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# Between Radical Rhetoric and Political Moderation

The Portuguese PS and Its International Networks in the Carnation Revolution

*Abstract:* This paper examines the connection between the political, ideological and discursive development of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) and the party's international relations during the Carnation Revolution (1974–1975). Specifically, it sheds new light on how the PS received and assimilated the support, pressures and influences from two ideologically diverse European socialist parties: the French Socialist Party (PSF) and the British Labour Party. The main argument is that PS received differing and sometimes contradictory influences from its European counterparts, despite the fact that these counterparts collaborated within the Socialist International. These diverging influences came from PSF on the one hand, and the main European social democrat parties and governments on the other. The PS found inspiration in the ideological renewal of the PSF in the early 1970s, especially their strategy of the union of the French left and the concept of *autogestion* (self-management). However, the PS was influenced in the political realm by the European social democrats, who worked towards preventing the possibility of a communist takeover in Portugal. These influences had an impact on the public discourse, political behaviour, and ideology of the PS, which helps to explain the disjunction between the radical discourse and the moderate political practice of the Portuguese Socialists.

*Keywords:* Portuguese Socialist Party, Union of the Left, Social Democracy, Mário Soares, workers' self-management

“The PS will not save Capitalism.”<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

The Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) was created in a clandestine manner in 1973, a year before the outbreak of the Carnation Revolution. It was a small socialist party positioned against capitalism and in favour of grassroots democracy, self-management, and a neutralist international policy, which took Marxism as its theoretical inspiration.<sup>2</sup> In 1975, only two years later, the Revolution was over and the PS had become the biggest party in Portugal. It criticised recent Portuguese experiments in workers' self-management, it envisaged a parliamentary democracy, and its leader, Mário Soares, declared the party's commitment to the EC and NATO.<sup>3</sup> This political and ideological transformation took place within the context of the Carnation Revolution, an episode that threatened the status quo in Europe and the process of détente to which it was linked.

This context suggests that the transformation of the PS from a small clandestine Marxist party into a catch-all party in government was heavily influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War. This paper will examine how this transformation took place, and the extent to which it was influenced by international factors. Recent studies on the Portuguese transition to democracy have shown that the Western powers were deeply involved in Portugal during the Revolution. They have highlighted the fact that the European powers under Social Democrat governments were the main international actors promoting democracy in Portugal and preserving the international equilibrium of Europe,<sup>4</sup> mainly via party support for the PS. However, this existing scholarship considers the PS merely as a channel through which the European parties could intervene in Portuguese politics. They have not taken into account how the party received, adapted, rejected, or assimilated the influences from abroad.

Nevertheless, the literature that specifically deals with the PS has explained the ideological transformation of the party in the mid-1970s in terms of domestic factors.<sup>5</sup> Whenever the influence of international factors has been considered, concepts such as "European socialists" or "Europeans" have been used as uniform analytical categories, which has favoured the tendency to consider them a homogeneous force.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, there has been a gap in understanding the significant question as to how the two distinctive perceptions of democracy and socialism among European socialists at the beginning of the 1970s – the social democrat and the socialist ideological lines that met within the SI<sup>7</sup> – affected or influenced the transformation of the PS.

The aim of this paper is therefore to shed new light on how during the Carnation Revolution the PS received and assimilated the support, pressures and influences from two ideologically diverse European socialist parties: the French Socialist Party (PSF) and the British Labour Party (BLP). I analyse the connection between the

political, ideological and discursive development of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) and the party's international relations during the intense period from April 1974 to November 1975.

This paper is based on primary source material from the historical archive of the French Socialist Party (Centre d'Archives Socialistes. Fondation Jean Jaurès, Paris), the UK National Archives (London), the Labour Party Archive (People's History Museum, Manchester) and the Mário Soares Foundation (Lisbon). In addition, I draw on publications including the official newspapers of the PSF and the PS.

My arguments are that during the Carnation Revolution, the PS received differing and sometimes contradictory influences from its European counterparts, despite the fact that these counterparts collaborated within the Socialist International. These diverging influences came from the PSF on the one hand, and the main European social democrat parties on the other. The PS found inspiration in the ideological renewal of the PSF in the early 1970s, especially their strategy of uniting the French left and the concept of *autogestion* (workers' self-management). However, the PS was influenced in the political realm by the European social democracy led by the SPD and the BLP, who worked towards preventing the possibility of a communist takeover in Portugal. These influences had an impact on the public discourse, political behaviour, and ideology of the PS, creating a disjuncture between a radical discourse and moderate political practice. Although in principle these influences pulled in opposite directions, the Portuguese Socialists – especially the party leader Mário Soares – managed to combine them in order to fight for a dominant position within the Portuguese left in the Revolution, and for the establishment of a Western kind of democracy in Portugal.

## The PS before the Revolution

Until 1973, the year before the Carnation Revolution began, the Portuguese Socialists did not have a party. They were involved with the *Acção Socialista Portuguesa* (ASP), which in practice was a group of friends with socialist and social democrat tendencies without a clear organic structure or grassroots support.<sup>8</sup> The main leaders of the ASP, Mário Soares, Francisco Ramos da Costa, and Manuel Tito de Morais, renowned opponents of Salazar's regime, were middle class intellectuals living in exile. They realised that the survival of the socialists depended on international support, and in the early 1970s they actively tried to establish relations with the main socialist and social democrat parties of Western Europe – the British Labour Party, the French and Italian socialist parties, and the German, Swedish and Swiss social democrat parties. Before the outbreak of the Carnation Revolution, some of these

parties gave limited help to the ASP; for example, the SPD covered the tickets for some ASP members to attend international meetings, the PSF and the BLP provided venues in their headquarters where the Portuguese could meet, and the PSI offered technical assistance to the ASP to print the newspaper *Portugal Socialista*. This help was fundamental to the survival and the evolution of the organisation.<sup>9</sup> The establishment of cordial relations with other European socialist parties culminated in the ASP being accepted into the Socialist International (SI) in 1972. The International created the Portugal Committee in order to make solidarity activities systematic and effective, but accepting the Portuguese party into the SI did not imply an immediate increase in European assistance for the ASP. Indeed, before the beginning of the Revolution, Portugal was not one of SI's priorities.<sup>10</sup>

Their entry to the International triggered the transformation of the ASP into a political party. In 1973, at the headquarters of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bad *Münstereifel* (Federal Republic of Germany), the Portuguese Socialists created the PS, and elected Mário Soares as the Secretary General. The location of this event has led to a widespread assumption that the German social democrats influenced the PS from its very inception. However, an analysis of the first declaration of principles and programme of the PS shows that the Portuguese were actually highly influenced by the ideological renovation of French Socialism at the beginning of the 1970s.<sup>11</sup> At the moment of its creation, the PS was attracted by three characteristics of the renewed French socialism: the aim to break with capitalism and to build socialism by democratic means, the strategy of the union between socialists and communists, and the concept of *autogestion* (workers' self-management), which were understood as the way to combine socialism and democracy.

