étude sur les formes anciennes de la polygamie chinoise” [“Sororal Polygyny and Sororate in Feudal China. A Study of the ancient forms of Chinese polygyny.”] (Granet 1920a), Granet sought to demonstrate that the ideal marriage was with a group of sisters or, in a lesser form, with a woman accompanied by companions who could have been her younger sisters. If they were not her sisters they would be relations, and obligatorily from the same clan. The aim of the process was to matrimonially unite two clans, and not only a man and a woman. Evidently, if this phenomenon is demonstrable it is only for the nobles whose ritualized chronologies we have. It is more difficult to prove for the peasantry, unless we suppose that marriage customs were identical at both ends of the social spectrum. Granet nevertheless affirms that “the assembled texts [...] formally establish that sororal polygyny was, in practice, a generally followed custom and obligatory, in law, for the nobility” (Granet 1953, 27). Here it seems that Granet is describing an idealized system (ideal for the ritualists at least) the practical application of which it is difficult to envisage (he himself recognizes that the companions of brides are often relatives rather than sisters, Granet 1953, 44). He even postulates “a trace of levirate” (marriage between a widow and a brother of her deceased husband) in ancient Chinese society, a hypothesis which seems audacious in the light of classical literature. This hypothesis leads him to conclude in the existence of a primitive system of “the collective union of a group of brothers with a group of sisters” (Granet 1953, 52, 58, taken up again in

Granet 1926, 15 and n. 2). Granet's analysis here, although intoxicating, does not convince, resulting above all as it does from the exploitation of a few late commentaries justifying certain ritual practices which appear to the commentators to reflect an ideal the reality of which seems insufficiently demonstrated.⁹

More relevant, in my eyes, is the article "Coutumes matrimoniales de la Chine antique" ["Marriage Customs of Ancient China"] (Granet 1912) in which Granet takes up and systematizes the information on marriage already gathered during his investigation of the poems of the *Shijing*. He adopts, with youthful verve, the same attitude as in *Festivals and Songs*, and disparages the Chinese commentators as "limited philologists [...] incapable of observation, [...] there is reason to mistrust them" (Granet 1953, 69, 85). All the finesse of Granet's university thesis reappears in this article's analysis of the poems of Antiquity, and the emotional substance of these songs is drawn out from the behaviour and emotional affects expressed or implied. He brilliantly shows the links between the agricultural calendar and prenuptial and wedding practices, which are so closely correlated: for one becomes engaged in the Spring, and marries in the Autumn.

In "Le dépôt de l'enfant sur le sol. Rites anciens et ordalies mythiques" ["The placing of the infant child on the ground. Ancient rites and mythic ordeals."] (Granet 1922b), Granet sets out to interpret poetic and ritual texts, dating from the Zhou and from the Han, and related to the placing of a newborn child on the ground of their birthplace. This practice is attested in paragraphs of the *Liji*, verses in the *Shijing*, and in extracts from a manual for the education of girls written by the great scholar Cao Dagu 曹大家 (official title of Ban Zhao 班昭, 49-120, poetess and co-author, with her brother Ban Gu 班固, of the *History of the [Former] Han* 漢書). The child is thus tested and their will for life put to the quick, for girls as well as for boys, through the energetic help of the earth. However, this is also the moment when the first differentiation between the sexes appears, and in their status, hierarchy, and future roles. Symbolic signs are displayed at the entrance to the room defining their tasks: for a boy, a bow, for a girl, a piece of cloth. This same "placing" was carried out for the dying, who sought the same chthonic energy. The site of the placement was generally in the southwest

⁹ Vandermeersch 1977, 315 ff. emphatically rejects the theory of levirate advanced by Granet.

corner of the house, the residence of the powerful family guardian spirits (Granet 1953, 167-168, 170, 192). For the dying, the ritual was accompanied by a recalling of the soul launched from the house's roof. Granet establishes a link with the mythological stories recorded in the *Shijing* which recount the destinies of exceptional heroes abandoned on the ground and saved by the gods, such as Houji 后稷, the Lord of Millet. He qualifies this part of the narrative as a "mythic ordeal" (Granet 1953, 181, 183) during which the gods, Heaven, Fate... make known to man the capacities of the abandoned infant but (*and therefore?*) chosen by spiritual forces. This study is certainly one of the most successful, fortuitously mixing ritual practices, collective emotions and mythology. It is a forerunner of the studies on a larger canvas found in *Dances and Legends*.

In two other articles "La vie et la mort. Croyances et doctrines de l'antiquité chinoise" ["Life and Death. Beliefs and doctrines in Chinese Antiquity."] (Granet 1920-1921), and "Le langage de la douleur d'après le rituel funéraire de la Chine classique" ["The language of suffering in the funerary rituals of classical China"] (Granet 1922a), Granet returns to this sort of analysis, principally carried out on the basis of rituals (*Liji*, *Yili*, *Zhou li*, *Da Dai liji* 大戴禮記 etc). He examines the Chinese conception of life and death as situated on a numerological plane, a concept dear to the literati and especially to the Confucians. For them, these two segments of human existence are part of a logical and quantifiable system whose respect will ensure the correct unfolding of life and death, as long as the right *tempi* are observed. Numbers determine the emotions linked to these events and also to certain beliefs, such as those relating to great men's reincarnation in certain of their descendants. As he clearly states, numerology served to allow scribes to demonstrate to everyone the unity of the universe and its coherence as manifested in the inalienable relationship established between man and the world (Granet 1953, 220). This enterprise is revisited in the second article, explicitly based on Mauss's article "L'expression obligatoire des sentiments" ["The obligatory expression of sentiments"] (Mauss 1921). Granet founds his analysis (here it is tempting to write 'again and always') on the ritual classics cited above rather than on the philosophers, whom he makes no use of but who nevertheless could have offered him perspectives different to the formal views of ritualists of all stamps. The language of suffering (essentially what is discussed is the language of grief) was more codified than any other and all groups (nobles and peasants, literati and merchants, soldiers and

religious officiants...) sought to conform to its multiple and complex rules. It was not, however, merely a spectacle, ritualized gestures, an exchange of gifts and banquets (Granet 1953, 233, 238). Grief is of course also an emotion that the poets and philosophers articulated and on which they have many things to say which cannot be contained within the normativity of the princely courts. On this point, Granet's analysis reduces the field of investigation by considering it primarily in its symbolic aspects.

Finally, the *Catégories matrimoniales et relations de proximité dans la Chine ancienne* [*Matrimonial Categories and Relations of Proximity in Ancient China*] (Granet 1939) marks a new departure, unfortunately the final one – he died the following year, in Granet's endeavour to reconstruct ancient Chinese society through the reconstitution of its family structures. This study's very far-reaching analysis was innovative for its time. It made an important impact on non-orientalist sociologists through its approach, which presupposed a knowledge of the language and technical terms of family relationships, which are so complex in the Chinese model of the family. In *Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté* [*The Elementary Structures of Kinship*], Claude Lévi-Strauss voiced his debt to Granet, but also underlined the errors in his analysis, at least as far as the Chinese domain was concerned. But it is true that by that time Lévi-Strauss could refer to other works by Chinese sociologists more specialized in the domain and who had themselves benefitted from cutting-edge contemporary research, particularly that carried out in the United States.¹⁰ Here again, Granet served as a pioneer, and ran the risk of being carried away by the seductive force of some of his own intellectual constructions which have not always been confirmed by subsequent studies. Lévi-Strauss speaks of his “confused and contradictory” interpretations, his “too simplistic” hypotheses, of the “extremely doubtful” context of Granet's demonstrations which were obsessed by an Australian system that he took as a frame of reference, and on top of all this that he opposed peasant mores to feudal institutions (*customs* versus *rites*). Lévi-Strauss's criticisms drew on research carried out by Chinese sociologists publishing in English, including Han-Yi Fêng, Francis Lang-Kwang Hsu and Fei Hsiao-Tung (H. T. Fei) (here I respect the transcriptions used by these authors, who

¹⁰ See Lévi-Strauss 1967, 358 ff. Elsewhere, in Lévi-Strauss 1964, 23 n. 1 and Lévi-Strauss 1966, 397, he recalls his admiration for Granet, whose work he qualifies as “admirable”, describing his “brilliant” intuitions as being “of genius”.

lived in the United States and are cited in this way by Lévi-Strauss). In the field of the sociology of Ancient China it would seem that Granet rather imprudently ventured onto ground that he did not completely master.

III. Mythology as it is danced, a new reading of ancient narratives (synthesis of *Dances and Legends*)

The *magnum opus* of Marcel Granet was and has uncontestedly remained his magisterial study of ancient Chinese mythology, *Dances et légendes de la Chine ancienne* [*Dances and Legends in Ancient China*] (Granet 1926, reissued in 1994a). At the time, Chinese “mythology” was a new idea. The mythology of “primitive” peoples had long been the object of scientific study. It was investigated through oral fieldwork carried out amongst living populations. Its object was primarily the peoples without writing (it was sometimes said, “without history” [*sic*]) of North America, Africa, and Oceania, for reasons which are incontestably linked to colonization in all its forms. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the only scholarly mythology imaginable for Europeans was that of Greece and Rome, based on the writings of the authors considered as classics studied by the Humanities. Apart from Ancient Egypt or Vedic India – rare specialities reserved for a happy few – few scholars ventured beyond the shores of the Mediterranean, the linguistic barrier forming a major obstacle. Granet had the idea of applying the model of compilation and analysis of written mythical narratives to China’s formative period, essentially that of the Zhou. Even the word “mythology” (*shenhuaxue* 神話學, a recent coinage) is still scarcely recognized, in China or in the West, when speaking of Chinese Antiquity; often the more lay term “legends” is used in preference.¹¹ Granet had already envisaged the question from a purely religious angle in his short work *La Religion des Chinois* [*Religion of the Chinese People*] (see below) in 1922. Several years later he would set out on a vast investigation with the aim

¹¹ It is the term used by B. Karlgren in Karlgren 1946, 199-365, published not long after the death of Granet. It is again used in the title of the lengthy study of Maspero 1924, and evidently in *Dances and Legends...* where Granet uses it interchangeably with “fables” (Daoist), and even “novels” (“romans”) (Granet 1926, 31, 32 n. 3). Is a “fable” (fabula) only a picturesque and moral story, unanchored in religious soil? There would appear to be grounds for distinguishing between the terms.

of presenting a quasi-complete representation of Chinese myths (even if he would deny such exhaustivity [Granet 1926, 41-42, 55]). Once again, this immense work was placed under the auspices of Mauss to whom it was dedicated and who read the proofs. Granet hoped to find social facts, that is to say village customs and rural rites, but also and above all ways of thinking about the world and human relations, in these mythical narratives. But is it possible to construct a socio-political reality from a narrative based on the imaginary and the symbolic? One phrase encapsulates the principle behind his analysis: “Legends derive from the transformation into narrative of the ritual dramas and religious dances that played an important role at the time when seignorial power was being established.” (Granet 1926, 1, 51, 389). The relationship between a myth’s narrative and its transposition in “ritual drama” constitutes an enigma that anthropologists have not ceased to try to solve, as Lévi-Strauss attempts in his *Mythologiques*. Does the *legend* derive from the drama or the drama from the *legend*? Scholars played a major role in the compilation of narratives and they historicized them, inserting figures of reference such as the sage kings and emperors of pre-historical periods for didactic purposes. Moreover, the morsels of text are particularly brief, because subject to scholarly censorship that aimed to render them edifying. China did not know the genre of the epic, all that there is are these centos grouping several phrases, sometimes only several words, that need to be joined up together to be made sense of and to reconstruct the structure of a system. Granet quickly perceived that certain schemes recurred constantly, such as accepted – if not compulsory – narrative constructs, and this regardless of the period, from the Shang to the Han (Granet 1926, 37 n. 1, 48, 51, 593). Furthermore, historical literature being almost exclusively in the hands of the Confucians, ethics must always triumph in the name of social harmony and the purity of morals of the ancestral line. The centos (the term he uses to refer to these short narratives taken up by the authors in service of their ideology) that can escape from the control of the philosophers of the time and the court historians are rare. Where, in this scholarly literature intended for the “knowledgeable” and the princes – above all for their education – is there space for the popular speech that could give an account of the very real local cults and deeply-held beliefs of the peasant world (the question already posed itself for the poems of the *Shijing*)? We think here of Kuafu’s 夸父 race with the sun, of the propensity of the bird *jingwei* 精衛 to cross the Ocean, of the

beauty Chang'e's 常娥 flight to the Moon... Many of these mythical fragments are found in a major work that is unique for its genre because it is not contaminated by the ideological conflicts of its time: the *Shanhai jing* 山海經 or *Classic of Mountains and Seas* (translated into French as *Classique des Monts et des Mers* by the author of this article). Granet makes constant and permanent use of this text, and his exemplary use of its scholarly glosses is extremely incisive. But the bibliographical store on which he draws is larger still: all of ancient Chinese literature is exploited, its texts but also its commentaries and sub-commentaries (Granet 1926, 42-43). This method does raise some questions, as the works concerned cover a period spanning over a millennium, even if the majority are from the Eastern Zhou, for well-known historical reasons.¹²

By means of this intercrossing of anecdotes, Granet reconstructs a China he regards as real, from its origins to the birth of official history at the beginning of the Empire. This reconstruction does not constitute the main interest of the work, hypotheses about the roots of Chinese civilization and the supposed formation of a “feudality” having long been thrown into question by archaeologists and historians from both West and East (the hazardous but reiterated theory of the coexistence, following an invasion, of two peoples in Chinese Antiquity had a long shelf life). What really comes to life in these pages are the ways of representing to oneself the complex world of relationships among men (struggles for power and for prestige, real and symbolic conquests of territory and space), and between men and life-forces (animals, plants, cosmic elements) through foundational cosmogonic narratives. The recovery of these narratives – most frequently in the form of short apologia – by Daoist authors would give them a long life allowing them to find their place in fantastical literature during the Han period, and remain there throughout the Six Dynasties. What had been a ritual drama would become a literary object, but also an element of the “Daoist” religious cult (thinking here of “the Paces of Yu 禹” of distant origin). At no point however did this ensemble constitute a “system” . For that it would have needed a

¹² See my discussion in the preface to Granet 1926, XIV-XV. B. Karlgren criticized Granet for this undifferentiated use of texts of varied origins, eras, and ideologies, see Karlgren 1946, 278 n. 1, 325 n. 1, 346, 351... However Granet defied the fashion of his time for questioning the dating of ancient texts: “If we allow free rein to the Chinese and the Sinologists, soon nothing possessing any documentary value will rest of all the ancient literature”, he writes (Granet 1926, 24 ff.)

master craftsman such as Hesiod or Homer to lend coherence to these disparate, imbroglioed narratives the structures of which are so unbelievably complex. Granet could not, and did not wish to, surmount the incoherences that are the very essence of ancient mythology, but his presentation, although not complete was by this very fact representative of the ancient mythic world. The reception of this masterpiece was simultaneously enthusiastic and critical. For my part, it is precisely because I took on the task of criticising it when I prepared the “revised and annotated” edition that I have maintained my enthusiasm for a study still without equal in the finesse and profundity of its analysis, independent of occasional errors.

Granet has the good sense, in this book as in others, to defer to future archaeological discoveries for the confirmation of his hypotheses (Granet 1926, 619). Unfortunately in his time archaeology did not furnish him with any very relevant elements to cast into doubt or refine his hypotheses. The 20th and 21st centuries have been periods of an unequalled richness in archaeological finds, especially in the field of texts written on bamboo slips (thinking of the sites of Mawangdui 馬王堆 and Guodian 郭店). These have cast into doubt many of the approximate truths of the beginning of the 20th century in ways that Granet, or any other Western or Chinese researcher, could not have guessed at. The chronology of texts is a major element of an analysis that replaces the ideas and ritual practices described in them in a socio-political context. Although he was conscious of the difficulty of treating writings of different ideological, geographical and historical provenances on the same footing, he drew few methodological conclusions from this. The inventor of a sociological approach to fictional, and sometimes sacred, narratives, he was unable to confront the results of his work with those of other Eastern or Western scholars. Granet’s approach thus has, in his own eyes as in ours, the value of a *hypothesis*. However, these mythological domains are as illuminated by interpretative intuition as by the hope of a properly historical demonstration.

IV. Dissemination: access to Ancient China for the wider public

The work of dissemination begins when a scholar is sufficiently master of his subject and has proved his aptitude to carry a scientific enquiry to term. This was the case for

Granet, if we think of the two vast synthetic ensembles that are his *Chinese Thought* and *Chinese Civilization*. Certain of his articles that appeared at the beginning of the 1920s show their author's desire to address the non-sinological "honest man". This is the case for a small number of analyses reprinted in the above-mentioned (and inappropriately named) volume *Études sociologiques sur la Chine*. In his "Remarques sur le taoïsme ancien" ["Remarks on Ancient Taoism"] (Granet 1925), he returns to the Paces of Yu, a ritualized gesture in the practice of religious Daoism which finds its origins in a myth whose traces seem ancient. It would seem to be possible to assimilate what Granet calls neo-Daoism (*néo-taoïsme*) to the religious Daoism that appeared in the 2nd century. The question of a continuity between the mystical Daoism of Zhuang zi and the so-called "magical" practices of this late Daoism, which is nevertheless a heritor of the first, is posed (Granet 1925, 249). This question has since been more comprehensively tackled by Chinese and Western Sinologists. In "L'esprit de la religion chinoise" ["The Spirit of Chinese Religion"] (Granet 1929b), Granet evoked the place of the "three religions" (*sic*) (Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism) in social life, although saying that he would, as was his habitude, "leave Buddhist mythology to one side". In this essay he rapidly surveys and offers a synthesis of religious practices, which he will be able to more fittingly develop in his work for the wider public *Religion of the Chinese People*.

La Religion des Chinois [*Religion of the Chinese People*] (Granet 1922c, then 1951, reprinted 1980) proposes an overview of popular and lordly practices and their afferent mythologies. Only a few pages are devoted to Daoism and Buddhism, scarcely doing justice to these two grand teachings of Chinese civilization. The author's affirmation that the first Daoist religious movements are "very poorly known" (Granet 1922c, 132) is sufficiently eloquent of his lack of interest in these developments of the thought of the Dao. Along similar lines is his claim that the introduction of Buddhism into China "is doubtless destined to remain a mystery", a witness to the limited attraction this doctrine held for him. Globally speaking, in this book he offers the bases, that will become more scholarly expositions in *Chinese Civilisation*, in language which is both accessible and agreeable to read, a virtue which traverses the majority of his work.

Finally, in “La droite et la gauche en Chine” [“Right and Left in China”] (Granet 1933), he demonstrates how diverse the notions of “right” and “left” are in China and in Europe, in practice and in their symbolic representations. Not only when speaking of the human body, but also for the cosmos, and for man’s representations of the world and social relations. In China, *yin* and *yang* play a primordial role in the fixing of this physical and imaginary horizontality (Granet 1933, 277).¹³

Chinese Civilization appeared in 1929.¹⁴ It is divided into two main sections: political history and Chinese society. The first begins with the five mythical emperors and finishes with the Han dynasty (in fact the Former Han). In other words the historical background is examined very rapidly (Granet 1929a, 19-59) and for Granet a chronological history of China ends very early. It would be possible to argue that reducing the history of “Chinese civilization” to this period is misleading, if not wrong, especially when it is presented in forty pages.¹⁵ The second part, which treats the inhabitants of the countryside, the foundation of chiefdoms, seigneurial towns, and society at the beginning of the imperial period, is more interesting and more appreciated. It is here that Granet’s talent for synthesis really comes into play and shows its worth, despite the severe judgements of some Sinologists at the time, such as Alfred Forke.¹⁶ His talent for storytelling and the, sometimes affected, elegance of his style contributed to the public success of *Chinese Civilization*, but also gave rise to exaggerated accusations of imaginary constructions and misleading exploitation of the texts. His sociological analyses of an essentially pre-imperial China are based on the prior research whose value we have outlined above, and which cannot be treated condescendingly or superficially and without recognition for a work of synthesis so clear and intelligible for the layman.

¹³ Here we will not touch on the article “Quelques particularités de la langue et de la pensée chinoises” [“Some particularities of Chinese language and thought”] (Granet 1920b), which, in spite of its interest, bears the mark of its time of publication. Advances in linguistics, in particular Chinese linguistics, mean that graphological and philological analyses, and even more so, the grammar, are for the most part outdated. For the time, however, the effort to inform the reading public was a welcome initiative.

¹⁴ Granet 1929a was published in Paris by La Renaissance du livre, then reissued in pocket format in 1968 by Albin Michel. In 1994 I contributed to a new edition accompanied by a bibliographical index of citations and an afterword (Granet 1994b, 509-571); references given are to this 1994 edition.

¹⁵ On this period see, in French, Maspero 1927, republished in 1965. Granet only cites this major work a dozen times in the footnotes to his *Civilisation chinoise*. Also see Gernet 1964, not to mention the major syntheses of Ancient Chinese history published in English...

¹⁶ He sees it as a dreamed-up China, “an interesting novel”, and his appraisal finds common ground with the American criticism of Ding Wenjiang, who is severer still (see my reissue, Granet 1994b, 536-537).

Certainly, Granet puts his cards on the table from the beginning, declaring that he intends to express “the state of [his] opinions” without trying to address himself to the specialists (Granet 1929a, 15), but starting from “a direct analysis of the documents”. This is what makes it a remarkable work for its time and of a literary quality unique for the genre, at least in the European world.

The author of *Chinese Civilization* then conceived the ambitious idea of presenting a general synthesis of the philosophers of Antiquity, which was to become the work for which he was long best-known, *Chinese Thought*, published in 1934 and presented as a “complement” to the preceding work. This is not the place for an appraisal of the virtues – and the few vices – of this grand synthetic work. Other authors have since expressed more incisive opinions and more diversified approaches.¹⁷ However Granet had had the audacity to believe that it was possible to offer a global vision of the “recipes for wisdom” elaborated during the golden age of the *hundred schools*.

V. Conclusion. What remains of Granet?

The final tally of Marcel Granet’s work must be placed in context: there can be no judgement that removes him from the intellectual world in which he lived and in which his work was conceived. Child of the 19th century and adult of the beginning of the 20th, he inherited the historical, archaeological and sociological knowledge of the period which saw the birth of scientific Sinology with Chavannes and Pelliot. Born at the same time as Positivism and Scienticism, he was one of the first to uncover the social imaginary, trying to reconstitute it from fragilely-established and difficult to interpret texts. His other great merit is to have attempted an exhaustive study of Chinese rituals in order to build a model that would give a system, for the peasant world as well as for the upper classes.¹⁸ The reception of his works was sometimes lukewarm and on a few

¹⁷ In France, let us mention Cheng 1997 (multiple re-editions), and the many publications of François Jullien seeking to identify the “unthought” (“impensés”) in Europe and China. The studies published under the direction of Joseph Needham and Michael Loewe are remarkable examples of enquiry in the fields of Chinese thought, not to mention the works of Jacques Gernet.

¹⁸ Two French authors have taken up this sort of enquiry along other paths: Vandermeersch 1977 (see note 11), and Boileau 2013, which I have reviewed (Mathieu 2017).

occasions critical. But, expressing himself in an elegant and limpid language, Granet was able to conquer wider audiences than just his colleagues, which played no small part in the success of his publications.

To know China, Granet is not enough. But it is not vain to begin from his approach and then to enrich it with the many works produced by contemporary Sinology, not just in France but also in the United States and in Europe. If he can be reproached it is not so much for his errors of interpretation (others have made similar mistakes since) but for having given the impression that all China could be understood through its formative phase. To the contrary, the imperial period opened the long era of what is called “classical” China, which was regarded as “eternal” by the Europeans who discovered it. It is not impossible that Granet was still a prisoner of this immobile, conservative vision. Yet, it is to Granet that so many of us European Sinologists, and more largely wider publics curious about the cultures of the Orient, owe having penetrated into a world regarded as difficult of access. Far from taking an esoteric approach, such as the obscure visions of the missionaries, he was able to show that it is only possible to understand China through an intimate knowledge of her ancient texts.

Appendix: The Reception of Granet in China

The works of Granet (*Gelanyan* 葛蘭言) have received varied receptions in China. His claim to explain Chinese society and thought if not better than, then at least differently than, Chinese scholars has scarcely been enthusiastically received. The interpretations of “sinological anthropology” have been criticized.¹⁹ Nevertheless an important part of the Chinese intelligentsia – who studied in France at the beginning of the 20th century – showed an interest in his work. The French school of sociology was appreciated and some of its works were translated into Chinese. Durkheim’s *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* were translated and prefaced by Xu Deheng 許德珩 (1890–1940) and Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940); Wang Li 王力 (1900–1986), who studied at the University of Paris, also published a translation of Durkheim’s *De la division du travail social* in 1936. The principal publications of Marcel Mauss, including his *Essai sur le don* were also translated. Yang Kun 楊堃 (1901–1998), who had been Granet’s student, was influenced by his works before graduating in 1930. He published an *Introduction to the Research of Marcel Granet* in 1943. Today’s Chinese school of anthropology has promoted Granet as one of the most important of the European scholars who worked for the understanding of China. Amongst them, Wang Mingming 王銘銘 – who teaches in Peking and is one of the school’s most public figures – has promoted the translations and works of Mauss and Granet, which have been rediscovered and revalorized. In the footsteps of Granet, folklorists such as Ma Changyi 馬昌儀, and mythologists, such as Yuan Ke 袁珂, have, in a certain manner, placed their research in the line of the scientific study of beliefs and “superstitions” (the word *mixin* 迷信 is of Japanese origin) that have resurfaced after the Cultural Revolution. Today’s Chinese school of anthropology can trace its origins back to the work of Granet and of Mauss, as Wang Mingming (2018, 151) notes. In the current political context, Granet has benefitted from renewed interest as a promoter of Chinese thought in the West (Lu 2018).

¹⁹ See Xu Lufeng and Ji Zhe 2018, 40–41 ff, and the special issue of the journal *cArgo, Revue Internationale d’Anthropologie culturelle & sociale* on “The New Chinese anthropology. La nouvelle anthropologie chinoise.”

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TRANSLATION REVIEW

Zhuangzi. The Way of Nature

Illustrated by C. C. Tsai. Foreword by Edward Slingerland

Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2019,
xvi + 237 pp.

ISBN: 9780691179742

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Keywords: Zhuangzi, Chinese philosophy, daoism, comic, Tsai Chih Chung

關鍵詞：莊子，國學，道學，漫畫，蔡志忠

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When the renowned academic publisher Princeton University Press decides to publish a comic book, it has to be something special. And indeed, the English translation of C. C. Tsai's comic version of the *Zhuangzi* is such a special thing.

Born in 1948, the Taiwanese Tsai Chih Chung 蔡志忠 became one of Asia's most famous cartoonists. As Brian Bruya states in his introduction to the present book (xv): "At the height of his popularity as a syndicated cartoonist, he turned in yet another direction - the illustration of the Chinese classics in comic book format. They were an instant success and propelled him to the top of the bestseller list". More than 40 million copies in over twenty languages of C. C. Tsai's comic versions of the classics were sold. In his foreword to the present book, Edward Slingerland (ix) testifies to the impact upon him of C. C. Tsai's version of the «*Zhuangzi*», a copy of which he came across in a local bookstore when he was studying in Taiwan in the late 1980s: "The drawings themselves were wonderful and really seemed to capture the spirit of the text as I'd glimpsed it in English. Probably more importantly, the *baihua* (colloquial) Chinese explanations and dialogues vividly brought to life the conversations and stories that I was struggling to comprehend as I slogged through the painfully difficult original text. The original classical Chinese appeared in the margins, so I could refer back to it, but the illustrations and lively modern Chinese gave me an easy and pleasurable way to access the ideas behind the text".

In the present English version of the text, done by Brian Bruya, the original layout has been kept intact. In the margins, we find the original classical Chinese text, and the colloquial Chinese of the text balloons in the original work have been replaced by equally lively colloquial English. All in all, 155 stories from the Inner Chapters, Outer Chapters, and Miscellaneous Chapters (with the exception of chapter 33 (All-under-Heaven) of the «*Zhuangzi*» are rendered into a comic version. Among this selection, we find such famous stories as 'Huizi's Giant Gourds', 'Three at Dawn and Four at Dusk', 'The Dream of the Butterfly', 'The Cook Carves Up a Cow', 'A Tree's Natural Life Span', 'An Autumn Flood', 'The Frog in the Well', 'Zhuangzi Drums to Death', and 'Catch the Fish, Discard the Trap'.

The philosophy of the *Zhuangzi* which, through these stories, is made easily accessible for the reader who is not familiar with Chinese classical philosophy is further succinctly

introduced in Brian Bruya's introduction, touching upon the pre-Qin history of China, the development of the so-called 'one hundred philosophical schools', and the basic ideas of 'Daoist' philosophy. For the lay reader, the fact that contemporary scholarship has raised many questions on the authenticity of the text and its possible authorship(s), is not of primary concern and should not distract her or him from the general philosophical message conveyed in the selected stories. Text-historical questions may be of importance for the sinologist, but even for the sinologist, the comic drawings and witty expressions of the book more than once conjure up a smile. After all, as C. C. Tsai allegedly said: "I work 365 days a year, 18 hours a day, but at the same time I am not working at all because I am just enjoying what I am doing". Or as Brian Bruya phrased it: "This book is the result of playtime in his modest studio" (xvi).

When "not all conventions are as useful, benign, or advantageous as they are often made out to be" (xiii), this Princeton University Press comic version of the «*Zhuangzi*», with the visual dimension that brings the reader directly into the world of the ancients, is both for the sinologist and for the lay reader alike, a very enjoyable book – and that is what it should be.

In 2018, the English versions of C. C. Tsai's «*The Analects*» (translation by Brian Bruya; foreword by Michael Puett) and «*The Art of War*» (translation by Brian Bruya; foreword by Lawrence Freedman) were also published, and, in 2020 also the English version of his «*Dao De Jing*» (translation by Brian Bruya; foreword by Pico Iyer) was published.



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TRANSLATION REVIEW

Die Reise in den Westen. Ein klassischer chinesischer Roman mit 100 Holzschnitten nach alten Ausgaben

[The Journey to the West. A Classic Chinese Novel. With 100 Wood-cuts from Old Editions]

Translated and commented by Eva Lüdi Kong

Stuttgart, Reclam, 2016, 1320 pp.

ISBN: 9783150108796

Der Schlüssel zur “Reise in den Westen”. Entstehung und Deutung des Romans

[The Key to the Journey to the West. Origins and Interpretation of the Novel]

Translated and edited by Eva Lüdi Kong

Stuttgart, Reclam, 2019, 260 pp.

ISBN: 9783150112250

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Keywords: Journey to the West, Four classic novels, Ming novels, Wu Cheng'en, translation studies

關鍵詞：西遊記，四大古典小說，明代小說，吳承恩，翻譯研究，翻譯評論

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The novel *Journey to the West* (*Xiyou ji* 西遊記) ranks among the masterworks of the Ming novel and has remained among the favourite reading matter of Chinese audiences up to the present time. To Western reading audiences, the *Journey* first became generally accessible through Arthur Waley's (1889–1966) much abridged but highly readable rendition *Monkey* (Waley 1942), which was retranslated into various other European languages (including German) and has since been widely circulated. Waley's truncated *Monkey* omitted numerous episodes and in fact included only about 30 out of the 100 chapters, for which reason some Sinologists considered it a "retelling" rather than a translation, and at best an essentialised, at worst a distorted, representation of the novel. The first full translation of the *Journey* into English was offered by Anthony C. Yu (Yu Guofan 余國藩, 1938–2015), whose *The Journey to the West* (Yu 1977–1983; rev. ed., 2013) was published in four volumes between 1977 and 1983. Yu's translation was uncompromisingly integral, as it was based on the earliest known edition of the novel *Xiyou ji* by the Nanjing publisher Shide tang 世德堂 (1582), the supremacy of which Glen Dudbridge (1938–2017) had established primarily for its earliness and assumed closeness to the original (hence Dudbridge (1969, 184) termed it edition A.1). Yu included virtually the entire number of the estimated 750 verse passages, the importance of which he justly emphasised. Moreover, he equipped his unabridged translation with a scholarly apparatus comprising many hundreds of notes explaining to the reader anything he might not readily understand in the text, or the implications of which could enrich the reader's understanding. In 2013, Yu's translation was republished in a revised and updated edition.

André Lévy's (1925–2017) French translation *La Pérégrination vers l'Ouest*, published in 1991, is comparable to Yu's *Journey*, although it was somewhat more selective in translating the verse and other potentially redundant passages in the text. Another, no less admirable approach to English renditions of the full *Journey* is represented by W.J.F. Jenner's (b. 1940) *Journey to the West*, which was published almost simultaneously with Anthony Yu's version, between 1982 and 1984 (Jenner 1982–1986), and which sought to address the general readership, and hence tried to achieve a high level of readability, virtually doing without any notes and also omitting many of the verse passages.

These earlier attempts at translating the full *Xiyou ji* novel, as outlined above, represent a range of possible approaches to the question of comprehensiveness and solutions for some of the particular challenges posed by the text. They render it evident enough that any translator attempting a new rendition of this novel must make some basic decisions and devise an overall strategy. Translating the *Journey* has to take into account that there is not a single text, but in fact a choice of relevant early editions of this novel. Moreover, in its reception history, in China too, there have been varying perspectives and approaches, representing positions along a wide scale, with its popular perception as a collection of folklore, at the one end, and sophisticated attempts at decoding its assumed depths of wisdom and of religious-philosophical knowledge, at the other.

The new translation of the *Xiyou ji* into German, to be reviewed here, is the work of the Swiss Sinologist Eva Lüdi Kong (b. 1968). While it comprises the full number of one hundred chapters and therefore may be considered “complete”, it nevertheless turns out to be tied to a markedly different edition of the novel as compared to previous full translations. The translator chose the 1663 edition by the title *Xiyou zheng dao shu* 西遊證道書 (The Book on Fulfilling the Way on the Journey to the West) as the basis of her rendition. This edition (C.1 in Dudbridge’s nomenclature), upon its first publication in the early decades of the Qing, quickly overshadowed all the other versions of the *Journey*. Its editors, though, had systematically pruned the text, omitting “most of the verse passages and much of the circumstantial detail” that we find in other editions (i.e., types A and B in Dudbridge’s system of editions) (Dudbridge 1969, 152), which reduced the overall length of the text by about one third. The editors supported the validity of their widely different version of the novel by the high claim that it actually represented the novel’s “urtext” (*guben* 古本, as opposed to the editions in circulation, termed *suben* 俗本, “vulgar editions”) which they attributed to the eminent Southern Song patriarch of the Quanzhen 全真 sect of Daoism, Qiu Chuji 丘處機 (1148–1227), based on a – most likely faked – preface they included. While this claim may have been bought by readers in the Qing, it is nowadays considered an obvious fabrication. The editors’ entire strategy, camouflaging textual innovation by anachronistically appealing to old authority and not shying away from fabricating

“evidence” in support of this construction, is strongly reminiscent of Jin Shengtan’s 金聖嘆 (1608–1661) pathbreaking edition of *Shuihu zhuan* 水滸傳 (Water Margin Saga), first published around 1644, thus preceding the *Xiyou zheng dao shu* by about two decades (Cf. Altenburger 2014). The two editing projects’ obvious parallels also pertain to their commentaries, which primarily rely on chapter comments placed ahead of each chapter. The 1663 edition of *Xiyou ji* was produced by two scholars-turned-publishers and book merchants in Hangzhou, Wang Xiangxu 汪象旭 (1604–1668, originally from Huizhou 徽州) and Huang Zhouxing 黃周星 (1611–1681, originally from Nanjing 南京), who likely combined in this edition their mercantile interests with their Daoist affiliation (Widmer 1988; Robertson 2002; Rolston 1997, 73–76). While Wang is generally considered the author of the pre-chapter comments, Huang is given credit for the comprehensive editing of the novel’s text.¹ Through the Daoist authorship they construed and Wang’s commentary, they were also influential in putting forward a Daoist line of reading of the text despite its ostensibly Buddhist plot. In the years right after the conquest, when the new Qing regime was still far from consolidated, Quanzhen Daoism was closely associated with Ming loyalism.

As for the translator’s choice of the *Xiyou zheng dao shu* as the basis of her new rendition of the full *Journey*, it clearly remains disputable. Some might argue that this is not the classic text² and that so many of the finer points of the earlier edition(s) are missing in it; nevertheless, others might justly counter that it was mostly in this edition that the novel was being circulated and read throughout the Qing. The employment of an already streamlined text from which most of the numerous verse passages had already been erased, exempted the translator from the thankless task of having to make any cuts by herself and thus crucially contributed to improving the readability of a text that is otherwise notorious for its tedious longueurs. Thus, the translator’s textual choice followed a smart, viable middle course between the contradictory demands of relative completeness, on the one hand, and easier accessibility, on the other. It would

¹ While it is officially attributed to Wang Xiangxu, Rolston thinks that there is reason to believe that the commentary was at least partially written by Huang. See Rolston 1997, 74.

² Sinological readers might complain that modern editions of this version of the novel are not so readily available. The translator herself hints (“Nachwort”, p. 1317) that she mainly based herself on the edition *Huang Zhouxing ding ben Xiyou zheng dao shu*.

have been preferable, though, had this new translation declared the alternative choice of its reference edition openly, right on the title page. However, somewhat infelicitously, the identification of the source text was banished to the final pages of the post-script (pp. 1317–1318). It nevertheless is logical and appropriate that the translator avoided attributing the text to any individual authorship, neither to Wu Cheng'en 吳承恩 (ca. 1500– ca. 1582) to whom the novel is still conventionally ascribed (despite the scant evidence), nor to the two early-Qing editors behind the edition *Xiyou zheng dao shu*. By not indicating any authorship, not even “anonymous”, the translator justly supports the notion of the *Journey* as an accretive text that was shaped by many hands.

The reading process is supported by a list of all the deities mentioned in the text, provided in the volume's appendix (“Verzeichnis der Gottheiten”, pp. 1265–1283), offering the reader good service in navigating through the novel's eclectic pantheon. In her general introduction to the list, the translator emphasises the novel's “playful and impious” treatment of this pantheon, and its “profane traits” that constantly approximate the deities' behavior to the human world (p. 1265). The list also serves to relieve the footnotes of much of their typical burden, instead reserving them for occasionally needed additional information, such as the elucidation of difficult terminology or the identification of source quotations. It is somewhat regrettable, though, that source references are not tied to any editions of texts. In other respects, however, the technical standard of this translation rather resembles that of a Sinological publication, such as in its use of romanised transcription (Hanyu Pinyin) with tone signs added, and even including Chinese script wherever a Sinological reader might expect it. The set of high-quality illustrations that were prepared on the basis of woodcut blockprints is a useful paratextual feature that not only embellishes the volume's overall appearance, but facilitates the reader's imagination of the novel's strange world (in more than one sense). The German publishing house Reclam is to be congratulated for making no compromises in presenting the translation volume in such a state-of-the-art way.

The translator's outstanding achievement has already been duly acknowledged by the award of the 2017 Leipzig Book Fair's translation prize, which further increased the translation's publicity and helped advertise it to a readership that far surpassed the typically narrow circles of specialists and amateurs of traditional Chinese literature and

culture. Since the translator's mastery manifest in this German-language rendition can hardly be done justice to in an English-language review, a few general observations and a small number of examples will have to suffice here. The translation work is noted, first of all, for its high aspiration of leaving nothing in the source text untranslated. The translator, moreover, demonstrates a precise sensitivity for the subtleties and finesse of the rich and nuanced vocabulary of the novel's hybrid source language that oscillates between lowly vernacular and high literary style. She frequently exhibits ingenuity in finding creative solutions, especially in rendering verses in rhythmic style and with end rhymes (in even-numbered lines). The reader is stunned, beyond that, by the translator's mastery in dealing with technical terminology that is always based on sound expertise in a wide range of fields, whether Daoist Inner Alchemy, Buddhism, or demonology. While acutely aware of the text's witty and playful sides, the translator insists on the ultimate profundity of the knowledge incorporated in the text.

Place names, except for historical-geographical place names within the realm of the Chinese empire, are translated as a rule, since they tend to include rather strong allegorical connotations. Family names, too, are translated if they bear obvious allegorical meaning, such as in chapter 20: "... Mein Sippename ist Schein; der meines Mannes Kein. ..." (p. 305; "...My maiden name is 'Illusion', that of my husband 'No'." 小婦人娘家姓賈，夫家姓莫。). This would appear somewhat forced, though, since in Chinese the family names Jia 賈 and Mo 莫 do exist, while the allegorical meaning of *jia* is only implied via the homophone (賈/假).

Terms of address are generally handled in a skilful way. There are only a few cases of terms of self-reference that may be confusing to the reader since their deictic implication of the first-person is too weak or virtually absent, such as when the Tang Monk's 唐僧 (i.e. Tripitaka's) self-reference *pimseng* 貧僧 is rendered as "geringer Mönch" ("humble monk", chap. 25, p. 332). The exclamation "Der gute Dämon!" ("The good demon!" 那怪物, e.g., chap. 27, p. 352) is repeatedly employed as a formula introducing the description of a demon's behavior. While not a literal translation and perhaps somewhat surprising since demons in the *Journey* are hardly ever "good", it nevertheless is a suitable stylistic choice since it seems to borrow from the language of German fairytales.

Puns are among the greatest challenges for translators, since they can hardly ever be satisfactorily reproduced in the target language, such as in the case of the homophonic pun on *xing* 性/姓, ‘character’/ ‘family name’ (in chapter 1) that is dealt with in the least elegant way, by resorting to transcription combined with an explanation in a note (p. 30, n. 23). In chapter 34, Sun Wukong, in order to confuse some simple-minded demons, inverts the elements of his name *Sun xing zhe* 孫行者 to *zhe xing Sun* 者行孫. The rendering as “Pilger Sun / Sunger Pil” (p. 434) structurally imitates the permutation of syllables, which is one viable way of dealing with this pun.³ A semiotically particularly inventive solution for a pun is found in chapter 20, where gluttonous Zhu Bajie’s 豬八戒 hunger cannot be satisfied by a host who explains:

“Auf die Schnelle kann ich kein Gramm an weiteren Speisen auftreiben. ...” (At short notice I cannot provide a single gram of additional food. 倉卒無饒。)

To which Bajie responds:

“Was schwatzt der Alte, es hat doch keiner ein Orakel gelegt. Egal, ob ‘Trigramm’ oder ‘Hexagramm’, bringt her, was Ihr habt, ...” (What is the old man babbling about, no one has had their fortune told after all. Whether ‘trigram’ or ‘hexagram’, bring over whatever you have. 老兒滴答甚麼，誰和你發課，說甚麼五爻六爻，有飯只管添將來就是。 pp. 271-272)

Zhu Bajie mishears *yao* 饒 (‘meal’, in elevated style) for the homophonic *yao* 爻 (‘line of a hexagram’), as is additionally explained in a footnote. By introducing the seme/phoneme ‘Gramm/-gramm’ (‘gram/-gram’), the translator creates an isotopy that links up food with the terminology of oracular hexagram analysis according to the *Yi-jing* 易經 (Classic of Changes), as suggested by the phrase *wuyao-liuyao* 五爻六爻 (‘fifth line and sixth line’). However, while in the Chinese text the semantic layer is shifted back to the theme of ‘food’, this is only implied in the translation, which is one reason why the recreation of this pun, despite the clever idea, fails to convince entirely. Nevertheless, while these few examples have just highlighted some problems of

³ Yu 1977-1983, 2: 144: “Pilgrim Sun / Grimpil Sun”. Since Lüdi Kong’s translation was based on a widely different source, no attempt is made here, otherwise, to compare it to any of its predecessors translated into English or any other language.

translation, it must be emphasised, once again, that this German rendition is indeed rich in felicitous solutions and pleases the reader with its high level of readability and differentiation of style. Since the entire translation was published in one heavy (1.7 kg) volume, readers who intend to take this book on a journey are advised to buy the e-book version instead.