Under Salazar's dictatorship, the leftist clandestine opposition in Portugal offered fertile ground for adopting a radical anti-capitalist discourse. Capitalism was associated with the dictatorship, and advocating a clear rupture was a common characteristic of the Portuguese left. This is reflected in the ideological outlook of the PS before the beginning of the Revolution. The party aimed to establish a socialist society in freedom. It repudiated capitalism, as well as Soviet communism. Furthermore, it rejected Social Democracy – a concept discredited in Portugal – for having accepted the basic structures of capitalism. The PS was in favour of implanting a system in Portugal that would combine representative democracy and grassroots democracy, thereby building an original Portuguese road to socialism. Moreover, it was in favour of international neutralism, and against both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. All of this situated the party within the ideological milieu occupied by the southern European socialism being promoted at the time by French Socialists.<sup>12</sup>

The PS acknowledged that in order to fight against the dictatorship, the Portuguese opposition had to be united. Furthermore, in accordance with several histor-

ical experiences and political theory, post-authoritarian transitions to democracy would require an initial phase of governments of national unity; in this sense, advocating some kind of union with the communists, who had been the main party in the opposition to the dictatorship, seemed to be a political necessity. In this context, Soares thought that the best way to compete with the strength of the communist party was to be allied with them; such an alliance could help the socialists to grow at the expense of the PCP, which had strong links with the workers and part of the Portuguese intelligentsia.<sup>13</sup> This reasoning echoed the logic of the PSF when it decided to pursue the union of the French left.<sup>14</sup>

In fact, before the beginning of the Revolution, the PSF and the PS were working together to achieve the union of the left in Portugal. In September 1973, under the auspices of the PSF, the PS and the PCP met in Paris, intending to establish a kind of cooperation similar to that reached by the French left. The Portuguese socialists meant to sign a common programme with the PCP, but this was rejected by the Portuguese communists. Instead, they issued a joint statement in which they displayed the same short term objectives: to put an end to the dictatorship and the colonial wars, establish democratic freedoms in Portugal, end monopolies in Portugal, and establish a provisional government after the fall of the regime that would call elections for a Constituent Assembly.<sup>15</sup> There was one more attempt by the Portuguese socialists to sign a common programme with the PCP in April 1974. Both parties met again in Paris, in a venue discreetly provided by the PSF,<sup>16</sup> with the intention of advancing the elaboration of a common programme. Again, the result was a new joint statement, similar to the earlier one, that was meant to be published on 25<sup>th</sup> April. The immediate outbreak of the Carnation Revolution rendered its contents out of date, and it remained unpublished.<sup>17</sup>

## The coup d'état

The military coup d'état led by the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA) overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship on 25<sup>th</sup> April 1974. Immediately after the coup, the MFA issued a basic programme of transition. They intended to create a National Salvation Junta led by the conservative General António de Spínola which would form a provisional government, as well as restore the basic freedoms, promise a new economic policy to serve the Portuguese people, promise to respect the international commitments of the country, and offer a political solution to the colonial wars. At that time, Mário Soares was in Bonn intending to meet with Willy Brandt. Their meeting did not take place, as after receiving the news of the coup in Portugal, Soares decided to fly to Lisbon. He arrived on 28<sup>th</sup> April, and was received enthusiastically by the

population. Three days later, he participated in the May Day celebrations in Lisbon, where he and PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal were cheered by a huge crowd.

The British government was aware of the significance of the change of regime in Portugal, and immediately invited Mário Soares to visit London. This invitation was proffered through the British Labour Party and not the government, as Soares did not yet have any official position in Portugal. Soares flew to the British capital on 2<sup>nd</sup> May, only four days after his arrival in Portugal. During his one-day visit to London, Soares met with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. Their discussions included official recognition for the new regime, the formation and tasks of the Portuguese provisional government, the socialist/communist balance of forces in Portugal, and decolonisation. This was the first stop on Soares' tour of the western European capitals with the official purpose of obtaining international recognition for the new regime. However, Soares also used this trip to obtain advice, political, economic and moral support for the PS from the European sister parties.<sup>18</sup>

It was a British practice to “recognise governments which enjoy with a reasonable prospect of permanence the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of much the greater part of the national territory.” They considered that “the new Portuguese regime fulfils these criteria.”<sup>19</sup> However, the Labour government waited until Soares' visit to recognise the new Portuguese regime, thus giving the impression that it was waiting to hear Soares' opinion before taking any decision. James Callaghan “intended to try to strengthen Dr. Soares' position by announcing that the Government had decided to accord recognition to General Spínola following the discussion with Dr. Soares in London.”<sup>20</sup>

Soares informed the British of the formation and the tasks of the future Portuguese provisional government. He thought that the government would be formed within two weeks, and he expected to be appointed Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. The provisional government would be in power for one year, after which free, general, and democratic elections would be held. The communists wanted to participate in the government, and Soares thought that this would be appropriate, “if only to share the criticism if things went wrong.” The conversation was directed towards a discussion of the socialist/communist balance of power. The British were concerned because Alvaro Cunhal, the leader of the PCP, was received enthusiastically when he returned to Portugal from exile. Although Soares supported the entrance of the PCP into the provisional government, he tried to draw the British attention towards his own party by using Cold War logic; he warned them about “his belief that the Portuguese Communist Party is receiving substantial financial backing from the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in Eastern Europe.”<sup>21</sup> This led the British to decide that “the Portuguese Socialists were in need of technical help.” Callaghan

reached the conclusion that two areas needed immediate action: “First, there was the question of Party support; Dr. Soares should let the Labour Party know what he wanted. Secondly, as between Governments, he hoped General Spínola would tell the British Government what Portugal needed so that Britain [...] could help.”<sup>22</sup>

After this visit to London, Soares travelled to the main Western European capitals as a representative of the new Portuguese authorities. He had the same double objective as in London: to ensure international recognition of the new Portuguese regime, and obtain international support and assistance for the PS. Regarding the PS, Soares was asked in Belgium about his party’s commitment to NATO and the EEC. He admitted that “the Portuguese Socialist Party had in the past campaigned against both NATO and the EEC,” but he added that “now that the political situation in Portugal had [sic] changed, the policy of the Portuguese Socialist Party has also changed.” He thought “it was safe to say that his party was now in favour of continued membership of NATO and of a rapprochement with the European Communities.”<sup>23</sup> In Bonn, Soares had a meeting with the American ambassador, and while discussing the economic problems of Portugal, Soares declared that these problems “must be solved without resort to extreme right or leftist solutions.” Soares cited the Pinochet government in Chile as an example of an approach which he hoped Portugal could avoid. In facing these economic problems, Soares said: “liberty in Portugal – to which the Socialists are very attached – would be maintained.”<sup>24</sup>

Soares gave the Western governments the impression of being in the political centre as early as May 1974, which was at odds with the programme of the PS. These statements show Soares’ realistic and pragmatic approach to the Portuguese situation, but also his wavering attachment to the programme of his own party – to which he himself had contributed a great deal.<sup>25</sup> The programme stated that the aim of the PS was to establish a socialist society in Portugal, which was certainly in contradiction with capitalism – and incompatible with the maintenance of the international status quo, as Portugal was a member of NATO. Moreover, one of the aims of the party regarding international policy was to work for the “simultaneous disappearance of the diplomatic instruments – universal and regional – of domination of the two super-powers, particularly NATO.”<sup>26</sup> As these statements could cause concern in most of the western European governments, Soares was willing to clear up any doubts that Portugal’s western allies might have about his party’s commitment to the rules of the game existing in the West – Atlanticism, liberal democracy, and capitalism.

The fact that Soares’ statements were at odds with the PS programme can be further explained by two recent occurrences, one international and the other national. Firstly, the Chilean coup d’état in September 1973 against Salvador Allende, the socialist president, had shown the limits of the socialist experience in certain places that were geo-strategically important to the equilibrium of the Cold War. Secondly,

the situation in Portugal had changed since the PS had approved its programme in 1973, when it had still been an illegal party. In addition, the programme of the PS left some room for changes and flexible interpretations. The beginning of the text stated that “[it represents] a point of reference”; “[...] it is a starting point for further ideological discussion, reflection and development.”<sup>27</sup> However, the sense that Soares’ statements provoke is that he was not as committed to his party’s programme as he was to taking advantage of the state of affairs that offered him the possibility of obtaining the support of the western powers for his party, as well as for the political evolution of Portugal along Western lines.