In her knowledgeable postscript (“Nachwort”) to the volume, besides the typical philological questions, such as that of textual tradition, the translator also introduces a range of approaches toward more profound textual interpretations. As a matter of fact, in this essay she already provides the reader with several “keys” to reading the text. If the supplementary volume *Der Schlüssel zur “Reise in den Westen”. Entstehung und Deutung des Romans* (The Key to the *Journey to the West*. Origins and Interpretation, henceforth referred to as *Schlüsse*), published three years after the translation, at least in its title promises “the key” to the text, this may therefore seem somewhat misleading, even more so since it first of all offers to the interested reader a range of related source materials in German translation, the general concept of which is similar to a Chinese source collection that also served as the reference for some of the materials included (Zhu Yixuan (1983) 2002). The sources divide into three categories: (A) early versions of related story material, (B) prefaces and comments, and (C) overall commentaries on the novel. Part (A) is further subdivided into (I) early narratives on Xuanzang and the *Journey to the West*, (II) early versions of individual episodes of the novel, and (III) early tales about divine monkeys. Each item carries a brief introduction, which, however, does not always point out clearly enough the reason why this particular item has been selected, and what episode in the *Journey* it pertains to. Therefore, while browsing through this supplementary volume, the status and relevance of the textual excerpts may not always be evident to the reader.

This source collection in translation, nevertheless, is a treasure trove well worth a discovery tour. Particularly noteworthy among the texts included in section (I) are the fragmentary storyteller’s script “Tang Sanzang qu jing shihua” 唐三藏取經詩話 (Chantefable on Tripitaka’s fetching of the holy scriptures), an early popularised narrative from the Southern Song; and the Yuan dramatist Yang Na’s 楊訥 northern-style singing drama script (*zaju* 雜劇) “Xiyou ji” 西遊記 (The journey to the west). In the

case of the latter text, though, due to the overall length of the play, a number of scenes have been paraphrased rather than translated. The first item among the potential precursors to episodes in the novel, “Tang Taizong ruming ji” 唐太宗入冥記 (Tang emperor Taizong enters the netherworld), is known exclusively from a Dunhuang cave library document (S.2603, held in the British Library). It is fragmented in some places and hard to decipher due to writing variants for numerous graphs. It is somewhat infelicitous, though, that the translator based her partial rendition (*Schlüssel*, pp. 100–103) on Wang Zhongmin’s 王重民 anthology of transformation texts (*bianwen* 變文) from Dunhuang (Wang Zhongmin (1957) 1984, 1: 209–215), which no longer reflects the current textual research on early vernacular narratives from Dunhuang. She might have made use of more recent improved editions of the text that have filled some lacunae and cleared up some uncertainties in Wang’s earlier transcription (e.g., Huang Zheng and Zhang Yongquan 1997). Section “A.III” offers three items of monkey lore from the Tang and Song whose relevance for the *Journey* may be less than obvious to the reader. The third item among them, entitled “*Chen xunjian Meiling shi qi ji*” 陳巡檢梅嶺失妻記 (How Inspector Chen lost his wife on Plum Ridge), is somewhat obscurely identified in the introductory lines as a “short story” and a “storyteller script”, and the references (*Schlüssel*, p. 258) do not disclose its original source, for the translator just refers to the aforementioned collection of source materials. Actually this is an item from the early vernacular story collection *Liushi jia xiaoshuo* 六十家小說 (Sixty stories), better known by its modern title *Qingping shantang huaben* 清平山堂話本 (Storyteller scripts from the Qingping Mountain Hall), only part of which is preserved (Hong Bian 1955, 121–136). Since merely a content summary is provided for this item, a reference to a full translation into another European language would have been in place here besides a proper source identification (Dars 1987, 397–418).

Part B of the source collection comprises the two categories of (I) prefaces and post-scripts found in early editions, and (II) general critical comments and essays. The translator at first included in the supplementary volume the three arguably most important prefaces to the *Journey*, being that by Chen Yuanzhi 陳元之 (to the Shide tang edition of 1592), the one by Yuan Yuling 袁于令 (1592–1674) (to the “Li Zhuowo”

李卓吾 edition, probably from the late 1620s), and that included in the reference edition of 1663, attributed to Yu Ji 虞集 (1272–1348), a third-generation disciple of Qiu Chuji's, whose – likely fabricated – “preface” is instrumental in construing Qiu's alleged authorship. Apart from these, the translator apparently sought to outline the wide range of interpretive approaches to the text that variously include Daoist, Buddhist, Neo-Confucian and syncretist views. The emphasis on syncretism, in particular, becomes evident from several of the included prefaces and critical comments, and some allegorical readings are exemplified by them, such as, in Zhang Hanzhang's 張含章 (ca. 1730–1829) postscript to *Xiyou zhengzhi* 西遊正旨 (The proper intent of the *Journey to the West*, 1819), the idea of exploring the deeper meaning of the novel with the help of the system of hexagrams and trigrams according to the *Classic of Changes* (*Schlüssel*, pp. 147–151).

The translations are generally reliable, with few exceptions, such as the too literal rendering and insufficiently complex understanding of the term *haoshizhe* 好事者 as “Leute, die sich dafür interessierten” (“people who were interested in it”, *Schlüssel*, p. 136). This term is as ubiquitous as it is hard to grasp in prefaces to late Ming and early Qing vernacular texts, where it approximates meanings like ‘amateurs’, ‘busybodies’ or ‘aficionados’ in cultural enterprises, which could have either a slightly pejorative or an appreciative connotation (‘dilettantes’ and ‘devotees’, respectively) (McLaren 2005, 163–167).

The final section of the supplementary volume features the translation of all the one hundred chapter-commentaries from the reference edition of the novel (*Schlüssel*, pp. 177–254), which stands out as by far the longest item in the entire book. It is only logical that the translator, favouring this particular edition, also wished to include its chapter-commentaries, even more so since it was the earliest full commentary on the *Journey* and became an integral part of the edition *Xiyou zhengdao shu*. Besides the pre-chapter comments, it also included other means of commenting on the text, such as interlinear comments, which were too inconvenient to translate. Since the comments on each chapter are introduced by the – somewhat pretentious – phrase *Danyi zi yue* 澹漪子曰 (“Thus spoke Master Tranquil Water Ripples”), they are identified as having been written by Wang Xiangxu, who adopted *Danyi* 澹漪 as a changed style

name (*gengzi* 更字). The rather comprehensive translation of these chapter comments (though with occasional omissions) represents yet another tour de force. It would appear somewhat anachronistic, though, that terms such as “Buddhismus” (Buddhism) and “Daoismus” (Daoism) are used where we find *fo* 佛 and *xian* 仙 in the Chinese text (*Schlüssel*, p. 177). While the author’s strong inclination toward ideas of the Dao, with occasional references to *Zhuangzi* 莊子 and *Laozi* 老子, and an overwhelming interest in Inner Alchemy (“Golden Elixir”) can clearly be perceived, we also find strong doses of Five Phases (Wuxing 五行) and Yin-Yang 陰陽 thought, and moreover rather numerous references to the *Classic of Changes* and its system of hexagrams and trigrams, whereas Buddhist references are relatively rare. Literary, rhetorical and structural ideas, such as comparisons between different chapters, play only a marginal role, which most evidently sets this apart from the approach chosen by Jin Shengtan in his chapter commentary on *Water Margin*. There is only one comment that draws a cross-comparison to *Water Margin* (on chapter 8, *Schlüssel*, p. 185), and in the final comment on chapter 100, a rather superficial comparison is drawn to the other masterworks of the Ming novel, when the uplifting concluding chapter of the *Journey* is favorably compared to the depressing endings of the other three works (*Schlüssel*, p. 254).

As another appropriate pick (*Schlüssel*, pp. 165–176), the translator chose to include Liu Yiming’s 劉一明 (1734–1821) “Xiyou yuanzhi dufa” 西遊原旨讀法 (Reading instruction for *The Original Intent of the Journey to the West*, 1778). This “reading instruction” (*dufa* 讀法) essay served to introduce a new edition which was published over a century later than, and clearly built on, Wang Xiangxu’s and Huang Zhouxing’s edition.⁴ Interestingly, this commentator disliked Wang Xiangxu’s previous commentary which he criticised as “frivolous”.

Most items in this supplementary volume are translated incompletely, with passages omitted here and there, which is an acceptable approach to such texts for which integrality is not always required, though the reader might have wished to know how much

⁴ It was also translated into English by Anthony C. Yu as “How to Read the Original Intent of the Journey to the West,” in Rolston 1990, 299–315.

text was omitted in each place, and perhaps also for what reason. Despite some flaws, the supplementary volume is a welcome addition to the marvellous translation.

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BOOK REVIEW

Fragile Elite: The Dilemmas of China's Top University Students

Susanne Bregnbæk

Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2016, 172 pp.

ISBN: 9780804796071

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Keywords: Education system, youth identity, university elites, Chinese Communist Party, suicide

關鍵詞：教育系統，青年身份，大學精英，中共，自殺，書評

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At the centre of the investigation Bregnbæk undertakes in her compelling monograph "Fragile Elite" stands the question of the identity of Chinese elite students at the two universities of Tsinghua and Beijing University. Drawing on the data from two phases of field work, conducted in 2005 and 2007, in which she entered into dialogue with not only students, but also teachers and parents, she examines how these elite students experience being one in a million who have made it to the top of the education system.

Referring to the so-called Oedipal Project as the natural need of children to withdraw more and more from the influence of their parents in the context of growing up, Bregnbæk presents the social dilemma of double binds (15) in the context of the still socially, but also politically persistent relevance of traditional concepts like Confucian filial piety. For example, young Chinese find themselves confronted with the tension between the need for self-realisation and the fulfilment of the generational contract of the sacrifices made by their parents. She also succeeds in highlighting the fact that these double-bind tensions can be identified due to structural parallels between the political system and the family system in the overall social context. The Communist Party presents itself as a parental figure whose expectations are also projected on to today's youth, who identify their own social role as children of the state (79).

The all-encompassing framework of her research builds on suicides among elite students, whose motives form both the introduction (1) and the conclusion (139) of her investigation. Within this framework, Chapters 1 and 2 deal mainly with Confucian filial piety and its role in the relationship of students to parents, as well as to the state. Using *inter alia* the example of the student JingJing, Bregnbæk highlights the influence of Confucian filial piety on the identification process of young people in modern society in the People's Republic of China (27). Furthermore, it is shown that the tensions between self-realisation and self-sacrifice triggered by the Oedipal Project do not so much lead to an active counteraction against parental ideas by the children, but are rather resolved, for example, by the secret second lives of the students (59).

The central subject of the following chapters 3 and 4 is primarily the role of the Communist Party in the self-location process of the young elite and what role party membership plays in that process. Bregnbæk focuses not only on students, but also on teachers as representatives of the political system (66). It is evident that the parental

role of the party (71) appears to be effective in the overall social context and thus the appeal to the Confucian filial piety of its citizens appears to be effective overall. However, this is also accompanied by the already mentioned tensions caused by the Oedipal Project in the smaller family context, now transferred to the overall social level (74). Furthermore, although she identifies love for the Party to be a possible reason for entry in the case of certain interlocutors (83), it is nevertheless clear that the intended membership of an increasing number of students can rather be identified from the pragmatic point of view as the means to an end. Here, it is not so much a political persuasion as the desire for the social mobility that goes hand in hand with membership that is at the centre of the decision (89). In this case, she notes from conversations with students over an extended period of time that even those students who had previously joined the party out of political persuasion experienced gradual disillusionment in the face of spreading corruption within the party (96).

Chapter 5 then discusses the role of the Chinese education system as well as that of childcare in the context of the one-child policy. The central motif here is the concept of *suzhi jiaoyu* 素质教育 (education for quality) along with that of the spoiled little empresses and emperors. Bregnbæk emphasises the direct connection between the one-child policy and the ongoing discourse about the little emperors (99). Furthermore, she presents the so-called *suzhi jiaoyu* as a contradictory and above all unsuccessful concept. While *suzhi jiaoyu* was originally adopted to educate "innovative citizens" and relieve students of pressure, its reality appears to be a test- and party-centered competitive system whose extracurricular courses further increase the pressure on students (105).

In Chapter 6, Bregnbæk concludes by returning to the subject of suicides among students. Here, the psychological problems of affected students are examined in the context of the double bind and again *suzhi jiaoyu*. Not only is the handling and perception of the topic of suicides within different parties such as the students, universities, or the parents illuminated (123-125), she also takes a closer look at the possibility of an interpretation of suicide as a social critique (134). Taking into account the traditional use of suicide as a means of referring to social injustice in the public sphere, she finally comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to give precise answers to the questions

about the reasons for committing suicide in the context of this work. She finds clear words, however, in her conclusion on the tabooing of this topic by the official authorities. In Bregnbæk's view, the suicide of the educational elite and an active discourse in public space would, for example, have the potential to question the logic of the system of self-sacrifice and fulfilment of the generational contract, both in the family and in society as a whole (136-137).

In my opinion, the most significant point of criticism lies in the transparency of the methodology applied by Bregnbæk. She does not go into detail about exactly what criteria she used to select her interlocutors, nor how exactly she accessed them. For example, she only mentions within one subordinate clause that she looked for interlocutors by using an advertisement on the university intranet (47). Instead, it would have been interesting, for example in the context of the introduction, to know what problems she encountered during her data collection within her field research, especially in the light of her quite provocative research topic. Moreover, it is not possible clearly to identify exactly how her interview approach was designed. An explanation of how the dialogues were structured and guided would have been just as interesting as, for example, the selection and type of questions asked.

Apart from that, I consider Bregnbæk's work to be a valuable and important contribution to the current topic of the identification processes of young Chinese in today's People's Republic. She succeeds in explaining to the reader in a logical and understandable way the complex identification processes and the associated problems to which young Chinese people are exposed against the background of overall social as well as individual family situations. Even though the question of identity is not new, Bregnbæk's work is particularly outstanding for its interdisciplinary approach to her subject. Thus, her analysis includes Mencius (11) or the 24 Paragons of Filial Piety (36), as well as Arendt (27), Freud (38), or Laing (132). It should also be emphasised that she is always aware of the problems of transcultural applicability of Western theories to her subject (38), as well as of her participatory role in the research process (98).



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BOOK REVIEW

Муравей грызет кость. Избранные очерки о Китае

[Ants Gnawing at a Bone – Selected Texts about China]

Владимир Яковлевич Портяков Vladimir Portyakov

Москва: «ИД ФОРУМ» [Moscow: Phorum Publishing House], 2018, 464 pp.

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Keywords: People's Republic of China, Chinese politics, international relations, foreign policies, economic development, social transformation, New Era

關鍵詞：中華人民共和國，中國政治，國際關係，外交政治，經濟發展，社會轉型，新時代，書評

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The book “Ants Gnawing at a Bone – Selected Texts about China” (*Муравей грызет кость. Избранные очерки о Китае*) is a collection of roughly 30 papers written throughout some 40 years by Vladimir Portyakov, one of Russia’s most accomplished and respected sinologists and the author of more than 300 publications including nine individual monographs in both Russian and English languages. Although it is his latest major work to be published thus far (2018), this collection contains only a small part of Portyakov’s academic contributions presented in chronological order from 1975 to 2017 and mainly dealing with both principal areas of his academic research on China, namely the evolution of its economic and its foreign policies during the reform and opening-up era.

The instructive name of the book derives from a well-known Chinese idiom signifying perseverance to achieve a long term goal “like ants gnawing at a bone” (蚂蚁啃骨头). Portyakov, however, thus defines his principal methodological approach: that the basis of real sinological research is the ascent from the particular to the general, from micro to macro based purely on reflections on Chinese-language sources. Notably, following his own advice to dwell beyond the Russian sinological ‘ivory tower’, the author reveals a close acquaintance with the relevant scholarship and deep understanding of its principal debates not only in China and the Chinese-speaking part of the world, but in the West as well.

The book’s roughly 30 texts can be grouped into those dealing with China specifically, namely its economic development, political system and foreign policies; those analysing Sino-Russian relations, including an informative piece on the evolution of Chinese studies in Russia; and reviews of international conferences attended by the author in different parts of the world, with particular emphasis on research into the Overseas Chinese. The monograph starts with a series of economic essays, reflecting Portyakov’s original academic training and diplomatic work in China. Throughout quite a personal experience of the many twists and turns of the reform era, the author not only demonstrates an impressive knowledge of these complex processes but also hints at the wish for his own country to learn more from the Chinese success story instead of eventually opting for the neo-liberal shock therapy that largely caused much suffering soon after

the collapse of the Soviet Union. The progression of economy-themed contributions highlights the uniqueness of China's breath-taking growth rates.

In the case of domestic politics, a recurring topic is Portyakov's conviction that it is the peasantry that continues to have the largest potential to destabilise China's party-state. His remarkable sinological training is perhaps most visible and fruitful in those informative papers that thoroughly analyse some of the most important concepts of Chinese foreign policy making throughout the reform era. Indeed, Portyakov convincingly reveals how Deng Xiaoping's famous *taoguang yanghui* (韬光养晦) adage has become an important feature of 'China threat' theories due to its fundamental misinterpretation in the West in general and the U.S. in particular as 'biding time/hiding capabilities'. He also dedicates two pieces to the notion of Comprehensive National Power (综合国力), an important Chinese innovation in international relations theory. China's nuanced reactions to famous American calls to become a "responsible stakeholder" are also dealt with in a separate essay.

Naturally, Portyakov addresses quite extensively the complex question of the Sino-Russian relationship. He joins many of his Russian colleagues in acknowledging that the build-up of constructive and friendly relations with China has become one of Moscow's principal successes in the post-Soviet era. This is not to suggest, however, that the author ignores or consciously diminishes important remaining problems and tensions in this multi-dimensional relationship as has increasingly become the case in Russia, particularly its federal centre in Moscow. Quite to the contrary, he is well aware of the intricate Sino-Russian dynamics on their common border in the country's distant Siberian and Far Eastern reaches.

Nevertheless, Portyakov seems to be firm in claiming that Moscow should by all means refrain from simplistic and alarmist 'China threat' narratives and resist the calls to join any ad-hoc balancing coalitions against Beijing. Needless to say, this counsel has apparently become even more timely since Donald Trump's arrival in the White House. According to Portyakov, Russia simply has no sensible alternative to the deepening strategic partnership with China, though it obviously needs constantly to adapt to changing circumstances, including the gradually widening multi-dimensional

asymmetry caused by the rapid rise of its huge partner up to the level of the world's second superpower.

Strictly speaking, this book is not only about China or even Sino-Russian relations. On many occasions Portyakov demonstrates his appreciation for the humanities as opposed to pure social sciences and his willingness to know more about places and topics far beyond those defined by traditional sinology and contemporary China studies. While attending numerous international conferences across the globe he expresses genuine interest in the host and other countries' research on China or the peculiarities of their Chinese diasporic communities, including the so-called 'bananisation' (i.e. Westernisation) of their youth. On the side-lines of the main narrative on things Chinese, his occasional remarks are also dedicated to the rest of the continent (Japan, Korea, India, Southeast Asia) and even beyond.

Portyakov ends his study with a brief but touching conclusion in which he sums up the need to break down the entrenched myth that China's development during the reform era was a straightforward process, without major interruptions except for the 1989 Tiananmen crisis. Although in reality a much more complex phenomenon, as he shows, it should still be considered a remarkable success story at least for now. Portyakov's last point drawn from the Chinese lesson, telling us that in order to ensure its greatness a state has to emphasise development, not vice versa, seems to be covertly addressed primarily to his own country. Surely, the big remaining question for all of us now is whether Xi Jinping's China continues to think likewise. In order to try to answer that, we need more ants to gnaw at that bone.



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BOOK REVIEW

Les Enfers vivants ou la tragédie illustrée des coolies chinois à Cuba et au Pérou

Pierre-Emmanuel Roux

Paris, Hémisphères éditions, 2018, 275 pp.

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關鍵詞: 苦力，晚清國際政治，中國移民，古巴，秘魯，書評

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“One can’t find rest but in death, and one can be afraid that from now on it is the best a Chinese can hope for his sake” (253). The last sentence of *Living Hells: With Plates and Explanations* (*Sheng diyu tushuo* 生地獄圖說) could not better sum up the condition of Chinese coolies in Cuba and Peru in the second half of the 19th century. Cheated, kidnapped, embarked by force on ships described as floating hells, Chinese workers in plantations were exploited, beaten, maimed, mutilated, killed with excruciating methods. Even after passing away, their bones served either as food for wild animals or as materials to refine sugar (226–229). No proper burial was provided for them. Reading *Living Hells* means diving into a rogues’ gallery of descriptions, the next being always more macabre than the former. Published in 1875, this book was instrumental in denouncing the horrible conditions of about 250,000 Chinese coolies in the West. Despite its being widely distributed, it was, however, as short-lived as the characters it depicted: Spain, who feared that the great diffusion of such a pamphlet would encourage Chinese mobs to attack Westerners as a form of retribution, obtained agreement from the Zongli Yamen in 1877 that the book be censored. Most of the exemplars were consequently confiscated and destroyed. Only eight remaining original copies have been identified around the world.

As such, with *Les Enfers vivants ou la tragédie illustrée des coolies chinois à Cuba et au Pérou*, Pierre Emmanuel Roux embarks on a quest to save this historical document from oblivion. This text which was published by one of the most important Cantonese publishing houses of the time—Fuwenzhai 富文齋—has already been mentioned in several pieces of literature concerned with the history of the Chinese coolies. But this translation goes further than acknowledging its existence; it propels the book to another level: it makes it accessible to the modern reader while highlighting its political and, more interestingly, its religious impetus. The text of the *Sheng diyu tushuo* is provided in French translation with a facsimile of the original Chinese, including the original illustrations, for each chapter. It is composed of a preface and 42 short chapters, which are framed by an extended introduction and series of annexes (maps, some supplementary illustrations and a bibliography). Among the supplementary illustrations are notably included images taken from the *Manuscript of the Jade Calendar*

(*Yuli chaozhuan* 玉歷鈔傳)¹, a religious text from which the author of the *Sheng diyu tushuo* drew much inspiration regarding both pictorial representations and writing tropes.

The introduction precisely relocates the pamphlet in its context by presenting the general situation of Chinese coolies during the 19th century—here Roux gives a good synthesis of their legal status, their place in late Qing international politics, but also of the terminologies deployed by historical participants, be they Chinese or Westerners, to label them. The importance of this book which shed light on the life of the coolies abroad and its conjunction with the 1874 Qing Commissions to Cuba and Peru and more generally the talks between China and Spain regarding the status of the coolies are notably clearly expounded on. Through his description, Roux incidentally offers a new perspective on the history of Qing diplomacy: far from being a secondary issue, the problem of coolies was dovetailed with a renewed approach by the Qing towards diplomatic missions. Roux's introduction to the text also gives clear precision on the material conditions in which the book was printed, offering in passing an interesting window on the world of Cantonese publishers at the end of the 19th century, and how a Guangdong governor could have all the existing copies of a book destroyed when needed. Regarding the question of who wrote this pamphlet, the definitive answer remains unfortunately elusive. Roux discusses several hypotheses that have been formulated, and seems to lean towards the possibility that the Reverend Daniel Vrooman (1818–1895) may have largely contributed to the redaction of this book. But because of some inconsistencies, “speculations remain open” (48).