Soares’ European tour was a success in terms of gaining support for the PS, especially in the UK and in the RFA.<sup>28</sup> For British Labour, a key factor in deciding to support the PS was the fact that Soares was its leader. He was quite well known to some Labour leaders, and his party could offer the guarantee of a moderate centre-left party. In the words of James Callaghan: “I have known Mário Soares for many years and have considerable confidence in him, we shall be offering the Portuguese Socialist Party organisational and technical help in the belief that a government with their participation, is the one which offers the best prospects for the West.”<sup>29</sup> Thus, Callaghan offers a clue as to how relevant Soares himself was for the BLP’s decision that the PS was the party to be supported. This statement, however, has to be contextualised. It was directed to American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who did not trust the capabilities of the Portuguese socialist leader,<sup>30</sup> so it is also possible that Callaghan was trying to convince Kissinger of the reliability of Soares and the socialists. Kissinger was overly concerned with the expected presence of communists in the Portuguese government, which could be a dangerous precedent for other NATO member countries, such as France and Italy, and thus at the beginning of the Revolution, the Americans maintained chilly relations with the new Portugal.<sup>31</sup>

The PS publicly exploited Soares’ tour around Europe for its own benefit as much as it could. The party emphasised the fact that Mário Soares had made his trip as the Secretary General of the PS, and that the British government had waited for the opinion of the PS before recognising the new Portuguese regime.<sup>32</sup> Not only, then, did Soares try to obtain the full support of the western governments, and the social democrat parties that ruled some of them, by emphasising his political moderation and realism, but he also tried to present himself in Portugal as a figure with international support and legitimacy. Furthermore, the tour presented the PS as the guarantor of democracy in Portugal. Since the party organisation was quite weak, this international backing was precious capital. Additionally, the fact that Soares mentioned that he had guaranteed the National Salvation Junta’s commitment to democracy and decolonisation put some pressure on the directions that the new Portugal had to take.



On 16<sup>th</sup> May, the JSN formed the Provisional Government. It included members from the military and all the main political forces. The conservative General António de Spínola was appointed President, the Socialists received four ministries, including Soares appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Communists had two ministries, as did the *Partido Popular Democrático* (PPD). The main objectives of the Provisional Government programme were the democratisation of Portugal, the re-establishment of the basic freedoms, and a solution to the colonial problem.

Soon afterwards, in June, following the planning of the first meeting between Soares, Wilson and Callaghan, the BLP started to financially support the PS, individually as well as through the SI. The International began to co-ordinate the policies and the financial support of their member parties and to channel them towards the PS. However, the rapid evolution of the Portuguese situation would mean that the European social democrats' help for the PS would soon surpass that of the SI.<sup>33</sup>

Despite this, the Secretary General of the SI, Hans Janitschek, met with Soares in London in May. Although the historical archive of the SI does not contain any records of what was discussed in the meeting, Soares probably asked for every kind of support the SI could offer the PS. This is suggested by the fact that some days after this encounter, the International held an emergency meeting of the Portugal Committee of the SI<sup>34</sup> "to discuss the giving of technical aid by member parties to Portuguese Socialist Party".<sup>35</sup> The decision taken by the Bureau on Portugal was to give material, economic, and technical support to the PS. The member parties were asked to provide the PS with direct financial aid, as well as the following material:

"20 electric duplicators, 50 manual duplicators, 20 photocopying machines, 5 scanners, 1 new set of printing machinery for the newspaper 'Republica', 1 off-set printing machine, 1 printing press for posters, 50 type-writers, 5 addressographs, 3 Fiat 124 or Simca 1,500 cars, 5 Fiat 850 or Simca 1,000 cars, 1 electronic punched-card filing system [...], [p]hotographic and cinematographic equipment, [c]upboards and filing cabinets."

Besides this demand of material support, the Bureau also asked the member parties to provide the following:

"[s]alaries of 20 senior party officers (approx. 3,500 French francs monthly per person), 50 [s]alaries for second-level party workers (approx. 2,000–3,000 French francs monthly per person), [r]ent of 370 premises for party use (approx. 1,000 French francs monthly per premise), travel expenses for party workers (total of approx. 3,000 French francs monthly). The Bureau [also] decided to make a contribution out of the International's Reserve Fund to the amount of £5,000 to the Portuguese Party."

The European Socialist parties responded to this call for help and immediately offered the PS a sum of more than £32,000.<sup>36</sup> I have not found evidence that the PS received the rest of the items, but if this was the case, it would be possible to argue that the Western European parties, using the SI as a channel, provided the material and financial support that the PS would need to raise their basic infrastructure and equipment to a national level.

## After the coup, the Revolution begins

The situation in Portugal changed very quickly. What had begun as a military coup d'état soon became a real revolution. The overthrowing of the regime unleashed long-repressed tensions and demands of the Portuguese population. Already in May, the number of strikes increased rapidly; the occupations of houses, factories and lands started soon after the overthrowing of the dictatorship and continued throughout the summer and beyond. This forced the first Provisional Governments, the MFA, and the recently established political parties to try to restrain these movements on the one hand, and to try to seduce them on the other. Generally, they did so by radicalising their rhetoric and their policies.

Here, then, I introduce a new argument: at this early stage of the Revolution, Mário Soares was constructing a two-faced image of himself and of his party,<sup>37</sup> with the aim of obtaining as much support as possible from as many partners and people as possible. Thus, while for the western European powers he was the moderate and centrist leader of a Socialist Party that envisaged “middle-of-the-road” policies, and who “was now in favour of continued membership of NATO and of a rapprochement with the European Communities”, in Portugal, he and the PS wore a different, more leftist face. It was based on anti-capitalist discourse combined with the defence of a pluralist democracy and freedom.

The radical language of the Portuguese Socialists, which always went together with moderate/reformist political objectives, was an attempt to satisfy the above-mentioned social demands rhetorically, but also to impose limits on them, and to channel them towards the direction that the party preferred. The rhetoric and ideological means that the PS had at their disposal for coping with this complex situation were to some extent borrowed from the French Socialists. By using concepts such as the union of the left, socialism in freedom, or *autogestão*, the PS tried to influence both the ongoing social and the political revolutions.<sup>38</sup>

Since the beginning of the Revolution, the idea of unity among the left-wing parties had been defended by the members of the PS. It was considered necessary for building a democratic and socialist Portugal and for containing the possible

excesses of the counter-revolution. Magalhães Godinho, a member of the PS executive, declared at a PS rally in June that it was “necessary to consolidate democracy in this historical moment [...]. It is imperative to establish [...] an alliance or coalition of parties to construct together a democratic Portugal [...] which none of us could build alone.” Godinho added that this union, in which the main parties would be the PS and the PCP, had to have its own rules: “an open cooperative spirit, loyalty in purposes and acts, and rejection of hegemonic ambitions”. Soares was also attached to these ideas – in public. Although he did not mention the communists explicitly, he stated at the same rally: “I can assure you, in the name of the Socialist Party, that we are open to all the Portuguese democratic forces, without exception, to negotiate [...] a programme that could keep us united not only until the elections, but beyond the elections.”<sup>39</sup>

Until that moment, the behaviour and the public statements of the PCP had been very moderate. The party leader, Cunhal, had emphasised his commitment to the programme of the MFA and democracy. The PCP had been more concerned with the threat of reaction than with implementing a Portuguese road to socialism, and busy strengthening its position in the national trade union *Intersindical* and developing its organisation, and it defended the coalition with the PS and the PPD in the provisional government.

The revolutionary process gained momentum after Spínola’s resignation at the end of September 1974. The acceleration of the process of decolonization in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique and the general social unrest caused the reappearance of the right-wing forces behind President Spínola. The conservative supporters of the President organised a rally on 28<sup>th</sup> September, appealing to the ‘silent majority’ of Portuguese people to demonstrate in favour of his moderate, presidentialist political line. This rally was viewed by the Portuguese left to be a cover for reactionary activity, more in line with the former regime’s aims than with those of Spínola. On the night of 27<sup>th</sup> September, extreme left-wing militants, socialists, but above all, communists, set up barricades on the main roads into Lisbon. Spínola cancelled the demonstration and resigned two days later.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> October, Soares had the opportunity to personally explain these events to the British Ambassador in Lisbon, Nigel Trench. The leader of the PS was anxious because he “feared that the recent developments in Portugal might have alarmed Western governments.” Actually, the first thing he said at this meeting was that “Portugal would remain faithful to existing international obligations and alliances.” But with the communists taking key positions in the state apparatus and within the Armed Forces Movement, Soares’ words were questionable. As the Ambassador put it; “[...] So far as [sic] NATO is concerned, one is forced to wonder how long the Communist Party [...] will continue to acquiesce in Portuguese membership.”<sup>40</sup>

Soares probably felt the need to justify the fact that his party had taken part in the recent actions against Spínola on the side of the PCP, and he tried to minimise the outcome of this whole episode. But he must have been afraid of the Western powers' reaction to this situation, because he did not want the Chilean sequence of events repeated in Portugal.

Although this was Soares' stance in private conversations with the British, his public statements were radically different. He and his party kept arguing in favour of the union with the communists. The PS and the PCP coexisted in the current provisional government, but Soares' statements at this point showed his desire to go beyond this coalition. At the end of October 1974, in an interview with the Portuguese journal *Expresso*, Soares stated that the union with the Communists was a question that would have to be decided at the PS party conference that would be held in December. "However, I can tell you now that we consider it necessary to maintain the current coalition, that its existence is very important until the elections. Even after the elections, we do not see why we should modify this coalition [...]" He went on to add that:

"it is evident that the current coalition is not a popular front. A closer, organic alliance between the PC[P] and the PS [...] will not be excluded. For that, it is crucial to reach an accord on the mid-and long-term objectives, on the means of action and on a common programme signed before all of the people. Although we have envisaged it, the discussion of this programme and this agreement has not taken place yet."<sup>41</sup>

Despite these statements, there were several elements that went against the unitary ideal in Portugal. They included the growing tension between the PCP and the PS, due to their attempt to dominate the political and the social realms. The PCP claimed to represent the Revolution's avant-garde, and the PS began to adopt a more moderate position, appearing as a bulwark against the authoritarian threat that the Portuguese Communists represented for many Portuguese people. Another factor was the internal division within the MFA (divided between pro-socialists, pro-communists and extreme leftists). One more element was the pressures that the western powers and the European social democrat parties exerted against the communist influence in Portugal, and Soares' promise to work to anchor Portugal to the West in every political, social, and economic sense, as we have seen.

The first legal congress of the PS was convened in Lisbon from 13<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> December 1974. It was the right moment for the party to update and consolidate its ideological tenets, its political programme, and its internal organisation, considering the confusing sociopolitical situation in the country and the fact that elections were expected in the spring of 1975. The PS needed to rethink its strategy and

to put forward a new programme that could not only tackle the main political and socio-economic problems that Portugal was facing, but could also present a credible and acceptable alternative direction towards socialism in Portugal. From an organisational perspective, the congress was also important for resolving the confusion that reigned in the ranks of the PS. After 25<sup>th</sup> April, thousands of new militants had joined the party, and the PS had been unable to assimilate the overwhelming amount of newcomers.

At this congress, the elected executive led by Mário Soares had to face a challenge from the most left-leaning faction within the party, the *Movimento Socialista Popular* (MSP). Manuel Serra, leader of the MSP, presented a motion criticising Soares and the leadership of the PS because of their ambiguous policy, their close relationship with the European Social Democracy, and Soares' individualistic style of leadership. Serra proposed a more resolute policy for the search for "Socialism without ambiguity", which would include collaboration with the more progressive sections of the MFA and the PCP. He also defended the democratisation of the internal structure of the party.<sup>42</sup> Soares defeated Serra by a narrow margin, and used this episode to ban organised factions within the PS,<sup>43</sup> thereby reinforcing internal discipline and strengthening his control over the party further.

The declaration of principles for the PS that emerged from the Congress was very similar to those that had been stated a year and a half before, when the party was first created. The main theoretical objective of the PS remained the construction of "a society without classes where the power will emanate from the popular will". The PS proposed "a path to socialism that will be able to embrace and develop political pluralism". The PS also declared itself to be against the capitalist system and bourgeois domination. Therefore, the party rejected "the path followed by the movements that called themselves social democrats, or even socialists, that end up deliberately serving the structures and interests of capitalism"; rather, the PS was in favour of "the complete destruction [of capitalism]", to be carried out by the union with all the other forces that claimed the same objectives.<sup>44</sup>

Social democracy as it existed in Western Europe was considered unfeasible and undesirable for Portugal, because in the context of the national and international economic crisis, opting to develop the country along capitalist lines – even if capitalism was regulated – would mean putting Portugal in the hands of the big monopolies. Thus, the PS programme proposed massive nationalisations and agrarian reform.<sup>45</sup> These nationalisations were intended to radically change the relations of production, and to make these relations more democratic, *autogestão* would be extended to all the industrial companies. Therefore, democratically elected groups of workers would rule the companies, and the self-managed companies would be integrated into the state planning of the economy.

## 1975: the Revolution radicalises and so does PS rhetoric

In the first weeks of January 1975, the PCP intensified its criticism of the PS. After the line proposed by Manuel Serra was defeated at the PS congress, the communists criticised the PS for being moderate social democrats. According to Cunhal, “[in Portugal] there is a curious situation, [...] the fascists called themselves social democrats – that is the case with the PPD – and the social democrats call themselves socialists.”<sup>46</sup> The frequent contacts Soares had with the main leaders of European social democrat parties fuelled communist criticism. Cunhal further criticised the PS for serving as a “base of a new offensive of the reactionary forces that want to stifle the revolutionary process and orientate the power towards the right.”<sup>47</sup>

Furthermore, in January the communists tried to pass a law that would impose a single central union organisation controlled by the PCP. The PS was in favour of trade union unity, but it was opposed to the establishment of a single central union that would be compulsory for all workers, because it implied losing what little control it had over the working class, and allowing the communists to perpetuate a leading role as a vanguard of the workers. The law was approved on 21<sup>st</sup> January, and the Ministers of the PS and the PPD threatened to resign. At the last minute, an agreement was reached between the socialists, the communists and the MFA. The law passed, but the socialists could introduce some amendments, such as the acceptance of different tendencies within the union. The PS also obtained a compromise from the PCP and the MFA to hold democratic elections in April.

All of this criticism within this specific context made it necessary for the PS to maintain strong anti-capitalist language in order to deny and counter these accusations. The PS responded to the communist criticism by declaring that, “we are not Social-Democrats [...], the PS will not save capitalism,” and we “fight for the destruction of capitalism in order to establish a classless society.”<sup>48</sup> However, in the short term, they still considered that the best way to maintain the struggle against capitalism was to “firmly respect the programme of the MFA”, which meant respecting the date of the forthcoming democratic elections. These were the priority for the PS at that point, as they expected a positive electoral result. If that turned out to be the case, the socialists believed, the party would be in a preeminent position to lead the revolutionary process.

Nevertheless, although the relations between socialists and communists worsened in 1975, in public the PS kept arguing in favour of the union of the left in Portugal. For the PS leaders, the claim of the union of the left was always understood as a way of competing with the communists. However, if at the beginning of the Revolution this union was advocated as a guarantee against the reactionary forces, later it allowed the socialists to publicly criticise the vanguard strategy of the PCP, arguing

that the Communist rejection of the union of the left in socialist terms implied their rejection of democracy. The fact that the PS kept arguing publicly in favour of this union is not contradictory to the anti-communist stance that Soares showed privately to his Western allies. Rather, this was a complementary way of fighting for the domination of the Revolution and the Portuguese left.

By using this concept tactically, the PS was responding to the fact that it was losing ground in the government and in the state apparatus in favour of the PCP. In fact, this was not the only method the socialists employed in order to discredit and try to dominate the PCP. The PS leaders used all the means at their disposal to refute the criticism coming from the PCP, and also to attack them in turn. For example, Mário Soares praised the Spanish communist leader Santiago Carrillo in public; at that point Carrillo was involved in the ideological redefinition of the PCE in a Euro-Communist sense. Soares did the same with the Italian Communist Party, and in January he visited Romania and Yugoslavia, two communist countries that followed an independent line from Moscow. The PS kept its affinity with the PSE, a partner of the communists in France, highly visible. By showing their close relations with other communist parties, the socialists wanted to show that in principle, they were willing to make a pact with the PCP, which put the responsibility for the failure of the union of the left on the shoulders of the Portuguese communists for being Stalinist, anti-democratic, totalitarian, and so on. Attributing these characteristics to the PCP allowed the PS to equate the communists with the former dictatorship, the *Estado Novo*.