Considering the text, apart from a few exceptions, the chapters are concerned with the stories of 37 men. They follow the same architecture: after a brief personal record of the coolie, and how he was “enrolled,” a description is given of his trip to the Americas, and the hell that was awaiting him there. Each story is concluded by a short maxim or a moral lesson to be drawn from the tale. Nonetheless, as Roux astutely points out, these short accounts are not random scenes, and their sequence is subject to a specific

¹ This morality book (*shanshu* 善書) is by the way available in French translation with the original Chinese in Goossaert, Vincent. 2012. *Livres de morale révélés par les dieux*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 105–155.

organisation. The narration stresses successively the different moments of these journeys to hell. While the first chapters delve into the danger of seafaring, the last put the emphasis on what happens to the bodies of the deceased coolies. There is an agenda behind the composition and the structure of the text. Besides, one should here emphasise the fact that the horrors of the tales narrated were far from fictional. They were slightly adapted from official reports produced by Chinese officials regarding the situation of the coolies in Cuba and in Peru. In his detailed footnotes, Roux identifies the original documents from Chen Lanbin's 陳蘭彬 and Yung Wing's (Rong Hong 容閔) reports that served as original materials for each passage.

It is obvious at first glance that *Sheng diyu tushuo* conveyed a political message. The text “succeeded in synthesising and making audible the voices of hundreds of thousands of Chinese who were eager to denounce this slave trade” (59), Roux asserts. Being one of the earliest illustrated books that offered a representation of Chinese coolies in Chinese language and through Chinese pictorial codes, *Sheng diyu tushuo* rebalances the general representation of the West: Chinese were not necessarily dazzled by its modernity—as an important strand of literature could let us believe—; facing laudatory depiction of the West were also books such as the *Sheng diyu tushuo* that denounced the cruelty of the foreigners. It also reminds us that when Westerners lambasted China for its savagery and the cruelty of its people, they were often but a pot calling the kettle black. Yet, one of the specificities of this pamphlet was the medium through which it marshalled its denunciation. The critique of cruel Western treatment of Chinese coolies was spearheaded by an iconography closely entwined with popular religion. In his preface, the author even clearly mentioned taking inspiration from the *Manuscript of the Jade Calendar*—this fact makes me think that the Vrooman hypothesis is all the more plausible: a Chinese would not have needed to state the obvious.

Regarding now the translation: the French is limpid and respects the general meaning of the original. Sometimes, a few words like “living hell” (which doesn't sound as good in French as it does in English) seem a little too much, but this choice is justified as Roux wants to single out this terminology as a key concept of the text, and the genre in which it found its place. He also provides a great number of notes that shed light on the context, the concepts and the terms that the text deploys. Many remarks dwell on

the religious vocabulary put to use, while others fact-check many elements asserted by the writer. Roux has done here some minute detective work that is praiseworthy. Details in some explanation, notably regarding Buddhism, could of course be improved—e.g. the expression *ban you xin zao* 半由心造 (67) sounds to me more like an adaptation of *jing you xin zao* 境由心造 than what the translator proposes—but it is, all in all, a great work of scholarship. The non-specialist reader will find plenty of information to nourish her understanding of this prose and its background. In the end, Pierre-Emmanuel Roux has produced a serious translation with a very good introduction that rightly restores this forgotten work to the historical place it deserves. I concur with much of the analysis he provides. However, I cannot help thinking that more remarks on the iconography of the pictures opening each chapter might have been welcome for the neophyte.

Some other contextual elements could also have been given more explication. For instance, the author always presents the protagonists as people who were tricked into the “piglet house” (*zhuzai guan* 豬仔館) and forced to sign a working contract that would doom their life. How did that happen? When reading the text, it seems that no sooner had they entered the building than they were doomed to hell. More explanation could have been provided on this very elliptic but crucial node in all the stories narrated. In my reading, I have also noticed an aspect of the book that Roux has failed to single out: the denunciation of lucre and the search for profit. I found quite revealing that most of the stories start with a description of a Chinese person who was duped when he was looking for opportunities to make a pile of money. It seems to me that there is even an ambivalent discourse here: the author denounces the savage practices of the Westerners but by writing his book with reference to the *Yuli chaozhuan* and enlisting therefore the logic of “retribution”, doesn’t he imply that those coolies reaped the consequences of their acts or at least intentions? Finally, the author of the *Sheng diyu tushuo* affirmed several times that the condition of Chinese workers was far worse than that of the “Black slaves” (e.g. 70, 73)—who are incidentally often presented as participants or accomplices of the White masters in the ordeals of the Chinese. Such assertions can be commented on, but ought not be uncritically reproduced.

In conclusion, the book here under review is an important addition to our understanding of the history of Chinese coolies, and more generally to the transnational history of the late Qing era. I hope that with this translation and lengthy commentary, this book is now reborn to a new and longer life. May it also find new incarnations into other languages, for it deals with a subject that should not be swept under the carpet. I should just add two remarks regarding the editing. First, I cannot understand why the spacing between the lines is so wide, or why some pages are not even printed double-sided. Presenting the text in this way is absolutely not environmentally friendly, and it does not look serious. The second comment is linked to the nature of this illustrative book. As Roux explains it, in the original Chinese, the illustration was supposed to be placed on the front of the page, while the text was located on the verso. Texts and images were disconnected from each other to create a peculiar effect: the picture entices the reader to turn the page in order to get the story overleaf, while the new drawing, disconnected from the text she has just read, draws her to another story. Although the French text indeed comes after the image, the Chinese text is now put before it. When translating Chinese, it should be encouraged to translate not only words, ideas, and emotions, but also the cultural practices through which they are channeled, which entails that the original materials (especially when reproduced) should not be altered.

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BOOK REVIEW

La République de Chine: Histoire générale de la Chine (1912-1949)

Xavier Paulès

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關鍵詞: 中華民國，中國現代史，中國革命，內戰，國民黨，書評

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The book here under review is the third instalment published so far of the new general history of China edited by Les Belles Lettres, with Damien Chaussende as general editor. Marianne Bujard's & Michèle Pirazzoli-t'Serstevens' volume on the Qin and Han dynasties was published in 2017, and Gilles Guilleux's book on the People's Republic of China was released in 2018. We are now waiting for the seven remaining volumes of this ambitious *General History of China*.

Xavier Paulès's *La République de Chine* is an important piece of scholarship that offers a long-awaited up-to-date synthesis on a period of Chinese history that has somehow been neglected in French academia since the seminal works of Lucien Bianco, Alain Roux and Marie-Claire Bergère. Writing a history of China strictly limited to the Republican era is, furthermore, a task rarely performed in the West. If one sets aside the dedicated volumes of the *Cambridge History of China*, the Republican era is too seldom discussed for its own sake. It more generally finds its place in two grander narratives: it is either a preparatory stage for the Maoist era that follows or a period that is intimately connected to the end of the Qing era—Peter Zarrow (2005), for instance, wrote what could be regarded as a *History of Republican China from 1895*.¹ Rare, in fact, are the books in western languages solely dedicated to its official chronological time frame. Dieter Kuhn's *Die Republik China von 1912 bis 1937* (2007) may be another example but it leaves aside the final decade of the period. This sets a challenge to Paulès: justifying whether this chronological segmentation is pertinent from a historiographical point of view. Although he reckons that the beginning and end dates of this history could easily be moved up or downstream, Paulès nonetheless answers this conundrum positively by stating that the Republican era holds a genuine unity: "It is the time when a Western styled parliamentary democracy was possible" (*le temps d'un possible pour une démocratie parlementaire à l'occidentale*, 348 highlighted by Paulès)—a characterisation I shall discuss below.

Being part of a series, the book is prohibited from deviating from a foreordained general structure: the first part is to be chronological, the second thematic. Regarding the former, Paulès follows a classic division: after a well-rounded introduction, the initial

¹ This connection with late Qing is also hinted at in several places in Xavier Paulès' book as he draws attention to the continuity between the Republican era and the New Politics of the 1900s.

chapter is dedicated to the 1911 Revolution and its direct aftermath; the second follows with the era of cliques and warlords (1916–1928); the third delves into the Nanking decade; the last two chapters are respectively concerned with the War against Japan (1937–1945) and the Civil War (1945–1949). The second half of the book then offers general syntheses on the economy (chapter 6), state building (chapter 7), social transformation (chapter 8), and cultural renewal (chapter 9). A conclusion in “the manner of an epitaph” (341) closes the monograph by discussing other historical narratives not adduced, and the continuity or resemblance between today’s China and that of the 1930s. This main body of text is finally supplemented with numerous appendices. They include beautiful coloured maps, a succinct chronology of the period, and several figures such as a comparison between the populations or the railroad systems of different countries, the family tree of the Song family and the political testament (*yizhu* 遺囑) of Sun Yatsen (in both French and Chinese). The main body of the text also features many original photographs and drawings. A general bibliography which includes works in French, English, and Chinese closes the volume. A peculiarity here is that Paulès has singled out twelve books whose reading is deemed critical for the neophyte. Although I would not have chosen exactly the same references, his choice appears to me very pertinent.

Reviewing a book whose scope spans over four decades and that touches on so many dimensions of the history of China is no easy task, especially when one faces a work of this quality that mobilises such a vast array of references. Specialists in narrow fields will always think that information is missing or that too much insistence is given to some details not deemed important. Others could complain that the book is stronger on some aspects than on others—Paulès gives for instance much more importance to political and economic institutions than to religious ones, religious life being dealt with in about five pages.² Paulès’ fascinating and well-documented descriptions of social and cultural life under the Republic could sometimes also be regarded as Southern China-

² It is nonetheless interesting that “religious elements” find their way on to pages dedicated to other themes. Fortune tellers and geomancers are, for instance, mentioned twice elsewhere in the book as tertiary workers or in a paragraph expounding on Chinese social practices.

centred.³ But, in order to focus on what is of greater relevance and to do justice to Paulès's scholarly ambition, I am of the opinion that his book should mainly be evaluated on the general narrative it offers and the argumentation it stakes out to attain his conclusion. In the pages below, I would like therefore mainly to discuss Paulès' characterisation of the period. However, before entering into the core of my critique, I would nonetheless like to raise several disparate elements of particular interest.

The first point to underline is that Paulès' book does not simply compile a gallery of academic studies regarding the period 1911-1949. On several occasions, the author adduces original archival materials to convey his view or to nuance previous characterisations of an event (*e.g.* 53, 160, 177, or 184). In his discussion regarding the issue of refugees and circulation of people during the war with Japan, he notably points to the fact that no research has been done on the movement of the Chinese population toward the Japanese occupied zones, and, on the way, he makes reference to archives he has personally consulted that relate to this taboo subject (143-144). In general, the author's own research contributes greatly to the general picture of Chinese history. Regarding the utilisation of studies by colleagues, one could simply regret that Chinese sources are used unevenly throughout the book. They are often invoked when dealing with raw data, or when expounding on a particular topic that has been neglected by Western historiography (for instance regarding the 1930 "War of the Great Plain" *Zhongyuan dazhan* 中原大戰, 101-103, or the "party-isation" *danghua* 黨化 of society under the Guomindang, 248). However, in contrast to the numerous theories by colleagues writing in English and French that Paulès discusses, only very few, if any, Chinese historians' names are mentioned in the main text as historians whose interpretations are directly validated or challenged. Maybe remarks regarding Chinese scholarship ought to be stated in the same manner as with Western sources and not only through generalities on "Chinese scholarship" or "Marxist historiography." This is, however, a classic impediment largely shared by Western sinology, and we should all carry out a general introspective reflection on this matter.

³ An original bias - in comparison to the large majority of Shanghai-centred works -, that he has admitted in a very interesting debate over his book held at the National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisation on 21 November 2019. Audio in INALCO 2020.

Speaking of historiography, it should nonetheless be stressed that the author has a real grip on the previous and ongoing research in his field. Almost every sub-subject is first introduced by several commentaries on the general scholarly tendencies regarding the theme or period under discussion. Here, Paulès offers pathways through tangled historical debates and often points out insufficiently explored problems and topics. Indeed, the author really has a sharp eye for singling out possible new fields of inquiry, and I can but hope that the reading of his book will entice francophone scholars to explore them. This is particularly the case in his chapter about the Chinese economy, which is a model for the genre—it is maybe the clearest synthesis I have ever read on the topic. Aside from outlining the great tendencies of economic history, Paulès pinpoints the lack of studies in specific economic sectors (like the service industry) or the methodological issues inherent in the potential study of key dimensions of Chinese economic life, such as the problem of the recycling of objects (217). Regarding the reasons behind the Guomindang (hereafter GMD) sclerosis, he burrows into an important truth when he notes that, oddly, almost no attention has been paid to the absence of a renewal among its leaders (180). It should also be highlighted that Paulès, who is well versed in the historiography of his homeland, draws several brilliant parallels with French history (*e.g.* centralisation after revolution in a Tocquevillian sense, 47; or the comparison between the 1947–1948 elections and the electoral system under the Second Empire, 183). He additionally makes use of some analytical concepts from French history that hit the spot: Dominique Barthélemy’s notion of “political viscosity” (67) should definitely be popularised to describe the warlord era.

Thirdly, in an academic world where jargon is often preferred to literate style, it should be stressed that reading this book is a genuine pleasure. Paulès often has very witty punchlines that are certain to be quoted in future works. “The 1911 Revolution is the daughter of the telegraph” (30), “Although the old regime dies in 1901, it is buried in 1912” (348) or the harder to translate into English “Pékin n’est pas seulement un symbole, c’est aussi un pactole” (51) are representative examples. One can for sure say that Paulès has a way with words. His prose is sprinkled with *recherché* adjectives and florid verbs, while he devises very interesting appellations: warlords are referred to as “satraps.” His style will certainly shake up many literate readers. It must also be added that Paulès often offers very concrete and picturesque descriptions of daily life in

China that are very pertinent. They succeed in capturing the social universe of the time. In a word, his prose really serves the content.

This being said, let us discuss in more detail the scope and the governing principle of Paulès' *La République de Chine*. In his introduction, Paulès explains that his book is concerned only with *China proper* or the China of 18 provinces, and does not delve into peripheral territories such as Mongolia, Tibet, or Manchuria. This choice is justified—Paulès wishes to avoid the 1949 teleological narrative that anchored these non-Han territories as necessarily Chinese—but so doing raises issues. Aside from dismissing arguments that could strengthen or weaken his argumentation (what for instance to do about the Mongolian crisis under Yuan Shikai briefly mentioned p. 19?), it soon appears difficult to write a history of Republican China without Manchuria, especially after 1931. In the end, Paulès cannot forgo it. There is therefore a small discrepancy between the scope he originally sets and the history he narrates—a positive discrepancy, I would say, because Paulès shows very interesting developments regarding China outside the 18 provinces, notably when he dwells on Chinese cultural influence on its close and farther neighbors (334–339). I was surprised to learn that in the 1930s, 30% of restaurants in Lima (Peru) were run by Chinese! As such, in truth, Paulès book is not concerned only with *China proper*; it simply drops Tibet and Mongolia. However, this is but a minor detail in comparison to what appears in my eyes an incongruity of greater importance: it seems to me that Paulès' conclusion is not completely in conformity with his development.

To clarify my position right away, I should state that in my eyes both his conclusion and his development are accurate. I share his belief that the Republican era was a “time when a Western styled parliamentary democracy was possible,” yet I have understood the text that precedes this characterisation as mainly a GMD-centred history of the Republican China in which there was not much room for democracy. By pointing out this apparent *non sequitur*, I do not wish to downplay the value of Paulès' exposition: he successfully moves away from both the narrative of the teleology of Communist revolution and the modernisation theory, while providing a convincing depiction of this era. He rightly replaces the GMD in its due place: it was the main

actor on the scene, it accomplished much, and it fell out of it mainly because of contingent reasons. *La République de Chine* is a book constructed around this strong thesis. It is therefore a crucial read that strongly argues in favour of a positive evaluation of the GMD during the first half of the twentieth century. The conclusion averring that it was a possible time for democracy is simply not the one I was expecting after reading the nine chapters. After all, Paulès clearly points to the fact that the GMD was incapable of turning democratic (182–84).

In order to defend the idea that the Republican era was a “time when a Western styled parliamentary democracy was possible,” Paulès should, in my opinion, have put the emphasis on what is unfortunately a neglected aspect in *La République de Chine*: intellectual history.

Despite a recent surge, French historiography, be it of modern China or any other country, has never been very keen on intellectual history (Lilti 2014). Much justification could be raised for this judgment in general but also in the particular instance of the Republic of China. In the case at hand, it is obvious that Chinese intellectuals were not at the centre of the picture. They no longer wielded the impetus of their literati forerunners. But I cannot help but wonder how it could be possible to anatomise the Chinese Republican era as a time for a possible democracy without paying attention to the debate of political ideas. Democracy takes hold not solely in institutions, but also in the men and women who put it into practice. Paulès is aware of that, for he speaks of the “invention and diffusion of a new post-imperial political culture” (229), yet in this subsection he expounds only on architecture, symbols, and political rituals practised by speechless figures. In terms of “ideas” and debates, aside from very general remarks on the different “isms” available at the time (329–330), the book puts on display only Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People and his theory of five powers. Unfortunately, no other political figures’ or intellectuals’ positions are discussed. With an ounce of exaggeration, it is as if there was no exchange of ideas within or without the GMD. The 1930s controversy over democracy versus dictatorship is for instance missing from the frame.

Although the author justifies why he did not put more emphasis on the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) and its ideological evolution, it seems to me that he has

in fact swapped a CCP-centred history of Republican China for a GMD-centred one. Hardly any other voices are heard. Liberal intellectuals of high calibre are mentioned here and there but without hinting at the ideas they put forward. Luo Longji is referred to, for example, as a theoretician of human rights in China (185), but nothing is said about the debates over those rights. In total three pages are dedicated to the Democratic League or to its members (173, 182, 187), and they are mostly informed by Edmund Fung's vision of it. Despite their obvious failure to have much impact on political life, many political parties or movements—like the Chinese Youth Party of Zeng Qi, Deng Yanda's Third Party or Zhang Junmai's Chinese National Socialist Party—tried from the 1920s to find a place in between the GMD and the CCP. Borrowing Roger Jeans' helpful term, one could say that these self-declared third forces sketched "roads not taken" (Jeans 1992, X) that could really be regarded as a possible way to democracy in the sense of Paulès' conclusion. There was also in the 1930s a strong interest in the rural world. Many rural reconstruction movements experimented with other ways of carrying on the political organisation of society. By enlisting the rich world of political ideas and practices beyond the GMD and the CCP, Paulès could have shown with stronger arguments that the Republican era, or twentieth century China for that matter, was not simply a race to power between two soviet-style parties. This could also have prevented oversimplification and inexactness. Qualifying Liang Qichao's Progress Party (38) or Liang Shuming as conservatives without ever discussing their position or explaining the meaning of this label in the Chinese context is a little dissatisfying because it is arbitrary. Both men adhered to the Republic, and extolled some forms of socialism. Are they denoted as conservative only because of their infatuation with Buddhism or Confucianism?

Delving into the place of Confucius in twentieth century China, I should point out one specific topic in which Paulès' lack of interest in intellectual history has not served well his otherwise brilliant synthesis. His treatment of May Fourth remains mired in a monological narrative. To him, Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi are more or less the only figures of the New Culture movement—which is by the way not differentiated from the May Fourth movement. It seems that Chow Tse-tung's *The May Fourth Movement* of 1960 has remained Paulès main source of information on the topic. Without mentioning very recent studies that have insisted on the diversity of movements within May Fourth

and the attempts to subsume them under one single narrative since the time of the First United Front (Forster 2018; Kuo 2017), Paulès has missed the pluralisation and decentralisation of May Fourth (Ip et al. 2013) or the many scholarly endeavours to go “beyond the May Fourth paradigm” (Chow 2009) that started two decades ago, as well their implications for our understanding of the political debates of the time. As rightly noted by Yves Chevrier, iconoclasm was, for that matter, “not a cultural answer to a crisis of culture—a contradiction between identity and modernity—but a political response to a political crisis” (Chevrier 2007, 270). Studies in Chinese conservatism have also added very much to our understanding of the 1920s and 1930s, decades whose scholarly depictions have grown richer and more nuanced. Although pro-Confucian figures did not openly take part in the field of politics, their pleas were neither uninfluential nor disconnected from grand political issues. Contrary to what is commonly implied, Confucianism was far from buried in 1919. It is therefore a pity that this side of the story was not narrated in *La République de Chine*.

Yet, despite this criticism—which is, of course, formulated by someone interested in intellectual history—I would like to restate that Paulès’ work is a great book filled with acute insights. He succeeds in painting a comprehensive picture of the Republican era while dovetailing his depiction with a critical appreciation of the state of the art. His contribution to the reevaluation of the importance and the successes of the GMD should not be missed. It is a must-read for any francophone working on the Republican Era, and more largely on modern China.

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BOOK REVIEW

Chengyu: Caratteristiche e apprendimento delle espressioni idiomatiche del cinese

[Chengyu: Characteristics and learning of Chinese idioms]

Sergio Conti

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This review consists of a detailed description of the theoretical background and the original insights of Sergio Conti's *Chengyu: Caratteristiche e apprendimento delle espressioni idiomatiche del cinese* (Chengyu: Characteristics and learning of Chinese idioms). The monograph was published in June 2019 by the Italian publisher *libreriauniversitaria.it edizioni*, and is the first volume of the peer-reviewed series *Studi Orientali* (Oriental Studies). The series is directed by Marina Miranda, "Sapienza" University of Rome, and its scientific committee includes members affiliated to different European universities. Conti's book consists of a linguistic study on *chéngyǔ* 成语 'four-character idioms', the most renowned Chinese idiomatic expressions. The volume is published in Italian and constitutes the very first attempt in Italian to provide a comprehensive account of the topic from both the theoretical and the pedagogical standpoint.