The PS implemented this strategy from January to the summer. They considered that on the Portuguese path to Socialism, “it was legitimate, and even valuable [...] to count on the capacity and experience of Comrade Cunhal. However, for this to happen, a change of mood is indispensable”; this meant not only better relations and the end of criticism, but also that Cunhal should reject Eastern-style socialism for Portugal, and accept pluralism, democracy, and freedom.

On January 16<sup>th</sup>, at the demonstration against the imposition of the single central union by the communists, the socialists stated that “the union of the left is indispensable for consolidating democracy and for moving towards socialism, but this union will be in freedom or it will not exist at all.” Moreover, now that the constitution of a trade union model was at stake, the socialists thought that the union of the left had to be built up from the base, from the ground up, and not imposed top-down by the leaders of the parties. Previously, as we have seen, all socialist attempts and claims to achieve the union of the left in Portugal had been initiatives taken by the leaders of the party. However, in this new context, the socialists argued that “only the union of the working class will be that weapon [against capitalism and for the construction of socialism] [...] when constituted from the base to the top.” Against this reinterpretation

tion of the union of the left, the PCP's attempts to control the trade union *Intersindical* meant "to confuse the union of the working class by framing it in a unique trade union imposed by the state." This, according to PS member Lopes Cardoso, would constitute the base from which "to build a state capitalism in which the workers are reduced to mere pieces of a machine."<sup>49</sup>

In the following months, the concept of the union of the left increasingly became a weapon for criticising the anti-democratic tendencies of the PCP, and for putting the Socialist Party in a position of moral superiority. After Spínola's failed attempt at a coup d'état on 11<sup>th</sup> March, the Portuguese communists strengthened their position within the state apparatus. The socialists became seriously concerned as the first revolutionary policies were implemented with the acquiescence of the communists – the nationalisation of the banks and insurance companies, the expropriations of lands, the creation of the Council of the Revolution and the PCP's control of the national trade union *Intersindical*. In this situation, the communists asked for a meeting with the socialists to discuss the problems facing the Revolution. The PS publicly accepted this petition, releasing the following statement:

"[...] As usual, the PS accepts the dialogue with the PCP, [it] considers that an accord between both parties, with the aim of implanting a pluralist democracy and constructing of socialism in freedom, represents – if it materialises – an important event.

The PS always fought for cooperation with the PCP [...]. In recent months, the anti-democratic stances adopted by the PCP have made the understanding between both parties difficult. It is important to underline that it was not the PS that interrupted the dialogue and cooperation with the PCP; it was the PCP that fomented an anti-PS campaign.

The socialists have always affirmed their willingness to talk and [to be] interested in reaching a platform for common action. For that to happen, it is necessary that the PCP compromise itself to respect, today and in the future, the fundamental freedoms, to accept democratically the result of the elections, renouncing hegemonic pretentions [...]."<sup>50</sup>

The argument defended in this paper, that the use of the concept of the union of the left was instrumental for the PS, seems to be strengthened by including in its scope Soares' reaction in private to the abovementioned failed coup d'état by Spínola. On 21<sup>st</sup> March, the leader of the PS met with PSF representative Antonie Blanca, who went to Portugal to evaluate the situation for his own party. Soares told Blanca: "The situation is very serious; we are moving towards a popular democracy." He considered that the Revolution was moving towards a dead end where the only prospect was



the establishment of an authoritarian regime, whether rightist or leftist. According to his interpretation of the events, all the experiments of the left, meaning the union between socialists and communists, “would be in jeopardy.”<sup>51</sup>

However, the public reaction of the PS to these events remained relatively temperate. When it came to the nationalisations carried out after the failed coup, the socialists reacted supportively, arguing that “this measure has been a constant in our programme since the times when we were a clandestine party.”<sup>52</sup> However, a close analysis of the public statements of the PS reveals that defending these measures was to a certain extent tactical. Without attempting to downplay the socialist convictions of the PS members, it is significant to note that at the beginning of February, Soares was not completely convinced that nationalising the banking sector in Portugal would be appropriate. He thought that it could aggravate the economic crisis, as the important remittances of the exiled Portuguese would be halted. However, in March, when the nationalisations became a reality, the PS supported them.

I would argue that the socialist support for nationalising the banks was tactical in three ways. First, supporting the nationalisations once they had been achieved was a way to remain consistent with the programme of the party, and also to respond to – and appropriate – the will of the workers who took the initiative of seizing companies by themselves. Second, the PS tried not to alienate the MFA, since after the failed coup the key positions were occupied by military members who were ideologically close to the PCP. Finally, supporting the nationalisations was a way to challenge the communist control of the workers within the *Intersindical*, and therefore the control of the nationalised sectors, without exposing the party to criticism from the left flank. In this sense, the socialist use of the concept *autogestão* was instrumental.

In the first issue published by *Portugal Socialista* after the nationalisation of the banks, several articles appeared that emphasised the following idea: the PS supported the nationalisations, but proposed that the nationalised banks should be controlled by representatives freely and democratically elected by all the workers. This implied that the *Intersindical* should not intervene in the management of the banks. Thus, the socialists tried to undermine the control of the national trade union over the working class, as well as over the nationalised banks and companies.

“[...] [T]he management and control of the banks by the workers, which [we] support entirely, [as it is] entrusted [to them] in the programme of our Party, will only be effective if [it] is realised directly and democratically by the workers themselves.

In these conditions, we state that:

1. The Trade Unions [...] should not intervene or participate, [not] even indirectly, in any action in the management of the companies.
2. Thus, [...] the [members] of the temporary management commissions that will be designated by the Trade Unions [...] should be substituted within a week by [members] elected by all the workers [...].<sup>53</sup>

The PS did not have any other alternative than to support the nationalisations as a *fait accompli*, especially because it was part of its own programme. However, despite their displeasure, they could use the nationalisations to argue in favour of self-managed socialism, which was a way of attacking the role of the *Intersindical* and the strategy of the PCP, just as the trade union system was being created. In addition, the PS's temperate public reaction to the events in March can be explained by the fact that the main objective of the socialists at that time was to ensure that the elections would be held in April. They knew that a good electoral result would change the dynamic of the Revolution, and contribute to limiting the influence of the radical sectors of the MFA and the PCP.<sup>54</sup>

This objective, together with the newly-weakened position of the PS within the state apparatus, also explains the fact that at the beginning of April, the party had to accept a harmful condition imposed by the MFA. The MFA, with the support of the PCP, used its strengthened position to make the participation of the political parties in the elections conditional on the signature of a pact that limited the competences and the autonomy of future governments. However, the moral legitimacy that the electoral results could lend the PS, and the delegitimizing effect that a poor result would have for the PCP and their supporters in the MFA, made it essential for the PS to maintain the election in spite of these limitations. Thus, they signed the pact.<sup>55</sup>

The electoral campaign of the socialists was to an important, although undetermined, extent financed and supported by the western European social democratic parties in the SI, who also suggested that the PS base its campaign around the image of Soares. They provided the PS with material, economic, technical and moral support.<sup>56</sup> The electoral results were favourable to the PS, which achieved the highest number of votes with 37.9%. The PPD came second with 26.4%, and the PCP came in third with 12.5%. Now, the PS believed, they had electoral legitimacy to lead the Revolution.

### The *verão quente*

In June 1975, the Portuguese Revolution entered a very turbulent phase commonly known as the *verão quente* (the hot summer). After the elections in April, the socialists and the communists had physical confrontations on 1<sup>st</sup> May. The leaders of the

PCP and the Council of the Revolution made public statements that downplayed the importance of the electoral results on the basis of the abovementioned pact signed between the parties and the MFA. This led the PS, who considered the electoral result to grant them a legitimate leading role in the government and in the Revolutionary process, to organise massive demonstrations in Lisbon and Porto. Later, the occupation of the socialist newspaper *República*, and the lack of satisfactory solutions to this problem offered by the Council of the Revolution, resulted in the socialist ministers resigning from government on 10<sup>th</sup> June.

In May, some days before the occupation of *República*, representatives of the PSF visited Portugal and met with several members of the MFA and the PS. If in previous meetings between Portuguese and French Socialists they had discussed the possibilities of implementing the union of the Left in Portugal, now that the PCP disregarded the electoral results Soares considered it unfeasible, arguing that “the PCP does not want the common programme because it does not want political democracy in Portugal.” The leader of the PS also described the socio-economic situation in Portugal as economic paralysis. There was a shortage of investments, and the gold reserves on which Portugal was surviving were close to being exhausted. Against this backdrop, there was a wave of “unrealistic social demands” that could not be satisfied, which could make the situation explosive. Thus, Soares stated, “Portugal needs foreign aid, particularly from the EEC. It is necessary to predict an urgent aid plan, but it is necessary to demand political guarantees.”<sup>57</sup> With this last sentence, he meant to make this aid conditional on the establishment of a liberal democracy in Portugal.

In fact, this economic plan was already taking shape on the EEC level. The idea was to offer financial aid – the amount was undecided, but it would be very significant – to Portugal under the condition that the country would evolve towards a Western kind of democracy.<sup>58</sup> This was a carrot and stick approach that considering the dilapidated Portuguese economic situation could be very persuasive. It was an initiative born in the Council of Ministers of the EEC, where the Social Democrats were the majority, but it still had to be discussed. Soares agreed on the potential effectiveness of such measures for reorienting the direction of the Revolution. In mid-July, he met with the British and the American Ambassadors in Lisbon on several occasions. In these meetings, he emphasised the Portuguese need for economic assistance, and he thought that the Europeans should offer a programme of economic aid “conditioned on the development of a democratic regime.”<sup>59</sup> On 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> July 1975, there was a SI Bureau meeting in Dun Laoghaire, Ireland, where the situation in Portugal was discussed. The PS representative at the meeting was Victor Rego, Soares’ chief of cabinet, who among other things suggested that Europe, “particularly the EEC”, should link their economic assistance to “the problem of democ-

racy in Portugal” and “the position of the Portuguese Socialist Party”;<sup>60</sup> meaning the leading position of the PS in the government.

However, in public Soares and his party still admitted that the solution for saving the Revolution from authoritarianism, rightist or leftist, was to reach a basic agreement with the communists. In support of my argument here, the PS followed a tactic in Portugal that consisted, even during the hot summer, in keeping alive the idea of reaching an agreement with the PCP. This behaviour, not always understood by the European social democrat partners of the PS, had several motives. As mentioned above, it aimed to discredit the PCP, whose rejection of the socialist proposition helped the PS to denounce the authoritarian and anti-democratic nature of the communists. But now, it was also a way of eroding the cohesion of the PCP by seducing and strengthening the position of the minority Euro-communist tendency that existed within it.<sup>61</sup> It is highly likely that this tactic was also designed to keep the possibility of a future agreement with the PCP open, if the Revolution were to eventually suffer an extreme leftist drift or end in a rightist counter-revolutionary coup.

An evaluation of the PS’s public discourse during that summer supports this assessment. On 9<sup>th</sup> July, the day before the PS abandoned the Fourth Provisional Government, the Socialists published an open letter addressed to the PCP. The PS proposed, “despite our divergences”, reaching “a platform of agreement, or a common programme such as the one established by the French left, or another formula [...]”. However, after this proposition, the letter criticised the PCP for being an obstacle to the union of the left, accusing it of having a “closed, anti-democratic, monolithic, rigid and rigorously hierarchical leadership, presided over by a Stalinist pharaoh [who is] cold, tough, ruthless [...]”.

After this criticism, the PS asked: “communist comrades, are we going to let Cunhal [...], whose ideas are out of date, frustrate the Portuguese socialist revolution?” And the text finished with a condition *sine qua non* for reaching the union of the left: “While the leadership of the PCP keeps this spirit of assault on power with the excuse of legality bestowed by the revolution, while its general secretary considers the elections and democracy incompatible with a revolutionary process, [...] it cannot be any kind of platform for agreement.”<sup>62</sup>

In this text it is noticeable that the PS was attempting to cause unrest within the PCP rank and file. By blaming Cunhal and the “hierarchical” leadership of the party almost exclusively, and calling the rest of the members of the PCP “comrades,” it seems that the PS was attempting to seduce and promote existing alternative positions within the PCP, along the lines of the Euro-communists PCE and PCI.

While this was the domestic discursive strategy of the PS, internationally a meeting of the socialist and social democrat European leaders was held in Stockholm in August, followed by another in London in September, to discuss coordinated action

for avoiding a communist takeover in Portugal. After these meetings, the Committee of Friendship and Solidarity with Democracy in Portugal was created. Its most immediate objectives were to help to establish a democratic regime in Portugal with a government that would reflect the electoral results of the April elections, to restore basic freedoms, and to fight against Portuguese international isolation. Financial support for the PS, however, remained crucial.<sup>63</sup> After the meeting, a bank account was established through which all of the participants of the meeting and the parties who were members of the SI could transfer money to the PS. The account would be in the name of the international secretary of the PdvA, Mr Harry van den Bergh, and it was agreed that “this matter of financial aid is treated with the greatest confidentiality and that no publicity whatsoever is given to the fact that [donations are made] to the Portuguese Socialist Party.”<sup>64</sup>

This international socialist campaign in support of the PS and democracy in Portugal had a very high impact on the party, the Portuguese Revolution, and international attitudes towards Portugal. After this meeting, the official discourse of the PS again changed in subtle ways, becoming more moderate than before, especially regarding its stance on the EEC, NATO, and the social democrat ideology. Despite the non-linear pace of the change in the party’s discourse, the meeting with the European Social Democrat partners in Stockholm was a turning point in this transformation. However, the PS leaders tried not to show the relationship between these two facts. On 6<sup>th</sup> August, the official newspaper of the PS *Portugal Socialista* published an interview with Soares about the Stockholm meeting. He was asked about the economic aid that Europe was considering giving to Portugal. He said that it would be “essential”, but he also said something that did not exactly match reality. He asserted that, “the thesis I defended on behalf of the PS was that this aid should be given without any kind of political condition, since Portugal very much valued its national independence, of which the PS has always been the interpreter.” As we have seen above, this was not completely accurate, since Soares and Victor Rego had emphasised on various occasions to their Western and European social democrat partners that the economic aid should be linked to the development of democracy in the country.

The Revolution is considered to have come to an end between September and November 1975, when a moderate group of officers led by Major Melo Antunes, o *Grupo dos Nove*, assisted by an outbreak of popular demonstrations against the communists in the north of the country and by pressure from the Socialist Party, succeeded in removing General Gonçalves from the post of Prime Minister. On 19<sup>th</sup> September 1975, a sixth provisional government was formed in correspondence with the electoral results of April. Soares campaigned in favour of including the PCP in this government. He again made use of the union of the left to ensure the inclu-

sion of the PCP because it would force the communists to accept democracy in Portugal. He also wanted to share responsibilities with them and to ensure the governability of the country. The PS occupied the majority of the Ministries with five, the PPD had two, and the PCP only one. Non-communist military officers and technocrats occupied the rest of the ministries.

Shortly after the creation of the new government, the Western powers coordinated their responses to the Portuguese events and the US and the EEC<sup>65</sup> conceded economic aid to Portugal. They made it very clear that this gesture was a sign of support for the new government, and that economic aid was conditional on the development of a liberal democracy in Portugal. They also publicly supported a Portuguese request to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance of payments aid. Portugal entered into a dynamic of international economic dependence that would anchor the country to the West. As the Western support was linked to the promotion of the PS as the main bulwark against communism, this dynamic would ultimately be a crucial international factor in the process of moderation of the PS in ideological terms in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

## Conclusion

The roots of the ideological transformation of the PS must be sought in the period of the Carnation Revolution. During this year and a half, the Portuguese Socialists depended heavily on their European counterparts, and this influenced them on both the political and ideological levels. On the political level, Soares used his international contacts to gain support for his party, and attempted to establish a democracy compatible with those of Western Europe in Portugal. This support was very important for making the PS one of the main political actors during the Revolution, and became particularly relevant in the last months of the process. The effect of this support on the PS was to make the party act as the bulwark against communism in Portugal, leading it to change the order of its theoretical priorities. Establishing democracy came to be of primary importance to the PS, and moving towards socialism became secondary.