The book is composed of four chapters. The first chapter introduces the concepts of formulaicity and idiomaticity by reviewing the relevant literature in general, cognitive and psycho-linguistics (e.g. Gibbs 1994; Wray 2002). First, the author reports the main definitions of formulaicity and introduces the relationship between formulaic and analytic language, as well as the main critiques of the Chomskyan generative model and the LAD (Language Acquisition Device). In addition, the main functions of formulaic language are described in relation to the speakers' socio-interactional needs and to the limits of human short-term memory and processability. Second, the author addresses the notion of idiomaticity by providing the reader with the most influential definitions in the literature, finally adopting the one proposed by Liu (2008) and a view that conceives idiomatic expressions as a sub-type of formulaic sequences. Following this, the main taxonomies are introduced and discussed based on the criteria adopted by the proponent(s) of each classification, and the main hypotheses concerning the comprehension and processing of the idioms are presented and explained. The last part of the chapter provides a general overview of the different types of Chinese idioms, generally contained under the umbrella label *shúyǔ* 熟语 'familiar sayings'. Starting from a few historical notes on phraseology in China, the author subsequently provides the main classifications utilised by Chinese scholars, describing the characteristics of the different types of idiomatic expressions, mainly *guànyòngyǔ* 惯用语 'habitual

expressions’, *yànyǔ* 谚语 ‘proverbs’, *xǐhòuyǔ* 歇后语 ‘two-part allegorical sayings’ (e.g. Sun 1989; Wu 2007).

The second chapter provides a comprehensive description of *chéngyǔ* based on the different proposals elaborated by Chinese lexicologists. After a general overview of the studies produced in the last century, Conti focuses on the problematic definition of these expressions, describing those approaches adopting one single criterion to differentiate them from other sequences (e.g. Liu 1990; Yao 1998; Zhou 1997, 1998), those proposing multiple criteria (e.g. An 2016; Wu 2007) and those embracing more recent criteria such as Rosch’s prototype theory and Lakoff’s Idealized Cognitive Models (Hu 2015). In the following pages, *chéngyǔ* are described from the etymological, morpho-syntactic and semantic perspectives. In describing the first perspective, the author takes into consideration the three elements proposed by An (2016) for the classification of the primary sources of *chéngyǔ* and exemplifies the different processes that led to their formation (Sun 1989). The second perspective focuses on the distinction between morphosyntactically analysable and non-analysable *chéngyǔ*. Several examples are carefully chosen from relevant literature (e.g. An 2016; Hu 2015; Sun 1989) to illustrate the differences between structurally different types and sub-types. Moreover, *chéngyǔ* are classified according to the word class and the syntactic function they perform in the sentence, with the identification of five main types. Lastly, the analysis focuses on the different semantic components of *chéngyǔ* and the relationship between their compositional and idiomatic meaning, which may either coincide or be connected by a metonymical or metaphorical relationship (Sun 1989).

Conti’s third chapter moves from linguistic description to the perspective of acquisition and learning, mainly referring to cognitive linguistics, psycho-linguistic and applied linguistics studies conducted on Indo-European languages. First, the author provides a critical discussion of the flourishing contributions on the comprehension and processing of formulaic language in the field of second language acquisition, pointing out the implications that their specific features bear for second language learning and teaching. Second, the contributions on idiomatic language are reviewed, addressing both the psycho-linguistic advances in describing how they are comprehended and processed by native and non-native speakers, and their learning and teaching in second

and foreign languages. As the author cogently argues, different experimental studies have shown that native speakers' and learners' comprehension and processing of formulae and idioms are substantially different, since they are conditioned by different factors – such as a different composition of their mental lexicon – which also have an impact on the way these expressions are learned. After reporting the main results obtained on the topic in applied linguistics (e.g. Boers 2001; Zyzik 2011), the last paragraph of the chapter focuses on the strategies and techniques that have been specifically proposed for idiomatic expressions, among which are included both macro-strategies such as raising learners' awareness of idioms and implementing forms of discovery-learning, and micro-strategies such as the L1-L2 comparison and interpretation and comprehension techniques such as the etymological elaboration, etc. (Liu 2008).

Lastly, the fourth chapter addresses the issue of *chéngyǔ* teaching and learning in Chinese as a foreign language. The first section of this chapter is devoted to describing the current state of *chéngyǔ* teaching by taking into consideration reference syllabuses, teaching materials, and teaching methods. According to the author, many of the shortcomings emerging from this section can be attributed to the discrepancy between the importance of the *chéngyǔ* on the one hand and the low attention received in teaching on the other hand, due to the general perception of *chéngyǔ* being difficult to learn and to teach (Guo 2017). The second section focuses on the contributions produced in the field of Error Analysis, one of the most prolific lines of research in *chéngyǔ* teaching. The different types of errors reported in the literature – including formal, semantic, syntactic and pragmatic – are discussed together with examples of learners' actual productions (Shi 2008). The last section of the chapter addresses the two main issues that have emerged from the analyses of learners' errors and the causes of these errors: i) the problematic task of defining the degree of difficulty of *chéngyǔ* and their subsequent selection for inclusion in the teaching materials in order to guarantee the graduality and incrementality of the learning process (Zhang 2012); ii) the debate on the effectiveness of methods, techniques, and strategies for *chéngyǔ* teaching (Zhou & Wang 2009). Citing Guo (2017), the author suggests that although a rich literature has been produced in recent years on the topic of idiomatic expressions, much remains

to be done both in terms of the methods employed and the theoretical models adopted. More specifically, it is claimed that research in *chéngyǔ* teaching should shift from a purely descriptive to an experimental stage, so as to determine how to teach *chéngyǔ* effectively in a guided-learning context.

The volume offers a valuable contribution to the fields of Chinese theoretical lexicology and applied linguistics. The main merit is that of collecting and systematising the large and fragmentary body of existing research on Chinese phraseology, at the same time integrating it into the wider context of formulaicity and idiomaticity in natural languages. By doing this, the author evidences the specificities of Chinese language, while also relating them to universal phenomena which characterise human language. Although there is no lack of works published on the topic of *chéngyǔ*, both in Chinese and in European languages, very few have succeeded in the task of crossing the boundaries set by the traditional lexicological approach and applying theoretical models and categories specifically elaborated to account for non-Sinitic languages.

Another major achievement of the study is highlighting the challenges in *chéngyǔ* learning and the main shortcomings in the existing studies in Chinese pedagogy, offering interesting insights for future research, especially concerning the graduality and incrementality of acquisition as well as the importance of the empirical validation of different teaching techniques. The amount of materials consulted and reviewed by the authors is conspicuous, encompassing both Chinese and European sources sensibly organised and positioned in the volume to allow for a mutual enrichment of theoretical and applied linguistics, research activities and teaching practices.

In sum, this enlightening and fascinating volume wisely assembles the existing pieces of a puzzle in order to shed light on a phenomenon such as Chinese idiomatic expressions – deeply rooted in the culture, tradition and collective imaginary of a country – availing itself of the tools created both locally and globally. The result is a bigger picture wherein the specific features of a single language are interwoven within and intersect with the formal structures and cognitive processes that universally shape human language. Specifically, this study is particularly suited to satisfy both the interest of lexicologists in Chinese idiomatic language and the needs of the applied linguists seeking suggestions on the acquisition and teaching of *chéngyǔ*.

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Ahn, Thomas Dongsob

The Way and the Glory: A Study of Zhou Dunyi Shrines in the Southern Song (1127–1279)

The University of Oxford, 2019

<https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3441cd42-dc4a-4ae7-9046-564fde85654e>

Abstract:

This thesis studies 130 cases of establishment and refurbishment of shrines dedicated to a Chinese philosopher, Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–73), in the Southern Song (1127–1279). About 100 years after his death, this philosopher was reinvented as the founding father of Neo-Confucianism and shrines to him were founded in all corners of the empire. The thesis investigates who sought to dedicate shrines to Zhou and who declined to do so; why they did so; and what the significance for each locality of having such a monument was.

In the Southern Song, localities actively sought to connect themselves to famous literati in order to gain a prominence greater than that of other localities. This competition facilitated the spread of literati culture and the consolidation of a previously fragmented Chinese society. Some Neo-Confucian thinkers took this opportunity to promote their movement as well. Through enshrining Zhou Dunyi in different settings, they effectively refashioned the man as their scholarly ancestor and iconised him as the exemplary Confucian literatus.

Chapter 1 introduces the main argument and discusses methodologies. Subsequent sections provide brief explanations of pertinent technical terms and theoretical points. Chapter 2 discusses Zhou Dunyi's life, focusing on selected aspects of his life that were most debated and most relevant to his posthumous enshrinement. Chapter 3 investigates the Zhou Dunyi shrines in Southern Song Daozhou and Jiangzhou, two localities that competed for recognition as Zhou Dunyi's true hometown due to his having been born in one and died in the other. The dispute would be settled only when Neo-Confucian dignitaries came out in support of Daozhou's claim. This example shows how the building of the shrines was negotiated and how they were appropriated by local elites who took great pride in them.

Chapter 4 studies the lack of Zhou Dunyi shrines in a place where they would be expected to be. Zhenjiang (Runzhou) refrained from establishing any such shrines until as late as 1253. Neo-Confucians shied away from establishing a shrine there. This case shows to what degree Neo-Confucians were involved in Zhou Dunyi shrine projects and in what manner.

Chapter 5 explores Guangdong and Guangxi. The prevalence of Zhou Dunyi shrines in this much less developed region belies a standard characterisation of Neo-Confucianism as an ideology for well-educated, affluent, and non-office-holding elites. A selection of cases demonstrates that the region's relatively limited assimilation into mainstream literati culture formed its habitus in favour of the proliferation of Zhou Dunyi shrines.

Chapter 6 points to a consequence of the proliferation of Zhou Dunyi shrines in the Song. Localities began to seek distinction by promoting famous local literati, which was possible only on the basis of embracing the new standard of fame shared by other localities—namely, the Sinitic literati culture. This formula, the pursuit of fame on the basis of homogeneous literati culture, contributed to the integration of late imperial Chinese society.

Bellinetti, Maria Caterina

Building a Nation: The Construction of Modern China Through CCP's Propaganda Images

University of Glasgow, 2018

<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/30913/>

Abstract:

To date, the study of Chinese propaganda photography has been limited. While some research has been made on post-1949 photography, the photographic production of the pre-1949 period has not been sufficiently explored. Focusing on the years of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), this thesis aims at addressing this gap in the literature and at providing an analysis of how the Chinese Communist Party exploited photography for propaganda purposes during the war. Through the images taken by Party-affiliated photographers and printed on the *Jin Cha Ji Pictorial*, the first Communist photographic propaganda magazine, this study aims to show how this type of visual propaganda aimed not only at narrating the events of the war against Japan, but also at creating a new idea of the Chinese nation.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first, *The Jin Cha Ji Pictorial: A Brief History* presents the history of the magazine and the work of the CCP affiliated photographers who contributed to its creation and popularity. Chapter two, *The Geography of a Revolution*, explores how a new cultural landscape was visually constructed to create the basis for the political legitimation that the CCP needed during wartime. Chapter three, *Becoming Modern Women*, investigates the symbolic and ideological value of the spinning wheel in 1943 in relation to women's contribution to the war effort and the thorny issue of women empowerment. Lastly, chapter four, *Moulding the Future*, looks at the visual representation of childhood and discusses the issue of militarisation and masculinisation of childhood during wartime. This study ends with few considerations on the propagandistic, historical and artistic value of Communist propaganda photography during the Second Sino-Japanese War as well as a reflection on how the symbolic and ideological significance of some of the photographs presented here are still recognisable in contemporary Chinese propaganda.

Bond, Jennifer

Foreign Puppets, Christian Mothers or Revolutionary Martyrs? The Multiple Identities of Missionary School Girls in East China, 1917-1952

SOAS University of London, 2018

<https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32251/>

Abstract:

My PhD thesis examines the experience of girls who attended missionary middle schools in East China 1917-1952. I look at four schools across three cities: In Shanghai, St. Mary's founded by the American Episcopal Church in 1881 and McTyeire, an American Methodist school founded in 1892. In Ningbo and Hangzhou, I focus on two union schools for girls established by the North American Presbyterian and Baptist Missions; Riverside Academy established in Ningbo in 1923 and Hongdao, established in Hangzhou in 1912. Using pupils' writings in their school magazines, alongside interviews with ex-pupils, missionary reports and newspaper sources, the thesis seeks to understand missionary school girls' agency in shaping and influencing new forms of modernity emerging in early twentieth century China. How did they navigate their school environment and negotiate their identities as both Christian and Chinese within an increasingly nationalistic setting, characterised by anti-imperialist and anti-Christian movements in the 1920s? How did mission school pupils use a gendered Christian rhetoric to fashion their identities within debates about women's roles in a newly emerging public sphere in the Republican era? What can the experience of missionary school girls tell us about the relationship between Christianity, Communism and the Women's Movement in China? This research breaks new ground by examining the missionary enterprise from the point of view of pupils who attended missionary schools rather than from the missionary perspective. By placing the experience of pupils at the centre of enquiry, we can see how Chinese women were active agents in the creation of a transnational modernity in treaty port East China. I argue that the hybrid cultural environment at missionary schools unintentionally created a free space or 'laboratory' where girls could experiment with more fluid gender identities, which challenged traditional binaries and allowed them to forge new conceptions of Chinese womanhood.

Cai, Tingjian

Secularisation and the Return of Religion in China

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2019

Abstract:

The dissertation titled with “Secularization and the Return of Religion in China” examines mainly the secularization theory which came on the scene at the end of 19th century and its failed prediction: withering away of religion. As preamble the dissertation begins with the explanation of various concepts of religion and its historical social transformation since the beginning of modernization, i.e. secularization. It has been shown that the classical secularisation theories could not explain the religious development in recent decades and different reflections on the secularisation theory have built a new framework of “after secularisation” in which the research in this dissertation proceeds.

Before the analysis goes further on the specific issue of Chinese secularisation and reviving religions, a brief reconstruction of the history of political-religious interactions in both western and Chinese context has been made at first which could be taken as an important perspective to examine the whole historical development of politics and state. Political-religious interactions in the western-christian tradition has decisively influenced the strike of how politics and state have been perceived, from the birth of “Politics” in ancient Greek over the religious wars and the formation of nation- states to the ongoing development of liberal-constitutional state till nowadays, in which the narrative of religion and secularization continues to develop. Nevertheless, it means in China the continuation of statism through the whole dynasties, which deeply impacted the perception of political rule and the way to treat religion - “Government the master, religions the follower” - in state`s system as ever. The dissertation deconstructs and reconstructs then the history of “religion” in China, which means the discursive introduction of the terminology “religion” and the parallel state-runned secularization since the beginning of 20th century as well as the remarkable revival of religions in recent decades, which has been proved by empirical observations and statistics from different sources.

As the revival of religions in China has been shown as obvious and influential, the dissertation ends with a comparative analysis of the inner logic of political-religious problems in the western and China as well as the respective political-religious governance. The political-religious governance in the western context means mainly the constitutional doctrines of state neutrality – the separation of politics and religion – and the guarantee of private (religious) liberty, and accordingly the application of habermasian “discourse ethics” in religious sphere. In China governance includes at least the reflections on present religion policy, the outlook of possible religious development and the corresponding selection of governance and/or regulation strategy. The future of the political-religious interactions in China could be the revival of traditional thought resources – possibly confucianism. It could be the implementation of constitutionality and guarantee of private liberty. Or it could be a Chinese special way: the reconciliation of liberty and orderliness and the combination of liberty and good, as proposed by Ci Jiwei in his research about “Moral China” and its prospects.

Carrozza, Ilaria

Securing the way to power: China's rise and its normative peace and security agenda in Africa

London School of Economics and Political Science, 2019

<http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3869/>

Abstract:

China's role as a global security actor has increased dramatically over the last decade and the country is now projecting its power and promoting its agenda well beyond Asia. In particular, peace and security have come to be at the centre of China's Africa strategy and are now a major factor affecting not only China's relations with African countries, but also its global image. Studying China through its engagement with the continent's security regime allows us to see the global actor the PRC is becoming. In order to obtain a more nuanced understanding of the topic, I advance an argument that is both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, I argue that the concept of normative power, understood as the power to shape the 'normal' in international affairs, gives us insights into China's preferred norms and practices and into the mechanisms through which it is promoting its vision of world order. Empirically, I claim that not only is China being socialised into the international system, but it also contributes to shaping it. Its norms-making attempts become more evident if we look at its engagement with Africa's security environment. I thus make two related claims. First, China increasingly acts as a security norms-shaper in the continent thanks to a stable discourse articulating China and African countries as fellow members of the Global South. Second, as China-Africa security cooperation develops mostly through multilateral institutions, I argue that its normative power potential varies depending on the contingent institution. After mapping China's Africa discourse on security across the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the African Union, and the United Nations Security Council in the period 2000–2018, I argue that it is especially through creating dedicated forums responding to its interests and priorities, that China is becoming a normative power.

Chen, Shujie

Urban Conservation System in China and its Improvement by using Historic Urban Landscape Approach

University of Nova Gorica, 2019

<http://repozitorij.ung.si/IzpisGradiva.php?id=3981&lang=sly>

Abstract:

In the last few decades, the Modern Conservation Movement has developed from European-limited practices into a global movement with universal common views and practical measures for managing heritage resources in different cultural contexts. As an innovative idea of this movement, the Historic Urban Landscape approach aims to protect and manage historic urban environments with respect to both the fundamental principles in the international doctrines and the local social/cultural/historical contexts. It recommends local authorities to use the HUL toolkit to identify, conserve and manage the overall landscape of their historic cities.

In the case of China, who is an old civilization, a modern nation and a socialist country at the same time, the conservation practice needs to follow the basic and common conservation principles in the international doctrines, and meanwhile, it shall make its initiatives based on the actual social, cultural and political situations. The establishment of Historically and Culturally Famous City (HCF City in short) system is a positive attempt for such a purpose. The system manages various urban elements relating to the city's historical and cultural features under a comprehensive notion of HCF City. However, the system is not perfect because it depends excessively on the top-down management of local governments, and also because it overlooks the spatial and spiritual relationships among the protected elements...

The thesis provides a big picture of architectural and urban conservation practices in China. It introduces the forming process and the characteristics of historic urban fabric, as well as the history of urban conservation. Then, it takes a deep look at the existing HCF City system, including its basic ideas, structures and mechanism. It analyses the system's initiatives and deficiencies. Finally, it provides feasible advices to improve the current system by using the HUL toolkit.

Chen, Xi

Towards More Open Citizenship: Exorcising the Colonial Ghost, Re-Imagining Urban Space, and Critical Spatial Practice in Wenzhou, China

Newcastle University, 2019

<https://theses.ncl.ac.uk/jspui/handle/10443/4523>

Abstract:

This practice-based research focuses on Jiangxin island, which is a place of nostalgia, religion, colonial history, and modern entertainment in Wenzhou, China. It starts with an investigation of the socio-cultural significance of this place. It then searches for a more open citizenship through rethinking the colonial heritage while revealing the socio-political mysteries within Chinese society. In the end, it questions what alternative future the island could have and how that could contribute to a more open citizenship in Wenzhou.

“More Open Citizenship” is a polysemic phrase. It can refer to people’s spatial rights to the city, or to identity construction, as well as agency within the production of space in China. The term *critical spatial practice* is used to address the difficulties in developing public spaces for public events on the island with regards to the complexities of the socio-political structure in China.

Drawing on the researcher’s roles as an architect, a political participant and a son in a Chinese family, this research is facilitated by different agencies. It applies feminist theory, auto-ethnography, mapping, political engagement, two public participatory events, two design workshops, and spatial design. All these factors aim to re-imagine an open future for Jiangxin Island and the British Consulate buildings. This is tested through the intervention of food as a daily cultural practice.

Chu, Huijie

Construction of Individuality: Sociological Imagination of Entering Higher Education Institutions in China

Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2018

Abstract:

Taking institutional reforms of China's higher education as the backdrop, this dissertation investigates the rationales of students' educational choices, and the factors that sustain the system for and the practice of entering higher education institutions (HEIs) despite occasional circumstances that challenge the belief in payoffs. To answer the central question why Chinese students enter HEIs in China, I argue that it is both in order to address pragmatic needs of job security and social mobility and to conform to the cultural schema of normative accomplishment and personal qualities.

The belief in and practice of entering HEIs has become too ingrained to shift swiftly in response to changes in the social environment and market demand. Meanwhile, individualistic evaluation of HEIs, mobility and acquisition of resources, and contested reproduction of encompassing ideals reveal the agentic dimension in the balance between institutional forces and pursuit of self-development. Contradictions within the framework of state regulations, family, market principles, and media influence, as well as tensions due to individual interpretations that more or less diverge from the institutional orders give rise to ambivalence towards the meaning of attending HEIs, the selection regime, educational equality, and *suzhi jiaoyu* (education emphasizing well-rounded development and civil behaviour). In this regard, the study on Chinese students entering HEIs in China provides an insight into the ongoing social process of individualization and the portrayal of individuals as both recipients and creators of social structures in the course of seeking a way out.

Coulouma, Sarah

Une ethno-histoire des Wa-Paraok de Wengding (Yunnan, Chine): pratiques, représentations et espace social face au tourisme

[Customs, Representations and Social Space in the Age of Tourism: An Ethno-historical Study of the Wa-Paraok People in Wengding (Yunnan, China)]

Aix-Marseille Université, 2018

<http://www.theses.fr/2018AIXM0610>

Abstract:

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Chinese province of Yunnan has chosen tourism development as a tool for economic growth. Relying on the attractiveness of national minorities (*shaoshu minzu* 少数民族) and their diverse cultural practices, local authorities encourage the development of ethnic and cultural tourism, at the national and international level.

In Cangyuan county, a few kilometers from the Burmese border, the village of Wengding (翁丁) is advertised as the “last primitive tribe of China” (*zongguo zuihou yuanshi buluo* 中国最后原始部落) by government officials and travel industry. A tourism development plan targeting the village – which is home to a hundred families of the Wa-Paraok ethnolinguistic group – has been set up since 2000’s. For that purpose, the village has been redesigned to (re)present and preserve the « culture of the Wa nationality » (*wazu wenhua* 佤族文化).

This thesis analyses the processes of social and cultural changes affecting this village at the heart of the touristic arena, from the multi-disciplinary perspective of sinology, ethnology and history. The spatial and social organization, origin myth, cosmological representation, and ritual practices in the village show how its community’s relationship with its territory and natural environment has contributed to its constant renewal. Radical changes in the villagers’ daily lives are generated by external actors and by the development of tourism activities that have led to the staging of their living space and the commoditization of traditional crafts (such as weaving), artistic and ritual practices. These reconfigurations reveal the characteristics of heritage and development policies, at both national and regional level, with respect to the Wa nationality. The

ethnogenesis and history of the community and its territory shed light on the centuries-old interethnic relations between the Han – the Chinese ethnic majority – and the Wa.

Finally, the practices and discourses of individual villagers display their reflexive attitude towards their representation by the Han majority and the dynamism of the social body. Confronted with tourism and tourists, the villagers appropriate, exclude or include, recompose, showing resilience and resistance. They constantly reinvent their being in the world, between the heritage of values and traditional practices, and a desire for modernity and inclusion in contemporary Chinese society. The touristic arena is thus a place of dynamic reshaping of identities.

Du, Juan

Entre solidarité et exploitation. Marchés ethniques du logement et du travail et insertion urbaine des migrants chinois en banlieue parisienne

[Between solidarity and exploitation: Ethnic housing and labor markets and urban integration of Chinese migrants in the Paris suburbs]

Université Paris Diderot, 2018

<https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02137794>

Abstract:

This thesis has as its main object of interest the forms of agency manifested in the everyday life of Chinese migrants in disadvantaged situations in France. This is studied through fieldwork conducted in two neighborhoods in Paris suburbs, which received a great number of arrivals “from the bottom”, who began their life as migrants through an undocumented period. Despite a double exclusion in the host society from migration policies and from the market, Chinese immigrants usually manage to pull themselves out. How did they achieve this?

By investigating the access to housing and work, two essential domains in the migration experience, this thesis attempts to address this problem with a focus on ethnic markets and how do they work. In those markets, both interpersonal relationships and community bonds based on ethnicity are mobilized as resources.

This thesis aims first to bring to light ethnic markets in housing and work, in order to achieve a better understanding of the mechanisms that enable this ethnic economy to function. Both in scholarly and political perspectives, this thesis emphasizes three essential questions: the emic approach, in which the perspectives of migrants themselves are privileged, the tension between the importance of community resources in the everyday life of Chinese immigrants and their constraints, and finally the false dilemma between community and integration.

Elosua, Miguel

Un régime de propriété aux caractéristiques chinoises : droit foncier du sol collectif et urbanisation

[A Property Rights System with Chinese Characteristics: collective Land Rights and Urbanisation]

École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), 2018

<http://www.theses.fr/2018PSLEH198>

Abstract:

In China, land rights have always been a central concern for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since it came to power.

The system of collective land property rights has undergone multiple changes since the arrival of the CCP to power. During the first few years after the economic opening the liberalisation of the rural land market brought about high rates of economic growth to the Chinese countryside. However, since the end of the 1980, and especially since the 1990 with the ban on the transfer of rural land and the increase of the speed of urbanisation, it has coexisted with an urban land rights system where land has been progressively liberalised. In urban areas there is a thriving market in real estate that has contributed greatly to the robustness of the economy and the welfare of urban residents.

This has thus led to the increasingly less *peaceful coexistence* of two diametrically opposed systems of property: a system of collective ownership with socialist characteristics and a quasi free-market system where land can be transferred, leased, or used as collateral, exploiting its inherent value.

Behind the rural land policy of the CCP is the ideal of *common prosperity*. However, after more than thirty years of rapid economic development, a salient feature of China's rural areas has been the *common poverty* of the farmer class as a whole. The economic gap between the rural and the urban has not ceased to increase.

The author argues that one of the main causes of this urban-rural gap lies in the dual system of land property rights, which has proved to be flawed, as farmers have been

deprived from exploiting the value of their most precious asset: land. This is illustrated through the analysis of the emergence of new phenomena linked to land development, such as minor property rights and urban villages, which show the lack of adaptation of the land property regime to the new socioeconomic circumstances that prevail in China today.

In order to test his assertions the author makes an historical analysis of the formation of the dual system of land property rights since the arrival to power of the CCP. Likewise, the author identifies the main flaws of the dual property rights system and put them in relation with the existing *rule by laws* in China, which serves as its framework. Finally, in order to illustrate his hypothesis the author draws on two study cases carried out in the municipality of Chongqing.

Therefore, the author advocates reforming the dual property system, and more specifically, land-use rights concerning rural construction land. The author uses a comparative perspective borrowing from European Union's property rights systems as a reference, to devise certain aspects that could be used by Chinese law makers as a reference for an eventual reform.

Gallelli, Beatrice

De-Framing a National Dream: Identity and Political Legitimacy in the Discourse on the Chinese Dream

Ca' Foscari University of Venice, 2019

<http://dspace.unive.it/handle/10579/14975>

Abstract:

The concept of the “Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” sums up China’s goal in the 21st century, a goal whose realisation is meant to lead China into a “new era”, according to Xi Jinping’s current leadership. Moving from a theorization of discourse as a locus of articulation of meaning and “truth” – to use Foucault’s terminology – this research aims to analyse how the Chinese dream is discursively conceptualized and structured. More specifically, the purpose of this research is twofold: On the one hand, it analyses the construction of a “Chinese” collective identity in the era of globalization. In other words, the analysis delves into the two-pronged process of self-ing and other-ing as the basic procedure at use in the identity-making process. On the other hand, it examines the legitimation of the Chinese communist party, that is the binary practices of (a) the construction of common interests shared by governed and governors, and (b) the representation of leaders’ ruling qualities. While pursuing this two-fold aim, this research sheds light on what is “new” in “China’s new era”, by clarifying the elements of ideological continuity and discontinuity in the discourse on the Chinese dream in relation to previous practices. Data for this analysis can be thus divided into one group for synchronic analysis and another for diachronic analysis: for the former, materials include speeches given by the current president, collected into three volumes, and audio-visual material focused on the “Chinese new era”. For the diachronic analysis, the various work reports issued at the National Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party are used to highlight the elements of break with the past. This analysis demonstrates that, in a nutshell, the Chinese dream is the product of China’s growing involvement with globalization, a phenomenon formerly led by the so-called “West”, while showing China’s ambition to become the new globalising force. However, this can hardly be defined as a discontinuity with previous discursive practices. All results reveal that the discourse on the

Chinese dream might be deemed as a continuation of “older” discursive practices, albeit in new clothing. If any novelty is to be found here, it must be in the process of legitimating the CCP’s rule. The construction of a model leader - Xi Jinping - embedding traditional Confucian values while remaining close to “the people” shows that the Chinese dream brings about a “charismatic turn” in the CCP’s approach to justify the political power it holds.

Hanisch, Sarah

Searching for sweetness: Chinese women in Fuqing and Lesotho

University of Vienna, Department of East Asian Studies/Sinology, 2018

<http://othes.univie.ac.at/53392/>

Abstract:

This thesis is located at the intersection of Anthropology, African and Chinese studies, and traces the journeys of three generations of Chinese women born between 1973 and 1995 from their rural and semi-urban villages (cun) and towns (zhen) in Fuqing, a county-level city in Southern China, to the nearby urban county seat as well as to Lesotho, a small-landlocked country in Southern Africa. In particular, this thesis asks how different forms of migration fit into the individual and family projects of Fuqingese women, and how these women locate themselves and their families discursively within the post-Mao modernity project in China as well as within the post-independence modernity project in Lesotho. To answer these questions, I present ethnographic material which I collected during eight months of field research in Lesotho in 2014, and during one month of field research in Fuqing in 2015. I employ 'bitterness' (ku) and 'sweetness' (tian) as discursive concepts to analyze the life stories and everyday practices of Fuqingese women in Fuqing and Lesotho. 'Bitterness' and 'sweetness' are not only reoccurring narratives in the stories of Fuqingese women which I collected, but are also central to Chinese state meta-narratives connected to the state's modernity project. Bitterness and sweetness are, thus, useful analytical concepts to connect Fuqingese women's endeavors to obtain material prosperity and social status across different localities and different stages of their life cycle, but also to connect seemingly individual endeavors to the state's modernity projects in China and Lesotho. To underline this argument, I analyze different settings which include Fuqingese women's childhood in Fuqing, their first working experiences during early adulthood, their entries into 'the city' as well as their journeys to Lesotho. I show that the meaning of bitterness and sweetness changes over time and across different generations. In particular, I argue that Fuqingese women employ the concepts of bitterness and sweetness to make discursive claims to be part of the state's modernity project. Furthermore, I argue that they develop self-management abilities to show that they are

subjects of the modernity project. In employing these two concepts and by talking about their self-management abilities, Fuqingnese women expand narrow and linear conceptions of modernity. Therefore, I conclude that Fuqingnese women provide not only a different perspective on the male-centered debate on China-Africa migration, but also on modernity in China as well as in Lesotho in general.

Harper, Tom

The Symbolism of Chinese Power: Understanding the Constructs of China in Africa and China's Normative Foreign Policy

University of Surrey, 2019

<http://eprints.surrey.ac.uk/852041/>

Abstract:

The case of China's engagement with the African states has been one of the key case studies of Chinese foreign policy in the Post-Cold War era. This has resulted in the creation of a vast body of literature studying these policies, with the American and Chinese depictions of China's African policies being unified into two, coherent narratives by several recurring constructs. While examples of Chinese engagement with the African states have already been subject to extensive study, the knowledge on China in Africa has not been subjected to the same degree of examination, let alone the process of how it is created nor what it symbolises. The purpose of this paper is to explore the constructs of China's African policies from the established body of literature and to apply these concepts to the official discourses on China's engagement with Sudan and Zimbabwe. This served to explore how the competing American and Chinese constructs were symbolic of the competition for the construction of China's international identity as well as being reflective of two normative systems that seek to spread themselves to a wider context. By doing so, these constructs served to illustrate the nature and methodology of Chinese foreign policy, which has utilised the shared experience of European imperialism and national liberation to successfully cement China's ties with the African states. This has also seen soft power enjoy an equal, if not greater, status to hard power in Chinese policy, which has been largely missing from the populist images of China's rise which have focused chiefly on the augmentation of China's military assets. Such a perspective has resulted in a skewed representation of Chinese strategies, which has led to the factors behind the success of Chinese foreign policy being ignored.

He, Mengying

Édouard Chavannes, fondateur de la sinologie moderne

[Édouard Chavannes, the founder of the modern sinology]

École pratique des hautes études (EPHE, PSL), 2019

<http://www.theses.fr/s205765>

Abstract:

This thesis is devoted on the French founder of modern Sinology, Édouard Chavannes. It explores his life as well as his works. The research is based on archives, primary sources (administrative documents, correspondence, working manuscripts, collection of books and objects), his books and articles. Born in a Protestant family, he was characterized by perseverance and a scientific spirit. After graduate studies in philosophy, history and Chinese, he was sent to the French Legation in Beijing to study China. Initially inclined to be a diplomat, he was appointed on the chair of Chinese professor at the College de France. Following the paths laid by his predecessors, he has invested the research fields in the history of ancient China, epigraphy and archaeology, Taoist rituals and relations between China and its neighboring countries. Based on translations and cross analysis of historical books and primary sources (inscriptions and carvings on stone, records on wooden and bamboo slips), the novelty of his contribution comes from his scientific and critical approach. His missions in China allowed him to collect documents and observe historical monuments and the contemporary society. He has maintained a rich collaboration with researchers in different fields. Chinese scholars have played an important role in his translations and epigraphic works, as well as in the propagation of his works in China. Some of their thinking and methods were probably inspired by him. He has published a large number of quality works of great diversity, and has trained a generation of great Sinologists. His influence remains important until today.

Hou, Renyou

L'institution du mariage et ses transformations en Chine rurale contemporaine. Une enquête ethnographique sur les activités matrimoniales dans un village du Henan

[The Institution of Marriage and Its Transformations in Contemporary Rural China. An Ethnographic Study of Matrimonial Activities in a Henan Village]

Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, 2018

<http://www.theses.fr/2018USPCF016>

Abstract:

Based on an ethnographic study of matrimonial activities at Zhang Village (Henan province), this dissertation aims to identify continuities and changes in matrimonial rituals and procedures and explain whether observed changes speak of a structural transformation of the institution of marriage in contemporary rural China. By studying the matrimonial activities step by step, it demonstrates that perpetuation of the patrilineal lineage remains a transcendent value encompassing all types of family relationships. Although there have been many changes in private life since the Chinese Communist Party's rise to power in 1949, these changes primarily concern the ways in which family members maintain bonds with each other, whereas, the institution of marriage itself, and its principal vocation, that of perpetuating the patrilineal lineage, are hardly called into question. Thus, against the thesis of the individualization of Chinese society suggested by the Sino-American anthropologist Yan Yunxiang 阎云翔, the analyses provided in this dissertation put forward the idea that observed changes take place within a perennial structure vis-à-vis what they are secondary. In other words, it is a "change *in* society" instead of a "change *of* society".

Hsiao, Chihyin

Owning China: The Material Life of London Tradesmen, 1700–1750

University of Glasgow, 2019

<http://theses.gla.ac.uk/40991/>

Abstract:

This PhD project seeks to understand how imported chinaware was used and appreciated in London tradesmen's homes between 1700 and 1750. Statistical evidence from London Court of Orphan Inventories reveals the patterns of consumption for the key household items in London tradesmen's homes. Imported chinaware was one such commodity which enjoyed a surging popularity during the first half of the eighteenth century. Records show that the ownership of Chinese porcelain fluctuated amongst London tradesmen's households, indicating a potential competition between chinaware, silver, pewter and delftware. This thesis thus argues that local metal and ceramic productions could no longer support the lifestyle required for polite living in eighteenth-century England while imported exotics successfully established itself as a luxurious item for tea and dinner services. The change of household fashion not only highlights the increasing number of emerging consumers but also celebrates their desire to upgrade their material life. The dynamic cultural imaginary of exotic goods gave emerging consumers an opportunity to purchase a new social identity which had not been available in the previous century. Ultimately, the want for a better material life changed the hierarchy of things at home and the social behaviour of people. Gender representation, family alliance and business partnership are exemplified through surviving ceramic objects.

Jakubów, Zofia

Obraz społeczeństwa konsumpcyjnego i sfera wartości materialnych w twórczości Murong Xuecuna i Li Shijiang

[The Image of the Consumer Society and the Sphere of Material Values in the Works of Murong Xuecun and Li Shijiang]

University of Warsaw, 2018

<https://depotuw.ceon.pl/handle/item/3262>

Abstract:

The aim of the thesis is to examine the phenomena described by the Chinese writers Murong Xuecun and Li Shijiang in terms of liquid modernity and consumerism and to determine the changes in both writers' attitudes to material values. To achieve this, a literary analysis, embedded in the context of culture and history, backed by philosophical and sociological theories, has been employed. The theoretical background of the thesis is provided mainly by Zygmunt Bauman's *Liquid Modernity*, Jean Baudrillard's *The Consumer Society. Myths and Structures* and Jacques Derrida's *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*. The categories of liquid modernity and consumer society, defined in the first two books, help expose the negative aspects of the reality described in the novels set in post-reform China, and Derrida's theory of hauntology provides a key to understanding the authors' search for values alternative to materialism and neoliberalism, which becomes especially vivid in their later works.

To analyze the writers' attitudes to consumerism and material values, the thesis examines the meaning of objects and waste (including human waste as described by Bauman) in their prose writings and their way of describing work and interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, because almost all their protagonists are men, the models of manhood typical of contemporary China and identifiable in the analyzed novels are investigated: the models of the white-collar man inspired by Western influence and of the businessman reliant on a local group linked by *guanxi* relationships are discussed in detail. The analyses generally point to the fact that Murong Xuecun and Li Shijiang are highly critical of consumerism and neoliberalism. The last chapter of the thesis discusses the

alternative values they identify as remedies for the problems of modern reality. Their texts are, as Derrida would put it, ‘haunted’ by specters of the past and the tradition. The dangerous, chaotic, dark metropolitan spaces can be replaced by the bright countryside, brimming with life, defined by harmony between man and nature and heart-warming family reunions. Some of their characters also take an interest in local traditions of the cities they live in, thus opposing the forces of globalization. Neoliberal influence may be countered by the affirmation of traditional models of manhood too, especially the models based on *wen* values (as described by Kam Louie and Louise Edwards) and the neotraditional model defined by Nimrod Baranovitch. The need of religion and transcendence is another symptom of disdain for materialism. The characters’ attitudes to religion often have strong pragmatic overtones; however, some of them genuinely turn to traditional beliefs such as faith in destiny, fateful coincidence and cosmic recompense. The specters that haunt the protagonists sometimes take the form of death, memories, bad conscience. It is common among the characters to seek liberation from them in individual religious (especially Buddhist) practice and become less active in their professional and social lives.

Leung, Virginia Yee-Yam

Coming of Age in Hong Kong: A study of a colonial literary field in the 1950s

Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, 2019

Abstract:

The thesis *Coming of Age in Hong Kong: A study of a colonial literary field in the 1950s* discusses five novels written in the 1950s by Chinese émigré writers, also known as ‘southbound literati’, who had moved from mainland China to the south seeking refuge in Hong Kong from continuous warfare and political upheaval on the Mainland during the first decades of the twentieth century. The study traces the disrupted lineage of modern Chinese literary history by revealing a revival of the youth plot among their coming-of-age stories. The thesis examines the literary-historical context in which the Bildungsroman was introduced in modern Chinese literature and discusses how marginalized subjects achieve Bildung and growth in Hong Kong’s colonial society; Hong Kong’s literary and publishing field of the 1950s; and how the Hong Kong Bildungsroman of the 1950s facilitated the formation and dissemination of nation-building narratives.

The study follows the development of the Bildungsroman from its emergence in eighteenth-century Germany to recent discourses and theories written in Western and Chinese languages, with a focus on generic characteristics including the protagonist’s journey, the role of secondary characters, and the tension between an individual’s potential and social reality. In the last century the Bildungsroman was introduced into China via Western translations as part of the Chinese discourse on modernism. It became a prominent genre that reflected and expressed the shifting meanings of youth and selfhood. Coming-of-age novels also appeared in Taiwanese and Hong Kong literature exploring the topic of the individual and her or his place in society. 1950s Hong Kong offered many émigré writers a particular cultural niche in which they were able to pursue their profession and further their development and adaption of modern literary forms and formats.

The thesis presents readings of the novels *The Story of Shrimp Ball* (Huang Guliu), *The Hotel* (Cao Juren), *Yindi: A Barcarolle* (Qi Huang), *Love at Gulang Island*

(Huang Sicheng), and *A Hong's Boyhood* (Bai Mu). It argues that the Hong Kong Bildungsromans of the 1950s share some striking characteristics that revolve around such motifs as a strong connecting link to the homeland, reevaluation of established moral values, and alienation from the city, all of which guide the hero to a certain kind of Bildung. In this regard the Hong Kong coming-of-age novels show that a hero's growth and formation follow a path that presupposes his or her departure from the place of origin and negotiation between established and newly-acquired values, resulting in an enlightened and affirmative perspective on the status quo.

Lucas, Aude

L'expression subjective dans les récits oniriques de la littérature de fiction des Qing

[Subjective Expression in Dream Accounts of Qing Fictional Literature]

Université Paris Diderot, 2018

<https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02126767/>

Abstract:

This doctoral thesis studies Chinese fictional dream accounts during the 17th-18th centuries. It discusses four works: *Liaozhai zhiyi* 聊齋誌異 by Pu Songling 蒲松齡 [1640-1715], *Zibuyu* 子不語 by Yuan Mei 袁枚 [1716-1797], *Yuewei caotang biji* 閱微草堂筆記 by Ji Yun 紀昀 [1724-1805], *Honglou meng* 紅樓夢 by Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹 [1715?/1724?-1763?/1764?] and Gao E 高鶚 [1738?-1815?]. The objective is to analyze various forms of subjective expression in the context of the evolution of that period. Subjectivity is expressed by language and desire, which are thus the two main pillars – linguistic and thematic – of this study. This study draws on both thematic, and textual and philological aspects. It also makes comparisons between common reinvented motifs and narratives that evolved over the centuries.

Firstly, this thesis explores the main characteristics of the Chinese dream culture, in particular the notions of “souls” (*hun* 魂 and *po* 魄), spirit travelling (*shenyou* 神遊), as well as the imagination of the invisible world – multiple levels of hell and the irruption of the other world into the daily space. Then, the thesis examines dream accounts of Taoist and Buddhist origins, the subject of which is the realization of the emptiness of human life. Comparisons are drawn with ancient texts so as to explain why specific motifs still appeared in Qing literature, and underline how these motifs were reinvented or rewritten in the 17th-18th centuries.

Textual forms are studied by analyzing semantic, narrative, and linguistic tools with which the accounts are constructed. This thesis analyzes the vocabulary and narrative techniques regularly used to reveal the oneiric nature of the tale only after the dream. It also consists of intralingual comparisons that highlight the differences between several versions of a same story, particularly that between classical Chinese and vernacular

versions. This demonstrates that the language chosen by the author may imply a subjective stance reflective of the dreamer's inner self.

Thirdly, this thesis focuses on the hidden intention behind dream accounts. Ancient Chinese dream accounts imply that the dream is necessarily linked to an interpretation that is given retrospectively. But Qing authors increasingly tended to subvert this traditional objective, and sometimes even produced dream accounts that had no purpose other than their own originality or aesthetic research - in other words, these were "dreams for dream's sake".

The last part of this dissertation puts the dream accounts to the test of Lacanian theories of desire, since over the course of the 17th-18th centuries, the expression of desire became an essential component of oneiric accounts. Through elements evocative of characteristic mechanisms of desire as psychoanalysis would describe in the 20th century, some of the Qing oneiric accounts appear to be particularly relevant with respect to how authors constructed subjective fictional characters. This theoretical approach highlights the underlying coherence in the production of dream accounts and its significance in the early modern Chinese era.

Marinaccio, Julia

The Chinese Cadre Management - A Tool to Rule?

University of Vienna, 2018

<http://othes.univie.ac.at/53835/>

Abstract:

Cadre training has long been recognized as a central political institution in China's political system. Though being a comparatively under-represented research topic in the field of Chinese politics, a series of informative works have been published since the early 1960s. They explore different premises where Chinese officials undergo training, the organizational processes of training management, the institutional and regulatory adjustments that accompanied China's socio-economic transformation, and the role of training in state cohesion (Price, 1976; Shambaugh, 2008; Picke, 2009a; Chin, 2011; Lee, 2015). Given these insights, why the need for another book on this topic?