At the discursive level, the Europeans also influenced the party. However, this influence did not come from the social democrats, but from the French socialists. The PS adopted several ideological characteristics of their French counterparts, such as the ideas of the union of the left, *autogestion* and the rupture with capitalism, which during the Revolution became an essential part in the discourse used by the PS to fight against the PCP for the hegemony within the left and in the revolutionary process. Especially relevant in this case was the notion of the union of the left, which

allowed the PS to criticise and attack the PCP without losing ground on the left. For the leaders of the PS, the union of the left was always understood as a way of competing with the communists, but it had different purposes and meanings depending on the context in which it was used. At the beginning of the Revolution the PS argued in favour of an alliance with the PCP in order to protect the Revolution from a possible counter-revolutionary coup, and also in order to move towards socialism in freedom. Later, this concept became a weapon to publicly criticise the vanguard strategy of the PCP, arguing that the communist rejection of the union of the left in socialist terms implied their rejection of democracy.

Despite the apparent contradiction between the moderate political practice supported by the European social democrats and the radical rhetoric influenced by the French socialists, both levels of action had the same final aim: to assert control over the Revolution, to fight for hegemony within the left, and ultimately to establish a pluralist democracy in Portugal along the lines of the Western European societies.

## Notes

- 1 Sem o Partido Socialista não é possível construir a democracia e o socialismo, in: *Portugal Socialista*, special number, 17 January 1975.
- 2 Declaração de Princípios e Programa do Partido Socialista, edições *Textos Portugal Socialista* (Itália), SET.1973. Documento do Arquivo Histórico do Partido Socialista (Arquivo Mário Soares).
- 3 “Portugal e a Europa”, Arquivo Histórico Diplomático dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Fundo PEA 3/331/1975. Política interna e externa de Portugal. Actividades dos partidos políticos portugueses.
- 4 Mario Del Pero et al., *Democrazie. L’Europa Meridionale e la Fine delle Dittature*, Milano 2010; Mario Del Pero, A European solution for a European Crisis. The international implications of Portugal’s Revolution, in: *Journal of European Integration History* 15/1 (2009), 15–34; Mario Del Pero, “Which Chile, Allende?” Kissinger and the Portuguese Revolution, in: *Cold War History* 11/4 (2011), 625–657; Ana Mónica Fonseca, The Federal Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (1974–1976), in: *Journal of European Integration History* 15/1 (2009), 35–56; Ana Mónica Fonseca, O apoio da social-democracia alemã à democratização, in: *A transição democrática portuguesa: novos contributos historiográficos = Ler história no. 63* (2012), 93–107; David Castaño, “A Practical Test in Détente”: International Support for the Socialist Party in the Portuguese Revolution, in: *Cold War History* 15/1 (2015), 1–26; António Simões do Paço, El gobierno Wilson 1974–1976. Europa y la Revolución Portuguesa, in: *Ayer. Revista de Historia Contemporánea* 99 (2015), 101–122; Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Os Americanos na Revolução Portuguesa (1974–1976)*, Lisboa 2004.
- 5 The commonly accepted explanation of the PS’s ideological transformation is based on the constraints imposed on the party by the behaviour of the Portuguese Communist Party and the Armed Forces Movement during the Revolution, see: António Reis, “O Partido Socialista na revolução. Da via portuguesa para o socialismo em liberdade à defesa da democracia pluralista”, in: Vitalino Canas, ed., *O Partido Socialista e a Democracia*, Oeiras 2005, 51–93; António Reis, *O Partido Socialista na revolução, no poder e na oposição. Da dialéctica com o projecto nacional-militar à dialéctica com o eanismo*, in: Vitalino Canas, ed., *O Partido Socialista e a Democracia*, Oeiras 2005, 95–127.
- 6 George Kyrtsov, *The Attitudes and Policies of European Socialists Regarding Spain, Portugal and Greece, since 1967*, London School of Economics 1980; Juliet Antunes Sablosky, *O PS e a transição para a democracia. Relações com os partidos socialistas europeus*, Lisboa 2000; Juliet Antunes Sab-

- losky, A actividade partidaria transnacional e as relações de Portugal com a Comunidade Europeia, in: *Análise Social* 31/138 (1996), 1007–1020; António Simões do Paço, “Friends in high places – O Partido Socialista e a “Europa conosco”, in: Raquel Varela, ed., *Revolução ou Transição? História e memória da Revolução dos Cravos*, Lisboa 2012, 117–138. Juliet Anunes Sablosky considers the different ideological models that the European Socialists offered to the PS, but she does not go into detail.
- 7 The main representatives of these trends were the German SPD, the British LP and the Swedish SAP in the case of social democracy and the French Socialist Party in the case of socialism. On the confrontation between these two ideological lines see: Christelle Flandre, *Socialisme ou social-démocratie? Regards croisés français allemands, 1971–1981*, Paris 2006.
  - 8 Susana Martins, *Socialistas na Oposição ao Estado Novo*, Lisboa 2005, 98.
  - 9 Sablosky, *O PS e a transição*, 30.
  - 10 Antonio Muñoz Sánchez, *La Socialdemocracia alemana y el Estado Novo (1961–1974)*, in: *Portuguese Studies Review* 13/1-2 (2005), 477–503.
  - 11 Programa do Partido Socialista, 22 August 1973 (Arquivo Mário Soares – Pasta 2249,001).
  - 12 The relations between French and Portuguese socialists during the Revolution can be partially seen in: Fadi Kassem, *Choosing a Foreign Policy for French Socialists. The case of the Democratic Revolution in Portugal, 1974–1981*, in: *Zeitgeschichte* 2/40 (March/April 2013), 87–106; Alan Granadino, *Fertile Soil for Socialism or Communist Threat? The Carnation Revolution Through the Eyes of the French Socialists*, in: Matteo Albanese/Annarita Gori, eds., “Un problema difícil” *La Rivoluzione dei Garofani vista dalla sinistra europea = Ricerche Storiche* 46/1 (2016), 61–70.
  - 13 Reis, *Partido Socialista*, 59–62.
  - 14 On the ideology of the PSF at the beginning of the 1970s see: D.S. Bell/Byron Criddle, *The French Socialist Party. The Emergence of a Party of Government*, New York 1988; George A. Codding Jr./William Safran, *Ideology and Politics: The Socialist Party of France*, Boulder, Col. 1979; Dossier: *Le PS, Nouvelles approches = Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* no. 96 (2007/4).
  - 15 Susana Martins, *A fundação do Partido Socialista em 1973* in: Vitalino Canas, ed., *O partido Socialista e a Democracia*, Oeiras 2005, 47.
  - 16 Antoine Blanca, *Portugal: les dernières heures d'exile de Mario Soares*, in: *Le Poing et la Rose* 29 (May 1974), 7.
  - 17 Reis, *Partido Socialista*, 63; Maria João Avelaz, Soares, *Ditadura e Revolução*, Lisboa 1996, 264.
  - 18 Confidential report from R.H. Baker (FO, South European Department) to Lord Bridges, 10 May 1974, UKNA, FCO 9/2072, Dr. Soares' visit to UK and other European capitals May 1974. This document has been partially used in Simões do Paço, *Friends in high places*, 117–138.
  - 19 Early day motion Number 90: Recognition of Portuguese Administration, 9 May 1974, UKNA, FCO 9/2061, Recognition of new regime in Portugal.
  - 20 Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Dr. Mário Soares at 2.10 p.m. on Thursday 2 May 1974 at 10 Downing Street, UKNA, FCO 9/2072, Dr. Soares visit to UK and other European capitals May 1974. This document has been published in its entirety in Keith A. Hamilton/Patrick Salmon, *Documents on British Policy Overseas. The Southern Flank in Crisis 1973–1976, Series III, Vol. V*, London/New York 2006, 357–360.
  - 21 Telegram from James Callaghan for departmental distribution, 6 May 1974, UKNA, FCO 9/2072, Dr. Soares' visit to UK and other European capitals May 1974.
  - 22 Record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and Dr. Mário Soares at 2.10 p.m. on Thursday 2 May 1974 at 10 Downing Street, UKNA, FCO 9/2072, Dr. Soares' visit to UK and other European capitals May 1974.
  - 23 Letter from R. Hanbury-Tenison (British Embassy in Brussels) to A.C. Goodison (Southern European Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office), Visit of Senhor Mário Soares to Brussels, 6 May 1974, UKNA, FCO 9/2072, Dr. Soares' visit to UK and other European capitals May 1974. This quotation has been previously used in: Alan Granadino, *De la Europa social a la CEE. La transformación de la idea de Europa en el Partido Socialista portugués a través de sus relaciones con los partidos socialistas europeos en los años 70*”, in: *Circunstancia* 12/34 (May 2014).
  - 24 Confidential report from R.H. Baker (FO, South European Department) to Lord Bridges, 10 May 1974, UKNA, FCO 9/2072, Dr. Soares' visit to UK and other European capitals May 1974.