In my dissertation, I argue that extant literature fails to fully grasp the complexities of China's official training structure and its critical function in (environmental) governance. So far, studies have focused on training in party schools and academies of administration and its role in regime adaptation and resilience. I explore the training of officials working at the State Forestry Administration, tackling the question of the part of training in the central government's efforts to operationalize what I call the Chinese Communist Party's 'ideology of sustainability.'

My theoretical framework draws on a multidimensional concept of ideology that distinguishes between symbolic and operational features of ideology. While symbolic ideology refers to abstract ideas formulated and promulgated by the Chinese Communist Party, operational ideology pertains to functional bureaucracies' concrete policies. I argue that cadre training operates on two dimensions: Horizontally, cadre training facilitates the translation of symbolic ideology into operational ideology. Vertically, cadre training operates in central-local relations, pursuing a higher degree of responsiveness of local government agencies toward central mandates. In the context of a transformation from a growth-driven development model toward a model that also pursues

environmentally soundness and social equity, training is a central tool for achieving this value change. Training not only conveys abstract ideas to people working for China's state administration (and beyond) and imparts a set of pre-defined knowledge and skills that should enable transformation on a practical level.

The contributions of my dissertation can be summarized as follows: First, by unpicking China's training structure, I expound how 'sector-specific training' (行业培训) in functional bureaucracies relates to what is commonly understood as 'cadre training' (干部培训) in literature. Second, focusing on discursive processes, I explain how training transmits development directives from the central to the local level and shapes what officials involved in policy implementation think about and how they act upon sustainable development. Third, based on document analysis and data collection from three rounds of fieldwork in Beijing, Fujian, Chongqing, and Yunnan, I demonstrate why training fails to enhance natural resource management capacities where they are most needed.

The dissertation is organized into seven chapters, four of which present my research's empirical findings that I conducted between 2014 and 2017 at the Department of East Asian Studies/Sinology, University of Vienna.

Markgraf, Katharina

Frauenbilder im Werk der taiwanischen Autorin Xiao Sa 蕭颯: Eine postkoloniale Perspektive

[Female Identities in the Work of the Taiwanese Woman Writer Xiao Sa 蕭颯: A Postcolonial Perspective]

Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, 2018

<https://publikationen.uni-tuebingen.de/xmlui/handle/10900/83626>

Abstract:

This dissertation deals with literary representations of female identity in Taiwan, thereby combining postcolonial theories with Taiwanese literature. The works of the female author Xiao Sa (born 1953) provide a textual basis for the analysis, which concentrates on the 1980s. This was a time of profound change in Taiwanese culture, society and politics, and cultural and national identity was discussed. In her texts, Xiao Sa shows female protagonists, their histories and conceptions of womanhood from different perspectives and interweaves them with contemporary debates eminent at that time. Against the background of Confucian role models for Chinese women, it is shown how Taiwanese women in the 1980s combined these traditional concepts with their own, more emancipated ideas of femininity.

For this purpose, Homi Bhabha's concept of hybridity is taken as a theoretical framework. Applying this theory to Taiwanese literature specifies post-colonialism in South-East-Asia and makes it possible to look at questions of identity building from a new perspective. By approaching the texts from the social-historic base of New Historicism, it will be shown how Xiao Sa constitutes womanhood in her texts and how this reflects the cultural hybridity of Taiwanese culture.

Ng, Damien

The representation of trade wars in Western newsmagazines: A critical discourse analysis of Time, The Economist, L'Express and Der Spiegel on China (2010) and Japan (1987)

Durham University, 2019

<http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/12998/>

Abstract:

This doctoral thesis explores the representation of China's and Japan's trade wars with their trading partners in four Western newsmagazines: *Time*, *The Economist*, *L'Express*, and *Der Spiegel*. Based on both quantitative and qualitative approaches, this interdisciplinary thesis draws on two analytical frameworks from the realm of critical discourse analysis (CDA), van Leeuwen's (2008) socio-semantic inventory of social-actor representation and van Dijk's (1980) notion of macro-rules as the overarching approaches, supported by multilingualism and translation, to understand the changing dynamics of international relations and the global economy through Western media.

The sample in this thesis consists of 160 headlines and 160 lead texts, half of which are focused on China and the other half on Japan. The time frame stretches across a period of 12 months in 2010 (China) and in 1987 (Japan). The analysis is carried out via four case studies: Case Study 1 on China in the headlines; Case Study 2 on China in the lead texts; Case Study 3 on Japan in the headlines; and Case Study 4 on Japan in the lead texts. The findings obtained from the empirical research have revealed that China was not only reported more unfavourably than Japan in terms of depth, but also across a broader range of areas spanning economics, politics, and military affairs. It has also emerged that all the four Western newsmagazines tended to centre their coverage on the United States and China in 2010, and the United States and Japan in 1987, although they did not speak in one collective voice with regard to their coverage of China and Japan.

This thesis makes the following three key contributions to scholarship: (1) the inclusion of information drawn from primary sources in Chinese, French, German, and Japanese to complement English-language sources, along with their translation into

English where necessary; (2) the inclusion of one French and one German newsmagazine to complement the coverage by one American and one British newsmagazine, thus giving a fuller Western perspective on China and Japan, and (3) the author's proposed 'discourse of harm', which encapsulates the discovery of a separate strand of discourse on the Economic Other that (i) harms others to benefit itself, and (ii) harms others and harms itself.

Panina, Mariia E.

Образ России и русских в современной китайской публицистике (на материале писательских путевых очерков)

[The image of Russia and the Russians in contemporary Chinese journalism (travel essays)]

Saint Petersburg State University, 2019

<https://www.dissercat.com/content/obraz-rossii-i-russkikh-v-sovremennoi-kitaiskoi-publitsistike-na-materiale-pisatel'skikh-putevykh-ocherkov>

Abstract:

This paper tries to explain the place, role and content of the Chinese journalism categories in the general literature classification and create a Russian categorical apparatus for the Chinese journalism studies.

The paper studies how the nation image is formed in Chinese journalism based on the examples of Russia and the representation of Russians in contemporary Chinese writers' travel essays (2000s–2010s): essays “Russia, black and white: 10 years' experience of a Chinese in Russia” by Ma Fulin; “Witnessing Russia” by Ye Yongle; “Nord-Ost siege: my experience” by Guo Chen and travel essays “Notes of Two Cities in Russia” by Feng Jicai.

The practical significance of the research is describing the Chinese representations of Russia and the Russians in new texts not translated into Russian previously. Conclusions about the image of Russia can be considered in the processes of intercultural communication, nation branding, and the development Sino-Russian relations.

The first chapter views the image of a nation in journalism as the object of interdisciplinary study by imagology, literature and content analysis. The second chapter shows the characteristics of Chinese reportage literature as a complex space (combining different types of mode) in which a nation's image forms. The third chapter uses interdisciplinary methods to analyze the image of Russia and the Russians in the works of Chinese writers' journalism.

The term “image of the nation” is understood as the sum of stereotypical representations and knowledge of one nation about another, based on the binary opposition “the Self - the Other”. The image consists of stereotypes (collective representations about the Other) and imagemes (names representing the Other in the text) which can be grouped according to topics (economic, politics, culture, territory, national character of the Other). Basic imagothemes imply the comparison of the Other and the Self: as a rule, it is a negative evaluation of the Other and a positive evaluation of the Self, also, they can point to the advantages of the Other, which the Self lacks.

Chinese reportage literature includes an essay, a reportage, an analytical article, and documentary prose. The main feature of Chinese journalism is the syncretic nature - combination of journalistic, literary and documentary modes. In writings of four Chinese writers were found such imagothemes as “Black Russia - White Russia”, “Impractical Russia - Cultural Russia”, “Weak Russia - Strong Russia”, and “The Collapsing Soviet Union - the Reviving Russia”.

Imagothemes with negative connotations include statements mainly related to the economy and politics of Russia. Material culture (heavy, rough, uneconomical and uncomfortable things) of the Other is represented as a symbol of national character and negative features (laziness, non-punctuality, mismanagement). At the same time, a uniquely positive spiritual culture is associated with the best part of Russian character (the creativity, spiritual, and physical strength). Representations of Chinese authors about Russian culture do not simply state its positive assessment; they serve as a potential basis for rapprochement and forging contacts between Russia and China.

Pittwood, Linda Jean

Inscribing women onto bodies: an encounter with performance, photography and video art from Beijing and Shanghai, 1999–2016

University of Nottingham, 2019

<http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/56714/>

Abstract:

Since the turn of the millennium, many contemporary Chinese artists have used their own bodies or actors' bodies in their performance, photography and video art. These artworks become nodes in the communication of meaning about bodies and gendered categories. This project focuses on how selected objects of contemporary Chinese art represent 'women.' The category 'women' is understood in this project as not a socially constructed gender or essential sex, but as a role (or roles), practices and attributes linked to gender and sex identity, which can be inscribed onto bodies, including represented bodies. Scholarship at the intersection of contemporary Chinese art and gender has tended to focus on patterns emerging in the outputs and practices of exclusively female-identifying artists. By comparing the outputs of female-identifying and male-identifying artists, this thesis moves forward the debate relating to gendered authorship in international contemporary art and localized contemporary art discourse.

Artworks by seven leading contemporary Chinese artists are re-assessed, or given scholarly attention for the first time. The framework of this thesis combines two analytical categories: Michel Foucault's 'biopower' and turn of the 20th-century anarcho-feminist He-Yin Zhen's 'nannü.' Data for this project was collected and has been analysed using an approach of 'the encounter.' This comprised multi-sensory, emotional, entangled and embodied singular engagements with artworks, artists, archival materials, studios and cities.

This thesis finds in the discourse a complex, leaky, and fragmentary representation of 'woman' that exists in constant negotiation with an 'ideal,' 'consumed and consuming,' highly restricted, sometimes subjugated feminized body. The two 'women' are not necessarily exclusively represented by either female or male-identifying artists. However, the female-identifying artists are 'speaking a truth' of gendered experience

through their representations of 'women.' The female-identifying artists do not necessarily disrupt the binary genders, but they communicate the complexity of the attributes inscribed onto 'women.' The artists both acquiesce to and critique the circulating powers that contribute to inscribing 'women' onto bodies.

Qin, Guoshuai

La vie des patriarches Quanzhen: histoire d'une construction hagiographique, 13e-19e siècles

[The life of the Quanzhen patriarchs: A history of a hagiographic construction, 13th-19th centuries]

École pratique des hautes études (EPHE, PSL), 2019

<http://www.theses.fr/s205921>

Abstract:

In this work, we venture to understand on how, in the face of the particular religious environment of the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Quanzhen Taoists were, on the one hand, actively taking part in the historical and literary developments by narrating hagiographies to advocate the Quanzhen doctrine; and on the other hand, because there have been profound reorganizations in the narratives of the transformations of the Seven Veritables which were contrary to the Quanzhen doctrine and some of whose passages have given rise to conflict, how the Quanzhen Taoists retaliated, critiqued, and rewritten hagiographies to rectify and rehabilitate those stereotypes and comments. Such actions demonstrate that the Quanzhen Taoists had, from the Ming to the Republic China, a keen awareness of their specific religious identity.

At the present time, many scholars of popular religion studies consider that distinguishing Quanzhen too clearly from unofficial religions by opposing orthodox (Quanzhen) thought and sectarian (unofficial) thought is only an academic invention and a scientific interpretation that is irrelevant to historical reality. However, our analysis of a total of six versions and at least forty-four editions of the hagiographies of Quanzhen immortals indicates that the Quanzhen Taoists are not indifferent to the frequent interweaving of their doctrine with unofficial religions, but deeply concerned about their Quanzhen authenticity and religious identity.

Rochot, Justine

Bandes de vieux : une sociologie des espaces de sociabilité de jeunes retraités en Chine urbaine contemporaine

[Elder Gangs. A Sociology of Young Retirees' Spaces of Sociability in Contemporary Urban China]

École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), 2019

<http://www.theses.fr/2019EHES0118>

Abstract:

This dissertation stems from the observation of a booming number of elderly who have been gathering in Chinese urban public spaces to engage in collective activities since the beginning of the 2010s – a phenomenon exemplified by the 2013 controversies surrounding the “square dances” (广场舞) practiced by millions of elderly women, criticized as such for being too loud. Drawing from a sociology of ageing perspective and paying close attention to the meanings invested by actors in their daily experiences, I have wished to examine this intensification of elderly gatherings by confronting it with the recent experience of retirement of the first cohort of one-child parents, who were born and grew up during the Maoist period, and who constitute the main population of these gatherings.

The ethnographic practice, concerned with “following actors” and “letting them deploy their own world” (Latour, 2009) allowed me, through the initial investigation of a Beijing public park, to measure the diversity of spaces of intra-generational sociability these young retirees actually circulated through. Such spaces included public parks and squares, of course, but also stock exchange centers, matrimonial markets, neighborhood-based activity centers or for retired cadres, travel tours, digital groups, as well as health-products companies, all consequently appearing as a coherent network of spaces in which numerous urban young retirees were engaged.

Thanks to enquiries conducted in Beijing and Kunming between 2014 and 2016, this network is analyzed in the dissertation from a double perspective. On the one hand, my work endeavors to analyze the different “group styles” (Eliasoph, 2003) in which these young retirees are involved, the variety of forms taken by relationships and

interactions within these groups as well as the meanings individuals invest in them in view of their life course, their experience of retirement and the transformations of intergenerational relationships. Four case-studies, each presented in separate chapters, thus allow us to better grasp the various ways young retirees associate with each other in different spaces : the Sunshine Chorus, located in a Beijing park and composed of loosely acquainted participants ; the Joy Squadron, a group of people who were “sent down” to the countryside together at the end of the 1960s and who nowadays gather daily to practice taiji ; the Longevity Group, a pyramidal-sale company of health-products based in Beijing ; and the Yunnan University for the Elderly, a learning institution supervised by the Party-State.

On the other hand, beyond these singularities, this dissertation also takes seriously the strong resemblances which echo between these spaces, and therefore analyses from a more structural perspective the meanings of these resemblances : not only the emergence of a Chinese “third age”, as well as a rising generational and age consciousness between people sharing common worries and interests, but also the mobilization of generationally shared modes of action and resources in order to give meaning to old age in a context of strong uncertainty. Taken as a whole, the dissertation illustrates how, among such resources, the production of collective joy occupies a predominant place.

Sernelj, Tėja

Moderno konfucijanstvo na Tajvanu: Xu Fuguanova aksiologija estetike

[Modern Confucianism on Taiwan: Xu Fuguan's axiology of aesthetics]

University of Ljubljana, 2018

<https://plus.cobiss.si/opac7/bib/68039010>

Abstract:

The dissertation deals with the critical analysis of Xu Fuguan's aesthetic theory. Xu (1904–1982) is one of the central representatives of the second generation of the Taiwanese theoretical current of Modern Confucianism. The research was mainly focused on his fundamental contributions to the philosophy of this current, especially regarding his reinterpretations and re-evaluations of the basic axiological concepts of original Confucian and Daoist aesthetics. It also deals with questions linked to his attempts to preserve, systematize and modernize traditional Chinese aesthetics. Through the lens of the central assumption that Xu Fuguan's theory is defined by the paradigm of the traditional connection between ethics and aesthetics, the study also explored the importance of the mutually complementary interaction between Confucianism and Daoism in Xu's theory of aesthetics. Through a critical analysis of certain crucial fragments derived from the classical works of these two intellectual currents, the study also verified the presumption according to which both currents are instrumental for the consolidation of specifically Chinese aesthetics, albeit each of them in its unique way: while Confucianism contributed axiological elements to the inner coherence of traditional aesthetic discourses, Daoism endowed it with the important aspect of holistic vitality.

On the basis of studying, analysing and interpreting Xu Fuguan's most important works, the author also illuminated the significance of his innovative interpretation of the Chinese aesthetic concept *qiyun shengdong*, which still belongs to the most complex and difficult notions of the Chinese aesthetic tradition.

Since the representatives of the second generation of Modern Confucianism mainly placed their interpretations and re-evaluations of basic concepts defining the Chinese intellectual tradition into the framework of comparative analyses of Chinese and Euro-

American intellectual history, Xu Fuguan also based his interpretation of traditional Chinese aesthetics upon a comparative perspective, contrasting it with European aesthetics. However, the dissertation clearly shows that his analysis of European aesthetics is too generalized, and therefore problematic. These difficulties also manifest themselves in Xu's superficial and defective comprehension of modern Western art and culture.

Xu Fuguan's central theoretical contributions, i.e. the notion of concerned consciousness, the concept *qiyun shengdong*, and the systematic elucidation of the axiological foundations of Chinese aesthetics, which have been introduced and critically analysed in the present dissertation, are among the most important philosophical innovations elaborated by the Modern Confucian theory. These novel approaches are also interesting from the perspective of the global theoretical discourses, for they reveal important, culturally conditioned differences between traditional Western and traditional Chinese philosophy regarding their particular ways of perceiving and interpreting reality.

Song, Ge

Indes néerlandaises et culture chinoise. Deux traductions malaises du Roman des Trois Royaumes (1910-1913)

[Dutch Indies and Chinese Culture. Two Malay Translations of Romance of the Three Kingdoms (1910-1913)]

Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, 2018

<https://hal.inria.fr/tel-02080153/>

Abstract:

In the early 1880s, the descendants of Chinese immigrants (called Peranakan in Malay) achieved and printed a large number of Malay translations of Chinese novel in the Dutch Indies. We chose to study two translations published simultaneously during the years 1910-1913 when the Chinese community of Insular Southeast Asia was trying to rethink its cultural and political identity from literary, philological, historical and sociological angles.

The research is about two complete translations of the *Sanguo yanyi* 三國演義 (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), the most remarkable Chinese historical novels that depict the period of Three Kingdoms. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part aims to offer the literary and historical information required for the study of two translations *Sam Kok* (abbreviated title commonly used in Indonesia to refer to the *Sanguo yanyi*). We provided, at first, an overview of Malay translations of Chinese novel published in the Dutch Indies before 1910. In two subsequent chapters, we stated briefly the literary and cultural values of the *Sanguo yanyi* and review chronologically its Malay translations in the Dutch Indies.

In the second part, our studies focus on textual analysis of two *Sam Kok* from linguistic, literary and cultural angles. We found that although their translators, Lie In Eng et Tjie Tjin Koeij, had some rudimentary Chinese education and knowledge of the language Malay used in the urban areas of Java, they exhibited a great willingness to translate the poems and the comments in the novel, to explain Chinese proverbs and allusions by adding the notes, and to express the culture values of the *Sanguo yanyi*.

Their motivations behind the translations refer to the aims of commerce, education and entertainment.

The last part continues the reflection on the impact of *Sam Kok* on the Chinese community. In first chapter of this part, we put the Malay translations of Chinese novel in their historical context that a kind of Chinese national consciousness gradually emerged in the *peranakan* communities since the movements of re-chinesization have risen in Surabaya in the 1860s. In the next chapter, despite the lack of historical documents, certain influences of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* are traced in *peranakan*'s writing, architectural ornament and their religious life. We also studied weekly newspaper *Sin Po* in which Lie In Eng published his *Sam Kok* during 1910–1912, in order to reflect on the signification and the function of the *Sam Kok* in the newspaper. Inspired by Benedict Anderson's "Imagined Communities", we regard *Sam Kok* and other Chinese novels as an important medium that connects the *peranakan* to their common culture and tradition. In the last chapter, by comparing two *Sam Kok* with other Malay translations published during 1880–1910 in which the historical theme was the most in favor with *peranakan* readers, we are able to assert that, through those translations, especially those of *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, the *peranakan* have acquired some understanding of the history and culture of their ancestral country, which also constituted their past.

Steuer, Benjamin

The Development of the Circular Economy in the People's Republic of China - Institutional Evolution with Effective Outcomes?

University of Vienna, 2018

<http://othes.univie.ac.at/53629/1/54110.pdf>

Abstract:

This thesis deals with the evolution of the Circular Economy (CE) in the People's Republic of China and in primary instance investigates the institutional, i.e. rule-based, solution outcomes of this process. For this purpose, an analytical model of institutional evolution was devised, which covers the procedural sequence between institutional inheritance, the operation of selection and thereof derived variation in institutional outputs. These three operative elements are linked through constantly reoccurring information feedbacks, which emerge from the practice of institutional outputs (i.e. solutions) and as result nurture the institutional inheritance stock. The knowledge that is channelled into the institutional inheritance stock accrues to actors in the form of learning and in turn enhances their decision making capacities in the institutional selection process.

Given that actors and their institutional solutions are at the centre of the analysis, the thesis engages with the Chinese CE along four content-specific chapters: Firstly, the CE concept per se is highlighted and its formal institutional development is discussed in three country case studies including China. The second chapter offers a closer insight into the domain of state actor specific interest dynamics, formal institutional selection and outcomes of the CE implementation in China. The last two chapters constitute case studies on CE applications in the PRC. Herein, the first one centres on CE relevant industry parks, which depicts the evolutionary institutional process propelled by the institutional responsiveness dynamics between state (administrative) and corporate actors. The outcomes in this field are strongly influenced by the state's top-down guidance, while evolutionary variation emerges due to divergences in corporate actor constellations and respective efforts of interest realisation. The second case study revolves around the institutional dynamics in urban waste management, particularly the collection, transport and pre-processing of waste recyclables and discarded

electronic devices. In this context, the institutional dynamic is significantly propelled by the informal domain, consisting of highly-organised, unregistered informal waste collectors and traders, who pose a substantial challenge for state actors.

In summary, the results of the main query show that the initiation of the CE has induced a substantial and ongoing creation as well as a subsequent revision of CE relevant, institutional outputs. This result not only indicates the difficulties of finding durable and effective solutions for tackling CE specific problems. It moreover indicates that the competing, actor-specific interests are yet difficult to reconcile within the Chinese CE.

Sumaadii, Mina

China's Foreign Aid in the Balkans and the South Caucasus: A Different Approach to Development?

Freie Universität Berlin, 2019

Abstract:

The dissertation examines the development of Chinese foreign aid program in the Balkans and the South Caucasus between 2000 and 2014. In recent years the government of Xi Jinping placed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the core of China's development policy. While the initiative is yet to take its concrete form, Europe is undoubtedly its final destination. Currently, the Balkans and the South Caucasus are affected by the split in the EU-Russia relations, given which China became a less political actor.

Consequently, the countries of the Balkans and the South Caucasus became important in establishing alternative non-Russian transit routes to Europe. The visibility and scale of BRI related projects attracted media and public attention and triggered discussions about potential economic and political risks. However, many of the projects precede BRI activities. Thus, the timeline of this study captures the early developments.