- 25 Reis, Partido Socialista, 53.
- 26 Declaração de Princípios e Programa do Partido Socialista, 1973, 61.
- 27 Programa do Partido Socialista, 22 August 1973 (Arquivo Mário Soares – Pasta 2249,001, im. 156).
- 28 Fonseca, Federal Republic of Germany, 40.
- 29 Del Pero et al., *Democrazie*, 126. This quotation has been previously used in: Granadino, *Europa social*.
- 30 Del Pero et al., *Democrazie*, 127.
- 31 *Ibid*; see also: Bernardino Gomes/Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Carlucci versus Kissinger. The US and the Portuguese Revolution*. Lanham/Plymouth 2011.
- 32 Mário Soares em conferência de imprensa, in: *Portugal Socialista*, 5 May 1974.
- 33 Guillaume Devin, *L'Internationale Socialiste. Histoire et sociologie du socialisme international (1945–1990)*, Paris 1993, 185–194. Also: Castaño, “Practical Test”, 6.
- 34 The Portugal Committee of the SI was formed of party members from Belgium, Israel, Germany, Great Britain, Italy (both, the PSI and the PSDI), Portugal and the SI.
- 35 Telegram from Rodney Balcom to Karl Czernetz Dringen, 21/05/1974, IISH, SI Archives, 779 (Portugal 1970–1974).
- 36 Bureau decisions regarding Portugal and Chile, 08/06/1974, IISH, SI Archives, 779 (Portugal 1970–1974). Although this document has never been published, it has already been used in a doctoral thesis: Kyrtos, *Attitudes*, 180.
- 37 As Medeiros Ferreira has pointed out, it should be noted that during the first months of the Revolution “the image of the PS is the image of Mário Soares on TV.” See: Jose Medeiros Ferreira, *Portugal em Transe (1974–1985) = História de Portugal*, vol. 8, Lisboa 1994, 243.
- 38 At the same time, the French Socialists supported and tried to exert ideological influence over the PS and promote the union of the left in Portugal, see: Granadino, *Fertile Soil*.
- 39 Socialismo: a única resposta para o mundo que nos rodeia, in: *Portugal Socialista* 6, 8 June 1974.
- 40 Report from Nigel Trench, “The fall of Spínola”, 02/10/1974, UKNA, FCO 9/2059, *Change of Government in Portugal: October 1974*.
- 41 Mário Soares: la voie portugaise, in: *L'unité* 129, 25–31 October 1974, 16–17.
- 42 *Portugal Socialista*, dedicado ao I Congresso Nacional do Partido Socialista, 19 December 1974.
- 43 “Problemas de organização,” *Portugal Socialista*, dedicado ao I Congresso Nacional do Partido Socialista, 19 December 1974, 8.
- 44 450 RI 8, Declaration of principles du Parti Socialiste Portugais pour une voie democratique et originale vers le socialisme, Portugal, Congress National du Parti Socialiste portugais, dec. 1974, Centre d'Archives Socialistes (CAS), Fondation Jean-Jaurès.
- 45 Política Economica, A economia na sociedade socialista, 450 RI 8, Portugal, Congress National du Parti Socialiste portugais, dec. 1974, CAS, Fondation Jean-Jaurès.
- 46 Alvaro Cunhal, Nous ne voulons pas faire payer au peuple le prix d'un accord avec le PS, in: *L'unité* 175, 17–23 October 1975, 16–17.
- 47 Kyrtos, *Attitudes*, 189.
- 48 “Sem o Partido Socialista não é possível construir a democracia e o socialismo,” *Portugal Socialista*, special number, 17 January 1975.
- 49 António Lopes Cardoso, A unidade da esquerda é indispensável, mas essa unidade ou se fará na liberdade ou não se fará, in: *Portugal Socialista*, special number, 17 January 1975, 3–5.
- 50 Secretariado Nacional do Partido Socialista, O PS aceita o diálogo com o PCP, in: *Portugal Socialista* no. 31, 13 March 1975, 3.
- 51 450 RI 1, Carnet de route: 48 heures avec les socialistes portugais, March 1975, Antoine Blanca, CAS, Fondation Jean-Jaurès.
- 52 Secretariado Nacional, O poder democrático dos trabalhadores, in: *Portugal Socialista* no. 32, 20 March 1975, 4.
- 53 Comissão Coordenadora dos Bancários Socialistas, A gestão da Banca, in: *Portugal Socialista* no. 32, 20 March 1975, 4.
- 54 Liberdade, Socialismo, Independência Nacional, in: *Portugal Socialista* no. 32, 20 March 1975; see also: Reis, *Partido Socialista*, 74.
- 55 Mário Soares, Portugal: Quelle revolution? Entretiens avec D. Pouchin, Paris 1976, 109–110.

- 56 For the British contribution, see: Appeal for donations to help the Portuguese Socialist Party, December 1974, BLP Historical Archive, Box 89, Spain and Portugal.
- 57 450 RI 1, Rencontres avec: L'amiral Rosa Continho, le Capitaine Lorenço, Mário Soares, Jorge Campinos, Vasco Gonçalves. CAS, Fondation Jean-Jaurès.
- 58 Conversações com o Ministro Britânico dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 27 June 1975, Arquivo Histórico Diplomático dos Negócios Estrangeiros, Fundo PEA 43/1975/Processo 330 GBR. Conversa entre sexa o ministro Melo Antunes e o senhor Callaghan.
- 59 Meeting between Mário Soares and Nigel Trench, 12 July 1975, UKNA, FCO 9/2270, Internal political situation in Portugal, 1975. Document already used in Del Pero et al. *Democrazie*, 149.
- 60 Portugal-summary of discussion at Bureau meeting, Dun Laoghaire, Ireland, 12–13 July 1975, IISH, SI Archives, 780 (Portugal 1975–1976).
- 61 This idea appears in a document recording a conversation between Mário Soares and Willy Brandt, quoted by Ana Monica Rôla da Fonseca in her doctoral thesis. See: Ana Mónica Rôla da Fonseca, “É Preciso Regar os Cravos!” A Social-democracia alemã e a transição para a Democracia em Portugal (1974–1976), PhD diss., ISCTE – University Institute, Lisbon 2012, 292.
- 62 A Comissão Política da Secção de Limoeiro, Carta aberta aos camaradas comunistas, in: Portugal Socialista no. 49, 9 July 1975, 6.
- 63 See: Castaño, “Practical Test”, 15–22.
- 64 Confidential letter from Rodney Balcom to Mr. Ejner Hovgaard-Christiansen, 15 August 1975, IISH, SI Archives, 780 (Portugal 1975–1976).
- 65 The European aid was provided by the European Investment Bank, which gave 150 million ecus to Portugal. 1 ecu = 1.20 US dollars.