In recent years an increase of large infrastructure projects involving significant finances and lacking transparency raised policy concerns. The governments negotiate most projects, which are funded mainly by grants or concessional loans from China's official sector. They also are declared to be 'promoting economic development.' Overall, fitting into the general definition of official development assistance. Given this, the dissertation approaches the topic as an academic study of China's foreign aid program, and the research puzzle of the dissertation concerns China's foreign aid allocation patterns in the Balkans and the South Caucasus. It also explores these patterns in the context of the broader trends around the globe.

The study starts by developing an overall framework for the aid program in all of the available cases. Based on the updated version of the donor interests' model and existing literature, four variables – natural resource rents, UN voting similarity, trade dependency on the donor, and approval ratings of the donor country's leadership – were

identified as being relevant in explaining the variation in the level of aid allocation. In order to test this framework, the study developed a research strategy that started from a general level with a panel model analysis of the broad trends. Then it applied qualitative comparative analysis for the regional analysis.

Overall, the results add evidence to a foreign aid policy that is still evolving and adapts to the conditions rather than has solid direction and agenda. Moreover, based on the analyses, distinct policy timelines were identified, which gave mixed results based on timeframes. At the general level, findings show that in some countries, factors such as natural resource rents and UN voting similarity were important in determining foreign aid flows. However, these findings were most relevant in the period between 2000 and 2006. The regional analysis in the Balkans and the South Caucasus also found time-dependent patterns for the hypotheses. Over the whole period between 2000 and 2014, among the factors associated with aid allocations, only increasing trade dependency withstood the test of time. The rest of the factors either lost significance or were irrelevant. As a result, the main suggestion for all future research on the topic would be to include these policy shifts regardless of the methodological choices for the analyses.

Teo, Emily

A Comparative History of Travel: Late-Ming and Early Modern Travel Writers in China (1550-1644)

University of Kent/ Freie Universität Berlin, 2018

<https://kar.kent.ac.uk/73753/>

Abstract:

Early modern Europe and late-Ming China were societies which witnessed considerable advancements in transportation and communications infrastructure. Such developments enabled the proliferation of travel, alongside the creation, publication and dissemination of travel accounts, written by well-travelled and scholarly individuals.

This thesis focuses on the accounts of travel to and in China by four early modern European writers—Galeote Pereira, Gaspar da Cruz, Martin de Rada and Matteo Ricci— and three late-Ming Chinese writers—Wang Shixing, Yuan Zhongdao and Xu Xiake. One of its aims is to address the relative lack of a comparative perspective in current research on travel writing by offering an intercultural account of European and Chinese travel texts. This approach allows the juxtaposition, across different travel cultures and literary traditions, of accounts relating to the same time period (1550-1644) and geographical space (Ming China).

The assumption that Chinese and European travel accounts from this period are incommensurable due to differences in context, culture, purpose and form is challenged throughout. Instead, the thesis establishes a sustained conversation between Chinese and European travel accounts of late-Ming China by arguing that there were broad thematic similarities across the travel texts, ranging from writing the self into travel accounts, descriptions of travel infrastructure, the utopian impulse in travel texts, and ethnographic writing. This thematic approach allows for a focused reading of the travel texts, locating the similarities and differences between Chinese and European accounts on a given topic—and analysing what these texts reveal about the writers' approaches and their historical and cultural contexts.

This thesis contributes to the ongoing discussion about 'global' travel writing. Travel writing scholars in Western academia have challenged Eurocentrism in travel writing

studies and have sought to broaden the field by introducing texts from various cultural and linguistic traditions, providing historical overviews and translations of selected texts. This thesis seeks to go one step further in 'global' travel writing, by drawing Chinese and European travel texts into a conversation, allowing new insights to emerge from old texts.

Wang, Shuaishuai

Living with censorship: The political economy and cultural politics of Chinese gay dating apps

Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2019

<https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=553a17f6-7c90-48ac-b3be-a7fd82d6670a>

Abstract:

This dissertation studies the political economy and cultural politics of Chinese gay dating apps, namely, Blued, Aloha, and ZANK. Unlike their Western counterparts such as Grindr and Jack'd whose functionalities are concentrated on location-based browsing, Chinese gay dating apps frequently integrate new features into their basic dating structures. Examples of which include live streaming, gaming, shopping, and overseas surrogacy consultation. Drawing on internet ethnographic data and interview data with their founders and users, this dissertation addresses two major questions. First, how do businesses based on gay dating apps develop amid close state surveillance? Second, how do users' sexual and intimate desires shape and transform China's digital pink economies and homosexual cultural politics? As China continues to problematize homosexuality in terms of obscenity and pornography in its regulatory documents, the booming economy of gay dating apps provides an entry point for rethinking the role of censorship in shaping Chinese gay lives. Using censorship as an analytical tool, I first show that Chinese gay dating apps can maneuver censorship in their favor to carry out economic activities. In this process, gay dating apps and the government become interdependent in the aspects of economic development, HIV/AIDS prevention, and internet security. I then examine how censorship has been woven into the everyday use of gay dating apps. As censorship increasingly disciplines users' dating and live streaming activities, it has also inspired creative ways to satisfy their same-sex sexual/emotional needs in a regulatory environment. Together, this study shifts the focus in thinking about China's homosexual cultural politics from identity formation, community organization, and media (mis)representation to the everyday sexual and emotional desires and related personal and bodily performances afforded by gay digital platforms.

Xie, Kailing

Embodying the Exemplary Gender Ideal: The Lives of China's Privileged Daughters

University of York, 2018

<http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/21554/>

Abstract:

Designed as an integral part of China's national modernisation programme, the One Child Policy was launched simultaneously with the economic reform in 1979. As a result of these policy changes, Chinese people live with tensions between multiple contending or even oppositional ideologies, including the official advocacy of socialist values, the revival of Confucianism and a neoliberal emphasis on individual success. The ideological departure from Mao's China, has had a mixed impact on women. Those born in the 1980s, the first only child generation, have grown into adulthood during China's socio-economic transformation and have reached a pivotal time of life, establishing career, marriage and parenthood, now with the possibility of having two children. This thesis explores the lives of well-educated urban Chinese women born in the 1980s, who are largely the beneficiaries of the policy changes of the post-Mao era. Raised to embody the ideals of a modern Chinese nation, their experiences and life trajectories are distinct from those of previous generations. Nevertheless, gender equality has been compromised under the economic reform and by the party-state's promotion of traditional family values to maintain social stability. By exploring the lives of privileged women, gender inequality is thrown into sharp relief. Based on semi-structured interviews with thirty-one women, and eleven of their male peers, I explore gendered attitudes to and experiences of marriage, reproductive choices, career and aspirations for a good life. In particular, I examine the contradictory effects of neoliberal techniques deployed by an authoritarian regime on these women's striving for success in urban China. I argue that, paradoxically, these women's individualistic determination to succeed has led them onto the path of conformity by pursuing exemplary norms which fit into the party-state's agenda. Those Chinese women who resist normative patterns of life are a minority facing an uphill struggle.

Xu, Aymeric D.

Du nationalisme au conservatisme: les groupes intellectuels associés à l'« essence nationale » en Chine (vers 1890-1940)

[From Nationalism to Conservatism: The Intellectual Groups Associated with 'National Essence' in China (from 1890s to 1940s)]

École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), 2018

<https://www.theses.fr/2018PSLEH154>

Abstract:

This dissertation examines three “conservative” associations of the “national essence” circle: the National Essence School founded in 1905, the Southern Society created in 1909 and the Critical Review Group established in 1921. National essence designates the quintessence of Chinese traditional culture. In the Late-Qing revolutionary context, the National Essence School and the Southern Society theorized this concept to shape nationalism from two directions. At the societal level, nationalist expectations were expressed in various social forms, such as intermediate associations, and a social enlightenment movement was undertaken to liberate people from traditional familial and political constraints. This liberty was expected to be reconciled with responsibilities towards the nation. At the institutional level, the two associations incorporated traditional culture into reforms inspired by Western liberal politics, like democracy, separation of power and rule of law. National essence was this regenerated traditional culture, used to solidarize the nation and to model China’s future political system. The Critical Review Group, situated in a different historical context, inherited this nationalist rhetoric. However, this ideal of nationalism came to be seen as conservative during the May Fourth era, because certain activists advocated a clean break with tradition. Conservatism in this period is formulated as a reaction against the young generation’s perceived disregard for responsibilities in the pursuit of liberty, the denial of the political utility of traditional culture by the May Fourth intellectuals, but also as a response to the national crisis and the First World War, leading some to question the merits of Western civilization. The meaning of national essence for the members of the three associations thus diversified. Although the concept was still used to federate and discipline the people and to inform the political reforms, national essence no longer

necessarily incorporated Western liberal politics. According to the way in which national essence was translated into concrete political projects, conservatism of the Republican era can be divided into four types: liberal conservatism that continued to advocate liberal elements of Chinese tradition and Western liberal politics; anti-modern conservatism that appealed to a socio-political system in line with China's agrarian and communitarian culture; philosophical conservatism that emphasized the utility of Confucian values of elitism, social hierarchy and doctrine of the mean in rectifying excessive liberty and political corruption and authoritarian conservatism that mobilized the most repressive elements of Confucianism, like supremacy of the leader, absolute obedience to superiors and political tutelage, to oppose liberalism during the Nanjing decade.

Yang, Chin-Chi

Canon Formation: the painting of Xu Wei and daxieyi painting lineage

SOAS University of London, 2019

Abstract:

This thesis studies the canon formation of a Ming painter, Xu Wei (1521–1593), in which three topics are mainly involved: a Chinese painter Xu Wei and his visual works, the Chinese painting lineage *daxieyi*, and the canon formation of Xu Wei's painting and the *daxieyi* lineage. The essential argument proposed in this thesis is that the canon formation of Xu Wei and his painting is an active selection process of later painters and connoisseurs instead of a traditionally passive adoption development as believed by early researchers. In other words, the iconic position of Xu Wei has been gradually formed in a long-lasting period rather than at a particular historical moment, where he was the main actor but his supporters involved in the canon formatting process were all actual contributors. The relaying men in different periods just served as the agents who drew Xu Wei and his painting from the sixteenth century step by step through the Republican period into modern China. These historical agents and critical events involved in the process of canon formation of Xu Wei's painting and *daxieyi* lineage are roughly categorised into three force fields, i.e., politics, society and culture, such as literati notion, aesthetic taste and painting imitation process. Each individual participant and every single group helped to form the iconic position of Xu Wei in the world of collection and connoisseurship.

In Chapter one, two portraits of Xu Wei in the late Ming and early Qing periods, i.e., his self-image inside his 'grape' painting and his legendary image built by a late Ming scholar Yuan Hongdao are examined. In Chapter two, the germination of his core painting perspectives about 'shadow' and 'splash-ink', commentaries of the Ming left-over people on his painting in the early Qing period as well as his paintings collection at the Qing court are discussed. Chapter three discusses the adoption of his drawing manners, such as 'shadow' notion, lines performance and the inscriptions on paintings. Chapter four focuses on the development of *xieyi/daxieyi* painting lineage from late

Ming to modern China and the involvement of political force in the canon formation of Xu Wei and *daxieyi* painting lineage.

Zanini, Livio

Form and Significance of Tea Connoisseurship in the Late Ming Dynasty

University of Ljubljana, 2018

Abstract:

The Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was a crucial period in the history of tea culture in China. The reign witnessed important changes in the manufacture and consumption of tea as well as an unprecedented interest of the literary elite in the appreciation of the beverage and in the publication of essays dedicated to it. More than half of the corpus of the literature on tea connoisseurship produced in China during the imperial age was published in the last century of the Ming.

The present study investigates the form and the significance of tea connoisseurship in both its literary expression and material practice during the late Ming. The research poses several questions: what was the symbolic value of tea, who were the authors involved in the composition of essays on tea, what was the form and content of these texts, what was their dominant function, what was the relation between tea and Buddhism, what were the principles and the lexicon of tea connoisseurship, and what is the value of these sources for our understanding of tea production and consumption in the Ming dynasty.

The first chapter introduces the object, the background, and the methodology of the research, with an extensive overview of the modern scholarship on Chinese tea culture. Chapter 2 is an overview of the evolution of tea culture with an eye towards pinpointing the elements of continuity and discontinuity between previous epochs and the late Ming. Chapter 3 examines the social and cultural contexts of late Ming tea literature, analysing its position in book production, the revival of Buddhism in the sixteenth century and its influence on tea appreciation. Chapter 4 scrutinises the corpus of late Ming essays on tea, analysing the biography of the authors and editors, the structure and content of the texts. Chapter 5 investigates the discursive construction of late Ming tea connoisseurship, focusing on the textual modes and themes of tea literature and the lexicon of tea appreciation. Chapter 6 takes into consideration the material aspects of the production of tea and the preparation of the beverage

described in Ming tea essays, comparing them with other contemporary sources and modern practices. Chapter 7 is a case study on the scholar Feng Mengzhen (1548–1605), which offers further insights on the role of tea and tea connoisseurship in the life of the literary elite.

The present research contributes to filling important gaps in the study of Chinese literary heritage and material culture. It provides the first comprehensive bibliography of Ming tea literature available in English, with detailed information on the works by Ming authors included in the collectanea *Chashu quanji* and other main writings produced in this period. It revises and discusses previous studies and reference materials, bringing to light relevant sources not considered in earlier scholarship. It questions approaches of some modern studies in the analysis of these sources and provides the first survey in English on the lexicon of tea tasting in premodern China.

Zhang, Chi

How does the Chinese Communist Party legitimise its approach to terrorism?

University of Leeds, 2019

<http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/22740/>

Abstract:

This thesis explores how China's narratives of legitimacy and history condition the ways in which the state frames and approaches "real" and perceived terrorism challenges. Contrary to general belief, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is concerned about legitimising its counter-terrorism strategy. However illegitimate it may seem to external observers, the CCP is making efforts to present a logical and coherent counter-terrorism strategy to its domestic audiences. Rooted in the Chinese political context and historical continuities, China's counter-terrorism agenda prioritises the concept of national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This agenda is justified through the narratives of the Century of Humiliation, and is underpinned by the friend/enemy division that was inherited from the Mao era. The designation of the 'enemy abroad' - international hostile forces - and the 'enemy within' plays an important role in the formation of the Chinese identity and China's foreign policy. Anxious about the impact of democratisation on regime stability, Chinese political elites and scholars are highly sensitive to the sympathy on the part of the international community towards dissident groups that have a separatist agenda. In order to convince its domestic audiences of the legitimacy of its counter-terrorism strategy, the CCP has established a 'regime of truth' through its dominance in the framing of terrorism-related events. It has also sought to complement the highly centralised counter-terrorism system with a revival of the Mass Line strategy which was central to Mao's governance but faded from view for much of the post-Mao era. The application of the Mass Line strategy in counter-terrorism has helped the CCP to develop a community engagement model that emphasises co-optation of influential community members from within. The desire to maintain control has resulted in various problems in counter-terrorism policy and practice, which raise questions about - or even threaten to undermine - the government's ability to demonstrate the legitimacy and efficacy of its counter-terrorism strategy.

In exploring the peculiar characteristics of China's counter-terrorism approach, this thesis makes original contributions in five respects: 1) it draws on a wide range of Chinese-language sources that have been under-explored in the study of China's perception of its security threats. Introducing these sources, this thesis brings forwards domestic 'insider' debates to a wider non-Chinese-speaking audience interested in the concept of security, unity, separatism, and terrorism in China. 2) It provides an in-depth analysis of China's usage and manoeuvring of the frames, narratives, and labels in the construction of its counter-terrorism discourse, which offers an interesting insight into how the Chinese state and security apparatus works. 3) It analyses the evolution of the friend/enemy distinction in the Chinese political discourse and how it is embedded in the counter-terrorism discourse. 4) It contributes to terrorism research by examining the under-studied case of China, which is often neglected in mainstream 'Western' terrorism research. 5) Finally, the thesis contributes to China studies by investigating how China responds to 'real' and perceived terrorist threats.

Zhang, Linzhi

Contemporary Art and the Exhibitionary System: China as a Case Study

University of Cambridge, 2019

<https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/289428>

Abstract:

The challenge of contemporary art, unlike in art history, has only recently been identified in sociology. Furthermore, an overly philosophical orientation, has undermined sociological explanations of artistic production. To remedy this, I propose a sociology of exhibitions. This entails a shift of focus from the elusive subject matter of art towards the tangible exhibition, and the construction of a new framework: the exhibitionary system, which also stands for the physical, institutional, and network environment of exhibitions. The central question in the sociology of exhibitions is to explain how the exhibitionary system shapes artistic production. The answer was sought by observing exhibition making in the Chinese exhibitionary system, from which quantitative data about 1,525 exhibitions, held in 43 exhibition spaces between 2010 and 2016, were also collected. I argue that the exhibition context shapes the physical basis of individual artworks and the construction of an artist's oeuvre. Through the contextualised creation of artworks for public viewing, artists aim to raise their visibility, which is crucial for artists' career prospects and symbolic consecration. An artist's visibility is, however, constrained by where she exhibits and with whom she co-exhibits. My method for measuring visibility reveals its binary nature, divided along a singular dimension and a collective dimension. Yet no binary division between the non-profit and for-profit is found within the exhibitionary system with regards to the selection of artists. Rather, both sectors contribute to a dual selection of marketable artists. A model of professional autonomy, which reconciles "art and the market" on the level of practices and awareness, prevails in the exhibitionary system. The sociology of exhibitions has solved persistent theoretical problems in the sociology of art. My empirical findings give rise to new research questions. Finally, I have offered a dialogue between studies of non-western and western cases within the same framework.

Zhou, Xiaohan

Elements of Continuity between Mathematical Writings from the Song-Yuan (13th–14th Century) Dynasties and the Ming Dynasty (15th Century): Comparing Yang Hui’s Mathematical Methods (1261 C.E.) and Wu Jing’s Great Compendium (1450 C.E.)

Université Paris Diderot, 2018

<https://www.theses.fr/s180444>

Abstract:

The discourse of “break” between the mathematics in the Song-Yuan period and that in the Ming period exists in the historical writing of mathematics in China. This thesis analyzes the process and the reasons of the appearance of this kind of discourse and suggests that the “break” only appears when observers look at mathematics from certain perspectives. This thesis is devoted to find elements of continuity between the Ming mathematics and the Song-Yuan mathematics. *The Nine Chapters on Mathematical Procedures* (thereafter, *The Nine Chapters*) represented a very important work during the two periods. The completion date of *The Nine Chapters* in the form handed down is placed somewhere between the first century B.C.E. and the first century C.E. Yang Hui’s *Mathematical Methods* (1261 C.E.) and Wu Jing’s *Great Compendium* (1450 C.E.) are extant precious mathematical writings in the two periods which were based on *The Nine Chapters* and its former commentaries. With respect to the continuity of mathematical text, case studies on the basis of two books show that Wu Jing systematically took parts of the text of *Mathematical Methods* to compile *Great Compendium*. The approximate rule by which text was extracted in each chapter could be used to partly recover Yang Hui’s text. With respect to the continuity of mathematical ideas, firstly, the arrangement and the order of problems are essential results of the Song

scholar’s treatment of *The Nine Chapters*. They were accepted by Wu Jing when he arranged problems in *Great Compendium*. Secondly, Yang Hui laid a great emphasis on “mathematical methods”. He added some new mathematical methods and also changed some methods in *The Nine Chapters*. Wu Jing captured the changes and adopted them in his *Great Compendium*. Meanwhile, some mathematical concepts

and terms, and the use of diagrams, relating to these mathematical methods that the Song scholar introduced were also

absorbed into *Great Compendium*. All these findings prove that *The Nine Chapters* that circulated in the Ming dynasty had been largely permeated by the thoughts of the Song scholar.

Zhu, Yan

Children's understandings and experiences of peer friendships in a rural Chinese boarding school

The University of Edinburgh, 2019

<https://era.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/36667>

Abstract:

Friendship is an important form of people's everyday relationships with others. However, research is limited on friendship in the context of childhood, particularly that of Chinese rural children. This research will help to fill this gap.

The aim of the research is to explore the complexity and diversity of Chinese children's understandings and practices of peer friendships in the context of a rural primary boarding school. Data for this research were collected through an intensive 5-month ethnographic study in a rural primary boarding school (given the pseudonym "Central Primary School") in Hubei Province, China in 2016. Given the importance of ethics in childhood studies and the sensitivity of talking about emotionally charged friendship experiences, ethical considerations have been carefully considered throughout the research process.

Through analysing children's talk about and interactions with different peers who were named as "friends", this research argues that those who are friends, and what friendships mean and look like are contextualized. Its findings can be summarized in three points. Firstly, friendship is not a homogeneous concept but can be categorized into different types with different purposes and expectations. In these Chinese children's friendship groups, friendships can be formed on a basis of intimacy between individuals ("intimate friendship"), of friends' "usefulness" in helping one to improve school experiences ("instrumental friendship"), or of individuals' shared identity as "in-group members" (*zijuren*) of the same "collective" (*jiti*). Since friendships are complex, the affective and instrumental aspects can coexist in these friendships with different "weights". Secondly, friendships are dynamic, the levels of intimacy between friends might be upgraded or degraded in friendship practices; therefore, conversion can happen among these forms of friendships. Thirdly, gender, power structures amongst

children, hierarchical relationships between children and significant adults (teachers and parents), and China's Confucian virtues and collectivist values significantly shaped these Chinese children's constructions and practices of peer friendships. In discussing these influential elements, this research points out that they are not isolated but related when shaping children's friendships.

This research has conceptual implications for the conceptualizations of friendships. It contributes to sociological conceptualizations of friendships' complexity and diversity through providing rich findings about Chinese children's contextualized definitions, patterns and practices of peer friendships in their everyday boarding school lives. It also enhances our understandings of children's capacities as social actors and agents in the construction of their own social lives, and of complexities of childhood in a globalizing world through discussing these rural Chinese children's friendships in their childhood at school. Moreover, through offering detailed discussions about children's contextualized experiences of relationships with significant others (e.g., friends, peers, teachers and parents), this research has implications for China's current practices of relationship education, daily student organizing and evaluation at school. In addition, this research's reflexive account of multiple roles and relationships management during its ethnographic fieldwork in a Chinese school while maintaining ethical standards can offer methodological and ethical implications for further studies with Chinese children.

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